

V. I. LENIN

IMPERIALISM AND IMPERIALIST WAR
(1914-1917)

V·I·L E N I N

SELECTED WORKS

IN TWELVE VOLUMES

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V · I · LENIN

SELECTED WORKS

VOLUME V

**IMPERIALISM AND
IMPERIALIST WAR
(1914-1917)**



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PREFACE

VOLUME V of *Selected Works* covers the period from the outbreak of the World War of 1914-18 to the February Revolution in Russia in 1917. In the *Collected Works* of Lenin this period is covered by Vols. XVIII and XIX which are also available in English. All the works of Lenin in this period of the first round of imperialist wars and revolutions are so important for the study of Lenin's theory of proletarian revolution and for solving the problems of the international proletarian movement that it is very difficult to make a selection of these works, however well that may be done, without feeling conscious that many things of importance have been left out. However, this volume contains sufficient material to enable the reader to grasp the main ideas advanced by Lenin in this great turning point in the history of capitalist society and in the international class struggle of the proletariat.

The period opened with the imperialist war which completely revealed all the specific features of the epoch of imperialism and intensified its contradictions to the utmost degree. This confronted the international proletariat with the task of achieving the proletarian revolution, which in Russia had first to pass through the stage of the overthrow of tsarism and the bourgeois-democratic revolution. One of the most serious obstacles that stood in the path of fulfilling this task both in Russia and in the West was the victory of opportunism in the parties affiliated to the Second International, the transformation of opportunism into social-chauvinism, into the betrayal by the majority of these parties of socialism and into servility towards and defence of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Hence, in addition to the task of fighting for the socialist revolution, the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat was confronted with the task of waging a ruthless struggle against this betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, of very sharply dissociating itself

from the parties of the Second International and of fighting for the Third International. The whole content of the Bolshevik (Leninist) slogans of that time and the whole trend of Lenin's theoretical work and political leadership of the genuine revolutionary elements of the international working class movement and of the Bolshevik Party of Russia were determined by this latter task. In this, as well as in his preceding and subsequent activities, Lenin took his stand on the granite basis of the theories of Marxism and, as he did in all his activities, constantly improved and sharpened this indispensable weapon in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

During these years, Lenin, on the basis of a Marxian analysis of the epoch of imperialism and of the experience of the past and contemporary revolutionary movement, and studying the theories of Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution, developed his own theory of the proletarian revolution and, in particular, one of the fundamental ideas of this theory, viz., that "the victory of socialism is possible, first in a few or even in one single capitalist country."

All this emphasises the enormous importance of having a thorough understanding of the nature of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. For this reason we have included in this volume the full text of Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which is one of his greatest contributions to and further development of the theories of Marxism. This comprises Part I of this volume.

As Lenin proves in his *Imperialism*, the imperialist epoch of capitalism created the soil for the growth of opportunism in the international labour movement and the outbreak of the war revealed to what extent the canker of opportunism had eaten into the very heart of the Second International and of the parties affiliated to it. The Second International collapsed and the parties affiliated to it, with the exception of the Russian Bolsheviks and certain minorities within the various parties, went over to the side of their respective governments. Opportunism became transformed into social-chauvinism, into the downright betrayal of socialism and into service to the imperialist bourgeoisie. This called for the ruthless exposure of and struggle against the treachery of the

Second International and for propaganda for the organisation of a new, revolutionary, Third International.

It also raised the problem of the revolutionary socialist attitude towards imperialist war and the tasks of the proletariat in such a war. Lenin develops his position on this problem in the struggle against social-chauvinism of all shades, including so-called "centrism," represented by Kautsky and Trotsky, against the pseudo-Marxian "theories" advanced by the theoreticians of the Second International, Plekhanov, Kautsky and others, in justification of social-chauvinism and against the theoreticians of infantile "Leftism" and the "absurdly 'Left'" revolutionariness of petty-bourgeois "horror of war" expressed by the Left-radical Luxemburgians in Germany and Poland and by the Bukharin-Pyatakov group among the Russian Bolsheviks. All these problems are dealt with in Parts II and III of the present volume.

Finally, the period dealt with brought to the front the question of the nations oppressed by imperialism and their struggles for national independence. The significance of this problem in the epoch of imperialism and the arguments against the position taken up by the opponents of the right of nations to self-determination are brought out in the articles that comprise Part IV of this volume.

As in the other volumes of this series, the material in this volume is distributed historically according to subjects. The only important departure from the chronological order of the material is that *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* is put in as the first item. This has been done for the reason that a proper understanding of the ideas contained in the other articles in this volume cannot be obtained without a thorough understanding of the ideas developed in this work.

Readers are urged to make full use of the explanatory notes. These are indicated by an asterisk (*) in the text and the note in question can be found under the number in the explanatory notes corresponding to the page on which it occurs. Where more than one note occurs on a page, subsequent notes are indicated by two or more asterisks as the case may be. Footnotes are designated by superior figures (¹).

PART I
IMPERIALISM

IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM *

A POPULAR OUTLINE

PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION

THE pamphlet here presented to the reader was written in Zürich in the spring of 1916. In the conditions in which I was obliged to work there I naturally suffered somewhat from a shortage of French and English literature and from a serious dearth of Russian literature. However, I made use of the principal English work, *Imperialism*, J. A. Hobson's book, with all the care that, in my opinion, that work deserves.

This pamphlet was written with an eye to the tsarist censorship. Hence, I was not only forced to confine myself strictly to an exclusively theoretical, mainly economic analysis of facts, but to formulate the few necessary observations on politics with extreme caution, by hints, in that *Æsopian* language—in that cursed *Æsopian* language—to which tsarism compelled all revolutionaries to have recourse, whenever they took up their pens to write a "legal" work.¹

It is very painful, in these days of liberty, to read these squeezed-in passages of the pamphlet, crushed, as they seem, in an iron vice, distorted on account of the censor. Of how imperialism is the eve of the social revolution; of how social-chauvinism (socialism in words, chauvinism in deeds) is the utter betrayal of socialism, the complete desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie; of how the split in the labour movement is bound up with the objective conditions of imperialism, etc., I had to speak in a "slavish" tongue, and I must refer the reader who is interested in the question to the volume, which is soon to appear, in which are reproduced the articles I wrote abroad in the years 1914-17.* Special atten-

¹ "Æsopian," after the Greek fable writer *Æsop*, was the term applied to the allusive and roundabout style adopted in "legal" publications by revolutionaries in order to evade the censorship.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

tion must be drawn, however, to a passage on pages 119-20.¹ In order to show, in a guise acceptable to the censors, how shamefully the capitalists and the social-chauvinist deserters (whom Kautsky opposes with so much inconsistency) lie on the question of annexations; in order to show with what cynicism they *justify* the annexations of *their own* capitalists, I was forced to quote as an example—Japan! The careful reader will easily substitute Russia for Japan, and Finland, Poland, Courland, the Ukraine, Khiva, Bokhara, Esthonia and other regions peopled by non-Great Russians for Korea.

I trust that this pamphlet will help the reader to understand the fundamental economic question, *viz.*, the question of the economic essence of imperialism, for unless this is studied, it will be impossible to understand and appraise modern war and modern politics.

Petrograd, April 26, 1917.

¹ Page 112 in this edition.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

PREFACE TO THE FRENCH AND GERMAN EDITIONS *

I

As was indicated in the preface to the Russian edition, this pamphlet was written in 1916, with an eye to the tsarist censorship. I am unable to revise the whole text at the present time, nor, perhaps, is this advisable since the main purpose of the book was and remains: to present, on the basis of the collected returns of irrefutable bourgeois statistics, and the admissions of bourgeois scholars of all countries, *a general picture* of the world capitalist system in its international relationships at the beginning of the twentieth century—on the eve of the first world imperialist war.

To a certain extent it will be useful for many Communists in advanced capitalist countries to convince themselves by the example of this pamphlet, *legal, from the standpoint of the tsarist censor*, of the possibility—and necessity—of making use of even the slight remnants of legality which still remain at the disposal of the Communists, say, in contemporary America or France, after the recent wholesale arrests of Communists, in order to explain the utter falsity of social-pacifist views and hopes for “world democracy.” The most essential of what should be added to this censored pamphlet I shall try to present in this preface.

II

In the pamphlet I proved that the war of 1914-18 was imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, “spheres of influence” of finance capital, etc.

Proof of what was the true social, or rather, the true class character of the war is naturally to be found, not in the diplo-

matic history of the war, but in an analysis of the *objective* position of the ruling *classes in all* belligerent countries. In order to depict this objective position one must not take examples or isolated data (in view of the extreme complexity of social phenomena it is always quite easy to select any number of examples or separate data to prove any point one desires), but the *whole* of the data concerning the *basis* of economic life of *all* the belligerent countries and the *whole* world.

It is precisely irrefutable summarised data of this kind that I quoted in describing the *partition of the world* in the period of 1876 to 1914 (in chapter VI) and the distribution of the *railways* all over the world in the period of 1890 to 1913 (in chapter VII). Railways combine within themselves the basic capitalist industries: coal, iron and steel; and they are the most striking index of the development of international trade and bourgeois-democratic civilisation. In the preceding chapters of the book I showed how the railways are linked up with large-scale industry, with monopolies, syndicates, cartels, trusts, banks and the financial oligarchy. The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development—sums up, as it were, modern world monopolist capitalism. And this summing up proves that imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under *such* an economic system, *as long as* private property in the means of production exists.

The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilising enterprise; that is what it is in the opinion of bourgeois professors, who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colours, and in the opinion of petty-bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different inter-crossings bind these enterprises with private property in the means of production in general, have converted this work of construction into an instrument for oppressing a *thousand million* people (in the colonies and semi-colonies), that is, more than half the population of the globe, which inhabits the subject countries, as well as the wage slaves of capital in the lands of "civilisation."

Private property based on the labour of the small master, free competition, democracy, *i.e.*, all the catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive the workers and peasants—are things of the past. Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries. And this “booty” is shared between two or three powerful world pirates armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan), who involve the whole world in *their* war over the sharing of *their* booty.

III

The Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty* dictated by monarchist Germany and later on the much more brutal and despicable Versailles Treaty** dictated by the “democratic” republics of America and France, and also by “free” England, have rendered very good service to humanity by exposing both the hired coolies of the pen of imperialism and the petty-bourgeois reactionaries, although they call themselves pacifists and socialists, who sang praises to “Wilsonism” and who insisted that peace and reform were possible under imperialism.

The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the war—a war for the purpose of deciding whether the British or the German group of financial marauders is to receive the lion’s share—and the two “peace treaties” mentioned above open the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped by the bourgeoisie, with a rapidity hitherto unprecedented. Thus, out of the universal ruin caused by the war an international revolutionary crisis is arising which, in spite of the protracted and difficult stages it may have to pass, cannot end in any other way than in a proletarian revolution and in its victory.

The Basle Manifesto¹ of the Second International which in 1912 gave an appraisal of the war which ultimately broke out in

¹ Lenin deals with this manifesto in greater detail in “The Collapse of the Second International.” See p. 173 in this volume.—*Ed. Eng ed.*

1914, and not of war in general (there are all kinds of wars, including revolutionary wars), this manifesto is now a monument to the shameful bankruptcy and treachery of the heroes of the Second International.

That is why I reproduce this manifesto as a supplement to the present edition ¹ and again I call upon the reader to note that the heroes of the Second International are just as assiduously evading the passages of this manifesto, which speak precisely, clearly and definitely of the connection between that impending war and the proletarian revolution, as a thief evades the place where he has committed a theft.

IV

Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet to a criticism of "Kautskyism," the international ideological trend represented in all countries of the world by the "prominent theoreticians" and leaders of the Second International (Otto Bauer and Co. in Austria, Ramsay MacDonald and others in England, Albert Thomas in France, etc., etc.) and multitudes of socialists, reformists, pacifists, bourgeois-democrats and parsons.

This ideological trend is on the one hand a product of the disintegration and decay of the Second International, and on the other hand it is the inevitable fruit of the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, who, by the whole of their conditions of life, are held captive to bourgeois and democratic prejudices.

The views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete negation of the very revolutionary principles of Marxism which he championed for decades, especially in his struggle against socialist opportunism (Bernstein, Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.). It is not a mere accident, therefore, that the "Kautskyists" all over the world have now united in practical politics with the extreme opportunists (through the Second, or the Yellow, International) and with the bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which Socialists take part).

The growing world proletarian revolutionary movement in gen-

¹ In *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.—Ed.

eral, and the communist movement in particular, demands that the theoretical errors of "Kautskyism" be analysed and exposed. The more so since pacifism and "democracy" in general, which make no claim to Marxism whatever, but which, like Kautsky and Co., are obscuring the profundity of the contradictions of imperialism and the inevitable revolutionary crisis to which it gives rise, are still very widespread all over the world. It is the bounden duty of the proletarian party to combat these tendencies and win away from the bourgeoisie the small proprietors who are duped by them, and the millions of toilers who live in more or less petty-bourgeois conditions of life.

v

A few words must be said about chapter VIII, entitled "The Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism." As already pointed out in the text, Hilferding, ex-Marxist, and now a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky, one of the chief exponents of bourgeois reformist policy in the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany, has taken a step backward compared with the *frankly* pacifist and reformist Englishman, Hobson, on this question. The international split of the whole labour movement is now quite evident (Second and Third Internationals). Armed struggle and civil war between the two trends is now a recognised fact: the support given to Kolchak and Denikin in Russia by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries against the Bolsheviks; the fight the Scheidemanns, Noskes and Co. have conducted in conjunction with the bourgeoisie against the Spartacans¹ in Germany; the same thing in Finland, Poland, Hungary, etc. What is the economic basis of this phenomenon of world-historical importance?

Precisely the parasitism and decay of capitalism which are the characteristic features of its highest historical stage of development, *i.e.*, imperialism. As has been shown in this pamphlet, capitalism has now brought to the front a *handful* (less than one-tenth of the inhabitants of the globe; less than one-fifth, if the most "generous" and liberal calculations were made) of very rich

¹ See note to page 298.*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

and very powerful states which plunder the whole world simply by "clipping coupons." Capital exports produce a profit of eight to ten billion francs per annum, according to pre-war prices and pre-war bourgeois statistics. Now, of course, they produce much more than that.

Obviously, out of such enormous *super-profits* (since they are obtained over and above the profits which capitalists squeeze out of the workers of their "home" country) it is quite *possible* to *bribe* the labour leaders and the upper stratum of the labour aristocracy. And the capitalists of the "advanced" countries are bribing them; they bribe them in a thousand different ways, direct and indirect, overt and covert.¹

This stratum of the "labour aristocracy," or of workers who have become bourgeois, who have become quite petty-bourgeois in their mode of life, in their earnings, and in their outlook, serves as the principal bulwark of the Second International, and, in our day, the principal *social* (not military) *support of the bourgeoisie*. They are the real *agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement*, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class,² channels of reformism and chauvinism. In the civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie they inevitably, and in no small number, stand side by side with the bourgeoisie, with the "Versaillese" against the "Communards."³

Not the slightest progress can be made towards the solution of the practical problems of the communist movement and of the impending social revolution unless the economic roots of this phenomenon are understood and unless its political and sociological significance is appreciated.

Imperialism is the eve of the proletarian social revolution. This has been confirmed since 1917 on an international scale.

N. LENIN

July 6, 1920.

¹ Lenin deals with this in greater detail in "The Collapse of the Second International"; see pp. 204-06 in this volume.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² English in the original.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM

DURING the last fifteen or twenty years, especially since the Spanish-American War (1898) * and the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902),** the economic and also the political literature of the two hemispheres has more and more often adopted the term "imperialism" in order to define the present era. In 1902, a book by the English economist, J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, was published in London and New York. This author, who adopts the point of view of bourgeois social reform and pacifism, which, in essence, is identical with the present point of view of the ex-Marxist, K. Kautsky, gives an excellent and comprehensive description of the principal economic and political characteristics of imperialism. In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital*. In spite of the mistake the author commits on the theory of money,*** and in spite of a certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical analysis, as its sub-title tells us, of "the latest phase of capitalist development." Indeed, what has been said of imperialism during the last few years, especially in a great many magazine and newspaper articles, and also in the resolutions, for example, of the Chemnitz and Basle Congresses which took place in the autumn of 1912, has scarcely gone beyond the ideas put forward, or, more exactly, summed up by the two writers mentioned above.

Later on we shall try to show briefly, and as simply as possible, the connection and relationships between the *principal* economic features of imperialism. We shall not be able to deal with non-economic¹ aspects of the question, however much they deserve to be dealt with. We have put references to literature and other notes which, perhaps, would not interest all readers at the end of this pamphlet.²

¹ I.e., political; the pamphlet was intended for legal publication and so these aspects were left out in order to enable it to pass the tsarist censorship. Cf. Lenin's preface.—Ed.

² These references and notes are not given in this edition.—Ed.

CHAPTER I

CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND MONOPOLIES

THE enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises represent one of the most characteristic features of capitalism. Modern censuses of production give complete and exact information on this process.

In Germany, for example, for every 1,000 industrial enterprises, large enterprises, i.e., those employing more than 50 workers, numbered three in 1882; six in 1895; nine in 1907; and out of every 100 workers employed, this group of enterprises, on the dates mentioned, employed 22, 30 and 37 respectively. Concentration of production, however, is much more intense than the concentration of workers, since labour in the large enterprises is much more productive. This is shown by the figures available on steam and electric motors. If we take what in Germany is called industry in the broad sense of the term, that is, including commerce, transport, etc., we get the following picture: Large-scale enterprises: 30,588 out of a total of 3,265,623, that is to say, 0.9 per cent. These large-scale enterprises employ 5,700,000 workers out of a total of 14,400,000, that is, 39.4 per cent; they use 6,600,000 steam horse power out of a total of 8,800,000, that is, 75.3 per cent, and 1,200,000 kilowatts of electricity out of a total of 1,500,000, that is, 77.2 per cent.

Less than one-hundredth of the total enterprises utilise *more than three-fourths* of the steam and electric power! Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises (employing up to five workers), representing 91 per cent of the total, utilise only 7 per cent of the steam and electric power. Tens of thousands of large-scale enterprises are everything; millions of small ones are nothing.

In 1907, there were in Germany 586 establishments employing one thousand and more workers. They employed nearly one-tenth (1,380,000) of the total number of workers employed in industry and utilised *almost one-third* (32 per cent) of the total steam and electric power employed. As we shall see, money capital and the banks make this superiority of a handful of the largest enterprises still more overwhelming, in the most literal sense of the word, since millions of small, medium, and even some big "masters" are in fact in complete subjection to some hundreds of millionaire financiers.

In another advanced country of modern capitalism, the United States, the growth of the concentration of production is still greater. Here statistics single out industry in the narrow sense of the word, and group enterprises according to the value of their annual output. In 1904 in the United States, large-scale enterprises with an annual output of one million dollars and over numbered 1,900 (out of 216,180, that is, 0.9 per cent). These employed 1,400,000 workers (out of 5,500,000, *i.e.*, 25.6 per cent) and their combined annual output was valued at \$5,600,000,000 (out of \$14,800,000,000, *i.e.*, 38 per cent). Five years later, in 1909, the corresponding figures were: Large-scale enterprises: 3,060 (out of 268,491, *i.e.*, 1.1 per cent); employing: 2,000,000 workers (out of 6,600,000, *i.e.*, 30.5 per cent); producing: \$9,000,000,000 (out of \$20,700,000,000, *i.e.*, 43.8 per cent).

Almost half the total production of all the enterprises of the country was carried on by a *hundredth* part of those enterprises! These 3,000 giant enterprises embrace 268 branches of industry. From this it can be seen that, at a certain stage of its development, concentration itself, as it were, leads right to monopoly; for a score or so of giant enterprises can easily arrive at an agreement, while on the other hand the difficulty of competition and the tendency towards monopoly arise from the very dimensions of the enterprises. This transformation of competition into monopoly is one of the most important—if not the most important—phenomena of modern capitalist economy, and we must deal with it in greater detail. But first we must clear up one possible misunderstanding.

American statistics say: 3,000 giant enterprises in 250 branches of industry, as if there were only a dozen large-scale enterprises for each branch of industry.

But this is not the case. Not in every branch of industry are there large-scale enterprises; and, moreover, a very important feature of capitalism in its highest stage of development is the so-called *combine*, that is to say, the grouping in a single enterprise of different branches of industry, which either represent the consecutive stages in the working up of raw materials (for example, the smelting of iron ore into pig iron, the conversion of pig iron into steel, and then, perhaps, the manufacture of steel goods)—or are auxiliary to one another (for example, the utilisation of waste or of by-products, the manufacture of packing materials, etc.).

“... Combination,” writes Hilferding, “levels out the fluctuations of trade and therefore assures to the combined enterprises a more stable rate of profit. Secondly, combination has the effect of eliminating trading. Thirdly, it has the effect of rendering possible technical improvements and, consequently, the acquisition of super-profits over and above those obtained by the ‘pure,’ i.e., non-combined, “enterprises. Fourthly, it strengthens the position of the combined enterprises compared with that of ‘pure’ enterprises, it increases their competitive power in periods of serious depression when the fall in prices of raw materials does not keep pace with the fall in prices of manufactured articles.”

The German bourgeois economist, Heymann, who has written a book especially on “mixed,” that is, combined, enterprises in the German iron industry, says: “Non-combine enterprises perish, crushed by the high price of raw material and the low price of the finished product.” Thus we get the following picture:

“There remain, on the one hand, the great coal companies, producing millions of tons yearly, strongly organised in their coal syndicate, and closely connected with them the big steel plants and their steel syndicate; and these great enterprises, producing 400,000 tons of steel per annum, with correspondingly extensive coal, ore and blast furnace operations, as well as the manufacturing of finished goods, employing 10,000 workers quartered in company houses, sometimes owning their own wharves and railways, are today the standard type of German iron and steel plant. And concentration continues. Individual enterprises are becoming larger and larger,

An ever increasing number of enterprises in one given industry, or in several different industries, join together in giant combines, backed up and controlled by half a dozen Berlin banks. In the German mining industry, the truth of the teachings of Karl Marx on the concentration of capital is definitely proved, at any rate in a country where it is protected by tariffs and freight rates. The German mining industry is ripe for expropriation."

Such is the conclusion which a conscientious bourgeois economist, and such are exceptional, had to arrive at. It must be noted that he seems to place Germany in a special category because her industries are protected by high tariffs. But the concentration of industry and the formation of monopolist, manufacturers' combines, cartels, syndicates, etc., could only be accelerated by these circumstances. It is extremely important to note that in free trade England, concentration *also* leads to monopoly, although somewhat later and perhaps in another form. Professor Hermann Levy, in his special investigation entitled *Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts*, based on data on British economic development, writes as follows:

"In Great Britain it is the size of the enterprise and its capacity which harbour a monopolist tendency. This, for one thing, is due to the fact that the great investment of capital per enterprise, once the concentration movement has commenced, gives rise to increasing demands for new capital for the new enterprises and thereby renders their launching more difficult. Moreover (and this seems to us to be the more important point), every new enterprise that wants to keep pace with the gigantic enterprises that have arisen on the basis of the process of concentration produces such an enormous quantity of surplus goods that it can only dispose of them either by being able to sell them profitably as a result of an enormous increase in demand or by immediately forcing down prices to a level that would be unprofitable both for itself and for the monopoly combines."

In England, unlike other countries where the protective tariffs facilitate the formation of cartels, monopolist alliances of *entrepreneurs*, cartels and trusts, arise in the majority of cases only when the number of competing enterprises is reduced to a "couple of dozen or so." "Here the influence of the concentration movement on the formation of large industrial monopolies in a whole sphere of industry stands out with crystal clarity."

Fifty years ago, when Marx was writing *Capital*, free competition appeared to most economists to be a "natural law." The offi-

cial scientists tried, by a conspiracy of silence, to kill the works of Marx, which by a theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism showed that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Today, monopoly has become a fact. The economists are writing mountains of books in which they describe the diverse manifestations of monopoly, and continue to declare in chorus that "Marxism is refuted." But facts are stubborn things, as the English proverb says, and they have to be reckoned with, whether we like it or not. The facts show that differences between capitalist countries, e.g., in the matter of protection or free trade, only give rise to insignificant variations in the form of monopolies or in the moment of their appearance, and that the rise of monopolies, as the result of the concentration of production, is a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism.

For Europe, the time when the new capitalism was *definitely* substituted for the old can be established fairly precisely: it was the beginning of the twentieth century. In one of the latest compilations on the history of the "formation of monopolies," we read:

"A few isolated examples of capitalist monopoly could be cited from the period preceding 1860; in these could be discerned the embryo of the forms that are common today; but all undoubtedly represent pre-history. The real beginning of modern monopoly goes back, at the earliest, to the 'sixties. The first important period of development of monopoly commenced with the international industrial depression of the 'seventies and lasted until the beginning of the 'nineties. . . . If we examine the question on a European scale, we will find that the development of free competition reached its apex in the 'sixties and 'seventies. Then it was that England completed the construction of its old style capitalist organisation. In Germany, this organisation had entered into a decisive struggle with handicraft and domestic industry, and had begun to create for itself its own forms of existence. . . ."

"The great revolutionisation commenced with the crash of 1873, or rather, the depression which followed it and which, with hardly discernible interruptions in the early 'eighties and the unusually violent, but short-lived boom about 1889, marks twenty-two years of European economic history. During the short boom of 1889-90, the system of cartels was widely resorted to in order to take advantage of the favourable business conditions. An ill-considered policy drove prices still higher than

would have been the case otherwise and nearly all these cartels perished ingloriously in the smash. Another five-year period of bad trade and low prices followed, but a new spirit reigned in industry; the depression was no longer regarded as something to be taken for granted: it was regarded as nothing more than a pause before another boom.

"The cartel movement entered its second epoch. Instead of being a transitory phenomenon, the cartels became one of the foundations of economic life. They are winning one field after another, primarily, the raw materials industry. At the beginning of the 'nineties the cartel system had already acquired—in the organisation of the coke syndicate on the model of which the coal syndicate was later formed—a cartel technique which could hardly be improved. For the first time the great boom at the close of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03 occurred entirely—in the mining and iron industries at least—under the ægis of the cartels. And while at that time it appeared to be something novel, now the general public takes it for granted that large spheres of economy have been, as a general rule, systematically removed from the realm of free competition."

Thus, the principal stages in the history of monopolies are the following: 1) 1860-70, the highest stage, the apex of development of free competition; monopoly is in the barely discernible, embryonic stage. 2) After the crisis of 1873, a wide zone of development of cartels; but they are still the exception. They are not yet durable. They are still a transitory phenomenon. 3) The boom at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900-03. Cartels become one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capitalism has been transformed into imperialism.

Cartels come to agreement on the conditions of sale, terms of payment, etc. They divide the markets among themselves. They fix the quantity of goods to be produced. They fix prices. They divide the profits among the various enterprises, etc.

The number of cartels in Germany was estimated at about 250 in 1896 and at 385 in 1905, with about 12,000 firms participating. But it is generally recognised that these figures are underestimations. From the statistics of German industry for 1907 we quoted above, it is evident that even 12,000 large enterprises must certainly utilise more than half the steam and electric power used in the country. In the United States, the number of trusts in 1900 was 185, and in 1907, 250. American statistics divide all enterprises into three categories, according to whether they belong to

individuals, to private firms or to corporations. These latter in 1904 comprised 23.6 per cent, and in 1909, 25.9 per cent (i.e., more than one-fourth of the total industrial enterprises in the country). These employed in 1904, 70.6 per cent, and in 1909, 75.6 per cent (i.e., more than three-fourths) of the total wage earners. Their output amounted at these two dates to \$10,900,000,000 and to \$16,300,000,000 respectively, i.e., to 73.7 per cent and to 79 per cent of the total.

Not infrequently, cartels and trusts concentrate in their hands seven or eight-tenths of the total output of a given branch of industry. The Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, at its foundation in 1893, controlled 86.7 per cent of the total coal output of the area. In 1910, it controlled 95.4 per cent. The monopoly so created ensures enormous profits, and leads to the formation of technical productive units of formidable magnitude. The famous Standard Oil Company in the United States was founded in 1900:

"It has an authorised capital of \$150,000,000. It issued \$100,000,000 worth of common shares and \$106,000,000 worth of preferred shares. From 1900 to 1907 they earned the following dividends: 48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent, in the respective years, i.e., in all, \$367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907 the Standard Oil Company made clear profits to the amount of \$889,000,000 of which \$606,000,000 were distributed in dividends, and the rest went to reserve capital. . . . In 1907 the various enterprises of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than 210,180 workers and other employees. The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, the Gelsenkirchen Mining Company (*Gelsenkirchner Bergwerksgesellschaft*), employed, in 1908, 46,048 wage earners."

In 1902, the United States Steel Corporation produced 9,000,000 tons of steel. Its output constituted, in 1901, 66.3 per cent, and in 1908, 56.1 per cent of the total output of steel in the United States. Its share of the output of mineral ore increased from 43.9 per cent to 46.3 per cent of the total output in the same period.

The report of the American government commission on trusts states:

"Their superiority over their competitors is due to the magnitude of their enterprises and their excellent technical equipment. Since its inception, the tobacco trust devoted all its efforts to the substitution of mechanical for manual labour on an extensive scale. With this end in view, it bought

up all patents that had anything to do with the manufacture of tobacco and spent enormous sums for this purpose. Many of these patents at first proved to be of no use, and had to be modified by the engineers employed by the trust. At the end of 1906, two subsidiary companies were formed solely to acquire patents. With the same object in view, the trust built its own foundries, machine shops and repair shops. One of these establishments, that in Brooklyn, employs on the average 300 workers; there experiments are carried out on inventions concerning the manufacture of cigarettes, cheroots, snuff, tinfoil for packing, boxes, etc. Here, also, inventions are perfected."

"Other trusts employ so-called developing engineers whose business it is to devise new methods of production, think out new production processes and to test technical improvements. The United States Steel Corporation grants big bonuses to its workers and engineers for all inventions suitable for raising technical efficiency, for improving machinery or for reducing cost of production."

In German large-scale industry, *e.g.*, in the chemical industry, which has developed so enormously during these last few decades, the promotion of technical improvement is organised in the same way. In 1908, the process of concentration had already given rise to two main groups which, in their way, came close to being monopolies. First these groups represented "dual alliances" of two pairs of big factories, each having a capital of from twenty to twenty-one million marks: on the one hand, the former Meister Factory at Höchst and the Cassel Factory at Frankfurt-on-Main; and on the other hand, the aniline and soda factory at Ludwigshafen and the former Bayer Factory at Elberfeld. In 1905, one of these groups, and in 1908 the other group, each concluded a separate agreement with yet another factory. The result was the formation of two "triple alliances," each with a capital of from forty to fifty million marks. And these "alliances" began to come "close" to one another, to reach "an understanding" about prices, etc.¹

Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular, the process of technical invention and improvement becomes socialised.

This is no longer the old type of free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with one another, and

¹ The newspapers (June 1916) report the formation of a new gigantic trust which is to combine the chemical industry of Germany.

producing for an unknown market. Concentration has reached the point at which it is possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw material (for example, the iron ore deposits) of a country and even, as we shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such estimates made, but these sources are captured by gigantic monopolist alliances. An approximate estimate of the capacity of markets is also made, and the trusts divide them up among themselves by agreement. Skilled labour power is monopolised, the best engineers are engaged; the means of transport are captured: railways in America, shipping companies in Europe and America. Capitalism in its imperialist stage arrives at the threshold of the most complete socialisation of production. In spite of themselves the capitalists are dragged, as it were, into the new social order, which marks the transition from complete free competition to complete socialisation. Production becomes social, but appropriation remains private. The social means of production remain the private property of a few. The framework of formally recognised free competition remains, but the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more burdensome and intolerable.

The German economist, Kestner, has written a book especially on the subject of "the struggle between the cartels and outsiders," i.e., enterprises outside the cartels. He entitled his work *Compulsory Organisation*, although, in order to present capitalism in its true light, he should have given it the title: "Compulsory Submission to Monopolist Combines." This book is edifying if only for the list it gives of the modern and civilised methods that monopolist combines resort to in their striving towards "organisation."

They are as follows: 1) Stopping supplies of raw materials ("one of the most important methods of compelling adherence to the cartel"); 2) Stopping the supply of labour by means of "alliances" (i.e., of agreements between employers and the trade unions by which the latter permit their members to work only in trustified enterprises); 3) Cutting off deliveries; 4) Closing of trade

outlets; 5) Agreements with the buyers, by which the latter undertake to trade only with the cartels; 6) The systematic lowering of prices to ruin "outside" firms, *i.e.*, those who refuse to submit to the trust. Millions are spent in order to sell goods for a certain time below their cost price (the price of benzine was thus lowered from 40 to 22 marks, *i.e.*, reduced almost by half!); 7) Stopping credits; 8) Boycott.

This is no longer competition between small and large-scale industry, or between technically developed and backward enterprises. We see here the monopolies throttling those which do not submit to them, to their yoke, to their dictation. The following is the way in which this process is reflected in the mind of a bourgeois economist:

"Even in the purely economic sphere," writes Kestner, "a certain change is taking place from commercial activity in the old sense of the word to organisational-speculative activity. The greatest success no longer goes to the merchant whose technical and commercial experience enables him best of all to estimate the needs of the buyer, and, so to say, to 'discover' latent demand; it goes to the speculative genius" (?) "who knows how to estimate in advance, or even only to sense the organisational development and the possibilities of connections between individual enterprises and the banks."

Translated into ordinary human language this means that the development of capitalism has arrived at a stage when, although commodity production still "reigns" and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined and the big profits go to the "genius" of financial manipulation. At the basis of these swindles and manipulations lies socialised production; but the immense progress of humanity, which achieved this socialisation, entirely goes to benefit the speculators. We shall see later how "on these grounds" reactionary, petty-bourgeois critics of capitalist imperialism dream of taking a step *backward*, of a return to "free," "peaceful" and "honest" competition.

"The prolonged raising of prices which results from the formation of cartels," says Kestner, "has hitherto been observed only in relation to the most important means of production, such as coal, iron and potassium, and has never been observed for any length of time in relation to manufactured goods. Similarly, the increase in profits resulting from that has been limited only to the industries which produce means of production. To this observa-

tion we must add that the raw materials industry secures advantages from the cartel formation not only in regard to growth of income and profitability, to the detriment of the finished goods industry, but also a *dominating position* over the latter, which did not exist under free competition."

The words which we have italicised reveal the essence of the case which the bourgeois economists admit so rarely and so unwillingly, and which the modern defenders of opportunism, led by K. Kautsky, so zealously try to evade and brush aside. Domination and violence that is associated with it—such are the relationships that are most typical of the "latest phase of capitalist development"; this is what must inevitably result, and has resulted, from the formation of all-powerful economic monopolies.

We will give one more example of the methods employed by monopolies. It is particularly easy for cartels and monopolies to arise when it is possible to capture all the sources of raw materials, or at least the most important of them. It would be wrong, however, to assume that monopolies do not arise in other industries in which it is impossible to corner the sources of raw materials. The cement industry, for instance, can find its raw material everywhere. Yet in Germany it is strongly trustified. The cement manufacturers have formed regional syndicates: South German, Rhine-Westphalian, etc. The prices fixed are monopoly prices: 230 to 280 marks a carload (at a cost price of 180 marks). The enterprises pay a dividend of from 12 per cent to 16 per cent—and let us not forget that the "geniuses" of modern speculation know how to pocket big profits besides those they draw by way of dividends. Now, in order to prevent competition in such a profitable industry, the monopolists resort to sundry stratagems. For example, they spread disquieting rumours about the situation of their industry. Anonymous warnings are published in the newspapers, like the following: "Investors, don't place your capital in the cement industry!" They buy up "outsiders" (those outside the trusts) and pay them "indemnities" of 60,000, 80,000 and even 150,000 marks. Monopoly hews a path for itself without scruple as to the means, from "modestly" buying off competitors to the American device of "employing" dynamite against them.

The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to place capitalism in a favourable light. On the contrary, when monopoly appears in *certain* branches of industry, it increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production *as a whole*. The disparity between the development of agriculture and that of industry, which is characteristic of capitalism, is increased. The privileged position of the most highly trustified industry, *i.e.*, so-called heavy industry, especially coal and iron, causes "a still greater lack of concerted organisation" in other branches of production—as Jeidels, the author of one of the best works on the relationship of the German big banks to industry, puts it.

"The more developed an economic system is," writes Liefmann, one of the most unblushing apologists of capitalism, "the more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises abroad, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally to those which are only of local importance."

The increased risk is connected in the long run with the prodigious increase of capital, which overflows the brim, as it were, flows abroad, etc. At the same time the extremely rapid rate of technical progress gives rise more and more to disturbances in the co-ordination between the various spheres of industry, to anarchy and crisis. Liefmann is obliged to admit that:

"In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the economic system. . . for example, electricity and aviation. . . . As a general rule, in such a period of radical economic change, speculation becomes rife."

Crises of every kind—economic crises more frequently, but not only these—in their turn increase very considerably the tendency towards concentration and monopoly. In this connection, the following reflections of Jeidels on the crisis of 1900, which was, as we have already seen, the turning point in the history of modern monopoly, are exceedingly instructive.

"Side by side with the giant plants in the basic industries, the crisis of 1900 found many plants organised on lines that today would be considered obsolete, the 'pure' [non-combined] plants, which had also arisen on the crest of the industrial boom. The fall in prices and the falling off in demand put these 'pure' enterprises in a precarious position, but did not affect some of

the big combined enterprises at all and affected others only for a very short time. As a consequence of this the crisis of 1900 resulted in a far greater concentration of industry than the former crises, like that of 1873. The latter crisis also produced a sort of selection of the best equipped enterprises, but owing to the level of technical development of that time, this selection could not place the firms which successfully emerged from the crisis in a position of monopoly. Such a durable monopoly exists to a high degree in the gigantic enterprises in the present iron and steel and electric industries, and to a lesser degree, in the engineering industry and certain metal, transport and other enterprises in consequence of their complicated technique, their extensive organisation and the magnitude of their capital."

Monopoly! This is the last word in the "latest phase of capitalist development." But we shall only have a very insufficient, incomplete and poor notion of the real power and significance of modern monopolies if we do not take into consideration the part played by the banks.

CHAPTER II

THE BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE

THE principal and primary function of banks is to serve as an intermediary in the making of payments. In doing so they transform inactive money capital into active capital, that is, into capital producing a profit; they collect all kinds of money revenues and place them at the disposal of the capitalist class.

As banking develops and becomes concentrated in a small number of establishments, the banks become transformed, and instead of being modest intermediaries they become powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also a large part of the means of production and of the sources of raw materials of the given country and of a number of countries. The transformation of numerous intermediaries into a handful of monopolists represents one of the fundamental processes in the transformation of capitalism into capitalist imperialism. For this reason we must first of all deal with the concentration of banking.

In 1907-08, the combined deposits of the German joint stock banks, having a capital of more than a million marks, amounted to 7,000,000,000 marks, while in 1912-13, they amounted to 9,800,000,000 marks. Thus, in five years their deposits increased by 40 per cent. Of the 2,800,000,000 increase, 2,750,000,000 was divided among 57 banks, each having a capital of more than 10,000,000 marks. The distribution of the deposits among big and small banks was as follows:

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS

Period	In 9 big Berlin banks	In 48 other banks with a capital of more than 10 million	In 115 banks with a capital of 1 to 10 million	In the small banks with a capital of less than 1 million
1907-08	47	32.5	16.5	4
1912-13	49	36.0	12.0	3

The small banks are being squeezed out by the big banks, of which nine concentrate in their own hands almost half the total deposits. But we have left out of account many important details, for instance, the transformation of numerous small banks practically into branches of big banks, etc. Of this we shall speak later on.

At the end of 1913, Schulze-Gävernitz estimated the deposits in the nine big Berlin banks at 5,100,000,000 marks, out of a total of about 10,000,000,000 marks. Taking into account not only the deposits, but also the capital of these banks, this author wrote:

"At the end of 1909, the nine big Berlin banks, *together* with their *affiliated institutions*, controlled 11,276,000,000 marks, that is, about 83 per cent of the total German bank capital. The Deutsche Bank, *which, together with its affiliated banks*, controls nearly 3,000,000,000 marks, represents, parallel with the Prussian State Railway Administration, the biggest and also the most decentralised accumulation of capital in the old world."

We have emphasised the reference to the "affiliated" banks because this is one of the most important features of modern capitalist concentration. Large-scale enterprises, especially the banks, not only completely absorb small ones, but also "join" them to themselves, subordinate them, bring them into their "own" group or "concern" (to use the technical term) by having "holdings" in their capital, by purchasing or exchanging shares, by controlling them through a system of credits, etc., etc. Professor Liefmann has written a voluminous book of about 500 pages describing modern "holding and finance companies," unfortunately adding "theoretical" reflections of a very poor quality to what is frequently partly digested raw material. To what results this "holding" system leads in regard to concentration is best illustrated in the book written by the banker, Riesser, on the big German banks.

But before examining his data, we will quote an example of the "holding" system.

The Deutsche Bank group is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, banking group. In order to trace the main threads which connect all the banks in this group, it is necessary to distinguish between holdings of the first, second and third degree, or what amounts to the same thing, between dependence (of the lesser establishments on the Deutsche Bank), in the first, second and third degree. We then obtain the following picture:

THE DEUTSCHE BANK HAS HOLDINGS:

	<i>Constantly</i>	<i>For an indefinite period</i>	<i>Occasionally</i>	<i>Total</i>
1st degree	in 17 banks	in 5 banks	in 8 banks	in 30 banks
2nd degree	of which 9 hold stock in 34 others		of which 5 hold stock in 14 others	of which 14 hold stock in 48 others
3rd degree	of which 4 hold stock in 7 others		of which 2 hold stock in 2 others	of which 6 hold stock in 9 others

Included in the eight banks dependent on the Deutsche Bank in the "first degree," "occasionally," there are three foreign banks: one Austrian, the Wiener Bankverein, and two Russian, the Siberian Commercial Bank and the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade. Altogether, the Deutsche Bank group comprises, directly and indirectly, partially and totally, no less than 87 banks; and the capital—its own and others which it controls—ranges between two and three billion marks.

It is obvious that a bank which stands at the head of such a group and which enters into agreement with a half dozen other banks only slightly smaller than itself for the purpose of conducting big and profitable operations like floating state loans is no longer a mere "intermediary" but a combine of a handful of monopolists.

The rapidity with which the concentration of banking proceeded in Germany at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries is shown by the following data which we quote in an abbreviated form from Riesser:

SIX BIG BERLIN BANKS

<i>Date</i>	<i>Branches in Germany</i>	<i>Deposit banks and exchange offices</i>	<i>Constant holdings in German joint stock banks</i>	<i>Total establishments</i>
1895	16	14	1	42
1900	21	40	8	80
1911	104	276	63	450

We see the rapid extension of a close network of canals which cover the whole country, centralising all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national, capitalist, and then into an international, capitalist, economic unit. The "decentralisation" that Schulze-Gävernitz, as an exponent of modern bourgeois political economy, speaks of in the passage previously quoted really means the subordination of an increasing number of formerly relatively "independent," or rather, strictly local economic units, to a single centre. In reality it is *centralisation*, the increase in the role, the importance and the power of monopolist giants.

In the old capitalist countries this "banking network" is still more close. In Great Britain (including Ireland), in 1910, there were 7,151 branches of banks. Four big banks had more than 400 of these branches each (from 447 to 689); four had more than 200 branches each; and eleven more than 100 each.

In France, the three most important banks (Crédit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris and the Société Générale) extended their operations and their network of branches in the following manner:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Branches and Offices</i>			<i>Capital in million francs</i>	
	<i>In the provinces</i>	<i>In Paris</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Own Capital</i>	<i>Loan Capital</i>
1870	47	17	64	200	427
1890	192	66	258	265	1,245
1909	1,033	196	1,229	887	4,363

In order to show the "connections" of a big modern bank, Rieser gives the following figures of the number of letters dispatched

and received by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, one of the most important banks in Germany and in the world, the capital of which amounted to 300,000,000 marks in 1914:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Letters received</i>	<i>Letters dispatched</i>
1852	6,135	6,292
1870	85,800	87,513
1900	533,102	626,043

In 1875, the big Paris bank, the Crédit Lyonnais, had 28,535 accounts. In 1912 it had 633,539.

These simple figures show perhaps better than long explanations how the concentration of capital and the growth of their turnover is radically changing the significance of the banks. Scattered capitalists are transformed into a single collective capitalist. When carrying the current accounts of a few capitalists, the banks, as it were, transact a purely technical and exclusively auxiliary operation. When, however, these operations grow to enormous dimensions we find that a handful of monopolists control all the operations, both commercial and industrial, of capitalist society. They can, by means of their banking connections, by running current accounts and transacting other financial operations, first *ascertain exactly* the position of the various capitalists, then *control* them, influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering their credits, and finally they can *entirely determine* their fate, determine their income, deprive them of capital, or, on the other hand, permit them to increase their capital rapidly and to enormous proportions, etc.

We have just mentioned the 300,000,000 marks capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft of Berlin. The increase of the capital of this bank to this high figure was one of the incidents in the struggle for hegemony between two of the biggest Berlin banks—the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto.

In 1870, the Deutsche Bank, a new enterprise, had a capital of only 15,000,000 marks, while that of the Disconto was as much as 30,000,000 marks. In 1908, the first had a capital of 200,000,000, while the second only had 170,000,000. In 1914, the Deutsche

Bank increased its capital to 250,000,000 and the Disconto, by absorbing a very important bank, the Schaffhausenschen Bankverein, increased its capital to 300,000,000. And, of course, while this struggle for hegemony goes on the two banks more and more frequently conclude "agreements" of an increasingly durable character with each other. This development of banking leads specialists in the study of banking questions—who regard economic questions from a standpoint which does not in the least exceed the bounds of the most moderate and cautious bourgeois reformism—to the following conclusions:

The German review, *Die Bank*, commenting on the increase of the capital of the Disconto-Gesellschaft to 300,000,000 marks, writes:

"Other banks will follow its example and in time the three hundred men, who today govern Germany economically, will gradually be reduced to fifty, twenty-five or still fewer. It cannot be expected that this new move towards concentration will be confined to banking. The close relations that exist between certain banks naturally involve the bringing together of the manufacturing combines which they patronise. . . . One fine morning we shall wake up in surprise to see nothing but trusts before our eyes, and to find ourselves faced with the necessity of substituting state monopolies for private monopolies. However, we have nothing to reproach ourselves with, except with having allowed things to follow their own course, slightly accelerated by the manipulation of stocks."

This is a very good example of the impotence of bourgeois journalism which differs from bourgeois science only in that the latter is less sincere and strives to obscure essential things, to conceal the wood by trees. To be "surprised" at the results of concentration, to "reproach" the government of capitalist Germany, or capitalist society ("ourselves"), to fear that the introduction of stocks and shares might "hasten" concentration, as the German "cartel specialist" Tschierschky fears the American trusts and "prefers" the German cartels on the grounds that they do not, "like the trusts, hasten technical economic progress to an excessive degree"—is not this impotence?

But facts remain facts. There are no trusts in Germany; there are "only" cartels—but Germany is governed by not more than

three hundred magnates, and the number of these is constantly diminishing. At all events, banks in all capitalist countries, no matter what the law in regard to them may be, accelerate the process of concentration of capital and the formation of monopolies.

The banking system, Marx wrote a half century ago in *Capital*, "presents indeed the form of universal bookkeeping and of distribution of means of production on a social scale, but only the form."¹

The figures we have quoted on the development of bank capital, on the increase in the number of branches and offices of the biggest banks, the increase in the number of their accounts, etc., present a concrete picture of this "universal bookkeeping" of the *whole capitalist class*; and not only of the capitalists, for the banks collect, even though temporarily, all kinds of financial revenues of small businessmen, office clerks, and of a small upper stratum of the working class. It is "universal distribution of means of production" that, from the formal point of view, grows out of the development of modern banks, the most important of which, numbering from three to six in France, and from six to eight in Germany, control billions and billions. In point of fact, however, the distribution of means of production is by no means "universal," but private, i.e., it conforms to the interests of big capital, and primarily of very big monopoly capital, which operates in conditions in which the masses of the population live in want, in which the whole development of agriculture hopelessly lags behind the development of industry, and within industry itself, the "heavy industries" exact tribute from all other branches of industry.

The savings banks and post offices are beginning to compete with the banks in the matter of socialising capitalist economy; they are more "decentralised," i.e., their influence extends to a greater number of localities, to more remote places, to wider sec-

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, p. 712, C. H. Kerr edition. In this edition the phrase "*Verteilung der Produktionsmittel*" is wrongly translated as distribution of products. In the above passage, this has been corrected to read "distribution of means of production."—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

tions of the population. An American commission has collected the following data on the comparative growth of deposits in banks and savings banks:

Year	DEPOSITS (IN BILLIONS OF MARKS)						
	England		France		Germany		
	Banks	Savings Banks	Banks	Savings Banks	Banks	Credit Societies	Savings Banks
1880	8.4	1.6	?	0.9	0.5	0.4	2.6
1888	12.4	2.0	1.5	2.1	1.1	0.4	4.5
1908	23.2	4.2	3.7	4.2	7.1	2.2	13.9

As they pay interest at the rate of 4 per cent and $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on deposits, the savings banks must seek "profitable" investments for their capital, they must deal in bills, mortgages, etc. Thus, the boundaries between the banks and the savings banks "become more and more obliterated." The Chambers of Commerce at Bochum and Erfurt, for example, demand that savings banks be prohibited from engaging in "purely" banking business, such as discounting bills. They also demand the limitation of the "banking" operations of the post office. The banking magnates seem to be afraid that state monopoly will steal upon them from an unexpected quarter. It goes without saying, however, that this fear is no more than the expression, as it were, of the rivalry between two department managers in the same office; for, on the one hand, the billions entrusted to the savings banks are actually controlled by *these very same* bank magnates, while, on the other hand, state monopoly in capitalist society is nothing more than a means of increasing and guaranteeing the income of millionaires on the verge of bankruptcy in one branch of industry or another.

The change from the old type of capitalism, in which free competition predominated, to the new capitalism, in which monopoly reigns, is expressed, among other things, by a decrease in the importance of the Stock Exchange. The German review, *Die Bank*, wrote:

"For a long time now, the Stock Exchange has ceased to be the indispensable intermediary of circulation that it was formerly when the banks were not yet able to place with their clients the greater part of their issues."

"Every bank is a Stock Exchange—and the bigger the bank, and the more successful the concentration of banking is, the truer does this modern proverb become."

"While formerly, in the 'seventies, the Stock Exchange, flushed with the exuberance of youth" (a delicate allusion to the crash of 1873, and to the stock flotation scandals), "opened the era of the industrialisation of Germany by utilising the gambling chance that lies in stocks, nowadays the banks and industry are able to 'do it alone.' The domination of our big banks over the Stock Exchange is nothing but the expression of the completely organised German industrial state. If the domain of the automatically functioning economic laws is thus restricted, and if the domain consciously regulated by the banks is considerably increased, the national economic responsibility of a very small number of guiding heads is infinitely increased," wrote Professor Schulze-Gävernitz, an apologist of German imperialism, who is regarded as an authority by the imperialists of all countries, and who tries to gloss over a "detail," viz., that the "conscious regulation" of economic life by the banks is robbery of the public by a handful of "completely organised" monopolists. For the task of a bourgeois professor is not to lay bare the mechanism of the financial system, or to divulge all the machinations of the finance monopolists, but rather, to present them in a favourable light.

In the same way, Riesser, a still more authoritative economist and a banker himself, makes shift with meaningless phrases in order to explain away undeniable facts. He says:

"The Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for commerce and industry as a whole and for the circulation of securities in particular—that of being an exact measuring-rod and an almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it."

In other words, the old capitalism, the capitalism of free competition, and its indispensable regulator, the Stock Exchange, are passing away. A new capitalism is succeeding it, which bears obvious features of something transitory, which is a mixture of free competition and monopoly. The question naturally arises: to *what* is this new, "transitory" capitalism leading? But the bourgeois scholars are afraid to raise this question.

"Thirty years ago, employers, freely competing against one another, performed nine-tenths of the economic work which is outside the sphere of manual labour. At the present time, nine-tenths of this economic 'brain work' is performed by *officials*. Banking is in the forefront of this evolution."

This admission by Schulze-Gävernitz brings us once again to the question of what this new capitalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage, is leading to.

Among the few banks which, as a result of the process of concentration, remain at the head of all capitalist economy, there is naturally to be observed an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements, towards a *bank trust*. In America, there are not nine, but *two* big banks, those of the billionaires Rockefeller and Morgan, which control a capital of eleven billion marks. In Germany, the absorption of the Schaffhausenschen Bankverein by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, to which we referred above, was commented on in the following terms by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, one of the organs of the Stock Exchange interests:

"The concentration movement of the banks is narrowing the circle of establishments from which it is possible to obtain large credits, and consequently is increasing the dependence of large-scale industry upon a small number of banking groups. In view of the internal links between industry and finance, the freedom of movement of manufacturing companies in need of bank capital is restricted. For this reason, large-scale industry is watching the growing trustification of the banks with mixed feelings. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen the beginnings of certain agreements between the individual big banking concerns, which aim at limiting competition."

Again, the final word in the development of the banks is monopoly.

The close ties that exist between the banks and industry are the very things that bring out most strikingly the new role of the banks. When a bank discounts a bill for an industrial firm, opens a current account for it, etc., these operations, taken separately, do not in the least diminish the independence of the industrial firm, and the bank plays no other part than that of a modest intermediary. But when such operations are multiplied and become continuous, when the bank "collects" in its own hands enormous amounts of capital, when the running of a current account for the firm in question enables the bank—and this is what happens—

to become better informed of the economic position of the client, then the result is that industrial capital becomes more completely dependent on the bank.

Parallel to this process there is being developed a very close personal union between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, the fusing of one with the other through the acquisition of shares, through the appointment of bank directors to the boards of industrial and commercial enterprises and *vice versa*.

The German economist, Jeidels, has compiled very complete data on this form of concentration of capital and of enterprises. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in 344 industrial companies, and by their board members in 407 other companies. Altogether, they supervised a total of 751 companies. In 289 of these companies they either had two of their representatives on each of the respective Supervisory Boards, or held the posts of presidents. These industrial and commercial companies are engaged in the most varied branches of industry: in insurance, transport, restaurants, theatres, art industry, etc.

On the other hand, there were on the Supervisory Boards of the six banks (in 1910) fifty-one of the biggest manufacturers, among whom were the directors of Krupp, of the powerful Hamburg-Amerika Line, etc. From 1895 to 1910, each of these six banks participated in the share issues of several hundreds of industrial companies (the number ranging from 231 to 419).

The "personal union" between the banks and industry is completed by the "personal union" between both and the state.

"Seats on the Supervisory Board are freely offered to persons of title, also to ex-civil servants, who are able to do a great deal to facilitate" (!!) "relations with the authorities."

Generally there is "a member of parliament or a Berlin city councillor" on the Supervisory Board of a big bank. The building, so to speak, of the great capitalist monopolies is, therefore, going full steam ahead by all "natural" and "supernatural" ways. A sort of division of labour among some hundreds of kings of

finance who now reign over modern capitalist society is being systematically developed.

"Accompanying this widening of the sphere of activity of certain big industrialists" (sharing in the management of banks, etc.) "and together with the allocation of provincial managers to definite industrial regions, there is a growth of specialisation among the directors of the great banks. Generally speaking, this specialisation is only conceivable when banking is carried on on a large scale, and particularly when it has widespread connections with industry. This division of labour proceeds along two lines: on the one hand, the relations with industry as a whole are entrusted to one manager, as his special function; on the other, each director assumes the supervision of several isolated enterprises or enterprises with allied interests or in the same branch of industry, sitting on their Boards of Directors" (capitalism has reached the stage of organised control of individual enterprises). "One specialises in German industry, sometimes even in West German industry, alone" (the West is the most industrialised part of Germany). "Others specialise in relations with foreign states and foreign industry, in information about personal data, in Stock Exchange questions, etc. Besides, each bank director is often assigned a special industry or locality, where he has a say on the Board of Directors; one works mainly on the Board of Directors of electric companies, another in the chemical, brewing or sugar beet industry; a third in several isolated undertakings, and at the same time, in non-industrial, even insurance companies. . . . It is certain that, as the extent and diversification of the big banks' operations increase, the division of labour among their directors also spreads, with the object and result of lifting them somewhat out of pure banking and making them better experts, better judges of the general problems of industry and the special problems of each branch of industry, thus making them more capable of action within the respective bank's industrial sphere of influence. This system is supplemented by the banks' endeavours to have elected to their own Board of Directors, or to those of their subsidiary banks, men who are experts in industrial affairs, such as industrialists, former officials, especially those formerly in railway service or in mining, etc."

We find the same system, with only slight difference, in French banking. For instance, one of the three largest French banks, the *Crédit Lyonnais*, has organised a financial research service (*Service des Etudes Financières*), which permanently employs about fifty engineers, statisticians, economists, lawyers, etc., at a cost of six or seven hundred thousand francs per annum. The service is in turn divided into eight sections, of which one deals with industrial establishments, another with general statistics, a third with railway and steamship companies, a fourth with securities, a fifth with financial reports, etc.

The result is twofold: on the one hand, a fusion, or, as N. Bukharin aptly calls it, the merging of bank and industrial capital; and, on the other hand, a transformation of the banks into institutions of a truly "universal character." On this question we consider it important to quote the exact terms used by Jeidels, who has best studied the subject:

"An examination of the sum total of industrial relationships reveals the *universal character* of the financial establishments working on behalf of industry. Unlike other kinds of banks and contrary to the requirements often laid down in literature—according to which banks ought to specialise in one kind of business or in one branch of industry in order to maintain a firm footing—the big banks are striving to make their industrial connections as varied and far-reaching as possible, according to locality and branch of business, and are striving to do away with the inequalities in the local and business distribution resulting from the development of various enterprises. . . . One tendency is to make the ties with industry general; the other tendency is to make these ties durable and close. In the six big banks both these tendencies are realised, not in full, but to a considerable extent and to an equal degree."

Quite often industrial and commercial circles complain of the "terrorism" of the banks. We are not surprised, for the big banks "command," as will be seen from the following example: on November 19, 1901, one of the big Berlin "D" banks (such is the name given to the four biggest banks whose names begin with the letter D¹) wrote to the Board of Directors of the German Central Northwest Cement Syndicate in the following terms:

"We learn, from the notice you published in the *Reichsanzeiger* of 18th instant, that the next general meeting of your company, fixed for the 30th of this month, may decide on measures which are likely to effect changes in your undertakings which we cannot sanction. We deeply regret that, for these reasons, we are obliged henceforth to withdraw the credit which has been hitherto allowed you. If the said next general meeting does not decide upon measures we cannot sanction, and if we receive suitable guarantees on this matter for the future, we shall be quite willing to open negotiations with you on the opening of a new credit."

As a matter of fact, this is small capital's old complaint about being oppressed by big capital, but in this case it was a whole syndicate that fell into the category of "small" capital! The

¹ Deutsche Bank. Disconto-Gesellschaft, Dresdner Bank and Darmstadter Bank.—Ed.

old struggle between big and small capital is being resumed on a new and higher stage of development. It stands to reason that undertakings, financed by big banks handling billions, can accelerate technical progress in a way that cannot possibly be compared with the past. The banks, for example, set up special technical research societies, and only "friendly" industrial enterprises benefit from their work. To this category belong the Electric Railway Research Association and the Central Bureau of Scientific and Technical Research.

The directors of the big banks themselves cannot fail to see that new conditions of economic life are being created. But they are powerless in the face of these phenomena.

"Anyone who has watched, in recent years, the changes of incumbents of directorships and seats on the Boards of Directors of the big banks cannot fail to have noticed that power is gradually passing into the hands of men who consider the active intervention of the big banks in the general development of production to be indispensable and of increasing importance. It often happens that, between these new men and the old bank directors, disagreements of a business and personal nature often occur on this subject. The question that is in dispute is whether or not the banks, as credit institutions, will suffer from this intervention in industry, whether they are sacrificing tried principles and an assured profit to engage in a field of activity which has nothing in common with their role as intermediaries in providing credit and which is leading the banks into a field where they are more than ever before exposed to the blind forces of trade fluctuations. This is the opinion of many of the older bank directors, while most of the young men consider active intervention in industry to be a necessity as great as that which gave rise, simultaneously with big modern industry, to the big banks and modern industrial banking. The two parties to this discussion are agreed only on one point and that is, that as yet there are neither firm principles nor a concrete aim in the new activities of the big banks."

The old form of capitalism has had its day. The new form represents a transition towards something. It is hopeless, of course, to seek for "firm principles" and a "concrete aim" for the purpose of "reconciling" monopoly with free competition. The admission of the practical men has quite a different ring from the official praises of the charms of "organised" capitalism sung by its apologists, Schulze-Gävernitz, Liefmann and similar "theoreticians."

At precisely what period was the "new activity" of the big

banks finally established? Jeidels gives us a fairly exact answer to this important question:

"The ties between the industrial enterprises, with their new content, their new forms and their new organs, namely, the big banks which are organised on both a centralised and a decentralised basis, were scarcely a characteristic economic phenomenon before 1890; in one sense, indeed, this initial date may be advanced to the year 1897, when the important 'mergers' took place and when, for the first time, the new form of decentralised organisation was introduced to suit the industrial policy of the banks. This starting point could perhaps be placed at an even later date, for it was only the crisis" (of 1900) "that enormously accelerated and intensified the process of concentration of industry and banking, consolidated that process and more than ever transformed the connection with industry into the monopoly of the big banks, and made this connection, taken individually, much closer and more active."

Thus, the beginning of the twentieth century marks the turning point at which the old capitalism gave way to the new, at which the domination of capital in general made way for the domination of finance capital.

CHAPTER III

FINANCE CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY

"AN increasing proportion of industrial capital does not belong to the industrialists who employ it. They obtain the use of it only through the medium of the banks, which, in relation to them, represent the owners of the capital. On the other hand, the bank is forced to put an increasing share of its funds into industry. Thus, to an increasing degree the banker is being transformed into an industrial capitalist. This bank capital, *i.e.*, capital in money form which is thus really transformed into industrial capital, I call 'finance capital.' . . . So finance capital is capital controlled by the banks and employed by the industrialists."

This definition is incomplete in so far as it is silent on one extremely important fact: the increase of concentration of production and of capital to such an extent that it leads, and has led, to monopoly. But throughout the whole of his work, and particularly in the two chapters which precede the one from which this definition is taken, Hilferding stresses the part played by *capitalist monopolies*.

The concentration of production; the monopoly arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of banking with industry: this is the history of finance capital and what gives the term "finance capital" its content.

We now have to describe how, under commodity production and private property, the "domination" of capitalist monopolies inevitably becomes the domination of a financial oligarchy. It should be noted that the representatives of German bourgeois science—and not only of German science—like Riesser, Schulze-Gävernitz, Liefmann and others—are all apologists for imperialism and for finance capital. Instead of revealing the "mechanics" of the formation of an oligarchy, its methods, its revenues "innocent and sinful," its connections with parliament, etc., they conceal, obscure and embellish them. They evade these "vexed questions"

by a few vague and pompous phrases: appeals to the "sense of responsibility" of bank directors, praising "the sense of duty" of Prussian officials; by giving serious study to petty details, to ridiculous bills for the "supervision" and "regulation" of monopolies; by playing with theories, like, for example, the following "scientific" definition, arrived at by Professor Liefmann. "*Commerce is a gainful occupation carried on by collecting goods, storing it and making it available.*" (The professor's italics.) From this it would follow that primitive man, who knew nothing about exchange, was a trader, and that commerce will exist under socialism!

But the monstrous facts concerning the monstrous rule of the financial oligarchy are so striking that in all capitalist countries, in America, France and Germany, a whole literature has sprung up, written from the *bourgeois* point of view, but which, nevertheless, gives a fairly accurate picture and criticism—petty-bourgeois, naturally—of this oligarchy.

The "holding system," to which we have already briefly referred above, should be placed at the corner-stone. The German economist, Heymann, probably the first to call attention to this matter, describes it in this way:

"The executive director controls the parent company; the latter reigns over the subsidiary companies which similarly control still other subsidiaries."

Thus, it is possible with a comparatively small capital to dominate immense spheres of production. As a matter of fact, if holding 50 per cent of the capital is always sufficient to control a company, the executive director needs only one million to control eight millions in the second subsidiaries. And if this "interlocking" is extended, it is possible with one million to control sixteen, thirty-two or more millions.

Experience shows that it is sufficient to own 40 per cent of the shares of a company in order to direct its affairs, since a certain number of small shareholders find it impossible, in practice, to attend general meetings, etc. The "democratisation" of the ownership of shares, from which the bourgeois sophists and opportunist "would-be" Social-Democrats expect (or declare that

they expect) the "democratisation" of capital, the strengthening of the role of small-scale production, etc., is in fact one of the ways of increasing the power of the financial oligarchy. For this reason, among others, in the more advanced, or in the older and more "experienced" capitalist countries, the law allows the issue of shares of very small denomination. In Germany, it is illegal to issue shares of less value than one thousand marks, and the magnates of German finance look with an envious eye at England, where it is legal to issue one pound shares. Siemens, one of the biggest industrialists and "financial kings" in Germany, told the Reichstag on June 7, 1900, that "the one pound share is the basis of British imperialism." This merchant has a much deeper and more "Marxian" understanding of imperialism than a certain disreputable writer,¹ generally held to be one of the founders of Russian Marxism, who believes that imperialism is a bad habit of a certain nation. . . .

But the "holding system" not only serves to increase the power of the monopolists enormously; it also enables them to resort with impunity to all sorts of shady tricks to cheat the public, for the directors of the parent company are not legally responsible for the subsidiary companies, which are supposed to be "independent," and *through the medium* of which they can do *anything*. Here is an example taken from the German review, *Die Bank*, for May 1914:

"The Spring Steel Corporation of Kassel was regarded some years ago as being one of the most profitable enterprises in Germany. Through bad management its dividends fell within the space of a few years from 15 per cent to nil. It appears that the board, without consulting the shareholders, had loaned six million marks to one of the subsidiary companies, the Hassia, Ltd., which had a nominal capital of only some hundreds of thousands of marks. This commitment, amounting to nearly treble the capital of the parent company, was never mentioned in its balance sheets. This omission was quite legal, and could be kept up for two whole years because it did not violate any provisions of company law. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who as the responsible head signed the false balance sheets, was and still is the president of the Kassel Chamber of Commerce. The shareholders only heard of the loan to the Hassia, Ltd., long afterwards, when it had long been proved to have been a mistake" (this word the writer should have put in quotation marks),

¹ I.e., G. V. Plekhanov.—Ed.

"and when 'Spring Steel' shares had dropped nearly 100 points, because those in the know had got rid of them. . . .

"*This typical example of balance sheet jugglery, quite common in joint stock companies*, explains why boards of directors are more willing to undertake risky transactions than individual enterprises. Modern methods of drawing up balance sheets not only make it possible to conceal doubtful undertakings from the average shareholder, but also allow the people most concerned to escape the consequence of unsuccessful speculation by selling their shares in time while the private dealer risks his own skin.

"The balance sheets of most joint stock companies put us in mind of the palimpsests of the Middle Ages from which the visible inscription had first to be erased in order to discover beneath another inscription giving the real meaning of the document." (Palimpsests are parchment documents on which the original inscription was obliterated and another inscription imposed.)

"The simplest and, therefore, most common procedure for making balance sheets indecipherable is to divide a single business into several parts by setting up subsidiary companies—or by annexing such. The advantages of this system for various objects—legal and illegal—are so evident that it is quite unusual to find an important company in which it is not actually in use."

As an example of an important monopolist company widely employing this system, the author quotes the famous Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft, the A.E.G., to which we shall refer later on. In 1912, it was calculated that this company held shares in from 175 to 200 other companies, controlling them of course, and thus having control of a total capital of 1,500,000,000 marks!

All rules of control, the publication of balance sheets, the drawing up of balance sheets according to a definite form, the public auditing of accounts, the things about which well-intentioned professors and officials—that is, those imbued with the good intention of defending and embellishing capitalism—discourse to the public, are of no avail. For private property is sacred, and no one can be prohibited from buying, selling, exchanging or mortgaging shares, etc.

The extent to which this "holding system" has developed in the big Russian banks may be judged by the figures given by E. Agahd, who was for fifteen years an official of the Russo-Chinese Bank and who, in May 1914, published a book, not altogether correctly entitled *Big Banks and the World Market*.

The author divides the great Russian banks into two main

categories: a) those which operate as "holding banks," and b) "independent" banks (the independence of the latter being arbitrarily taken to mean being independent of *foreign* banks). The author sub-divides the first group into three sub-groups: 1) German holding banks; 2) British and 3) French, having in view those houses in whose business the big banks of the three European countries mentioned hold stock and predominate. The author divides the capital of the banks into "productively" invested capital (in industrial and commercial undertakings), and "speculatively" invested capital (in Stock Exchange and financial operations), assuming from his petty-bourgeois reformist point of view that it is possible, under capitalism, to separate the first form of investment from the second and to abolish the second form.

Here are the figures he supplies:

BANK ASSETS

(According to reports for October-November 1913, in millions of rubles)

<i>Groups of Russian Banks</i>	<i>Capital Invested</i>		
	<i>Productive</i>	<i>Speculative</i>	<i>Total</i>
A 1) Four banks: Siberian Commercial Bank, Russian Bank, International Bank, and Discount Bank	413.7	859.1	1,272.8
2) Two banks: Industrial and Commercial and Russo-British	239.3	169.1	408.4
3) Five banks: Russian-Asiatic, St. Petersburg Private, Azov-Don, Union Moscow, Russo-French Commercial	711.3	661.2	1,373.0
Total: (11 banks)	1,364.3	1,689.4	3,054.2
B Eight banks: Moscow Merchant, Volga-Kama, Junker and Co., St. Petersburg Commercial (formerly Wawelberg), Bank of Moscow (formerly Ryabushinsky), Moscow Discount, Moscow Commercial, Private Bank of Moscow ..	504.2	391.1	895.3
Total (19 banks)	1,869.0	2,080.5	3,949.5

According to these figures, of the approximately four billion rubles making up the "working" capital of the big banks, *more than three-fourths*, more than three billion belonged to banks which

in reality were only subsidiary companies of foreign banks, and chiefly of the Paris banks (the famous trio: Union Parisien, Paris et Pays-Bas and Société Générale), and of the Berlin banks (particularly the Deutsche Bank and the Disconto-Gesellschaft). Two of the most important Russian banks, the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade and the St. Petersburg International Commercial, between 1906 and 1912 increased their capital from 44,000,000 to 98,000,000 rubles, and their reserve from 15,000,000 to 39,000,000, "employing three-fourths German capital." The first belongs to the Deutsche Bank group and the second to the Disconto-Gesellschaft. The worthy Agahd is indignant at the fact that the majority of the shares are held by German banks, and that, therefore, the Russian shareholders are powerless. Naturally, the country which exports capital skims the cream: for example, the Deutsche Bank, while introducing the shares of the Siberian Commercial Bank on the Berlin market, kept them in its portfolio for a whole year, and then sold them at the rate of 193 for 100, that is, at nearly twice their nominal value, "earning" a profit of nearly 6,000,000 rubles, which Hilferding calls "promoters' profits."

Our author puts the total resources of the principal St. Petersburg banks at 8,235,000,000 rubles and the "holdings," or rather, the extent to which foreign banks dominated them, he estimates as follows: French banks, 55 per cent; English, 10 per cent; German, 35 per cent. The author calculates that of the total of 8,235,000,000 rubles of functioning capital, 3,687,000,000 rubles, or over 40 per cent, fall to the share of the syndicates, Produgol * and Prodameta **—and the syndicates in the oil, metallurgical and cement industries. Thus, the merging of bank and industrial capital has also made great strides in Russia owing to the formation of capitalist monopolies.

Finance capital, concentrated in a few hands and exercising a virtual monopoly, exacts enormous and ever-increasing profits from the floating of companies, issue of stock, state loans, etc., tightens the grip of the financial oligarchies and levies tribute upon the whole of society for the benefit of the monopolists. Here is an example, taken from a multitude of others, of the methods em-

ployed by American trusts, quoted by Hilferding: in 1887, Havemeyer founded the Sugar Trust by amalgamating fifteen small firms, whose total capital amounted to nearly \$6,500,000. Suitably "watered," as the Americans say, the capital of the trust was increased to \$50,000,000. This "over-capitalisation" anticipated the profits of the monopoly, in the same way as the United States Steel Corporation anticipated its profits by buying up as many iron fields as possible. In fact, the Sugar Trust managed to impose monopoly prices on the market, which secured it such profits that it could pay 10 per cent dividends on capital "*watered*" *sevenfold, or about 70 per cent on the capital actually invested at the time of the creation of the trust!* In 1909, the capital of the Sugar Trust was increased to \$90,000,000. In twenty-two years, it had increased its capital more than tenfold.

In France the role of the "financial oligarchy" (*Against the Financial Oligarchy in France*, the title of the well-known book by Lysis, the fifth edition of which was published in 1908) assumed a form that was only slightly different. Four of the most powerful banks enjoy, not a relative, but an "absolute monopoly" in the issue of bonds. In reality this is a "trust of the big banks." And their monopoly ensures the monopolist profits from bond issues. A country borrowing from France rarely gets more than 90 per cent of the total of the loan, the remaining 10 per cent goes to the banks and other middlemen. The profit made by the banks out of the Russo-Chinese loans of 400,000,000 francs amounted to 8 per cent; out of the Russian (1904) loan of 800,000,000 francs the profit amounted to 10 per cent; and out of the Moroccan (1904) loan of 62,500,000 francs, to 18.75 per cent. Capitalism, which began its development with petty usury capital, ends its development with gigantic usury capital. "The French," says Lysis, "are the usurers of Europe." All the conditions of economic life are being profoundly modified by this transformation of capitalism. With a stationary population, and stagnant industry, commerce and shipping, the "country" can grow rich by usury. "Fifty persons, representing a capital of 8,000,000 francs can control 2,000,000,000 francs deposited in four banks."

The "holding system," with which we are already familiar, leads to the same result. One of the biggest banks, the Société Générale, for instance, issues 64,000 bonds for one of its subsidiary companies, the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. The bonds are issued at 150 per cent, the bank gaining 50 centimes on the franc. The dividends of the new company are then found to be fictitious. The "public" lost from 90 to 100 million francs. One of the directors of the Société Générale is a member of the Board of Directors of the Egyptian Sugar Refineries. Hence it is not surprising that the author is driven to the conclusion that "the French Republic is a financial monarchy"; "it is the complete domination of the financial oligarchy; the latter controls the press and the government."

The extraordinarily high rate of profit obtained from the issue of bonds, which is one of the principal functions of finance capital, plays a large part in the development and stabilisation of the financial oligarchy.

"There is not in the whole country a single business that brings in profits even approximately equal to those obtained from the issue of foreign loans," says the German magazine, *Die Bank*.

"No banking operation brings in profits comparable with those obtained from the flotation of loans."

According to the *German Economist*, the average annual profits made on the issue of industrial securities were as follows:

	<i>Per cent</i>		<i>Per cent</i>
1895	38.6	1898	67.7
1896	36.1	1899	66.9
1897	66.7	1900	55.2

In the ten years from 1891 to 1900, *more than a billion* marks were "earned" on the issue of industrial securities.

While, during periods of industrial boom, the profits of finance capital are disproportionately large, during periods of depression small and unsound businesses go out of existence and the big banks take "holdings" in their shares which are bought up for next to nothing, or in profitable schemes for their "reconstruction" and "reorganisation." In the "reconstruction" of undertakings which have been running at a loss, the share capital is written

down, that is, profits are distributed on a smaller capital and subsequently are calculated on this smaller basis. If the income has fallen to nil, new capital is called in, which, combined with the old and less remunerative capital, will bring in an adequate return.

"Incidentally," adds Hilferding, "these reorganisations and reconstructions have a twofold significance for the banks: first, as profitable transactions; and secondly, as opportunities for securing control of the companies in difficulties."

Here is an instance. The Union Mining Company of Dortmund, founded in 1872, with a capital of about 40,000,000 marks, saw the market price of shares rise to 170 after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend in its first year. Finance capital skimmed the cream and earned a "trifle" of something like 28,000,000 marks. The principal sponsor of this company was that very big German Disconto-Gesellschaft which so successfully attained a capital of 300,000,000 marks. Later, the dividends of the Union dropped to nil: the shareholders had to consent to a "writing down" of capital, that is, to losing some of it in order not to lose it all. By a series of "reconstructions" more than 73,000,000 marks were written off the books of the Union in the course of thirty years.

"At the present time, the original shareholders of this company possess only 5 per cent of the nominal value of their shares."

But the bank made a profit out of every "reconstruction."

Speculation in land situated in the suburbs of rapidly growing towns is a particularly profitable operation for finance capital. The monopoly of the banks merges here with the monopoly of ground rent and with the monopoly of the means of communication, since the increase in value of the land and the possibility of selling it profitably in allotments is mainly dependent on good means of communication with the centre of the town; and these means of communication are in the hands of large companies connected, by means of the holding system and by the distribution of positions on the directorates, with the interested banks. As a result we get what the German writer, L. Eschwege, a contributor to *Die Bank*, who has made a special study of real estate

business and mortgages, calls the formation of a "bog." Frantic speculation in land in the suburbs of large towns: collapse of building enterprises (like that of the Berlin firm of Boswau and Knauer, which grabbed 100,000,000 marks with the help of the "sound and solid" Deutsche Bank—the latter acting, of course, discreetly behind the scenes through the holding system and getting out of it by losing "only" 12,000,000 marks), the ruin of small masters and of workers who get nothing from the fraudulent building firms, underhand agreements with the "honest" Berlin police and the Berlin administration for the purpose of getting control of the issue of building sites, tenders, building licenses, etc.

"American ethics," so strongly but hypocritically condemned by European professors and well-meaning bourgeois, have, in the age of finance capital, become the ethics of literally every large city, no matter what country it is in.

At the beginning of 1914, there was talk in Berlin of the proposed formation of a traffic trust to combine three Berlin traffic undertakings, i.e., to establish "common interests" between the metropolitan electric railway, the tramway company and the omnibus company.

"We know," wrote *Die Bank*, "that this plan has been contemplated since it became known that the majority of the shares in the bus company has been acquired by the other two traffic companies. . . . We may believe those who are pursuing this aim when they say that by uniting the transport services, they will unify traffic and thus secure economies part of which will in time benefit the public. But the question is complicated by the fact that behind the traffic trust that is being formed are the banks, which, if they desire, can subordinate the means of communication, which they have monopolised, to the interests of their real estate business. To be convinced of the reasonableness of such a conjecture, we need only recall that at the very formation of the Elevated Railway Company the traffic interests became interlocked with the real estate interests of the bank which financed it, and this interlocking even created the prerequisites for the formation of the traffic enterprise. Its eastern line, in fact, was to run through land which, when it became certain the line was to be laid down, this bank sold to the real estate firm at an enormous profit for itself and for several partners in the transaction."

A monopoly, once it is formed and controls thousands of millions, inevitably penetrates into *every* sphere of public life, re-

gardless of the form of government and all other "details." In the economic literature of Germany one usually comes across the servile praise of the integrity of the Prussian bureaucracy, and allusions to the French Panama scandal * and to political corruption in America. But the fact is that *even* the bourgeois literature devoted to German banking matters constantly has to go beyond the field of purely banking operations and to speak, for instance, of "the attraction of the banks" in reference to the increasing frequency with which public officials take employment with the banks.

"How about the integrity of a state official who in his inmost heart is aspiring to a soft job in the Behrenstrasse?" (The street in Berlin in which the head office of the Deutsche Bank is situated.)

In 1909, the publisher of *Die Bank*, Alfred Lansburgh, wrote an article entitled "The Economic Significance of Byzantinism," in which he incidentally referred to Wilhelm II's tour of Palestine, and to "the immediate result of this journey," the construction of the Bagdad railway,** that fatal "great product of German enterprise, which is more responsible for the 'encirclement' than all our political blunders put together." (By encirclement is meant the policy of Edward VII of isolating Germany by surrounding her with an imperialist anti-German alliance.) In 1912, another contributor to this magazine, Eschwege, to whom we have already referred, wrote an article entitled "Plutocracy and Bureaucracy," in which he exposes the case of a German official named Volker, who was a zealous member of the Cartel Committee and who some time later obtained a lucrative post in the biggest cartel, *i.e.*, the Steel Syndicate. Similar cases, by no means casual, forced this bourgeois author to admit that "the economic liberty guaranteed by the German Constitution is at present, in many departments of economic life, only a meaningless phrase" and that under the rule of the plutocrats, "the widest political liberty cannot save us from being converted into a nation of unfree people."

As for Russia, we will content ourselves by quoting one example. Some years ago, all the newspapers announced that Davidov, the director of the Credit Department of the Treasury,

had resigned his post to take employment with a certain big bank at a salary which, according to the contract, was to amount to over one million rubles in the course of several years. The function of the Credit Department is to "co-ordinate the activities of all the credit institutions of the country"; it also grants subsidies to banks in St. Petersburg and Moscow amounting to between 800 and 1,000 million rubles.

Generally speaking, under capitalism, the ownership of capital is separate from the application of capital to production; money capital is separate from industrial or productive capital; the *rentier*, living entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the *entrepreneur* and from all those directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the rule of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism in which this separation reaches vast proportions. The supremacy of finance capital over all other forms of capital means the rule of the *rentier* and of the financial oligarchy; it means the crystallisation of a small number of financially "powerful" states from among all the rest. The extent to which this process is going on may be judged from the statistics on emissions, i.e., the issue of all kinds of securities.

In the Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute, A. Neymarck has published very comprehensive and complete comparative figures covering the issue of securities all over the world, which have been repeatedly quoted in economic literature. The following are the totals he gives for four decades:

TOTAL ISSUES IN BILLIONS OF FRANCS

1871-1880	76.1
1881-1890	64.5
1891-1900	100.4
1901-1910	197.8

In the 1870's, the total amount of issues for the whole world was high, owing particularly to the loans floated in connection with the Franco-Prussian War, and the company promoting boom which set in in Germany after the war. In general, the increase is not very rapid for the three last decades of the nineteenth

century, and only in the first ten years of the twentieth century is an enormous increase observed of almost 100 per cent. Thus the beginning of the twentieth century marks the turning point, not only in regard to the growth of monopolies (cartels, syndicates, trusts), of which we have already spoken, but also in regard to the development of finance capital.

Neymarck estimates the total amount of issued securities current in the world in 1910 at about 815,000,000,000 francs. Deducting from this amounts which might have been duplicated, he reduces the total to 575-600 billion, which is distributed among the various countries as follows: (We will take 600,000,000,000.)

FINANCIAL SECURITIES CURRENT IN 1910
(*In billions of francs*)

Great Britain	142	} 479
United States	132	
France	110	
Germany	95	
Russia	31	
Austria-Hungary	24	
Italy	14	
Japan	12	
Holland	12.5	
Belgium	7.5	
Spain	7.5	
Switzerland	6.25	
Denmark	3.75	
Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc.	2.5	
Total	600.00	

It will be seen at once from these figures what a privileged position is held by four of the richest capitalist countries, each of which controls securities to amounts ranging approximately from 100 to 150 billion francs. Two of these countries are the oldest capitalist countries, and, as we shall see, possess the most colonies: England and France; the other two are in the front rank as regards rapidity of development and the degree of extension of capitalist monopolies in industry: the United States and Germany. Together, these four countries own 479,000,000,000

francs, that is, nearly 80 per cent of the world's finance capital. Thus, in one way or another, the whole world is more or less the debtor to and vassal of these four international banker countries, the four "pillars" of world finance capital.

It is particularly important to examine the part which capital exports play in creating the international network of dependence and ties of finance capital.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL

UNDER the old type of capitalism, when free competition prevailed, the export of *goods* was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism, when monopolies prevail, the export of *capital* has become the typical feature.

Capitalism is commodity production at the highest stage of development, when labour power itself becomes a commodity. The growth of internal exchange, and particularly of international exchange, is a special feature of capitalism. The uneven and spasmodic character of the development of individual enterprises, of individual branches of industry and individual countries, is inevitable under the capitalist system. England became a capitalist country before any other, and in the middle of the nineteenth century, having adopted free trade, claimed to be the "workshop of the world," the great purveyor of manufactured goods to all other countries, which in exchange were to keep her supplied with raw materials. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, *this* monopoly was already undermined. Other countries, protecting themselves by tariff walls, had developed into independent capitalist countries. On the threshold of the twentieth century, we see a new type of monopoly coming into existence. First, there are monopolist capitalist combines in all advanced capitalist countries; secondly, a few rich countries, in which the accumulation of capital reaches gigantic proportions, occupy a monopolist position. An enormous "superfluity of capital" has accumulated in the advanced countries.

It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today lags far behind industry everywhere, if it could raise the standard of living of the masses, who are every-

where still poverty-stricken and underfed, in spite of the amazing advance in technical knowledge, there could be no talk of a superfluity of capital. This "argument" the petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism advance on every occasion. But if capitalism did these things it would not be capitalism; for uneven development and wretched conditions of the masses are the fundamental and inevitable conditions and premises of this mode of production. As long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will never be utilised for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists; it will be used for the purpose of increasing those profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries, profits usually are high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The possibility of exporting capital is created by the entry of numerous backward countries into international capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been built or are being built there; the elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The necessity of exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become "over-ripe" and (owing to the backward state of agriculture and the impoverished state of the masses) capital cannot find "profitable" investment.

Here are approximate figures showing the amount of capital invested abroad by the three principal countries:

CAPITAL INVESTED ABROAD (In billions of francs)			
Year	Great Britain	France	Germany
1862	3.6	—	—
1872	15.0	10 (1869)	—
1882	22.0	15 (1880)	?
1893	42.0	20 (1890)	?
1902	62.0	27.37	12.5
1914	75-100	60	44.0

This table shows that the export of capital reached formidable dimensions only in the beginning of the twentieth century. Before the war the capital invested abroad by the three principal coun-

tries amounted to between 175 and 200 billion francs. At the modest rate of 5 per cent, this sum brought in from 8 to 10 billions a year. This provided a solid basis for imperialist oppression and the exploitation of most of the countries and nations of the world; a solid basis for the capitalist parasitism of a handful of wealthy states!

How is this capital invested abroad distributed among the various countries? *Where* does it go? Only an approximate answer can be given to this question, but sufficient to throw light on certain general relations and ties of modern imperialism.

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (ABOUT 1910)
(In billions of marks)

<i>Continent</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Total</i>
Europe	4	23	18	45
America	37	4	10	51
Asia, Africa, Australia	29	8	7	44
Total	70	35	35	140

The principal spheres of investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in America (for example, Canada), as well as in Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are bound up with the possession of enormous colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism we shall speak later. In regard to France, the situation is quite different. French capital exports are invested mainly in Europe, particularly in Russia (at least ten billion francs). This is mainly *loan* capital, in the form of government loans and not investments in industrial undertakings. Unlike British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism. In regard to Germany, we have a third type; the German colonies are inconsiderable, and German capital invested abroad is divided fairly evenly between Europe and America.

The export of capital greatly affects and accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development in the countries exporting capital, it

can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world.

The countries which export capital are nearly always able to obtain "advantages," the character of which throws light on the peculiarities of the epoch of finance capital and monopoly. The following passage, for instance, occurred in the Berlin review, *Die Bank*, for October 1913:

"A comedy worthy of the pen of Aristophanes is being played just now on the international money market. Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to the Argentine, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly approaching the big money markets demanding loans, some of which are very urgent. The money market is not at the moment very bright and the political outlook is not yet promising. But not a single money market dares to refuse a loan for fear that its neighbour might grant it and so secure some small reciprocal service. In these international transactions the creditor nearly always manages to get some special advantages: an advantage of a commercial-political nature, a coaling station, a contract to construct a harbour, a fat concession, or an order for guns."

Finance capital has created the epoch of monopolies, and monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist methods: the utilisation of "connections" for profitable transactions takes the place of competition on the open market. The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan that is granted shall be spent on purchases in the country of issue, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc. In the course of the last two decades (1890-1910), France often resorted to this method. The export of capital abroad thus becomes a means for encouraging the export of commodities. In these circumstances transactions between particularly big firms assume a form "bordering on corruption," as Schilder "delicately" puts it. Krupp in Germany, Schneider in France, Armstrong in England, are instances of firms having close connections with powerful banks and governments whose "share" must not be forgotten when arranging a loan.

France granted loans to Russia in 1905 and by the commercial treaty of September 16, 1905,* she "squeezed" concessions out of her to run till 1917. She did the same thing when the Franco-Japanese commercial treaty was concluded on August 19, 1911.**

The tariff war between Austria and Serbia, which lasted with a seven months' interval, from 1906 to 1911,* was partly caused by competition between Austria and France for supplying Serbia with war material. In January 1912, Paul Deschanel stated in the Chamber of Deputies that from 1908 to 1911 French firms had supplied war material to Serbia to the value of 45,000,000 francs.

A report from the Austro-Hungarian Consul at Sao-Paulo (Brazil) states:

"The construction of the Brazilian railways is being carried out chiefly by French, Belgian, British and German capital. In the financial operations connected with the construction of these railways the countries involved also stipulate for orders for the necessary railway material."

Thus, finance capital, almost literally, one might say, spreads its net over all countries of the world. Banks founded in the colonies, or their branches, play an important part in these operations. German imperialists look with envy on the "old" colonising nations which in this respect are "well established." In 1904, Great Britain had 50 colonial banks with 2,279 branches (in 1910 there were 72 banks with 5,449 branches); France had 20 with 136 branches; Holland, 16 with 68 branches, and Germany had a "mere" 13 with 70 branches.

The American capitalists, in their turn, are jealous of the English and German: "In South America," they complained in 1915, "five German banks had forty branches and five English banks had seventy. . . . During the last twenty-five years, Great Britain and Germany have invested in the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay about four billion dollars, which places under their control 46 per cent of the total trade of these three countries."

The capital exporting countries have divided the world among themselves in the figurative sense of the term. But finance capital has also led to the *actual* division of the world.

CHAPTER V

THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG CAPITALIST COMBINES

MONOPOLIST capitalist combines—cartels, syndicates, trusts—divide among themselves, first of all, the whole internal market of a country, and impose their control, more or less completely, upon the industry of that country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market. As the export of capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial relations, the “spheres of influence” of the big monopolist combines, expanded, things tended “naturally” toward an international agreement among these combines and toward the formation of international cartels.


This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and production, incomparably higher than the preceding stages. Let us see how this super-monopoly develops.

The electrical industry is the most typical of the modern technical achievements of capitalism of the *end* of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. This industry has developed most in the two most advanced of the new capitalist countries, the United States and Germany. In Germany, the crisis of 1900 gave a particularly strong impetus to its concentration. During the crisis, the banks, which by this time had become fairly well merged with industry, greatly accelerated and deepened the collapse of relatively small firms and their absorption by the large ones.

“The banks,” writes Jeidels, “in refusing a helping hand to the very companies which need it, bring on, after a frenzied boom, the hopeless failure of the companies which are not permanently closely attached to them.”


As a result, after 1900, concentration in Germany proceeded by leaps and bounds. Up to 1900 there had been seven or eight

"groups" in the electrical industry. Each was formed of many companies (altogether there were twenty-eight) and each was supported by from two to eleven banks. Between 1908 and 1912 all the groups were united into two, or possibly one. The diagram below shows the process:



The famous A.E.G. (General Electric Company), which grew up in this way, controls 175 to 200 companies (through share holdings), and a total capital of approximately 1,500,000,000 marks. Abroad, it has thirty-four direct representatives, of which twelve are joint stock companies, in more than ten countries. As early as 1904, the amount of capital invested abroad by the German electrical industry was estimated at 233,000,000 marks. Of this sum, 62,000,000 were invested in Russia. Needless to say, the A.E.G. is a huge combine. Its manufacturing companies alone number no less than sixteen, and their factories make the most varied articles, from cables and insulators to motor cars and aeroplanes.

But concentration in Europe was a part of the process of concentration in America, which developed in the following way:



Thus, *two* "Great Powers" in the electrical industry were formed. "There are no other electric 'powers' in the world *completely* independent of them," wrote Heinig in his article "The Path of the Electricity Trust." An idea, although far from complete, of the turnover and the size of the enterprises of the two "trusts" can be obtained from the following figures:

		<i>Turnover</i> (In millions of marks)	<i>No. of</i> <i>Employees</i>	<i>Net Profits</i> (In millions of marks)
America: General Electric Co.	1907	252	28,000	35.4
	1910	298	32,000	45.6
Germany: A.E.G.	1907	216	30,700	14.5
	1911	362	60,800	21.7

In 1907, the German and American trusts concluded an agreement by which they divided the world between themselves. Competition between them ceased. The American General Electric Company "got" the United States and Canada. The A.E.G. "got" Germany, Austria, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey and the Balkans. Special agreements, naturally secret, were concluded regarding the penetration of "subsidiary" companies into new branches of industry, into "new" countries formally not yet allotted. The two trusts were to exchange inventions and experiments.

It is easy to understand how difficult competition has become against this trust, which is practically world-wide, which controls a capital of several billion marks, and has its "branches," agencies, representatives, connections, etc., in every corner of the world. But the division of the world between two powerful trusts does not remove the possibility of *re-division*, if the relation of forces changes as a result of uneven development, war, bankruptcy, etc.

The oil industry provides an instructive example of such a *re-division*, or rather of a struggle for *re-division*.

"The world oil market," wrote Jeidels in 1905, "is even today divided in the main between two great financial groups—Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co., and the controlling interests of the Russian oilfields in Baku,

Rothschild and Nobel. The two groups are in close alliance. But for several years, five enemies have been threatening their monopoly:" 1) The exhaustion of the American wells; 2) the competition of the firm of Mantashév of Baku; 3) the Austrian wells; 4) the Rumanian wells; 5) the trans-oceanic oilfields, particularly in the Dutch colonies (the extremely rich firms, Samuel and Shell, also connected with British capital). The three last groups are connected with the great German banks, principally, the Deutsche Bank. These banks independently and systematically developed the oil industry in Rumania, in order to have a foothold of their "own." In 1907, 185,000,000 francs of foreign capital were invested in the Rumanian oil industry, of which 74,000,000 came from Germany.

A struggle began, which, in economic literature, is fittingly called "the struggle for the division of the world." On one side, the Rockefeller trust, wishing to conquer *everything*, formed a subsidiary company right in Holland, and bought up oil wells in the Dutch Indies, in order to strike at its principal enemy, the Anglo-Dutch Shell trust. On the other side, the Deutsche Bank and the other German banks aimed at "retaining" Rumania "for themselves" and at uniting it with Russia against Rockefeller. The latter controlled far more capital and an excellent system of oil transport and distribution. The struggle had to end, and did end in 1907, with the defeat of the Deutsche Bank, which was forced to choose between two alternatives, either to liquidate its oil business and lose millions, or to submit. It chose to submit, and concluded a very disadvantageous agreement with the American trust. The Deutsche Bank agreed "not to attempt anything which might injure American interests." Provision was made, however, for the annulment of the agreement in the event of Germany establishing a state oil monopoly.

Then the "comedy of oil" began. One of the German finance kings, von Gwinner, a director of the Deutsche Bank, began through his private secretary, Strauss, a campaign for a state oil monopoly. The gigantic machine of the big German bank and all its "connections" were set in motion. The press bubbled over with "patriotic" indignation against the "yoke" of the American trust, and, on March 15, 1911, the Reichstag by an almost unanimous vote adopted a motion asking the government to introduce a bill for the establishment of an oil monopoly. The government

seized upon this "popular" idea and the game of the Deutsche Bank, which hoped to deceive its American partner and improve its business by a state monopoly, appeared to have been won. The German oil magnates saw visions of wonderful profits, which would not be less than those of the great Russian sugar refiners. . . . But, first, the great German banks quarrelled among themselves over the division of the spoils; the Disconto-Gesellschaft exposed the covetous aims of the Deutsche Bank; secondly, the government took fright at the prospect of a struggle with Rockefeller; it was doubtful whether Germany could be sure of obtaining oil from other sources (the Rumanian output was small). Thirdly, just at that time the 1913 credits of a billion marks were voted for Germany's war preparations. The project of the oil monopoly was postponed. The Rockefeller trust came out of the struggle, for the time being, victorious.

The Berlin magazine, *Die Bank*, said in this connection that Germany could only fight the oil trust by establishing an electricity monopoly and by converting water power into cheap electricity.

"But," the author added, "the power monopoly will come when the producers need it, that is to say, when the next great failure in the electrical industry is impending and when the powerful expensive electric stations which are now being put up at great cost everywhere by private electric concerns, which obtain partial monopolies from towns, from the state, etc., can no longer work at a profit. Water power will then have to be used. But this cannot be converted into cheap electricity at state expense; it will have to be handed over to 'a private monopoly controlled by the state,' because of the immense compensation and damages that would have to be paid to private industry. . . . So it was with the nitrate monopoly; so it is with the oil monopoly; so it is with the petroleum monopoly; so it will be with the electric power monopoly. It is time our state socialists, who allow themselves to be blinded by beautiful principles, understood once and for all that in Germany monopolies have never pursued the aim, nor have they had the result of benefiting the consumer, or of handing over to the state part of the *entrepreneurs'* profits; they have served only to sanitize, at the expense of the state, private industries which were on the verge of bankruptcy."

Such are the valuable admissions which the German bourgeois economists are forced to make. We see plainly here how private monopolies and state monopolies are bound together in the age of finance capital; how both are but separate links in the

imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division of the world.

In mercantile shipping, the tremendous development of concentration has ended also in the division of the world. In Germany two powerful companies have raised themselves to first rank, the Hamburg-Amerika and the Nord-Deutscher-Lloyd, each having a capital of 200,000,000 marks in stocks and bonds, and possessing 185 to 189 million marks worth of shipping tonnage. On the other side, in America, on January 1, 1903, the Morgan trust, the International Maritime Trading Company, was formed which united nine British and American steamship companies, and which controlled a capital of 120,000,000 dollars (480,000,000 marks). As early as 1903, the German giants and the Anglo-American trust concluded an agreement and divided the world in accordance with the division of profits. The German companies undertook not to compete in the Anglo-American traffic. The ports were carefully allotted to each; a joint committee of control was set up. This contract was concluded for twenty years, with a prudent provision for its annulment in the event of war.

Extremely instructive also is the story of the creation of the International Rail Cartel. The first attempt of the British, Belgian and German rail manufacturers to create such a cartel was made as early as 1884, at the time of a severe industrial depression. The manufacturers agreed not to compete with one another for the internal markets of the countries involved, and they divided the foreign markets in the following quotas: Great Britain—66 per cent; Germany—27 per cent; Belgium—17 per cent. India was reserved entirely for Great Britain. Joint war was declared against a British firm which remained outside the cartel. The cost of this economic war was met by a percentage levy on all sales. But in 1886 the cartel collapsed when two British firms retired from it. It is characteristic that agreement could not be achieved in the period of industrial prosperity which followed.

At the beginning of 1904, the German Steel Syndicate was formed. In November 1904, the International Rail Cartel was revived with the following quotas for foreign trade: Great Britain—

53.5 per cent; Germany—28.83 per cent; Belgium—17.67 per cent. France came in later with 4.8 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 6.4 per cent in the first, second and third years respectively, in excess of the 100 per cent limit, *i.e.*, when the total was 104.8 per cent, etc. In 1905, the United States Steel Corporation entered the cartel; then Austria; then Spain.

"At the present time," wrote Vogelstein in 1910, "the partition of the world is completed, and the big consumers, primarily the state railways—since the world has been parcelled out without consideration for their interests—can now dwell like the poet in the palace of Jupiter."

We will mention also the International Zinc Syndicate, established in 1909, which divided output exactly among five groups of factories: German, Belgian, French, Spanish and British. Then there is the International Dynamite Trust, of which Liefmann says that it is

"quite a modern close alliance between all the manufacturers of explosives who, with the English and French dynamite manufacturers who have organised in a similar manner, have divided the whole world among themselves, so to speak."

Altogether, Liefmann, in 1897, counted about forty international cartels in which Germany had a share, while in 1910 there were about a hundred.

Certain bourgeois writers (with whom K. Kautsky, who has completely abandoned the Marxian position he held, for example, in 1909, has now associated himself) express the opinion that international cartels are the most striking expressions of the internationalisation of capital, and that they, therefore, give the hope of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically, this opinion is absurd, while in practice it is a sophism and a dishonest defence of the worst opportunism. International cartels show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed, and they *reveal the object* of the struggle between the various capitalist groups. This last circumstance is the most important; it alone shows us the historico-economic significance of events; for the *forms* of the struggle may and do vary in accordance with varying, relatively particular and transitory causes, but the *essence*

of the struggle, its class *content*, *cannot* change while classes exist. It is easy to understand, for example, that it is in the interests of the German bourgeoisie, whose theoretical arguments have now been adopted by Kautsky (we will deal with this later), to obscure the *content* of the contemporary economic struggle (the division of the world) and to emphasise one or another *form* of the struggle. Kautsky makes the same mistake. Of course, we have in mind not only the German bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie all over the world. The capitalists divide the world, not out of malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to get profits. And they divide it in proportion to capital, in proportion to "strength," because there cannot be any other system of division under the system of commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what takes place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by this change of forces. The question as to whether these changes are "purely" economic or *non-economic* (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which does not in the least affect the fundamental view on the latest epoch of capitalism. To substitute for the question of the *content* of the struggle and agreements between capitalist combines the question of the *form* of these struggles and agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow war-like, the next day peaceful again) is to descend into sophistry.

The epoch of modern capitalism shows us that certain relations are established between capitalist alliances, *based* on the economic partition of the world; while parallel to this fact and in connection with it, certain relations are established between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for economic territory."

CHAPTER VI

THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS

In his book, *The Territorial Development of the European Colonies*, A. Supan, the geographer, briefly sums up this development at the end of the nineteenth century, as follows:

PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORIES BELONGING TO THE EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS (INCLUDING UNITED STATES)

	1876	1900	Increase or Decrease
Africa	10.8	90.4	+79.6
Polynesia	56.8	98.9	+42.1
Asia	51.5	56.6	+ 5.1
Australia	100.0	100.0	—
America	27.5	27.2	— 0.3

"The characteristic feature of this period," he concludes, "is, therefore, the division of Africa and Polynesia."

As there are no unoccupied territories—that is, territories that do not belong to any state—in Asia and America, Mr. Supan's conclusion must be carried further and we must say that the characteristic feature of this period is the final partition of the globe—not in the sense that a *new partition* is impossible—on the contrary, new partitions are possible and inevitable—but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist countries has *completed* the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our planet. For the first time the world is completely shared out, so that in the future *only re-division* is possible; territories can only pass from one "owner" to another, instead of passing as unowned territory to an "owner."

Hence, we are passing through a peculiar period of world colonial policy, which is closely associated with the "latest phase

of capitalist development," with finance capital. For this reason, it is essential to deal in detail with the facts, in order to ascertain exactly what distinguishes this period from those preceding it, and what the present situation is. In the first place, two questions of fact arise here. Is an intensification of colonial policy, an intensification of the struggle for colonies, observed in this period of finance capital? And how, in this respect, is the world divided at the present time?

The American writer, Morris, in his book *The History of Colonisation*, has made an attempt to compile data on the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and Germany during different periods of the nineteenth century. The following is a brief summary of the results he has obtained:

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS						
Great Britain		France		Germany		
Area	Population	Area	Population	Area	Population	
(million	(millions)	(million	(millions)	(million	(millions)	
sq. miles)		sq. miles)		sq. miles)		
1815-30 ?	126.4	0.02	0.5	—	—	
1860 2.5	145.1	0.2	3.4	—	—	
1880 7.7	267.9	0.7	7.5	—	—	
1899 9.3	309.0	3.7	56.4	1.0	14.7	

For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial conquests is that between 1860 and 1880, and it was also very considerable in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. For France and Germany this period falls precisely in these last twenty years. We saw above that the apex of pre-monopoly capitalist development, of capitalism in which free competition was predominant, was reached in the sixties and seventies of the last century. We now see that it is *precisely following that period* that the "boom" in colonial annexations begins, and that the struggle for a territorial division of the world becomes extraordinarily keen. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that the transition of capitalism to monopoly capitalism, to finance capitalism, is *connected* with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the world.

Hobson, in his work on imperialism, marks the years 1884-

1900 as the period of the intensification of the colonial "expansion" of the chief European states. According to his estimate, Great Britain during these years acquired 3,700,000 square miles of territory with a population of 57,000,000 inhabitants; France acquired 3,600,000 square miles with a population of 36,500,000 inhabitants; Germany, 1,000,000 square miles with a population of 16,700,000 inhabitants; Belgium, 900,000 square miles with 30,000,000 inhabitants; Portugal, 800,000 square miles with 9,000,000 inhabitants. The quest for colonies by all the capitalist states at the end of the nineteenth century, and particularly since the 1880's, is a commonly known fact in the history of diplomacy and of foreign affairs.

When free competition in Great Britain was at its height, *i.e.*, between 1840 and 1860, the leading British bourgeois politicians were opposed to colonial policy and were of the opinion that the liberation of the colonies and their complete separation from Great Britain was inevitable and desirable. M. Beer, in an article, "Modern British Imperialism," published in 1898, shows that in 1852, Disraeli, a statesman generally inclined towards imperialism, declared: "The colonies are millstones round our necks." But at the end of the nineteenth century the heroes of the hour were Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, open advocates of imperialism, who applied the imperialist policy in the most cynical manner.

It is not without interest to observe that even at that time these leading British bourgeois politicians fully appreciated the connection between what might be called the purely economic and the politico-social roots of modern imperialism. Chamberlain advocated imperialism by calling it a "true, wise and economical policy," and he pointed particularly to the German, American and Belgian competition which Great Britain was encountering in the world market. Salvation lies in monopolies, said the capitalists as they formed cartels, syndicates and trusts. Salvation lies in monopolies, echoed the political leaders of the bourgeoisie, hastening to appropriate the parts of the world not yet shared out. The journalist, Stead, relates the following remarks uttered

by his close friend Cecil Rhodes in 1895 regarding his imperialist ideas:

"I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread,' 'bread,' 'bread,' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism. . . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."

This is what Cecil Rhodes, millionaire, king of finance, the man who was mainly responsible for the Boer War, said in 1895. His defence of imperialism is just crude and cynical, but in substance it does not differ from the "theory" advocated by Messrs. Maslov, Südekum, Potresov, David, the founder of Russian Marxism¹ and others. Cecil Rhodes was a somewhat more honest social-chauvinist.

To tabulate as exactly as possible the territorial division of the world, and the changes which have occurred during the last decades, we will take the data furnished by Supan in the work already quoted on the colonial possessions of all the powers of the world. Supan examines the years 1876 and 1900; we will take the year 1876—a year aptly selected, for it is precisely at that time that the pre-monopolist stage of development of West European capitalism can be said to have been completed, in the main, and we will take the year 1914, and in place of Supan's figures we will quote the more recent statistics of Hübner (*Geographical and Statistical Tables*). Supan gives figures for colonies only: we think it useful, in order to present a complete picture of the division of the world, to add brief figures on non-colonial and semi-colonial countries like Persia, China and Turkey. Persia is already almost completely a colony; China and Turkey are on the way to becoming colonies. We thus get the following summary:

¹ I.e., G. V. Plekhanov.—Ed.

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS

(In millions of square kilometres and in millions of inhabitants)

	Colonies				Home Countries		Total	
	1876		1914		1914		1914	
	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.	Area	Pop.
Great Britain .	22.5	251.9	33.5	393.5	0.3	46.5	33.8	440.0
Russia	17.0	15.9	17.4	33.2	5.4	136.2	22.8	169.4
France	0.9	6.0	10.6	55.5	0.5	39.6	11.1	95.1
Germany	—	—	2.9	12.3	0.5	64.9	3.4	77.2
U. S. A.	—	—	0.3	9.7	9.4	97.0	9.7	106.7
Japan	—	—	0.3	19.2	0.4	53.0	0.7	72.2
Total	40.4	273.8	65.0	523.4	16.5	437.2	81.5	960.6
Colonies of other Powers (Belgium, Holland, etc.)							9.9	45.3
Semi-colonial countries (Persia, China, Turkey)							14.5	361.2
Other countries							28.0	289.9
Total area and population of the world							133.9	1,657.0

We see from these figures how "complete" was the partition of the world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. After 1876 colonial possessions increased to an enormous degree, more than one and a half times, from 40,000,000 to 65,000,000 square kilometres in area for the six biggest powers, an increase of 25,000,000 square kilometres, that is, one and a half times greater than the area of the "home" countries, which have a total of 16,500,000 square kilometres. In 1876 three powers had no colonies, and a fourth, France, had scarcely any. In 1914 these four powers had 14,100,000 square kilometres of colonies, or an area one and a half times greater than that of Europe, with a population of nearly 100,000,000. The unevenness in the rate of expansion of colonial possessions is very marked. If, for instance, we compare France, Germany and Japan which do not differ very much in area and population, we will see that the first (France) has annexed almost three times as much colonial territory as the other two combined. But in regard to finance capital, also, France, at the beginning of the period we are considering, was perhaps several times richer than Germany and Japan put together. In addition to and on the basis of purely economic causes, geographical conditions and other factors also affect the dimensions of colonial possessions. However strong

the process of levelling the world, of levelling economic and living conditions in different countries may have been in the past decades as a result of the pressure of large-scale industry, exchange and finance capital, great differences still remain; and even among the six powers we see, first, young capitalist powers (America, Germany, Japan) which progressed very rapidly; secondly, countries with an old capitalist development (France and Great Britain), which have made much slower progress of late than the previously mentioned countries, and thirdly, a country (Russia) which is economically most backward, in which modern capitalist imperialism is enmeshed, so to speak, in a thick web of pre-capitalist relations.

Alongside the colonial possessions of these great powers, we have placed the small colonies of the small states, which are, so to speak, the next possible and probable objects of a new colonial "share-out." Most of these little states are able to retain their colonies only because of the conflicting interests, frictions, etc., among the big powers, which prevent them from coming to an agreement in regard to the division of the spoils. The semi-colonial states provide an example of the transitional forms which are to be found in all spheres of nature and society. Finance capital is such a great, it may be said, such a decisive force in all economic and international relations that it is capable of subordinating to itself, and actually does subordinate to itself, even states enjoying complete political independence. We shall shortly see examples of this. Naturally, finance capital finds it most "convenient," and is able, to extract the greatest profit from a subordination which involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples. In this connection, the semi-colonial countries provide a typical example of the "middle stage." It is natural that the struggle for these semi-dependent countries should have become particularly bitter during the period of finance capital, when the rest of the world had already been shared out.

Colonial policy and imperialism existed before this latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on

slavery, pursued a colonial policy and achieved imperialism.* But "general" arguments about imperialism which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference of social-economic systems, inevitably degenerate into absolutely empty banalities, or into grandiloquent comparisons like "Greater Rome and Greater Britain." Even the colonial policy of capitalism in its *previous* stages is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital.

The principal feature of modern capitalism is the domination of monopolist combines of the big capitalists. These monopolies are most durable when *all* the sources of raw materials are controlled by the one group. And we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist combines exert every effort to make it impossible for their rivals to compete with them; for example, by buying up mineral lands, oil fields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the monopolies against all the risks of the struggle with competitors, including the risk that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing a state monopoly. The more capitalism develops, the more the need for raw materials arises, the more bitter competition becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw materials proceeds all over the world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.

Schilder writes:

"It may even be asserted, although it may sound paradoxical to some, that in the more or less discernible future the growth of the urban industrial population is more likely to be hindered by a shortage of raw materials for industry than by a shortage of food."

For example, there is a growing shortage of timber—the price of which is steadily rising—of leather and raw materials for the textile industry.

"As instances of the efforts of industrial associations to effect a balance between agriculture and industry in world industry we might mention the International Federation of Cotton Spinners' Associations in the most important industrial countries, founded in 1904, and the European Federation of Flax Spinners' Associations, founded on the above pattern in 1910."

The bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, of course, try to belittle the importance of facts of this kind by arguing that it "would be possible" to obtain raw materials in the open market without a "costly and dangerous" colonial policy; and that it "would be possible" to greatly increase the supply of raw materials "simply" by improving agriculture. But these arguments are simply an apology for imperialism, an attempt to embellish it, because they ignore the principal feature of modern capitalism: monopoly. Free markets are becoming more and more a thing of the past; monopolist syndicates and trusts are restricting them more and more every day, and "simply" improving agriculture reduces itself to improving the conditions of the masses, of raising wages and reducing profits. Where, except in the imagination of the sentimental reformists, are there any trusts capable of interesting themselves in the condition of the masses instead of the conquering of colonies?

Finance capital is not only interested in the already known sources of raw materials; it is also interested in possible sources of raw materials, because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and because land which is useless today may be made fertile tomorrow if new methods are applied (to devise these new methods a big bank can equip a whole expedition of engineers, agricultural experts, etc.), and large amounts of capital are invested. This also applies to prospecting for minerals, to new methods of working up and utilising raw materials, etc., etc. Hence, the inevitable striving of finance capital to extend its economic territory and even its territory in general. In the same way that the trusts capitalise their property by estimating it at two or three times its value, taking into account its "possible" future (and not present) returns, and the further results of monopoly, so finance capital strives to seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds and in any place it can, and by any means, counting on the possibilities of finding raw materials there, and fearing to be left behind in the insensate struggle for

the last available scraps of unappropriated territory, or for the repartition of that which has been already appropriated.

The British capitalists are exerting every effort to develop cotton growing in *their own* Egyptian colony (in 1904, out of 2,300,000 hectares of land under cultivation, 600,000, or more than one-fourth, were devoted to cotton growing); the Russians are doing the same in their colony, Turkestan; and they are doing so because in this way they will be in a better position to defeat their foreign competitors, to monopolise the sources of raw materials and form a more economical and profitable textile trust in which *all* the processes of production will be "combined" and concentrated in the hands of a single owner.

The necessity of exporting capital also serves to stimulate the quest for colonies, for it is easier in the colonial market (and sometimes it is the only possible way), by monopolist methods to eliminate competition, to make sure of orders, to strengthen the necessary "connections," etc.

The non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology, stimulates the striving for colonial conquest. "Finance capital does not want liberty, it wants domination," as Hilferding very truly says. And a French bourgeois writer, developing and supplementing, as it were, the ideas of Cecil Rhodes, which we quoted above, writes that social causes should be added to the economic causes of modern colonial policy.

"Owing to the growing complexity and difficulties of life which weigh, not only on the masses of the workers, but also on the middle classes, impatience, irritation and hatred are accumulating in all the countries of the old civilisation and are becoming a menace to public order; employment must be found for the energy which is being hurled out of the definite class channel: it must be given an outlet abroad in order to avert an explosion at home."

Since we are speaking of colonial policy in the period of capitalist imperialism, it must be observed that finance capital and its corresponding foreign policy, which reduces itself to the struggle of the Great Powers for the economic and political division of the world, give rise to a number of *transitional* forms

of national dependence. The division of the world into two principal groups—of colony-owning countries on the one hand and colonies on the other—is not the only typical feature of this period; there is also a variety of forms of dependence; countries which, formally, are politically independent, but which are, in fact, enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence. We have already referred to one form of dependence—the semi-colony. Another example is provided by Argentina.

“South America, and especially Argentina,” writes Schulze-Gävernitz in his work on British imperialism, “is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony.”

Basing himself on the report of the Austro-Hungarian consul at Buenos Aires, Schilder estimates the amount of British capital invested in Argentina in 1909 at 8,750,000,000 francs. It is not difficult to imagine the solid bonds that are thus created between British finance capital (and its faithful “friend,” diplomacy) and the Argentine bourgeoisie, the leading businessmen and politicians of that country.

A somewhat different form of financial and diplomatic dependence, accompanied by political independence, is presented by Portugal. Portugal is an independent sovereign state. In actual fact, however, for more than two hundred years, since the war of the Spanish Succession (1700-14), it has been a British protectorate. The British have protected Portugal and her colonies in order to fortify their own positions in the fight against their rivals, Spain and France. In return, they have received commercial advantages, preferential imports of goods, and, above all, of capital into Portugal and the Portuguese colonies, the right to use the ports and islands of Portugal, her telegraph cables, etc. Relations of this kind have always existed between big and small states. But during the period of capitalist imperialism they become a general system, they form part of the process of “dividing the world”; they become a link in the chain of operations of world finance capital.

In order to complete our examination of the question of the

division of the world, we must make the following observation. This question was raised quite openly and definitely not only in American literature after the Spanish-American War, and in English literature after the Boer War, at the very end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth; not only has German literature, which always "jealously" watches "British imperialism," systematically given its appraisal of this fact, but it has been raised in French bourgeois literature in terms as wide and as clear as are possible from the bourgeois point of view. We will quote Driault, the historian, who, in his book, *Political and Social Problems at the End of the Nineteenth Century*, in the chapter "The Great Powers and the Division of the World," wrote the following:

"During recent years all the free territory of the earth, with the exception of China, has been occupied by the powers of Europe and North America. Several conflicts and displacements of influence have already occurred over this matter, which foreshadow more terrible outbreaks in the near future. For it is necessary to make haste. The nations which have not yet made provision for themselves run the risk of never receiving their share and never participating in the tremendous exploitation of the globe which will be one of the essential features of the next century" (i.e., the twentieth). "That is why all Europe and America has lately been afflicted with the fever of colonial expansion, of 'imperialism,' that most characteristic feature of the end of the nineteenth century."

And the author added:

"In this partition of the world, in this furious pursuit of the treasures and of the big markets of the globe, the relative power of the empires founded in this nineteenth century is totally out of proportion to the place occupied in Europe by the nations which founded them. The dominant powers in Europe, those which decide the destinies of the Continent, are not equally preponderant in the whole world. And, as colonial power, the hope of controlling hitherto unknown wealth, will obviously react to influence the relative strength of the European powers, the colonial question—'imperialism,' if you will—which has already transformed the political conditions of Europe, will modify them more and more."

CHAPTER VII

IMPERIALISM AS A SPECIAL STAGE OF CAPITALISM

WE must now try to sum up and put together what has been said above on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general. But capitalism only became capitalist imperialism at a definite and very high stage of its development, when certain of its fundamental attributes began to be transformed into their opposites, when the features of the period of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system began to take shape and reveal themselves all along the line. The fundamental economic factor in this process is the substitution of capitalist monopolies for capitalist free competition. Free competition is the fundamental attribute of capitalism and of commodity production generally. Monopoly is exactly the opposite of free competition; but we have seen the latter being transformed into monopoly before our very eyes, creating large-scale industry and eliminating small industry, replacing large-scale industry by still larger-scale industry, finally leading to such a concentration of production and capital that monopoly has been and is the result: cartels, syndicates and trusts, and merging with them, the capital of a dozen or so banks manipulating thousands of millions. At the same time monopoly, which has grown out of free competition, does not abolish the latter, but exists alongside it and hovers over it, as it were, and, as a result, gives rise to a number of very acute antagonisms, friction and conflicts. Monopoly is the transition from capitalism to a higher system.

If it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the mono-

poly stage of capitalism. Such a definition would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital of the few big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist combines of manufacturers; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unoccupied by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of the monopolistic possession of the territories of the world which have been completely divided up.

But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the main points, are nevertheless inadequate, because very important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined have to be especially deduced. And so, without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions, which can never include all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its complete development, we must give a definition of imperialism that will embrace the following five essential features:

1) The concentration of production and capital developed to such a stage that it creates monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.

2) The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of "finance capital," of a financial oligarchy.

3) The export of capital, which has become extremely important, as distinguished from the export of commodities.

4) The formation of international capitalist monopolies which share the world among themselves.

5) The territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers is completed.

Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the domination of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the partition of all the territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed.

We shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if consideration is to be given, not only to the basic, purely economic factors—to which the above definition is limited—but also to the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general, or to the relations between imperialism and the two main tendencies in the working class movement. The point to be noted just now is that imperialism, as interpreted above, undoubtedly represents a special stage in the development of capitalism. In order to enable the reader to obtain as well grounded an idea of imperialism as possible, we deliberately quoted largely from *bourgeois* economists who are obliged to admit the particularly indisputable facts regarding modern capitalist economy. With the same object in view, we have produced detailed statistics which reveal the extent to which bank capital, etc., has developed, showing how the transformation of quantity into quality, of developed capitalism into imperialism, has expressed itself. Needless to say, all the boundaries in nature and in society are conditional and changeable, and, consequently, it would be absurd to discuss the exact year or the decade in which imperialism “definitely” became established.

In this matter of defining imperialism, however, we have to enter into controversy, primarily, with Karl Kautsky, the principal Marxian theoretician of the epoch of the so-called Second International, that is, of the twenty-five years between 1889 and 1914.

Kautsky, in 1915 and even in November 1914, decisively attacked the fundamental ideas expressed in our definition of imperialism. Kautsky said that imperialism must not be regarded as a “phase” or stage of economy, but as a policy; a definite policy “preferred” by finance capital; that imperialism cannot be “identified” with “contemporary capitalism”; that if imperialism is to be understood to mean “all the phenomena of contemporary capitalism”—cartels, protection, the hegemony of the financiers and colonial policy—then the question as to whether imperialism is necessary for capitalism becomes reduced to the “flattest tautology”; because, in that case, imperialism is “natu-

rally a vital necessity for capitalism," and so on. The best way to present Kautsky's ideas is to quote his own definition of imperialism, which is diametrically opposed to the substance of the ideas which we have set forth (for the objections coming from the camp of the German Marxists, who have been advocating such ideas for many years already, have long been known to Kautsky as the objections of a definite trend in Marxism).

Kautsky's definition is as follows:

"Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to bring under its control and to annex increasingly big *agrarian*" (Kautsky's italics) "regions irrespective of what nations inhabit those regions."

This definition is utterly worthless because it one-sidedly, *i.e.*, arbitrarily, brings out the national question alone (although this is extremely important in itself as well as in its relation to imperialism), it arbitrarily and *inaccurately* connects imperialism *only* with industrial capital in the countries which annex other nations and in an equally arbitrary and inaccurate manner brings out the annexation of agrarian regions.

Imperialism is a striving for annexations—this is what the *political* part of Kautsky's definition amounts to. It is correct, but very incomplete, for politically imperialism is in general a striving towards violence and reaction. For the moment, however, we are interested in the *economic* aspect of the question, which Kautsky *himself* introduced into *his* definition. The inaccuracy of Kautsky's definition is obvious. The characteristic feature of imperialism is *not* industrial capital, *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital and the weakening of industrial capital that, from 1880 onwards, gave rise to the extreme extension of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex *not only* agricultural regions, but even highly industrialised regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), because 1) the fact that the world is already partitioned obliges those contemplating a *new* partition to stretch

out their hands to *any kind* of territory, and 2) because an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between a number of great powers in the striving for hegemony, *i.e.*, for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves, as to weaken the adversary and undermine *his* hegemony. (Belgium is chiefly necessary for Germany as a base for operations against England; England needs Bagdad as a base for operations against Germany,* etc.)

Kautsky refers especially—and repeatedly—to English writers who, he alleges, have given a purely political meaning to the word “imperialism” in the sense that Kautsky understands it. We take up the work by the Englishman Hobson, *Imperialism*, which appeared in 1902, and therein we read:

“The new imperialism differs from the older, first in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and the practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political aggrandisement and commercial gain, secondly, in the dominance of financial, or investing, over mercantile interests.”

We see, therefore, that Kautsky is absolutely wrong in referring to English writers generally (unless he meant the vulgar British imperialist writers, or the avowed apologists for imperialism). We see that Kautsky, while claiming that he continues to defend Marxism, as a matter of fact takes a step backward compared with the *social-liberal* Hobson, who more *correctly* takes into account two “historically concrete” (Kautsky’s definition is a mockery of historical concreteness) features of modern imperialism: 1) the competition between *several* imperialisms, and 2) the predominance of the financier over the merchant. If it were chiefly a question of the annexation of agrarian countries by industrial countries, the role of the merchant would be predominant.

But Kautsky’s definition is not only wrong and un-Marxian. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which run counter to Marxian theory and Marxian practice all along the line. We shall refer to this again later. The argument about words which Kautsky raises: whether the latest stage of capitalism should be called “imperialism” or “the stage of finance capital” is of no

importance. Call it what you will, it matters little. The important fact is that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy "preferred" by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which he alleges is possible on this very basis of finance capital. According to his argument, monopolies in economics are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. According to his argument, the territorial division of the world, which was completed precisely during the period of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiarities of the form of rivalry between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring over and a blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth. The result is bourgeois reformism instead of Marxism.

Kautsky enters into controversy with the German apologist of imperialism and annexations, Cuno, who clumsily and cynically argues as follows: imperialism is modern capitalism, the development of capitalism is inevitable and progressive; therefore imperialism is progressive; therefore we should bow down before it and chant its praises. This is something like the caricature of Russian Marxism which the Narodniki drew in 1894-95. They used to argue as follows: if the Marxists believe that capitalism is inevitable in Russia, that it is progressive, then they ought to open a public-house and begin to implant capitalism! Kautsky's reply to Cuno is as follows: imperialism is not modern capitalism. It is only one of the forms of the policy of modern capitalism. This policy we can and should fight; we can and should fight against imperialism, annexations, etc.

The reply seems quite plausible, but in effect it is a more subtle and more disguised (and therefore more dangerous) form of propaganda of conciliation with imperialism, for unless it strikes at the economic basis of the trusts and banks, the "struggle" against the policy of the trusts and banks reduces itself to bourgeois reformism and pacifism, to an innocent and benevolent expression of

pious hopes. Kautsky's theory means refraining from mentioning existing contradictions, forgetting the most important of them, instead of revealing them in their full depth; it is a theory that has nothing in common with Marxism. Naturally, such a "theory" can only serve the purpose of advocating unity with the Cunos. Kautsky writes that from the purely economic point of view it is not impossible that capitalism will yet go through a new phase, that of the extension of the policy of the cartels to foreign policy, the phase of ultra-imperialism, *i.e.*, of a super-imperialism, a union of world imperialism and not struggles among imperialisms; a phase when wars shall cease under capitalism, a phase of "the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital."

We shall have to deal with this "theory of ultra-imperialism" later on in order to show how definitely and utterly it departs from Marxism. In keeping with the plan of the present work, we shall examine the exact economic data on this question. Is "ultra-imperialism" possible "from the purely economic point of view" or is it ultra-nonsense?

If, by "purely economic point of view" a "pure" abstraction is meant, then all that can be said reduces itself to the following proposition: evolution is proceeding towards monopoly; therefore the trend is towards a single world monopoly, to a universal trust. This is indisputable, but it is also as completely devoid of meaning as is the statement that "evolution is proceeding" towards the manufacture of food-stuffs in laboratories. In this sense the "theory" of ultra-imperialism is no less absurd than a "theory of ultra-agriculture" would be, if one were suggested.

If, on the other hand, we are discussing the "purely economic" conditions of the epoch of finance capital as a historically concrete epoch in the twentieth century, the best reply that one can make to lifeless abstractions of "ultra-imperialism" (which serve an exclusively reactionary aim, *viz.*, that of diverting attention from the depth of *existing* antagonisms) is to contrast them with the concrete economic realities of present-day world economy. Kautsky's meaningless talk about ultra-imperialism encourages,

among other things, that profoundly mistaken idea which only brings grist to the mill of the apologists of imperialism, viz., that the domination of finance capital *lessens* the unevenness and contradictions inherent in world economy, whereas in reality it *increases* them.

Richard Calwer, in his little book, *An Introduction to World Economics*, attempted to compile the main, purely economic data required to depict in a concrete way the internal relations of world economy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. He divides the world into five "main economic areas," as follows: 1) Central Europe (the whole of Europe with the exception of Russia and Great Britain); 2) Great Britain; 3) Russia; 4) Eastern Asia; 5) America; he includes the colonies in the "areas" of the state to which they belong and "leaves out" a few countries not distributed according to areas, such as Persia, Afghanistan and Arabia in Asia; Morocco and Abyssinia in Africa, etc.

Here is a brief summary of the economic data he quotes on these regions:

Principal economic areas	Area	Pop.	Transport		Trade	Industry		
	Million sq. km.	Millions	Railways (thous. km.)	Mer-cantile fleet (million tons)	Import and export (billion marks)	Output of coal (million tons)	Output of pig iron (million tons)	No. of cotton spindles (mill.)
1) Central European	27.6 (23.6) ¹	388 (146)	204	8	41	251	15	26
2) British	28.9 (28.6)	398 (355)	140	11	25	249	9	51
3) Russian	22	131	63	1	3	16	3	7
4) East Asian	12	389	8	1	2	8	0.02	2
5) American	30	148	379	6	14	245	14	19

We notice three areas of highly developed capitalism, that is, with a high development of means of transport, of trade and of industry. These are the Central European, the British and the

¹ The figures in parentheses show the area and population of the colonies.

American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the world: Germany, Great Britain, the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have become very keen because Germany has only a restricted area and few colonies (the creation of "central Europe" is still a matter for the future; it is being born in the midst of desperate struggles). For the moment the distinctive feature of Europe is political disintegration. In the British and American areas, on the other hand, political concentration is very highly developed, but there is a tremendous disparity between the immense colonies of the one and the insignificant colonies of the other. In the colonies, capitalism is only beginning to develop. The struggle for South America is becoming more and more acute.

There are two areas where capitalism is not strongly developed: Russia and Eastern Asia. In the former the density of population is very small, in the latter it is very high; in the former political concentration is very high; in the latter it does not exist. The partition of China is only beginning, and the struggle between Japan, U.S.A., etc., in connection therewith is steadily gaining in intensity.

Compare this reality, the vast diversity of economic and political conditions, the extreme disparity in the rate of development of the various countries, and the violent struggles of the imperialist states, with Kautsky's stupid little fable about "peaceful" ultra-imperialism. Is this not the reactionary attempt of a frightened philistine to hide from stern reality? Do not the international cartels which Kautsky imagines are the embryos of "ultra-imperialism" (with as much reason as one would have for describing the manufacture of tabloids in a laboratory as ultra-agriculture in embryo) present an example of the division and the *re-division* of the world, the transition from peaceful division to *violent* division and *vice versa*? Is not American and other finance capital, which divided the whole world peacefully, with Germany's participation, for example, in the International Rail Syndicate, or in the International Mercantile Shipping Trust, now

engaged in *re-dividing* the world on the basis of a new relation of forces, which has been changed by methods *by no means* peaceful?

Finance capital and the trusts are aggravating instead of diminishing the differences in the rate of development of the various parts of world economy. When the relation of forces is changed, how else, *under capitalism*, can the solution for contradictions be found, except by resorting to *violence*?

Railway statistics provide remarkably exact data on the different rates of development of capitalism and finance capital in world economy. In the last decades of imperialist development, the total length of railways, expressed in thousands of kilometres, has changed as follows:

	1890	1913	Increase
Europe	224	346	122
U. S. A.	268	411	143
Colonies (total)	82	210	128
Independent or semi-independent states of Asia and America	43	137	94
	125	347	222
Total	617	1,104	

Thus, the development of railways has been more rapid in the colonies and in the independent or semi-independent states of Asia and America. Here, as we know, the finance capital of the four or five biggest capitalist states reigns undisputed. Two hundred thousand kilometres of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent more than 40,000,000,000 marks in capital, newly invested under particularly advantageous conditions, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.

Capitalism is growing with the greatest rapidity in the colonies and in trans-oceanic countries. Among the latter, *new* imperialist powers are emerging (e.g., Japan). The struggle of world imperialism is becoming aggravated. The tribute levied by finance capital on the most profitable colonial and trans-oceanic enterprises is increasing. In sharing out this booty, an exceptionally

large part goes to countries which, as far as the development of productive forces is concerned, do not always stand at the top of the list. In the case of the biggest countries, considered with their colonies, the total length of railways was as follows (in thousands of kilometres):

	1890	1913	Increase
U. S. A.	268	413	145
British Empire	107	208	101
Russia	32	78	46
Germany	43	68	25
France	41	63	22
Total	491	830	339

Thus, about 80 per cent of the total existing railways are concentrated in the hands of the five great powers. But the concentration of the *ownership* of these railways, that of finance capital, is much greater still: French and English millionaires, for example, own an enormous amount of stocks and bonds in American, Russian and other railways.

Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased "her" length of railways by 100,000 kilometres, four times as much as Germany. And yet it is well known that the development of productive forces in Germany, and especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been much more rapid during this period than in England—not to mention France and Russia. In 1892, Germany produced 4,900,000 tons of pig iron, and Great Britain produced 6,800,000 tons; in 1912, Germany produced 17,600,000 tons and Great Britain, 9,000,000 tons. Germany, therefore, had an overwhelming superiority over England in this respect!

We ask, is there *under capitalism* any means of remedying the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and "spheres of influence" by finance capital on the other side—other than by resorting to war?

CHAPTER VIII

THE PARASITISM AND DECAY OF CAPITALISM

WE have to examine yet another very important aspect of imperialism to which, usually, too little importance is attached in most of the arguments on this subject. One of the shortcomings of the Marxist, Hilferding, is that he takes a step backward compared with the non-Marxist, Hobson. We refer to parasitism, which is a feature of imperialism.

As we have seen, the most deep-rooted economic foundation of imperialism is monopoly. This is capitalist monopoly, *i.e.*, monopoly which has grown out of capitalism and exists in the general capitalist environment of commodity production and competition, and remains in permanent and insoluble contradiction to this general environment. Nevertheless, like all monopoly, this capitalist monopoly inevitably gives rise to a tendency to stagnation and decay. As monopoly prices become fixed, even temporarily, the stimulus to technical and, consequently, to all progress, disappears to a certain extent, and to that extent, also, the *economic* possibility arises of deliberately retarding technical progress. For instance, in America, a certain Mr. Owens invented a machine which revolutionised the manufacture of bottles. The German bottle manufacturing trust purchased Owen's patent, but refrained from utilising it. Certainly, monopoly cannot, under capitalism, eliminate competition in the world market completely and for a long period of time (and this, by the by, is one of the reasons why the theory of ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly the possibility of reducing cost of production and increasing profits by introducing technical improvements is an influence in the direction of change. Nevertheless, the *tendency* to stagnation and decay, which is the feature of monopoly, continues, and in

certain branches of industry, in certain countries, for certain periods of time, it becomes predominant.

The monopoly of ownership of very extensive, rich or well-situated colonies operates in the same direction.

Moreover, imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries, which, as we have seen, amounts to 100 to 150 billion francs in various securities. Hence the extraordinary growth of the class, or rather of the category, of bondholders (*rentiers*), people who live by clipping coupons, who take no part whatever in production, whose profession is idleness. The export of capital, one of the essential economic bases of imperialism, still more completely isolates the *rentiers* from production and sets the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by the exploitation of the labour of several overseas countries and colonies.

"In 1893," writes Hobson, "the British capital invested abroad represented about 15 per cent of the total wealth of the United Kingdom."

Let us remember that by 1915 this capital had increased about two and a half times.

"Aggressive imperialism," says Hobson further on, "which costs the taxpayer so dear, which is of so little value to the manufacturer and trader . . . is a source of great gain to the investor. . . . The annual income Great Britain derives from commissions in her whole foreign and colonial trade, import and export, is estimated by Sir R. Giffen at £18,000,000 for 1899, taken at 2.5 per cent upon a turnover of £800,000,000."

Great as this sum is, it does not explain the aggressive imperialism of Great Britain. This is explained by the 90 to 100 million pounds sterling revenue from "invested" capital, the income of the *rentier* class.

The revenue of the bondholders is *five times greater* than the revenue obtained from the foreign trade of the greatest trading country in the world. This is the essence of imperialism and imperialist parasitism.

For that reason the term, "bondholder state" (*Rentnerstaat*), or usurer state, is passing into current use in the economic literature that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided

into a handful of money-lending states on the one side, and a vast majority of debtor states on the other.

"The premier place among foreign investments," says Schulze-Gävernitz, "is held by those placed in politically dependent or closely allied countries. Great Britain grants loans to Egypt, Japan, China and South America. Her navy plays the part of bailiff in case of necessity. Great Britain's political power protects her from the indignation of her debtors."

Sartorius von Waltershausen in his work, *The Economic System of Foreign Investments*, cites Holland as the model bondholder state and points out that Great Britain and France have taken the same road. Schilder believes that five industrial nations have become "pronounced creditor nations": Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. Holland does not appear on this list simply because it is "industrially less developed." He asserts that the United States is creditor only of the other American countries.

"Great Britain," says Schulze-Gävernitz, "is gradually becoming transformed from an industrial state into a creditor state. Notwithstanding the absolute increase in industrial output and the export of manufactured goods, the relative importance of income from interest and dividends, issues, commissions and speculation is on the increase for the whole of the national economy. In my opinion it is precisely this that forms the economic basis of imperialist ascendancy. The creditor is more permanently attached to the debtor than the seller is to the buyer."

In regard to Germany, A. Lansburgh, the editor of *Die Bank*, in 1911, in an article entitled "Germany as a Bondholder State," wrote the following:

"People in Germany are ready to sneer at the yearning observed in France of people to become *rentiers*. But they forget that as far as the middle class is concerned the situation in Germany is becoming more and more like that in France."

The *rentier* state is a state of parasitic decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to influence all the social-political conditions of the countries affected generally and the two fundamental trends in the working class movement particularly. To demonstrate this in the clearest possible manner we will quote Hobson, who will be regarded as a more "reliable" witness, since he cannot be suspected of leanings towards "orthodox Marxism";

moreover, he is an Englishman who is very well acquainted with the situation in the country which is richest in colonies, in finance capital and in imperialist experience.

With the Boer War fresh in his mind, Hobson describes the connection between imperialism and the interests of the "financiers," the growing profits from war contracts, etc., and writes as follows:

"While the directors of this definitely parasitic policy are capitalists, the same motives appeal to special classes of the workers. In many towns, most important trades are dependent upon government employment or contracts; the imperialism of the metal and shipbuilding centres is attributable in no small degree to this fact."

In this writer's opinion there are two causes which weakened the older empires: 1) "economic parasitism," and 2) the formation of armies composed of subject races.

"There is first the habit of economic parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its provinces, colonies and dependencies, in order to enrich its ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into acquiescence."

And we would add that the economic possibility of such corruption, whatever its form may be, requires high monopolist profits.

As for the second cause, Hobson writes:

"One of the strangest symptoms of the blindness of imperialism is the reckless indifference with which Great Britain, France and other imperialist nations are embarking on this perilous dependence. Great Britain has gone farthest. Most of the fighting by which we have won our Indian Empire has been done by natives; in India, as more recently in Egypt, great standing armies are placed under British commanders; almost all the fighting associated with our African dominions, except in the southern part, has been done for us by natives."

Hobson gives the following economic appraisal of the prospect of the partition of China:

"The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the South of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East, with a somewhat larger group of professional retainers and tradesmen and a large body of personal servants and workers in the transport trade and in the final stages of production of

the more perishable goods; all the main arterial industries would have disappeared, the staple foods and manufactures flowing in as tribute from Asia and Africa.

We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of Western states, a European federation of great powers which, so far from forwarding the cause of world civilisation, might introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced industrial nations, whose upper classes draw vast tribute from Asia and Africa, with which they support great tame masses of retainers, no longer engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control of a new financial aristocracy. Let those who would scout such a theory as undeserving of consideration examine the economic and social condition of districts in Southern England today, which are already reduced to this condition, and reflect upon the vast extension of such a system which might be rendered feasible by the subjection of China to the economic control of similar groups of financiers, investors, and political and business officials, draining the greatest potential reservoir of profit the world has ever known, in order to consume it in Europe. The situation is far too complex, the play of world forces far too incalculable, to render this or any other single interpretation of the future very probable; but the influences which govern the imperialism of Western Europe today are moving in this direction and, unless counteracted or diverted, make towards some such consummation."

Hobson is quite right. *Unless* the forces of imperialism are counteracted they will lead to what he has described. He correctly appraises the significance of a "United States of Europe," in the present conditions of imperialism. He should have added, however, that, even within the working class movement, the opportunists, who are for the moment predominant in most countries, are "working" systematically and undeviatingly in this very direction. Imperialism, which means the partition of the world, and the exploitation of other countries besides China, which means high monopoly profits for a handful of very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of corrupting the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism. However, we must not lose sight of the forces which counteract imperialism generally, and opportunism particularly, which, naturally, the social-liberal Hobson is unable to perceive.

The German opportunist, Gerhard Hildebrand, who was expelled from the Party for defending imperialism, and would today make an excellent leader of the so-called "Social-Demo-

cratic" Party of Germany, serves as a good supplement to Hobson by his advocacy of a "United States of Western Europe" (without Russia) for the purpose of "joint" action against . . . the African Negroes, against the "great Islamic movement," for the "upkeep of a powerful army and navy," against a "Sino-Japanese coalition," etc.

The description of "British imperialism" in Schulze-Gävernitz's book reveals the same parasitical traits. The national income of Great Britain approximately doubled from 1865 to 1898, while the income from "overseas" increased *ninefold* in the same period. While the "merit" of imperialism is that it "trains the Negro to habits of industry" (not without coercion of course . . .), the "danger" of imperialism is that Europe

"will shift the burden of physical toil—first agricultural and mining, then the more arduous toil in industry—on to the coloured races, and itself be content with the role of *rentier*, and in this way, perhaps, pave the way for the economic, and later the political emancipation of the coloured races."

An increasing proportion of land in Great Britain is being taken out of cultivation and used for sport, for the diversion of the rich.

"Scotland," says Schulze-Gävernitz, "is the most aristocratic playground in the world—it lives on its past and on Mr. Carnegie."

Great Britain annually spends £14,000,000 on horse racing and fox hunting. The number of bondholders in Great Britain has risen to about one million. The percentage of producers among the total population is becoming smaller.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population (millions)</i>	<i>No. workers employed in basic industries (millions)</i>	<i>Per cent of producers to total population</i>
1851	17.9	4.1	23
1901	32.5	4.9	15

And, in speaking of the British working class, the bourgeois student of "British imperialism at the beginning of the twentieth century" is obliged to distinguish systematically between the "up-

per stratum" of the workers and the "*lower stratum of the proletariat proper*." The upper stratum furnishes the main body of co-operators, of trade unionists, of members of sporting clubs and of numerous religious sects. The electoral system, which in Great Britain is "*still sufficiently restricted to exclude the lower stratum of the proletariat proper*," is adapted to their level! In order to present the condition of the British working class in the best possible light, only this upper stratum—which constitutes only a *minority* of the proletariat—is generally spoken of. For instance, the problem of unemployment "*is mainly a London problem and that of the lower proletarian stratum, which is of little political moment*."

It would be better to say: which is of little political moment for the bourgeois politicians and the "socialist" opportunists.

Another special feature of imperialism, which is connected with the facts we are describing, is the decline in emigration from imperialist countries, and the increase in immigration to those countries from the backward countries where low wages are paid. As Hobson observes, emigration from Great Britain has been declining since 1894. In that year the number of emigrants from Great Britain was 242,000, while in 1900, the number was only 169,000. German emigration reached the highest point between 1880 and 1890, with a total of 1,453,000 emigrants. In the course of the following two decades, it fell to 544,000 and even to 341,000. On the other hand, there was an increase in the number of workers entering Germany from Austria, Italy, Russia and other countries. According to the 1907 census, there were 1,342,294 foreigners in Germany, of whom 440,800 were industrial workers and 257,329 were agricultural workers. In France, the workers employed in the mining industry are, "in great part," foreigners: Polish, Italian and Spanish. In the United States, immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are engaged in the most poorly paid occupations, while American workers provide the highest percentage of overseers or of the better paid workers. Imperialism has the tendency of

creating privileged sections even among the workers, and of detaching them from the main proletarian masses.

It must be observed that in Great Britain the tendency of imperialism to divide the workers in this way, to encourage opportunism among them, and cause temporary decay in the working class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries; for two important features of imperialism were observed in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century, *viz.*, vast colonial possessions and a monopolist position in world markets. Marx and Engels systematically traced this relation between opportunism in the labour movement and the imperialistic features of British capitalism for several decades. For example, on October 7, 1858, Engels wrote to Marx:

"The English proletariat is becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat *as well as* a bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is, of course, to a certain extent justifiable."

Almost a quarter of a century later, in a letter dated August 11, 1881, Engels speaks of ". . . the worst type of British trade unions which allow themselves to be led by men who have been bought by the capitalists, or at least are in their pay." In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote:

"You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general: the same as what the bourgeois think. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies." (Engels expressed similar ideas in the press in his preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, which appeared in 1892.*)

We thus see clearly the causes and effects. The causes are: 1) Exploitation of the whole world by this country. 2) Its monopolistic position in the world market. 3) Its colonial monopoly. The effects are: 1) A section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois. 2) A section of the proletariat permits itself to be led

by people who are bought by the bourgeoisie, or, at least, who are in their pay.

The imperialism of the beginning of the twentieth century completed the partition of the world among a very few states, each of which today exploits (*i.e.*, draws super-profits from) a part of the world only a little smaller than that which England exploited in 1858. Each of them, by means of trusts, cartels, finance capital, and debtor and creditor relations, occupies a monopoly position on the world market. Each of them enjoys to some degree a colonial monopoly. (We have seen that out of the total of 75,000,000 sq. km. which comprise the *whole* colonial world, 65,000,000 sq. km., or 86 per cent, belong to six great powers; 61,000,000 sq. km., or 81 per cent, belong to three powers.)

The distinctive feature of the present situation is the prevalence of economic and political conditions which could not but increase the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working class movement. Embryonic imperialism has grown into a dominant system; capitalist monopolies occupy first place in economics and politics; the division of the world has been completed. On the other hand, instead of an undisputed monopoly by Great Britain, we see a few imperialist powers disputing among themselves for the right to share in this monopoly, and this struggle is characteristic of the whole period of the beginning of the twentieth century. Opportunism, therefore, cannot now triumph in the working class movement of any country for decades as it did in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. But in a number of countries it has grown ripe, over-ripe, and rotten, and has become completely merged with bourgeois policy in the form of "social-chauvinism."¹

¹ Russian social-chauvinism represented by Messrs. Potresov, Chkhenskeli, Maslov, etc., in its obvious form as well as in its tacit form, as represented by Messrs. Chkheidze, Skobelev, Axelrod, Martov, etc., also emerged from the Russian variety of opportunism, namely liquidationism.

CHAPTER IX

THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM

By the critique of imperialism, in the broad sense of the term, we mean the attitude towards imperialist policy of the different classes of society as part of their general ideology.

The enormous dimensions of finance capital concentrated in a few hands and creating an extremely extensive and close network of ties and relationships which subordinate not only the small and medium, but also even the very small capitalists and small masters, on the one hand, and the intense struggle waged against other national state groups of financiers for the partition of the world and the power to rule over other countries, on the other hand, cause the wholesale transition of the possessing classes to the side of imperialism. The signs of the times are a "general" enthusiasm regarding its prospects, a passionate defence of imperialism, and every possible embellishment of its real nature. The imperialist ideology also permeates the working class. There is no Chinese Wall between it and the other classes. The leaders of the so-called "Social-Democratic" Party of Germany are today justly called social-imperialists, that is, socialists in words and imperialists in deeds; but as early as 1902, Hobson noted the existence of "Fabian imperialists" who belonged to the opportunist Fabian Society¹ in England.

The bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defence of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form and obscure its complete domination and its profound roots; they strive to concentrate attention on details and secondary characteristics and do their very best to distract attention from the main issue by

¹ See note to page 206.***—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

means of ridiculous schemes for "reform," such as police supervision of the trusts and banks, etc. Less frequently, cynical and frank imperialists speak out and are bold enough to admit the absurdity of the idea of "reforming" the fundamental features of imperialism.

We will give an example. The German imperialists attempt, in the magazine, *Archives of World Economy*, to follow the movements for national emancipation in the colonies, particularly, of course, in colonies other than those belonging to Germany. They note the ferment and protest movements in India, the movement in Natal (South Africa), the movements in the Dutch East Indies, etc. One of them, commenting on an English report of the speeches delivered at a conference of subject peoples and races, held June 28-30, 1910, at which representatives of various peoples subject to foreign domination in Africa, Asia and Europe were present, writes as follows in appraising the speeches delivered at this conference:

"We are told that we must fight against imperialism; that the dominant states must recognise the right of subject peoples to home rule; that an international tribunal should supervise the fulfilment of treaties concluded between the great powers and weak peoples. One does not get any further than the expression of these pious wishes. We see no trace of understanding of the fact that imperialism is indissolubly bound up with capitalism in its present form" (!!) "and therefore also no trace of the realisation that an open struggle against imperialism would be hopeless, unless, perhaps, the fight is confined to protests against certain of its especially abhorrent excesses."

Since the reform of the basis of imperialism is a deception, a pious "wish," since the bourgeois representatives of oppressed nations go no "further" forward, the bourgeois representatives of the oppressing nation go "further" *backward*, to servility towards imperialism, concealed by the cloak of "science." "Logic," indeed!

The question as to whether it is possible to reform the basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the aggravation of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backwards, towards allaying these antagonisms, is a fundamental question in the critique of imperialism. As a consequence of the fact that the political fea-

tures of imperialism are reaction all along the line, and increased national oppression, resulting from the oppression of the financial oligarchy and the elimination of free competition, a democratic petty-bourgeois opposition has been rising against imperialism in almost all imperialist countries since the beginning of the twentieth century. And the desertion of Kautsky and of the broad international Kautskyan trend from Marxism is displayed in the very fact that Kautsky not only did not trouble to oppose, not only was not able to oppose this petty-bourgeois reformist opposition, which is really reactionary in its economic basis, but in practice actually became merged with it.

In the United States, the imperialist war waged against Spain in 1898 stirred up the opposition of the "anti-imperialists," the last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy. They declared this war to be "criminal," denounced the annexation of foreign territories as being a violation of the constitution, and denounced the "Jingo treachery" by means of which Aguinaldo, leader of the native Filipinos, was deceived (the Americans promised him the independence of his country, but later they landed troops and annexed it). They quoted the words of Lincoln:

"When the white man governs himself, that is self-government, but when he governs himself and also governs others, it is no longer self-government; it is despotism."

But while all this criticism shrank from recognising the indissoluble bond between imperialism and the trusts, and, therefore, between imperialism and the very foundations of capitalism; while it shrank from joining up with the forces engendered by large-scale capitalism and its development—it remained a "pious wish."

This is also, in the main, the attitude of Hobson in his criticism of imperialism. Hobson anticipated Kautsky in protesting against the "inevitability of imperialism," and in calling for the need to "raise the consuming capacity of the people" (under capitalism!). The petty-bourgeois point of view in the critique of imperialism, the domination of the banks, the financial oligarchy, etc., is that adopted by the authors we have often quoted,

such as Agahd, A. Lansburgh, L. Eschwege; and among French writers, Victor Bérard, author of a superficial book entitled *England and Imperialism* which appeared in 1900. All these authors, who make no claim to being Marxists, contrast imperialism with free competition and democracy; they condemn the Bagdad railway "scheme" as leading to disputes and war, utter "pious wishes" for peace, etc. This applies also to the compiler of international stock and share issue statistics, A. Neymarck, who, after calculating the hundreds of billions of francs representing "international" values, exclaimed in 1912: "Is it possible to believe that the peace can be disturbed . . . that, in the face of these enormous figures, anyone would risk starting a war?"

Such simplicity of mind on the part of the bourgeois economists is not surprising. Besides, *it is in their interests* to pretend to be so naive and to talk "seriously" about peace under imperialism. But what remains of Kautsky's Marxism, when, in 1914-15-16, he takes up the same attitude as the bourgeois reformists and affirms that "everybody is agreed" (imperialists, pseudo-socialists and social-pacifists) as regards peace? Instead of an analysis of imperialism and an exposure of the depths of its contradictions, we have nothing but a reformist "pious wish" to waive it aside, to evade it.

Here is an example of Kautsky's economic criticism of imperialism. He takes the statistics of British import and export trade with Egypt for 1872 and 1912. These statistics show that this import and export trade has developed more slowly than British foreign trade as a whole. From this Kautsky concludes:

"We have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation. . . . The urge of the present-day states to expand can be best satisfied, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by peaceful democracy."

This argument, which is repeated in every key by Kautsky's armour-bearer (and the Russian protector of social-chauvinists), Mr. Spectator, forms the basis of Kautskyan criticism of imperialism and that is why we must deal with it in greater detail. We will begin with a quotation from Hilferding, whose conclusions,

as Kautsky on many occasions, and notably in April 1915, declared, have been "unanimously adopted by all socialist theoreticians."

"It is not the business of the proletariat," wrote Hilferding, "to contrast the more progressive capitalist policy to that of the now bygone era, of free trade and of hostility towards the state. The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, cannot be free trade, but socialism. The aim of proletarian policy cannot now be the ideal of restoring free competition—which has now become a reactionary ideal—but the complete abolition of competition by the abolition of capitalism."

Kautsky departed from Marxism by advocating what is, in the period of finance capital, a "reactionary ideal," "peaceful democracy," "the mere operation of economic factors," etc., for *objectively*, this ideal drags us back from monopoly capitalism to the non-monopolist stage, and is a reformist swindle.

Trade with Egypt (or with any other colony or semi-colony) would have been better "developed" *without* military occupation, without imperialism, and without finance capital. . . . What does this mean? That capitalism would develop more rapidly if free competition were not restricted by monopolies in general, by the "connections" or the yoke (*i.e.*, the monopoly) of finance capital, or by the monopolist possession of colonies by certain countries?

Kautsky's argument can have no other meaning; and this "meaning" is meaningless. But suppose, for the sake of argument, free competition, without any sort of monopoly, *would* develop capitalism and trade more rapidly. Is it not a fact that the more rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which *gives rise* to monopoly? And monopolies have *already* come into being—precisely *out of* free competition. Even if monopolies have now begun to retard progress, it is not an argument in favour of free competition, which has become impossible since it gave rise to monopoly.

Whichever way one turns Kautsky's argument, one will find nothing in it except reaction and bourgeois reformism.

Even if we modify this argument and say, as Spectator says,

that the trade of the British colonies with the mother country is now developing more slowly than their trade with other countries, it does not save Kautsky; for it is *also* monopoly and imperialism that is beating Great Britain, only it is the monopoly and imperialism of another country (America, Germany). It is known that the cartels have given rise to a new and peculiar form of protective tariffs: goods suitable for export are protected (Engels noted this in Vol. III of *Capital**). It is known, too, that the cartels and finance capital have a system peculiar to themselves, that of exporting goods at "dumping prices," or "dumping," as the English call it: within a given country the cartel sells its goods at a high price fixed by monopoly; abroad it sells them at a much lower price to undercut the competitor, to enlarge its own production to the utmost, etc. If German trade with the British colonies is developing more rapidly than that of Great Britain with the same colonies, it only proves that German imperialism is younger, stronger and better organised than British imperialism, is superior to it. But this by no means proves the "superiority" of free trade, for it is not free trade fighting against protection and colonial dependence, but two rival imperialisms, two monopolies, two groups of finance capital. The superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism is stronger than the wall of colonial frontiers or of protective tariffs. To use this as an argument in *favour* of free trade and "peaceful democracy" is banality, is to forget the essential features and qualities of imperialism, to substitute petty-bourgeois reformism for Marxism.

It is interesting to note that even the bourgeois economist, A. Lansburgh, whose criticism of imperialism is as petty-bourgeois as Kautsky's, nevertheless got closer to a more scientific study of commercial statistics. He did not compare merely one country chosen at random, and a colony, with the other countries; he examined the export trade of an imperialist country: 1) with countries which are financially dependent upon it, which borrow money from it, and 2) with countries which are financially independent. He obtained the following results:

EXPORT TRADE OF GERMANY
(millions of marks)

<i>Countries Financially Dependent on Germany</i>	1889	1908	Percentage of increase
Rumania	48.2	70.8	47
Portugal	19.0	32.8	73
Argentina	60.7	147.0	143
Brazil	48.7	84.5	73
Chile	28.3	52.4	85
Turkey	29.9	61.0	114
Total	234.8	451.5	92
<i>Countries Financially Independent of Germany</i>			
Great Britain	651.8	997.4	53
France	210.2	437.9	108
Belgium	137.2	322.8	135
Switzerland	177.4	401.1	127
Australia	21.2	64.5	205
Dutch East Indies	8.8	40.7	363
Total	1,206.6	2,264.4	87

Lansburgh did not *add up* the columns and therefore, strangely enough, failed to observe that *if* the figures prove anything at all, they prove that *he is wrong*, for the exports to countries financially dependent on Germany have grown *more rapidly*, if only slightly, than those to the countries which are financially independent. (We emphasise the "if," for Lansburgh's figures are far from complete.)

On the relation between export trade and loans, Lansburgh wrote:

"In 1890-91, a Rumanian loan was floated through the German banks, which had already in previous years made advances on this loan. The loan was used chiefly for purchases by Rumania of railway material in Germany. In 1891 German exports to Rumania amounted to 55,000,000 marks. The following year they fell to 39,400,000 marks; then with fluctuations, to 25,400,000 in 1900. Only in very recent years have they regained the level of 1891, thanks to a few new loans.

"German exports to Portugal rose, following the loans of 1888-89 to 21,100,000 (1890); then fell, in the two following years, to 16,200,000 and 7,400,000; and only regained their former level in 1903.

"German trade with the Argentine is still more striking. Following the

loans floated in 1888 and 1890, German exports to the Argentine reached, in 1889, 60,700,000 marks. Two years later they only reached 18,600,000 marks, that is to say, less than one-third of the previous figures. It was not until 1901 that they regained and surpassed the level of 1889, and then only as a result of new loans floated by the state and by municipalities, with advances to build power stations, and with other credit operations.

"As for Chile, exports to that country rose to 45,200,000 marks in 1892, after the loan negotiated in 1889. The following year they fell to 22,500,000 marks. A new Chilean loan floated by the German banks in 1906 was followed by a rise of exports, in 1907, to 84,700,000 marks, only to fall again to 52,400,000 marks in 1908."

From all these facts Lansburgh draws the amusing petty-bourgeois moral of how unstable and irregular export trade is when it is bound up with loans, how bad it is to invest capital abroad instead of "naturally" and "harmoniously" developing home industry, how "costly" is the *backsheesh* that Krupp has to pay in floating foreign loans, etc.! But the facts are clear. The increase in exports is *closely* connected with the swindling tricks of finance capital, which is not concerned with bourgeois morality, but with skinning the ox twice—first, it pockets the profits from the loan; then it pockets other profits from the *same* loan which the borrower uses to make purchases from Krupp, or to purchase railway material from the Steel Syndicate, etc.

We repeat that we do not by any means consider Lansburgh's figures to be perfect. But we had to quote them because they are more scientific than Kautsky's and Spectator's and because Lansburgh showed the correct way of approaching the question. In discussing the significance of finance capital in regard to exports, etc., one must be able to single out the connection of exports especially and solely with the tricks of the financiers, especially and solely with the sale of goods by cartels, etc. Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony (Egypt) with all other countries, is to evade and to tone down the very *gist* of the question.

Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has nothing in common with Marxism and serves no other purpose than as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportu-

nists and the social-chauvinists, precisely for the reason that it evades and obscures the very profound and radical contradictions of imperialism: the contradictions between monopoly and free competition that exists side by side with it, between the gigantic "operations" (and gigantic profits) of finance capital and "honest" trade on the free market, the contradictions between combines and trusts, on the one hand, and non-trustified industry, on the other, etc.

The notorious theory of "ultra-imperialism," invented by Kautsky, is equally reactionary. Compare his arguments on this subject in 1915, with Hobson's arguments in 1902.

Kautsky:

"... whether the present imperialist policy cannot be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capital. Such a new phase of capitalism is, at any rate, conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question."

Hobson:

"Christendom thus laid out in a few great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the most legitimate development of present tendencies and one which would offer the best hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-imperialism."

Kautsky called ultra-imperialism or super-imperialism what Hobson thirteen years earlier had described as inter-imperialism. Except for coining a new and clever word, by replacing one Latin prefix by another, the only progress Kautsky has made in the sphere of "scientific" thought is that he has labelled as Marxism that which Hobson, in effect, described as the cant of English parsons. After the Anglo-Boer War it was quite natural that this worthy caste should exert every effort to *console* the British middle class and the workers who had lost many of their relatives on the battle-fields of South Africa and who were obliged to pay high taxes in order to guarantee still higher profits for the British financiers. And what better consolation could there be than the theory that imperialism is not so bad; that it stands close to inter- (or ultra-) imperialism while it promises

permanent peace? No matter what the good intentions of the British parsons, or of sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, *i.e.*, real, social meaning Kautsky's "theory" can have is that it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, detracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present era, and directing it along illusory perspectives of an imaginary "ultra-imperialism" of the future. Deception of the masses—there is nothing but this in Kautsky's "Marxian" theory.

Indeed, it is enough to compare well-known and indisputable facts to become convinced of the utter falsity of the prospects which Kautsky tries to conjure up before the German workers (and the workers of all lands). Let us consider India, Indo-China and China. It is known that these three colonial and semi-colonial countries, inhabited by six to seven hundred million human beings, are subjected to the exploitation of the finance capital of several imperialist states: Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S.A., etc. We will presume that these imperialist countries form alliances against one another in order to protect and extend their possessions, their interests and their spheres of influence in these Asiatic states; these alliances will be "inter-imperialist," or "ultra-imperialist" alliances. We will presume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" sharing out of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital." As a matter of fact, alliances of this kind have been made in the twentieth century, notably with regard to China. We ask, is it "conceivable," assuming that the capitalist system remains intact—and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make—that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in all and every possible form?

This question only requires stating clearly enough to make it impossible for any but a negative reply to be given; for there can be *no* other conceivable basis under capitalism for the sharing out of spheres of influence, of interests, of colo-

nies, etc., than a calculation of the *strength* of the participants in the share out, their general, economic, financial, military strength, etc. And the strength of these participants in the share out does not change to an equal degree, for under capitalism the development of different undertakings, trusts, branches of industry or countries cannot be *even*. Half a century ago, Germany was a miserable insignificant country, as far as its capitalist strength was concerned, compared with the strength of England at that time. Japan was similarly insignificant compared with Russia. Is it "conceivable" that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strengths of the imperialist powers will have remained *unchanged*? Absolutely inconceivable.

Therefore, "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" alliances, in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine phantasies of English parsons or of the German "Marxist," Kautsky, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing *all* the imperialist powers, are *inevitably* nothing more than a "truce" in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in their turn grow out of wars; the one is the condition for the other, giving rise to alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle out of the *single* basis of imperialist connections and the relations between world economics and world politics. But in order to pacify the workers and to reconcile them with the social-chauvinists who have deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie, wise Kautsky *separates* one link of a single chain from the other, separates the present peaceful (and ultra-imperialist, nay, ultra-ultra-imperialist) alliance of *all* the powers for the "pacification" of China (remember the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion*) from the non-peaceful conflict of tomorrow, which will prepare the ground for another "peaceful" general alliance for the partition, say, of Turkey, on the day after tomorrow, *etc., etc.* Instead of showing the vital connection between periods of imperialist peace and periods of imperialist war, Kautsky puts before the workers a lifeless ab-

straction solely in order to reconcile them to their lifeless leaders.

An American writer, David Jayne Hill, in his *History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, points out in his preface the following periods of contemporary diplomatic history: 1) The revolutionary period; 2) The constitutional movement; 3) The present period of "commercial imperialism." Another writer divides the history of Great Britain's foreign policy since 1870 into four periods: 1) The first Asiatic period: that of the struggle against Russia's advance in Central Asia towards India; 2) The African period (approximately 1885-1902): that of the struggle against France for the partition of Africa (the Fashoda incident of 1898 which brought France within a hair's breadth of war with Great Britain); 3) The second Asiatic period (alliance with Japan against Russia), and 4) The European period, chiefly anti-German. "The political skirmishes of outposts take place on the financial field," wrote Riesser, the banker, in 1905, in showing how French finance capital operating in Italy was preparing the way for a political alliance between the countries, and how a conflict was developing between Great Britain and Germany over Persia, among all the European capitalists over Chinese loans, etc. Behold, the living reality of peaceful "ultra-imperialist" alliances in their indissoluble connection with ordinary imperialist conflicts!

The toning down of the deepest contradictions of imperialism by Kautsky, which inevitably becomes an embellishment of imperialism, leaves its traces in this writer's criticism of the political features of imperialism. Imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. The result is reaction all along the line, whatever the political system, and an extreme intensification of existing antagonisms in this domain also. Particularly acute becomes the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexations, i.e., the violation of national independence (for annexation is nothing else than the violation of the right of nations to self-determination). Hilferding justly draws atten-

tion to the relation between imperialism and the growth of national oppression.

"In regard to the newly opened up countries themselves," he writes, "the capitalism imported into them intensifies contradictions and constantly excites the growing resistance against the intruders of the peoples who are awakened to national consciousness. This resistance can easily become transformed into dangerous measures directed against foreign capital. The old social relations become completely revolutionised. The age-long agrarian incrustation of 'nations without a history' is blasted away, and they are drawn into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism itself gradually procures for the vanquished the means and resources for their emancipation and they set out to achieve the same goal which once seemed highest to the European nations: the creation of a single national state as a means to economic and cultural freedom. This movement for national independence threatens European capital in its valuable and most promising fields of exploitation and European capital can maintain its domination to an increasing extent only by continually increasing its means of exercising violence."

To this must be added that it is not only in newly opened up countries, but also in the old, that imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression, and, consequently, also to increased resistance. While opposing the intensification of political reaction caused by imperialism, Kautsky obscures the question, which has become very serious, of the impossibility of unity with the opportunists in the epoch of imperialism. While objecting to annexations, he presents his objections in a form that will be most acceptable and least offensive to the opportunists. He addresses himself to a German audience, yet he obscures the most topical and important point, for instance, the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine.* In order to appraise this "mental aberration" we will take the following example. Let us suppose that a Japanese is condemning the annexation of the Philippine Islands by the Americans.** Will many believe that he is doing so because he has a horror of annexations as such, and not because he himself has a desire to annex the Philippines? And shall we not be constrained to admit that the "fight" the Japanese is waging against annexations can be regarded as sincere and politically honest only if he fights against the annexation of Korea by Japan,*** and urges freedom for Korea to secede from Japan?

Kautsky's theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political criticism of imperialism, is permeated *through and through* with a spirit, absolutely incompatible with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the most profound contradictions of imperialism, and with a striving to preserve the crumbling unity with opportunism in the European labour movement at all costs.

CHAPTER X

THE PLACE OF IMPERIALISM IN HISTORY

WE have seen that the economic quintessence of imperialism is monopoly capitalism. This very fact determines its place in history, for monopoly that grew up on the basis of free competition, and out of free competition, is the transition from the capitalist system to a higher social economic order. We must take special note of the four principal forms of monopoly, or the four principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism, which are characteristic of the period under review.

1) Monopoly arose out of the concentration of production at a very advanced stage of development. This refers to the monopolist capitalist combines: cartels, syndicates and trusts. We have seen the important role these play in modern economic life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, monopolies acquired complete supremacy in the advanced countries. And although the first steps towards the formation of the combines were first taken by countries enjoying the protection of high tariffs (Germany, America), England, with her system of free trade, was not far behind in revealing the same phenomenon, namely, the birth of monopoly out of the concentration of production.

2) Monopolies have accelerated the capture of the most important sources of raw materials, especially for the coal and iron industry, which is the basic and most highly trustified industry in capitalist society. The monopoly of the most important sources of raw materials has enormously increased the power of big capital, and has sharpened the antagonism between trustified and non-trustified industry.

3) Monopoly has sprung from the banks. The banks have developed from modest intermediary enterprises into the monopolists

of finance capital. Some three or five of the biggest banks in each of the foremost capitalist countries have achieved the "personal union" of industrial and bank capital, and have concentrated in their hands the power to dispose of thousands upon thousands of millions which form the greater part of the capital and revenue of entire countries. A financial oligarchy, which throws a close net of relations of dependence over all the economic and political institutions of contemporary bourgeois society without exception—such is the most striking manifestation of this monopoly.

4) Monopoly has grown out of colonial policy. To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for "spheres of influence," i.e., for spheres of good business, concessions, monopolist profits, and so on; in fine, for economic territory in general. When the colonies of the European powers in Africa comprised only one-tenth of that territory (as was the case in 1876), colonial policy was able to develop by methods other than those of monopoly—by the "free grabbing" of territories, so to speak. But when nine-tenths of Africa had been seized (approximately in 1900), when the whole world had been shared out, there was inevitably ushered in a period of colonial monopoly and, consequently, a period of intense struggle for the partition and the repartition of the world.

The extent to which monopolist capital has intensified all the contradictions of capitalism is generally known. It is sufficient to mention the high cost of living and the power of the trusts. This intensification of contradictions constitutes the most powerful driving force of the transitional period of history, which began at the time of the definite victory of world finance capital.

Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination instead of the striving for liberty, the exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by an extremely small group of the richest or most powerful nations—all these have given birth to those distinctive features of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying capitalism. More and more there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, the crea-

tion of the "bondholding" (*rentier*) state, the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie lives on the proceeds of capital exports and by "clipping coupons." It would be a mistake to believe that this tendency to decay precludes the possibility of the rapid growth of capitalism. It does not. In the epoch of imperialism, certain branches of industry, certain strata of the bourgeoisie and certain countries betray, to a greater or less degree, one or other of these tendencies. On the whole capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before, but it is not only that this growth is becoming more and more uneven; this unevenness manifests itself also, in particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital (such as England).

In regard to the rapidity of Germany's economic development, Riesser, the author of the book on the great German banks, states:

"The progress of the preceding period (1848-70), which had not been exactly slow, stood in about the same ratio to the rapidity with which the whole of Germany's national economy and with it German banking progressed during this period (1870-1905), as the mail coach of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation stood to the speed of the present-day automobile . . . which in whizzing past, it must be said, often endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car."

In its turn, this finance capital which has grown so rapidly is not unwilling (precisely because it has grown so quickly) to pass on to a more "tranquil" possession of colonies which have to be captured—and not only by peaceful methods—from richer nations. In the United States, economic development in the last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, and *for this very reason* the parasitic character of modern American capitalism has stood out with particular prominence. On the other hand, a comparison of, say, the republican American bourgeoisie with the monarchist Japanese or German bourgeoisie shows that the most pronounced political differences become insignificant during the imperialist period—not because they are unimportant in general, but because throughout it is a case of a bourgeoisie with definite traits of parasitism.

The receipt of high monopoly profits by the capitalists in one

of the numerous branches of industry, in one of numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to corrupt individual sections of the working class and sometimes a fairly considerable minority, and win them to the side of the capitalists of a given industry or nation against all the others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the partition of the world increases this striving. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed itself first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact that certain features of imperialist development were observable there much sooner than in other countries.

Some writers, L. Martov, for example, try to evade the fact that there is a connection between imperialism and opportunism in the labour movement—which is particularly striking at the present time—by resorting to stereotyped, optimistic arguments (*à la* Kautsky and Huysmans) like the following: the cause of the opponents of capitalism would be hopeless if it were precisely progressive capitalism that led to the increase of opportunism, or if it were precisely the best paid workers who were inclined towards opportunism, etc. We must have no illusion regarding “optimism” of this kind. It is optimism in regard to opportunism; it is optimism which serves to conceal opportunism. As a matter of fact the extraordinary rapidity and the particularly revolting character of the development of opportunism is by no means a guarantee that its victory will be durable; the rapid growth of a malignant abscess on a healthy body only causes it to burst quickly and thus to relieve the body of it. The most dangerous people of all in this respect are those who do not wish to understand that the fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.

From all that has been said in this book on the economic nature of imperialism, it follows that we must define it as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism. It is very instructive in this respect to note that the bourgeois economists, in describing modern capitalism, frequently employ terms

like "interlocking," "absence of isolation," etc.; "in accordance with their functions and course of development," banks are "not purely private business enterprises; they are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private business regulations." And this very Riesser, who uttered the words just quoted, declares with all seriousness that the "prophecy" of the Marxists concerning "socialisation" has not been realised!

What then does this word "interlocking" express? It merely expresses the most striking feature of the process going on before our eyes. It shows that the observer counts the separate trees without seeing the wood. It slavishly copies the superficial, the fortuitous, the chaotic. It reveals the observer as one overwhelmed by the mass of raw material and utterly incapable of appreciating its meaning and importance. Ownership of shares and relations between owners of private property "interlock in a haphazard way." But the underlying factor of this interlocking, its very base, is the changing social relations of production. When a big enterprise assumes gigantic proportions, and, on the basis of exact computation of mass data, organises according to plan the supply of primary raw materials to the extent of two-thirds, or three-fourths of all that is necessary for tens of millions of people; when these raw materials are transported to the most suitable place of production, sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles away, in a systematic and organised manner; when a single centre directs all the successive stages of work right up to the manufacture of numerous varieties of finished articles; when these products are distributed according to a single plan among tens of hundreds of millions of consumers (as in the case of the distribution of oil in America and Germany by the American "Standard Oil")—then it becomes evident that we have socialisation of production, and not mere "interlocking"; that private economic relations and private property relations constitute a shell which is no longer suitable for its contents, a shell which must of necessity begin to decay if its destruction be postponed by artificial means; a shell which may continue in a state of decay for a fairly long

period (particularly if the cure of the opportunist abscess is protracted), but which must inevitably be removed.

The enthusiastic admirer of German imperialism, Schulze-Gävernitz, exclaims:

"Once the supreme management of the German banks has been entrusted to the hands of a dozen persons, their activity is even today more significant for the public good than that of the majority of the Ministers of State." (The "interlocking" of bankers, ministers, magnates of industry and bondholders, is here conveniently forgotten.) "If we conceive of the tendencies of development which we have noted as realised to the utmost: the money capital of the nation united in the banks; the banks themselves combined in cartels; the investment capital of the nation cast in the shape of securities, then the brilliant forecast of Saint-Simon will be fulfilled. 'The present anarchy of production caused by the fact that economic relations are developing without uniform regulation must make way for organisation in production. Production will no longer be shaped by isolated manufacturers, independent of each other and ignorant of man's economic needs, but by a social institution. A central body of management, able to survey the large fields of social economy from a more elevated point of view, will regulate it for the benefit of the whole of society, will be able to put the means of production into suitable hands, and above all will take care that there be constant harmony between production and consumption. Institutions already exist which have assumed as part of their task a certain organisation of economic labour: the banks.' The fulfilment of the forecasts of Saint-Simon still lies in the future, but we are on the way to its fulfilment—Marxism, different from what Marx imagined, but different only in form."

A crushing "refutation" of Marx, indeed! It is a retreat from Marx's precise, scientific analysis to Saint-Simon's guesswork, the guesswork of a genius, but guesswork all the same.

January-July 1916.

PART II

THE WAR, THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS AND THE TACTICS OF THE PARTY

THE WAR AND RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY*

THE European war, which the governments and the bourgeois parties of all countries have been preparing for decades, has broken out. The growth of armaments, the extreme sharpening of the struggle for markets in the epoch of the latest, the imperialist, stage in the development of capitalism in the foremost countries and the dynastic interests of the most backward East European monarchies were inevitably bound to bring about, and have brought about, the present war.** To seize land and to conquer foreign nations, to ruin a competing nation and to pillage her wealth, to divert the attention of the toiling masses from the internal political crises of Russia, Germany, England and other countries, to disunite the workers and fool them with nationalism, to exterminate their vanguard in order to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—such is the only real content, the significance and the meaning of the present war.

The first duty of Social-Democracy is to reveal this real meaning of the war and ruthlessly to expose the falsehoods, the sophisms and the “patriotic” phrases which are being spread by the ruling classes, the landlords and the bourgeoisie in defence of the war.

At the head of one of the belligerent groups of nations is the German bourgeoisie. It is fooling the working class and the toiling masses by asserting that it is waging war for the defence of the fatherland, freedom and civilisation, for the liberation of the peoples that are oppressed by tsarism, for the destruction of reactionary tsarism. In reality, this very bourgeoisie, which servilely cringes before the Prussian *Junkers* headed by Wilhelm II, has always been the most faithful ally of tsarism and the enemy of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in Russia. In reality, this bourgeoisie will, together with the *Junkers*, exert

every effort to support the tsarist monarchy against a revolution in Russia, no matter what the outcome of the war may be.

In reality, the German bourgeoisie has undertaken a predatory campaign against Serbia with the aim of subjugating it and throttling the national revolution of the Southern Slavs, at the same time directing the bulk of its military forces against the freer countries, Belgium and France, in order to plunder the richer competitor. Spreading the fable that it is waging a defensive war, the German bourgeoisie, in reality, chose the moment that in its opinion was most propitious for war, and is utilising its latest improvements in military technique and forestalling the new armaments that had already been planned and decided upon by Russia and France.

At the head of the other group of belligerent nations are the English and French bourgeois who fool the working class and the toiling masses by asserting that they are waging a war for the fatherland, freedom and civilisation, against the militarism and despotism of Germany. In reality, this bourgeoisie long ago hired with its billions, and prepared for an attack on Germany, the armies of Russian tsarism, the most reactionary and barbarous monarchy of Europe.

In reality, the object of the struggle of the English and French bourgeoisie is to seize the German colonies and to ruin a competing nation which is distinguished for its more rapid economic development. And in pursuit of this noble aim the "advanced" democratic nations are helping savage tsarism to strangle Poland, the Ukraine, etc., and to throttle the revolution in Russia more than ever.

Neither of the two groups of belligerent countries lags behind the other in plunder, atrocities and the endless brutalities of war. But in order to fool the proletariat and distract its attention from the only real war of liberation, namely, civil war against the bourgeoisie both of "its own" and "foreign" countries, in order to further this lofty aim, the bourgeoisie of each country strives, by means of lying phrases about patriotism, to extol the significance of "its own" national war and to assert that it strives to vanquish the enemy, not for the sake of plundering and seizing

territory, but for the sake of "liberating" all other peoples, except its own.

But the more zealously the governments and the bourgeoisie of all countries strive to disunite the workers and to pit them against one another, the more ferociously they employ the system of martial law and military censorship (which even now, in time of war, are applied more strictly against the "enemy within" than against the enemy without) for this lofty purpose, the more urgent is the duty of the class conscious proletariat to defend its class solidarity, its internationalism, its socialist convictions against the orgy of chauvinism roused by the "patriotic" bourgeois cliques of all countries. To renounce this task would mean the renunciation by the class conscious workers of all their strivings towards freedom and democracy, not to speak of socialism.

It must be stated with a feeling of deepest chagrin that the Socialist Parties of the leading European countries have not fulfilled this duty, while the behaviour of the leaders of those parties—particularly of the German party—borders on downright betrayal of the cause of socialism. At this moment of great world historical importance, the majority of the leaders of the present, the Second (1889-1914), Socialist International are trying to substitute nationalism for socialism. Owing to their behaviour, the workers' parties of those countries did not oppose the criminal conduct of the governments, but called upon the working class to merge its position with the position of the imperialist governments. The leaders of the International committed an act of treachery toward socialism when they voted for the war credits, when they repeated the chauvinist ("patriotic") slogans of the bourgeoisie of "their own" countries, when they justified and defended the war, when they entered the bourgeois Cabinets of the belligerent countries, etc., etc. The point of view of the most influential Socialist leaders, and of the most influential organs of the Socialist press of contemporary Europe, is chauvinistic, bourgeois and liberal, and not socialist. The responsibility for disgracing socialism in this way rests, in the first place, on the German Social-Democrats who comprised the strongest and most

influential party in the Second International. But neither can the French Socialists, who took ministerial posts in the government of the very bourgeoisie which had betrayed its fatherland and allied itself with Bismarck to crush the Commune, be excused.*

The German and Austrian Social-Democrats try to justify their support of the war by arguing that thereby they are fighting against Russian tsarism. We Russian Social-Democrats declare that we consider such a justification to be downright sophistry. During the past few years, the revolutionary movement against tsarism in our country has again assumed tremendous proportions. This movement has always been led by the Russian working class. The political strikes of the past few years, which affected millions of workers, proceeded under the slogan of overthrowing tsarism and the demand for a democratic republic. On the very eve of the war, the President of the French Republic, Poincaré, while visiting Nicholas II, was able to see with his own eyes barricades in the streets of St. Petersburg ** constructed by the hands of the Russian workers. The Russian proletariat has not shrunk from any sacrifice to free humanity from the shame of the tsarist monarchy. But we must say that if anything can, under certain conditions, delay the destruction of tsarism, if anything can help tsarism in its struggle against the whole of Russian democracy, it is the present war, which has placed the money-bags of the English, French and Russian bourgeoisie at the disposal of tsarism for the purpose of furthering its reactionary aims. And if anything can hinder the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class against tsarism, it is the behaviour of the leaders of German and Austrian Social-Democracy, which the chauvinist press of Russia is continually holding up to us as an example.

Even if we assume that German Social-Democracy was so weak that it was compelled to refrain from all revolutionary action, even then it should not have joined the chauvinist camp, it should not have taken steps which caused the Italian Socialists to declare with justice that the leaders of the German Social-Democrats were disgracing the banner of the proletarian International.***

Our party, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, has suffered, and will yet suffer, great losses in connection with the

war. Our legal labour press has been completely destroyed. The majority of the labour unions have been closed, a large number of our comrades have been imprisoned and exiled. But our parliamentary representatives—the Russian Social-Democratic Labour fraction in the State Duma—considered it to be its imperative socialist duty to refrain from voting for the war credits and even to walk out of the Duma, in order more energetically to express its protest; it considered it its duty to brand the policy of the European governments as an imperialist one.* And notwithstanding the fact that the oppression of the tsar's government has increased tenfold, our comrades, the workers in Russia, are already publishing their first illegal manifestoes against the war and are thus doing their duty towards democracy and the International.

If the representatives of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the minority of the German Social-Democrats ** and the best Social-Democrats in the neutral countries, are feeling a burning sense of shame over this collapse of the Second International, if Socialist voices against the chauvinism of the majority of the Social-Democratic Parties are becoming audible both in England and in France,*** if the opportunists, represented, for instance, by the German monthly, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*,¹ which has long occupied a national-liberal position, are justly celebrating their victory over European socialism—then those who vacillate between opportunism and revolutionary Social-Democracy (as does the "centre" in the German Social-Democratic Party), those who attempt to ignore or to cover up the collapse of the Second International with diplomatic phrases, are rendering the worst possible service to the proletariat.²

On the contrary, it is necessary openly to recognise this collapse and to understand its causes in order to be able to build a new, more lasting socialist unity of the workers of all countries.

The opportunists have violated the decisions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle Congresses, which imposed the duty on

¹ See note to page 206.*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² See article "The Collapse of the Second International," in this volume.—*Ed.*

the Socialists of all countries of fighting against chauvinism under all conditions, which imposed the duty on Socialists of reacting to every war begun by the bourgeoisie and the governments by increasing the propaganda for civil war and for social revolution. The collapse of the Second International is the collapse of opportunism, which grew up on the soil of a past, specific (so-called "peaceful"), historical epoch and which has practically dominated the International during the past few years. The opportunists long ago prepared the ground for this collapse by rejecting the socialist revolution and substituting for it bourgeois reformism, by repudiating the class struggle with its inevitable transformation into civil war at certain moments, and by preaching class collaboration, by preaching bourgeois chauvinism under the guise of patriotism and defence of the fatherland, and ignoring or repudiating the fundamental truth of socialism expressed long ago in *The Communist Manifesto*, namely, that the workers have no country, by confining themselves in their struggle against militarism to a sentimental, philistine point of view instead of recognising the need for a revolutionary war of the proletarians of all countries against the bourgeoisie of all countries, by converting the necessary utilisation of bourgeois parliamentarism and bourgeois legality into a fetish and into forgetfulness of the need for illegal forms of organisation and agitation in times of crises. The natural "supplement" of opportunism—and equally bourgeois and hostile to the proletarian, i.e., the Marxian, point of view—is the anarcho-syndicalist trend which has distinguished itself by a no less shamefully smug repetition of the slogans of chauvinism in the present crisis.

It is impossible to carry out the tasks of socialism at the present time, it is impossible to achieve the really international unity of the workers, without radically breaking with opportunism and without explaining to the masses the inevitability of its bankruptcy.

It must be the task of the Social-Democrats in every country, first of all, to fight against the chauvinism of their own country. In Russia this chauvinism has wholly affected bourgeois liberalism (the "Cadets") and partly the Narodniki, right down to

the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the "Right" Social-Democrats. In particular, it is necessary to brand the chauvinist declarations of such men as E. Smirnov, P. Maslov and G. Plekhanov,* for example, which have been taken up and widely utilised by the bourgeois "patriotic" press.

Under present conditions, it is impossible to determine, from the standpoint of the international proletariat, whether the defeat of one or the other group of belligerent nations is the lesser evil for socialism. For us Russian Social-Democrats, however, there cannot be the slightest doubt that, from the standpoint of the working class and of the toiling masses of all nations of Russia, the lesser evil would be the defeat of the tsarist monarchy, of the most reactionary and barbarous government that is oppressing the greatest number of nations and the largest mass of the population of Europe and Asia.

The immediate political slogan of the Social-Democrats of Europe must be the formation of a republican United States of Europe. But in contrast to the bourgeoisie, which is ready to "promise" anything in order to draw the proletariat into the general stream of chauvinism, the Social-Democrats will explain that this slogan is false and senseless without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies.

In Russia, in view of the fact that this country is most backward and has not yet completed its bourgeois revolution, the task of the Social-Democrats is, as heretofore, to achieve the three fundamental conditions for consistent democratic reform, viz., a democratic republic (with complete equality and self-determination for all nationalities), confiscation of the lands of the landlords and an eight-hour day. In all the advanced countries, however, the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, which becomes the more urgent, the more the burdens of war press upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its role must become in the restoration of Europe after the horrors of the present "patriotic" barbarism amidst the gigantic technical progress of big capitalism. The fact that the bourgeoisie is passing wartime laws to gag the proletariat makes it absolutely necessary to create illegal forms of agitation and organisation.

Let the opportunists "save" the legal organisations at the price of betraying their convictions; the revolutionary Social-Democrats will utilise the organisational habits and connections of the working class to create illegal forms of fighting for socialism that are suitable for an epoch of crisis, to unite the workers not with the chauvinist bourgeoisie of their respective countries, but with the workers of all countries. The proletarian International has not perished and will not perish. In spite of all obstacles the masses of the workers will create a new International. The present triumph of opportunism is short-lived. The greater the sacrifices the war imposes, the clearer will it become to the masses of the workers that the opportunists have betrayed the cause of labour and that it is necessary to turn the weapons against the government and the bourgeoisie in each country.

Transform the present imperialist war into civil war—is the only correct proletarian slogan; it was indicated by the experience of the Commune,* was outlined by the Basle resolution (1912)¹ and logically follows from all the conditions of an imperialist war among highly developed bourgeois countries. However difficult such a transformation may appear at any given time, Socialists will never relinquish systematic, persistent, undeviating, preparatory work in this direction, since war has become a fact.

Only along this road can the proletariat liberate itself from its dependence upon the chauvinist bourgeoisie, and, in one form or another, more or less rapidly, take decisive steps on the road to the real freedom of nations and on the road to socialism.

Long live the international fraternity of the workers against the chauvinism and patriotism of the bourgeoisie of all countries!

Long live the proletarian International, freed from opportunism!

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

October 1914.

¹ See note to page 167.***—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

CONFERENCE OF THE SECTIONS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. ABROAD *

A CONFERENCE of the sections of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad, held in Switzerland, closed its sessions a few days ago. Besides discussing affairs exclusively concerning the organisations abroad, which we shall try, at least briefly, to comment on in the next issues of the central organ, the conference drew up a resolution on the important and topical question of the war. We are publishing these resolutions forthwith in the hope that they will be of use to all Social-Democrats who are earnestly seeking a way out to vital work from the present chaos of opinions which, in substance, reduces itself to the recognition of internationalism in words, and to striving, at all costs and by any means, to make peace with social-chauvinism in deeds. We may add that on the question of the slogan of a "United States of Europe" the discussion took a one-sidedly political turn, and it was decided to postpone the question pending a discussion on the *economic* side of it in the press.¹

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

Taking its stand on the basis of the Central Committee's Manifesto published in No. 33,² the conference, in order to make propaganda more systematic, lays down the following propositions:

The Character of the War

The present war is of an imperialist character. This war is the outcome of the conditions of an epoch in which capitalism has reached the highest stage of its development; in which not only is the export of commodities of the greatest significance, but so

¹ See article "The United States of Europe Slogan" in this volume.—*Ed.*

² See preceding article.—*Ed.*

also is the export of capital; in which the trustification of industry and the internationalisation of economic life have assumed considerable dimensions; in which colonial policy has led to the partition of almost the whole of the globe; in which the productive forces of world capitalism have outgrown the limited boundaries of national and state divisions; in which the objective conditions for the achievement of socialism have fully matured.

The "Defence of the Fatherland" Slogan

The real essence of the present war is the struggle between England, France and Germany for the division of colonies and for the plunder of the competing countries, and the attempt on the part of tsarism and the ruling classes of Russia to seize Persia, Mongolia, Turkey in Asia, Constantinople, Galicia, etc. The national element in the Austro-Serbian war occupies an entirely subordinate place and does not alter the general imperialist character of the war.

The whole of the economic and diplomatic history of the last decades proves that both groups of belligerent nations have systematically prepared for precisely such a war. The question as to which group dealt the first military blow or first declared war is of no importance in determining the tactics of the Socialists. Phrases about the defence of the fatherland, resistance to enemy invasion, war of defence, etc., are, on both sides, nothing but a means for the wholesale deception of the people.

At the bottom of the genuinely national wars, particularly such as took place between 1789 and 1871, there was the long process of mass national movements, of struggle against absolutism and feudalism, of overthrowing national oppression and creating states on a national basis as prerequisites for capitalist development.

The national ideology that was created by that epoch left deep traces among the mass of the petty bourgeoisie and a section of the proletariat. Now, in a totally different, imperialist epoch, this is utilised by the sophists of the bourgeoisie, and by the traitors to socialism who follow in their wake, for the purpose of splitting the

workers and diverting them from their class tasks and from the revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

The words of *The Communist Manifesto*, that "the workingmen have no country," are truer now than ever. Only the international struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie can preserve its gains and open the road to a better future for the oppressed masses.

Slogans of Revolutionary Social-Democracy

"Transform the present imperialist war into civil war—is the only correct proletarian slogan; it was indicated by the experience of the Commune, was outlined by the Basle resolution (1912) and logically follows from all the conditions of an imperialist war among highly developed bourgeois countries."¹

Civil war, which revolutionary Social-Democracy is calling for in the present epoch, is the armed struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for the purpose of expropriating the capitalist class in the advanced capitalist countries, for a democratic revolution in Russia (democratic republic, eight-hour day, confiscation of the lands of the landlords), for a republic in the backward, monarchist countries generally, etc.

The extreme misery of the masses created by the war cannot fail to produce revolutionary sentiments and movements, and the civil war slogan must serve to co-ordinate and direct these.

The organisation of the working class at the present time is in a battered condition. Nevertheless, a revolutionary crisis is maturing. After the war, the ruling classes of all countries will exert still greater efforts to throw the proletarian movement for emancipation back many decades. It will be the task of revolutionary Social-Democracy, both in case of a rapid revolutionary development and in case of a protracted crisis, not to renounce prolonged everyday work, not to neglect any of the old methods of class struggle. It will be its task to direct both parliamentarism and the economic struggle against opportunism in the spirit of revolutionary mass struggle.

¹ Quoted from the Manifesto of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P.; see preceding article in this volume, p. 130.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

The first steps towards transforming the present imperialist war into civil war are: 1) absolute refusal to vote for war credits and resignation from bourgeois Cabinets; 2) complete rupture with the policy of "national peace"* (*bloc nationale, Burgfrieden*); 3) creation of an illegal organisation wherever the governments and the bourgeoisie abolish constitutional liberties by introducing war emergency laws; 4) support of fraternisation among the soldiers of the belligerent nations in the trenches and in the theatre of war in general; 5) support of every kind of revolutionary proletarian mass action in general.

Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International

The collapse of the Second International is the collapse of socialist opportunism. The latter grew up as a product of the preceding "peaceful" epoch of development of the labour movement. This epoch taught the working class important methods of struggle, such as utilising parliamentarism and all legal possibilities, it taught it to create mass economic and political organisations, a widespread labour press, etc.; on the other hand, this epoch created a tendency to repudiate the class struggle and to preach social peace, to repudiate the socialist revolution, to repudiate the very principle of illegal organisation, to recognise bourgeois patriotism, etc. Certain strata of the working class (the bureaucracy in the labour movement and the labour aristocracy which received a part of the profits obtained from the exploitation of the colonies and from the privileged position of their "fatherland" in the world market), as well as petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers within the Socialist Parties, served as the main social support of these tendencies and the channels of bourgeois influence over the proletariat.

The baneful influence of opportunism has manifested itself most strikingly in the policy of the majority of the official Social-Democratic Parties of the Second International during the war. Voting for war credits, participation in the Cabinets, the policy of "civil peace," the repudiation of illegal organisation when deprived of legality—all this means the violation of the most important decisions of the International and the downright betrayal of socialism.

The Third International

The crisis created by the war has exposed the real nature of opportunism, revealing it in the role of a direct accomplice of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The so-called Social-Democratic "centre," headed by Kautsky, has in reality completely slipped into opportunism, and is screening it by particularly harmful, hypocritical phrases and by falsifying Marxism to make it look like imperialism. Experience shows that in Germany, for instance, only by determinedly opposing the will of the majority of the Party leadership was it possible to come out in defence of the socialist point of view. It would be a harmful illusion to hope to restore a real socialist International without the complete organisational separation from the opportunists.

The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party must support every international and revolutionary mass action of the proletariat; it must strive to bring together all the anti-chauvinist elements of the International.

Pacifism and the Peace Slogan

One of the forms of deception of the working class is pacifism and the abstract preaching of peace. Under capitalism, particularly in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable. On the other hand, Social-Democrats cannot deny the positive significance of revolutionary wars, *i.e.*, not imperialist wars, but such as were conducted, for instance, between 1789 and 1871, for the purpose of abolishing national oppression and creating national capitalist states out of the separate feudal states, or of possible wars for the defence of the gains of the victorious proletariat in the struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Propaganda of peace at the present time, if not accompanied by a call for revolutionary mass action, is only capable of spreading illusions, of demoralising the proletariat by imbuing it with belief in the humanitarianism of the bourgeoisie, and of making it a plaything in the hands of the secret diplomacy of the belligerent countries. In particular, the idea that a so-called democratic peace is possible without a series of revolutions is profoundly mistaken.

The Defeat of the Tsarist Monarchy

In every country the struggle against the government waging the imperialist war must not stop at the possibility of that country's defeat as a consequence of revolutionary agitation. The defeat of the government's army weakens this government, aids the liberation of the nationalities oppressed by it and facilitates civil war against the ruling classes.

This proposition is especially true in relation to Russia. The victory of Russia will cause the strengthening of world reaction, the strengthening of reaction within the country, and will be accompanied by the complete enslavement of the people in the regions already seized. In view of this, the defeat of Russia is the lesser evil under all conditions.

Attitude Towards Other Parties and Groups

The war, having called forth an orgy of chauvinism, has revealed that the democratic (Narodnik) intelligentsia and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, whose oppositional trend in *Mysl* * is very unstable, as well as the main group of the liquidators (*Nasha Zarya*) ** supported by Plekhanov, are under the sway of this chauvinism. In practice, the Organisation Committee is also on the side of chauvinism—ranging from the masked support given to it by Larin and Martov, to the defence in principle of the ideas of patriotism by Axelrod—and so is the Bund, in which pro-German chauvinism prevails.*** The Brussels bloc (of August 3, 1914) has completely collapsed,**** and the elements that are grouped around *Nashe Slovo****** are vacillating between platonic sympathy for internationalism and a striving for unity at any price with *Nasha Zarya* and the Organisation Committee. Chkheidze's Social-Democratic fraction, which on the one hand expelled the Plekhanovist, i.e., the chauvinist, Mankov,***** and on the other hand desires at all costs to screen the chauvinism of Plekhanov, *Nasha Zarya*, Axelrod, the Bund, etc., is also vacillating.

The task of the Social-Democratic Labour Party in Russia is to strengthen still further the proletarian unity which was created in 1912-14, mainly through the efforts of *Pravda*, and to re-estab-

lish the Social-Democratic Party organisations of the working class on the basis of a decisive organisational separation from the social-chauvinists. Temporary agreements are permissible only with Social-Democrats who stand for a decisive organisational rupture with the Organisation Committee, *Nasha Zarya* and the Bund.

March 1915.

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE SLOGAN *

IN No. 40 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* we reported that the conference of the sections of our party abroad had decided to postpone the question of the "United States of Europe" slogan pending a discussion in the press on the *economic* side of the question.¹

At our conference the debate on the question assumed a one-sidedly political character. Perhaps this was partly due to the fact that the Manifesto of the Central Committee directly formulated this slogan as a political one ("the immediate *political* slogan," it says), and not only did it advance the slogan for a republican United States of Europe, but it especially emphasised that this slogan is false and senseless "without the revolutionary overthrow of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies."

To argue against such an approach to the question within the *limits* of a political estimation of the given slogan, for instance, to argue that this slogan obscures or weakens, etc., the slogan of the socialist revolution, is absolutely wrong. Political changes of a truly democratic nature, and especially political revolutions, can never, under any circumstances, obscure or weaken the slogan of the socialist revolution. On the contrary, they always bring it nearer, widen the basis for it, draw ever new strata of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle. On the other hand, political revolutions are inevitable in the course of the socialist revolution, which must not be regarded as being a single act, but must be regarded as an epoch of turbulent political and economic upheavals, of the most acute class struggle, civil war, revolutions and counter-revolutions.

But while the United States of Europe slogan, raised in connection with the revolutionary overthrow of the three most reaction-

¹ See preceding article in this volume.—*Ed.*

ary monarchies of Europe, headed by Russia, is quite invulnerable as a political slogan, the important question of its economic content and meaning still remains. From the point of view of the economic conditions of imperialism, *i.e.*, capital exports and the partition of the world among the "progressive" and "civilised" colonial powers, the United States of Europe is either impossible or reactionary under capitalism.

Capital has become international and monopolistic. The world has been divided among a handful of great powers, *i.e.*, powers successful in the great plunder and oppression of nations. The four Great Powers of Europe, England, France, Russia and Germany, with a population ranging from 250,000,000 to 300,000,000, with an area of about 7,000,000 square kilometres, possess colonies with a population of almost half a billion (494,500,000), with an area of 64,600,000 square kilometres, *i.e.*, almost half the surface of the globe (133,000,000 square kilometres, not including the Polar region). Add to this the three Asiatic states, China, Turkey and Persia, which are now being torn to pieces by the plunderers who are waging a "war of liberation," namely, Japan, Russia, England and France. In those three Asiatic states, which may be called semi-colonies (in reality they are now nine-tenths colonies), there are 360,000,000 inhabitants and their area is 14,500,000 square kilometres (almost one and one-half times the area of the whole of Europe).

Further, England, France and Germany have invested capital abroad to the amount of no less than 70,000,000,000 rubles. The function of securing a "legitimate" profit from this tidy sum, a profit exceeding 3,000,000,000 rubles annually, is performed by the national committees of millionaires called governments, which are equipped with armies and navies and which "place" the sons and brothers of "Mr. Billion" in the colonies and semi-colonies in the capacity of viceroys, consuls, ambassadors, officials of all kinds, priests and other leeches.

This is how, in the epoch of the highest development of capitalism, the plunder of about a billion of the earth's population by a handful of great powers is organised. No other organisation is

possible under capitalism. Give up colonies, "spheres of influence," export of capital? To think this is possible means sinking to the level of a little minister who preaches to the rich every Sunday about the greatness of Christianity and advises them to give to the poor, if not several billions, at least several hundred rubles yearly.

A United States of Europe under capitalism is equivalent to an agreement to divide up the colonies. Under capitalism, however, no other basis, no other principle of division is possible except force. A billionaire cannot share the "national income" of a capitalist country with anyone except in proportion to the capital invested (with an extra bonus thrown in, so that the largest capital may receive more than its due). Capitalism is private property in the means of production, and anarchy of production. To preach a "just" division of income on such a basis is Proudhonism, is stupid philistinism. Division cannot take place except in "proportion to strength." And strength changes in the course of economic development. After 1871 Germany grew strong three or four times faster than England and France; Japan, about ten times faster than Russia. There is and there can be no other way of testing the real strength of a capitalist state than that of war. War does not contradict the principles of private property—on the contrary, it is a direct and inevitable development of those principles. Under capitalism the even economic growth of individual enterprises, or individual states, is impossible. Under capitalism, there is nothing else that periodically restores the disturbed equilibrium than crises in industry and wars in politics.

Of course, *temporary* agreements between capitalists and between the powers are possible. In this sense the United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the *European* capitalists . . . but what for? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, of jointly protecting colonial booty *against* Japan and America, which feel badly treated by the present division of colonies, and which, for the last half century, have grown infinitely faster than backward, monarchist Europe, which is beginning to decay with age. In comparison with the United States of America, Europe as a whole implies economic stagnation. On the present

economic basis, *i.e.*, under capitalism, the United States of Europe would mean the organisation of reaction to retard the more rapid development of America. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated with Europe alone have gone forever.

The United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is a state form of national federation and national freedom which we connect with socialism—until the complete victory of communism brings about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic state. As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with socialism, second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in a single country is impossible; it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others.

Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible, first in a few or even in one single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would *confront* the rest of the capitalist world, attract to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, raise revolts among them against the capitalists, and, in the event of necessity, come out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of society in which the proletariat is victorious, in which it has overthrown the bourgeoisie, will be a democratic republic, which will more and more centralise the forces of the proletariat of the given nation, or nations, in the struggle against the states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without the dictatorship of the oppressed class, the proletariat. The free federation of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.

It is for these reasons and after repeated debates at the conference of the sections of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad, and after the conference, that the editors of the central organ have come to the conclusion that the United States of Europe slogan is incorrect.

August 23, 1915.

DEFEAT OF ONE'S OWN GOVERNMENT IN THE IMPERIALIST WAR *

A REVOLUTIONARY class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its government.

This is an axiom. It is disputed only by the conscious partisans or the helpless satellites of the social-chauvinists. To the former, for instance, belongs Semkovsky of the Organisation Committee (No. 2 of its *Izvestiya*); to the latter belong Trotsky and Bukvoyed,¹ and in Germany, Kautsky. To desire Russia's defeat, Trotsky says, is "an uncalled-for and unjustifiable concession to the political methodology of social-patriotism which substitutes for the revolutionary struggle against the war and the conditions that cause it, what, under present conditions, is an extremely arbitrary orientation towards the lesser evil." (*Nashe Slovo*,** No. 105.)

This is an example of the high-flown phraseology with which Trotsky always justifies opportunism. A "revolutionary struggle against the war" is an empty and meaningless exclamation, in which the heroes of the Second International are past masters, unless it means revolutionary action against *one's own government* even in time of war. One has only to think a little in order to understand this. And revolutionary action in wartime against one's own government undoubtedly and incontrovertibly means not only desiring its defeat, but really facilitating such defeat. (For the "penetrating reader": this does not mean "blowing up bridges," organising unsuccessful military strikes, and in general helping the government to inflict defeat upon revolutionaries.)

Making shift with phrases, Trotsky has lost his way amidst

¹ The pseudonym of D. B. Ryazanov.—Ed.

three pine trees.¹ It seems to him that to desire Russia's defeat means desiring Germany's victory. (Bukvoyed and Semkovsky express this "idea," or rather lack of idea, which they have in common with Trotsky, more directly.) And Trotsky regards this as the "methodology of social-patriotism"! To help people who are unable to think, the Berne resolution (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 40²) made it clear that in *all* imperialist countries the proletariat must now desire the defeat of its own government. Bukvoyed and Trotsky preferred to evade this truth, while Semkovsky (an opportunist who is more useful to the working class than all others, thanks to his naively frank repetition of bourgeois wisdom) openly blurted out the following: "This is nonsense, because either Germany or Russia must win." (*Izvestiya*, No. 2.)

Take the example of the Commune. Germany defeated France, but Bismarck and Thiers defeated the workers! Had Bukvoyed and Trotsky thought a little, they would have realised that *they* adopt the point of view of a war of governments and the bourgeoisie, i.e., that *they* cringe before the "political methodology of social-patriotism," to use Trotsky's affected language.

Revolution in wartime is civil war; and the transformation of war between governments into civil war is, on the one hand, facilitated by military reverses ("defeats") of governments; on the other hand, it is impossible really to strive for such a transformation without thereby facilitating defeat.

The very reason the chauvinists (including the Organisation Committee and the Chkheidze fraction) repudiate the "slogan" of defeat is that *this slogan alone* implies a consistent appeal for revolutionary action against one's own government in wartime. Without such action, millions of the r-r-revolutionary phrases like war against "war and the conditions, and so forth," are not worth a penny.

Anyone who seriously desired to refute the "slogan," defeat one's own government in the imperialist war, should have proved

¹ A Russian expression indicating that one is confused over a simple problem.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² See article "Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad," section entitled "Defeat of the Tsarist Monarchy."—*Ed.*

one of three things: 1) that the war of 1914-15 is not reactionary, or 2) that a revolution in connection with it is impossible, or 3) that it is impossible to co-ordinate and render mutual aid in the revolutionary movement in *all* belligerent countries. The last point is particularly important for Russia, because this is the most backward country, where an immediate socialist revolution is impossible. That is why the Russian Social-Democrats had to be the first to advance the "theory and practice" of the defeat "slogan." And the tsarist government was perfectly right when it asserted that the agitation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour fraction—which was the *only one* in the International to set the example not only of parliamentary opposition, but of real revolutionary agitation among the masses against the government—that this agitation weakened the "military power" of Russia and was likely to cause its defeat. This is a fact. It is foolish to try to hide from it.

The opponents of the defeat slogan are simply afraid of themselves when they refuse to recognise the very obvious fact that there is an inseparable connection between revolutionary agitation against the government and facilitating defeat.

Are co-ordination and co-operation possible between the Russian movement, which is revolutionary in the bourgeois-democratic sense, and the socialist movement in the West? Not a single Socialist who has expressed himself publicly during the last decade has had any doubt about this, and the movement among the Austrian proletariat after October 30 (17), 1905, *actually* proved that it was possible.*

Ask any Social-Democrat who calls himself an internationalist whether or not he approves of an agreement between the Social-Democrats of the various belligerent countries concerning united revolutionary action against all belligerent governments. Many will answer that it is impossible, as Kautsky did (*Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914), thereby *fully proving* that he was a social-chauvinist. For, on the one hand, it is a deliberate, flagrant untruth, which glaringly flouts commonly known facts and the Basle Manifesto. On the other hand, if it were true, *the opportunists would be quite right in many respects!*

Many will answer that they sympathise. To this we say: if this sympathy is not hypocritical, it is ridiculous to think that a "formal" agreement is required during war and for war, such as the election of representatives, arrangement of a meeting, signing of an agreement, appointment of a day and an hour! Only the Semkovskys are capable of thinking that. Agreement concerning revolutionary action even in a *single* country, not to speak of a number of countries, can be achieved *only* by the force of *example* of serious revolutionary actions, by *starting* them and *developing* them. It is impossible, however, to start them without desiring the government's defeat, and without facilitating such a defeat. The transformation of the imperialist war into civil war cannot be "made," any more than it is possible to "make" a revolution—it *grows* out of a multiplicity of diverse phenomena, phases, traits, characteristics, consequences of the imperialist war. Such a growth is *impossible* without a series of military reverses and defeats of those governments which receive blows from *their own* oppressed classes.

To repudiate the defeat slogan means reducing one's revolutionary actions to an empty phrase or to mere hypocrisy.

What substitute is proposed for the defeat slogan? The slogan, "neither victory nor defeat" (Semkovsky in *Izvestiya*, No. 2; also the *entire* Organisation Committee in No. 1). This, however, is nothing but a paraphrase of the "*defence of the fatherland*" slogan. It means transferring the question to the plane of war between governments (which, according to the content of this slogan, should *remain* in their old position, "retain their positions") and not to the plane of struggle of the oppressed classes against their governments! This is justification of the chauvinism of *all* imperialist nations whose bourgeoisie is always ready to say—and *does say to the people*—that it is "only" fighting "against defeat." "The meaning of our vote of August 4 was—not for war *but against defeat*," writes the leader of the opportunists, E. David, in his book.¹ The Organisation Committee, as well as Bukvoyed

¹ The book referred to is *Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkrieg*, 1915.—Ed.

and Trotsky, take *entirely* the same ground as David when they defend the slogan "neither victory nor defeat"!

On closer examination, this slogan will be found to mean "civil peace," renunciation of the class struggle by the oppressed classes in all belligerent countries, since class struggle is impossible without dealing blows to "one's own" bourgeoisie, "one's own" government, and dealing a blow to one's own government in wartime means (for Bukvoyed's information) high treason, it means facilitating the defeat of one's own country. Those who accept the slogan, "neither victory nor defeat," can only hypocritically be in favour of the class struggle, of "breaking civil peace"; those must, *in practice*, renounce an independent proletarian policy because they subordinate the proletariat of all belligerent countries to the *absolutely bourgeois* task of safeguarding imperialist governments against defeat. The only real and not verbal policy of breaking "civil peace," of accepting the class struggle, is for the proletariat *to take advantage* of the *embarrassments* of its government and its bourgeoisie *in order to overthrow them*. This, however, cannot be achieved, it *cannot be striven for*, without desiring the defeat of one's own government, without facilitating this defeat.

When, before the war, the Italian Social-Democrats raised the question of a mass strike, the bourgeoisie replied, undoubtedly correctly from *its* standpoint, that this would be high treason, and that Social-Democrats would be dealt with as traitors. This is true, just as it is true that fraternisation in the trenches is high treason. Those who write against "high treason," as Bukvoyed does, or against the "disintegration of Russia," as Semkovsky does, adopt the bourgeois, not the proletarian, point of view. A proletarian *cannot* strike a blow at his government or reach out (in practice) a hand to his brother, the proletarian of the "foreign" country which is at war with "us," *without committing* "high treason," *without facilitating* the defeat, the *disintegration* of "his" imperialist "Great" Power.

Those who are in favour of the slogan, "neither victory nor

defeat," are consciously or unconsciously chauvinists, at best they are conciliatory petty bourgeois; at all events they are *enemies* of proletarian policy, partisans of the present governments, of the present ruling classes.

Let us look at the question from still another angle. The war cannot but call forth among the masses the most turbulent feelings which disturb the usual somnolent state of mentality. Without adjustment to these new turbulent feelings, revolutionary tactics are *impossible*.

What are the main streams of these turbulent feelings? 1) Horror and despair. Hence, growth of religion. Again the churches are being filled, joyfully declare the reactionaries. "Wherever there is suffering there is religion," says the arch-reactionary Barrès. And he is right. 2) Hatred for the "enemy," a sentiment that is kindled especially by the bourgeoisie (not so much by the priests) and of economic and political value *only to the bourgeoisie*. 3) Hatred for *one's own* government and *one's own* bourgeoisie—the sentiment of all class conscious workers who understand, on the one hand, that war is "a continuation of the politics" of imperialism, which they counter by "continuing" their hatred for their class enemy, and, on the other hand, that "war against war" is a banal phrase if it does not mean revolution against *their own* governments. It is impossible to rouse hatred against one's own government and one's own bourgeoisie without desiring their defeat, and it is impossible to be a sincere opponent of "civil" (i.e., class) "peace" without rousing hatred against one's own government and bourgeoisie!!!

Those who stand for the slogan, "neither victory nor defeat," are in fact on the side of the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, for they "do not believe" in the possibility of international revolutionary action of the working class against its own governments, and they *do not wish* to help the development of such action, which, though no easy task, it is true, is the only task worthy of a proletarian, the only socialist task. It is precisely the proletariat in the most backward of the belligerent Great Powers, especially in view of the shameful treachery of the German and French Social-

Democrats, that had to adopt, through the medium of its party, revolutionary tactics which are absolutely impossible without "facilitating the defeat" of the government, but which alone lead to a European revolution, to the permanent peace of socialism, to the liberation of humanity from the horrors, misery, savagery and brutality now prevailing.

August (July) 1915.

THE DEFEAT OF RUSSIA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS*

THE "dispersal" of the Fourth Duma in retaliation to the formation of the opposition *bloc* consisting of liberals, Octobrists and nationalists, is one of the most vivid manifestations of the revolutionary crisis in Russia. The defeat of the armies of the tsarist monarchy, the growth of the strike movement and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, the ferment among the broad masses and the formation of the liberal-*Octobrist bloc* for the purpose of reaching an understanding with the tsar concerning a programme of reforms and mobilising industry for the defeat of Germany—such is the sequence and interrelation of events at the end of the first year of war.

Everyone can see now that there is a revolutionary crisis in Russia, but not everyone correctly understands its significance and the tasks of the proletariat that follow from it.

History appears to be repeating itself: again there is a war, as in 1905, a war into which tsarism has dragged the country for the sake of definite and patent annexationist, predatory and reactionary aims. Again there is military defeat and the acceleration of the revolutionary crisis caused by it. Again the liberal bourgeoisie—in this case even in conjunction with large sections of the conservative bourgeoisie and with the landlords—is advocating a programme of reforms and of understanding with the tsar. The situation is almost like that in the summer of 1905 prior to the Bulygin Duma, or like the summer of 1906 after the dispersal of the First Duma.**

In fact, however, there is a vast difference, which is that this war has affected the whole of Europe, all the most advanced countries in which there are mass and powerful socialist movements. The imperialist war has *connected* the revolutionary crisis in Rus-

sia, a crisis on the basis of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the growing crisis of the proletarian socialist revolution in the West. This connection is so direct that no separate solution of revolutionary [problems] is possible in any one country: the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is now not only a prologue to, but an indivisible, integral part of the socialist revolution of the West.

The task of the proletariat in 1905 was to consummate the bourgeois revolution in Russia in order to kindle the proletarian revolution in the West. In 1915 the second part of this task has become so urgent that it comes up on the order of the day simultaneously with the first task. A new political division has arisen in Russia on the basis of new, higher, more developed and more complicated international relations. This new division is between the revolutionary chauvinists, who desire revolution in order to defeat Germany, and the proletarian internationalist revolutionaries, who desire the revolution in Russia *for the sake of* the proletarian revolution in the West, and simultaneously with that revolution. This new division is, in fact, a division between the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in Russia, and the socialist proletariat. This new division must be plainly understood, for in view of the impending revolution the first duty of a Marxist, i.e., of every class conscious Socialist, is to comprehend the position of the *various classes* and to interpret general differences over tactics and principles as differences in the positions of the various classes.

There is nothing more puerile, nothing more contemptible and harmful, than the idea prevalent among revolutionary philistines, namely: "forget" differences "in view" of the immediate, common aims in the approaching revolution. Those who have not been convinced by the experience of the decade from 1905 to 1914 of the folly of this idea are hopeless from the revolutionary standpoint. Those who, at this stage, confine themselves to revolutionary exclamations, without analysing which classes have *proved* their ability to adopt, and have adopted, a certain revolutionary programme, do not really differ from "revolutionaries" like Khrustalev, Aladin and Alexinsky.

The position of the monarchy and of the feudal landlords is clear: "not to surrender" Russia to the liberal bourgeoisie; rather than that it would be better to come to an understanding with the German monarchy. Equally clear is the position of the liberal bourgeoisie: to take advantage of the defeat and the growing revolution in order to wrest compromises from a frightened monarchy and to compel it to share power with the bourgeoisie. Equally clear, too, is the position of the revolutionary proletariat, which is striving to consummate the revolution by taking advantage of the vacillations and embarrassments of the government and the bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie, however, *i.e.*, the vast mass of the barely awakened population of Russia, is groping blindly in the wake of the bourgeoisie, a captive to nationalist prejudices, on the one hand driven to revolution by the unprecedented, unheard-of horrors and miseries of war, the high cost of living, ruin, impoverishment and starvation, and on the other hand glancing *back* at every step to the idea of defence of the fatherland, or to the idea of the state integrity of Russia, or to the idea of small peasant prosperity, to be achieved by a victory over tsarism and over Germany, but without a victory over capitalism.

These vacillations of the petty bourgeois, of the small peasant, are not accidental, but the inevitable result of his economic position. It is foolish to shut one's eyes to this "bitter" but profound truth; it must be understood and traced in the existing *political currents and groupings*, so as not to deceive ourselves and the people, and so as not to weaken and render impotent the revolutionary party of the Social-Democratic proletariat. The proletariat will render itself impotent if it permits its party to vacillate as the petty bourgeoisie vacillates. The proletariat will fulfil its task only if it is able to march towards its great goal without wavering, to push forward the petty bourgeoisie, letting the latter learn from its mistakes when it wavers to the Right, and utilising all its forces in order to push forward, when life compels it to move to the Left.

The Trudoviki, the S.Rs., the liquidators—the supporters of the Organisation Committee—these are the political *trends* in

Russia that have become quite distinct during the past decade, that have proved their connection with the various groups, elements and strata of the petty bourgeoisie, and have displayed their vacillation from extreme revolution in words to alliance with the chauvinist Narodni-Socialists, or with *Nasha Zarya*, in deeds. For instance, on September 3, 1915, the five secretaries of the Organisation Committee abroad issued a manifesto on the tasks of the proletariat, in which not a word is said about opportunism and social-chauvinism, but a call is made for a "revolt" in the rear of the German army (this after a whole year of fighting the slogan of civil war!), and the slogan the Cadets praised so highly in 1905 is proclaimed, viz., a "constituent assembly for the liquidation of the war" and for the abolition of the autocratic (Third of June*) regime!! Those who have failed to understand the need for the complete separation of the party of the proletariat from these petty-bourgeois trends in order that the revolution may be successful take the name of Social-Democrat in vain.

No, in face of the revolutionary crisis in Russia, which is being accelerated precisely by *defeat*—and this is what the motley opponents of "defeatism" are afraid to admit—it will be the duty of the proletariat to continue, as hitherto, the fight against opportunism and chauvinism, without which it will be impossible to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, and to assist the movement of the latter by means of unambiguous revolutionary slogans. Not a constituent assembly, but the overthrow of the monarchy, a republic, the confiscation of the land of the landlords and an eight-hour day will continue to be, as hitherto, the slogans of the Social-Democratic proletariat, the slogans of our party. And in direct connection with this, and in order that it may really distinguish the tasks of socialism from, and contrast them with, the tasks of bourgeois (including Plekhanov and Kautsky) chauvinism in all its propaganda and agitation, and in all the actions of the working class, our party will, as hitherto, issue the slogan: transform the imperialist war into civil war, i.e., the slogan of the socialist revolution in the West.

The lessons of the war are compelling even our opponents

really to recognise both the position of "defeatism" and the necessity of issuing—at first as a slashing phrase in a manifesto, but later more seriously and thoughtfully—the slogan of "a revolt in the rear" of the German militarists, in other words, the slogan of civil war. The lessons of the war, it appears, are driving into their heads what we have preached from the very beginning. The defeat of Russia *has turned out* to be the lesser evil, for it has advanced the revolutionary crisis on a vast scale and has aroused millions, tens and hundreds of millions. And in the conditions of an imperialist war, a revolutionary crisis in Russia could not but lead people's thoughts to the only salvation of the people, to the idea of "a revolt in the rear" of the German army, *i.e.*, to the idea of civil war in all the belligerent countries.

Life teaches. Life is *marching*, through the defeat of Russia, to a revolution in Russia, and through that revolution, and in connection with it, to civil war in Europe. Life has taken this direction. And the party of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, drawing new strength from these lessons of life, which have justified its position, will, with still greater energy, pursue the path it has set out to follow.

October 1915.

A FEW THESES ¹

Proposed by the Editors

THE material published in this issue ² shows the great extent to which the St. Petersburg Committee of our party has developed its work. For Russia, and for the whole International, this is a real model of Social-Democratic work during a reactionary war and under most difficult conditions. The workers of St. Petersburg and Russia will support this work with all their might and will advance it more energetically, forcefully and widely along the same road.

Complying with the wishes of our comrades in Russia, we hereby formulate a few theses relative to the current problems of Social-Democratic work:

1) The slogan of a "constituent assembly," as an independent slogan, is incorrect because the question *now* is: who will convene it? The liberals accepted that slogan in 1905 because it *could* have been interpreted as meaning that it would be convened by the tsar and would be in agreement with him. The most correct slogans are the "three pillars" ³ (democratic republic, confiscation of the land of the landlords and an eight-hour day), in addition to the appeal (*cf.* No. 9) for the international solidarity of the workers in the struggle for socialism, for the revolutionary overthrow of the belligerent governments and against the war.

2) We are opposed to participation in the War Industries Committees, ^{*} which help the pursuit of the imperialist, reactionary war. We are in favour of utilising the election campaign, for

¹ See note to page 149.*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 45-46, October 24 (11), 1915.—*Ed.*

³ Lenin wrote "three whales," an allusion to the Russian fable that the earth rests on three whales. See note to page 161.**—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

instance, we are in favour of participation in the first stage of the elections *exclusively* for the purpose of agitation and organisation. There can be no thought of boycotting the State Duma. Participation in the elections is *absolutely necessary*. As long as there are no deputies from our party in the State Duma,¹ we must utilise everything that happens in the Duma to advance the aims of revolutionary Social-Democracy.

3) We consider that the immediate and most urgent tasks are to consolidate and extend Social-Democratic work among the proletariat, and then to extend it to the rural proletariat, to the rural poor and to the army. The most important task of revolutionary Social-Democracy is to develop the incipient strike movement, to conduct it under the slogan of the "three pillars." Proper place must be given in the work of agitation to the demand for the immediate cessation of the war. Among other demands, the workers must not forget to demand the immediate reinstatement of the workers' deputies, the members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour fraction.

4) Soviets of Workers' Deputies and similar institutions must be regarded as organs of insurrection, as organs of revolutionary power. Only in connection with the development of a mass political strike and in connection with insurrection, in proportion to its state of preparation, its development and its success, can such institutions be of lasting value.

5) The social content of the impending revolution in Russia can only be that of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. The revolution cannot be victorious in Russia unless it overthrows the monarchy and the feudal landlords; and these cannot be overthrown unless the proletariat is supported by the peasantry. The step forward in the differentiation of the rural population as between "homestead landlords" and rural proletarians has not abolished the oppression of the rural districts by the Markovs and Co.* We have urged and now urge the absolute need for the *separate* organisation of the rural *proletarians* under all circumstances.

¹ The Bolshevik members of the Duma were arrested and sentenced to exile in Siberia. See Badayev, *The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

6) The task of the proletariat of Russia is to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia *in order* to kindle the socialist revolution in Europe. This second task has now become extremely close to the first; nevertheless, it still remains a separate and a second task, for it is a question of the *different classes* that are collaborating with the proletariat of Russia; for the first task, the collaborators are the petty-bourgeois peasantry of Russia; for the second, it is the proletariat of other countries.

7) As hitherto, we consider that it is permissible for Social-Democrats to enter a provisional revolutionary government together with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but *not* with the revolutionary chauvinists.

8) By revolutionary chauvinists we mean those who desire victory over tsarism in order to secure victory over Germany—in order to plunder other countries—in order to consolidate the rule of the Great Russians over the other peoples of Russia, etc. The foundation of revolutionary chauvinism is the class position of the petty bourgeoisie. The latter always vacillates between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. At present it is vacillating between chauvinism (which prevents it from being consistently revolutionary, even in the sense of democratic revolution) and proletarian internationalism. The political spokesmen of this petty bourgeoisie in Russia at the present moment are the Trudoviki, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, *Nasha Zarya*, Chkheidze's fraction, the Organisation Committee, Mr. Plekhanov and the like.

9) If the revolutionary chauvinists were victorious in Russia, we would be opposed to defending *their* "fatherland" in the present war. Our slogan is: against the chauvinists, even if they are revolutionary and republican—*against* them, and *for* an alliance of the international proletariat for the socialist revolution.

10) To the question of whether it is possible for the proletariat to assume the leading role in the bourgeois Russian revolution, we answer in the affirmative: yes, it is possible if the petty bourgeoisie will swing to the Left at the decisive moment; and it is being pushed to the Left, not only by our propaganda, but by a number of objective factors, economic, financial (burdens of war), military, political, and others.

11) To the question of what the party of the proletariat would do if the revolution placed power in its hands in the present war, our answer is as follows: we would propose peace to *all* the belligerents on the basis of the liberation of the colonies and of *all* the dependent, oppressed and disfranchised peoples. Under the present governments, neither Germany nor England nor France would accept this condition. In that case we would have to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war, *i.e.*, we would not only by resolute measures fully carry out the whole of our minimum programme, but we would also systematically rouse to insurrection all the peoples now oppressed by the Great Russians, all the colonies and dependent countries in Asia (India, China, Persia, etc.), and also, and primarily, we would rouse to insurrection the socialist proletariat of Europe against its governments and in spite of its social-chauvinists. There is no doubt that a victory of the proletariat in Russia would create unusually favourable conditions for the development of the revolution both in Asia and in Europe. *Even* 1905 proved that. The international solidarity of the revolutionary proletariat is a *fact*, in spite of the filthy scum of opportunism and social-chauvinism.

We now present these theses for discussion among the comrades, and we shall develop our views in the forthcoming issues of the central organ.

October 1915.

THE TWO LINES OF THE REVOLUTION¹

IN *Prizyv* (No. 3), Mr. Plekhanov tries to present the fundamental theoretical problem of the impending revolution in Russia.* He quotes a passage from Marx ** to the effect that the Revolution of 1789 in France proceeded in an ascending line, whereas the Revolution of 1848 proceeded in a descending line. In the first instance, power passed gradually from the moderate to the more radical party—Constitutionalists, Girondists, Jacobins. In the second instance, the opposite was the case—proletariat, petty-bourgeois democrats, bourgeois republicans, Napoleon III. "It is desirable," concludes our author, "to direct the Russian revolution along an ascending line," i.e., that power should first pass to the Cadets and Octobrists, then to the Trudoviki, then to the Socialists. The conclusion from this reasoning is, of course, that the Left wing in Russia is unwise in not wishing to support the Cadets and in discrediting them prematurely.

Mr. Plekhanov's "theoretical" reasoning provides one more example of the substitution of liberalism for Marxism. Mr. Plekhanov reduces the subject to the question of whether the "strategic conceptions" of the advanced elements were "correct" or incorrect. Marx reasoned differently. He pointed out a fact: in each case the revolution progressed differently; but he did *not* seek the *explanation* of this difference in "strategic conceptions." From the point of view of Marxism it is ridiculous to seek it in conceptions. It must be sought in the difference in the *interrelation of classes*. Marx wrote that in 1789 the French bourgeoisie united with the peasantry and that in 1848 petty-bourgeois democracy betrayed the proletariat.*** Mr. Plekhanov knows Marx's opinion on this, but he does not mention it, because he desires to paint Marx "to look like Struve." In France, in 1789, it was

¹ See note to page 149.*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

a matter of overthrowing absolutism and the nobility. At the level of economic and political development then prevailing, the bourgeoisie believed in harmony of interests, it had no fears concerning the stability of its rule, and was prepared to enter into an alliance with the peasantry. This alliance secured the complete victory of the revolution. In 1848 it was a matter of the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie. The proletariat failed to win over the petty bourgeoisie, whose treachery caused the defeat of the revolution. The ascending line of 1789 was the form of revolution in which the mass of the people defeated absolutism. The descending line of 1848 was the form of revolution in which the betrayal of the proletariat by the mass of the petty bourgeoisie caused the defeat of the revolution.

Mr. Plekhanov substituted vulgar idealism for Marxism when he reduced the subject to a question of "strategic conceptions" and not to one of the interrelation of classes.

The experience of the 1905 Revolution and of the subsequent counter-revolutionary epoch in Russia teaches that in our country *two* lines of revolution were observed, in the sense that there was a struggle of two classes, the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie, for the leading influence over the masses. The proletariat advanced in a revolutionary way, and led the democratic peasantry to the overthrow of the monarchy and the landlords. That the peasantry manifested revolutionary tendencies in a democratic sense was proved on a *mass scale* by *all* the great political events: the peasant insurrections of 1905-06, the military unrest of the same years, the "Peasants' Union" of 1905, and the two first Dumas, where the *peasant* Trudoviki were not only "to the Left of the Cadets," but were also *more revolutionary* than the intellectual *Socialist-Revolutionaries* and Trudoviki. Unfortunately, this is often forgotten; but it is a fact. Both in the Third and in the Fourth Dumas, the *peasant* Trudoviki, in spite of their weaknesses, showed that the peasant masses were *opposed* to the landlords.

The first line of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution, deduced from facts and not from "strategic" chatter, was marked by the fact that the proletariat fought resolutely and that the peasantry followed it irresolutely. Both these classes fought against

the monarchy and the landlords. The lack of strength and the irresoluteness of these classes caused their defeat, although a partial breach in absolutism was caused nevertheless.

The second line was the behaviour of the liberal bourgeoisie. We Bolsheviks have always asserted, particularly since the spring of 1906, that this line was represented by the Cadets and Octobrists as a *single force*. The decade 1905-15 has proved the correctness of our view. At the decisive moments of the struggle, the Cadets, together with the Octobrists, betrayed democracy and "marched" to the assistance of the tsar and the landlords. The "liberal" line of the Russian revolution was marked by the "pacifying" and splitting up of the fight of the masses in order that the bourgeoisie might make peace with the monarchy. The international background of the Russian revolution and the strength of the Russian proletariat made this behaviour of the liberals inevitable.

The Bolsheviks deliberately helped the proletariat to proceed along the first line, to fight with supreme courage and to lead the peasants. The Mensheviks constantly slipped to the second line; they demoralised the proletariat by adapting its movement to the liberals—from the invitation to go into the Bulygin Duma (August 1905) to the Cadet Cabinet in 1906 and the *bloc* with the Cadets *against* democracy in 1907.* (From Mr. Plekhanov's point of view, we will observe parenthetically, the "correct strategic conceptions" of the Cadets and the Mensheviks suffered a defeat at that time. Why? Why did not the masses heed the wise counsels of Mr. Plekhanov and the Cadets, which were broadcast a hundred times more widely than the advice of the Bolsheviks?)

These trends, that of the Bolsheviks and of the Mensheviks, alone manifested themselves in the politics of the *masses* in 1904-08, and later, in 1908-14. Why? Because only these trends had firm class roots—the first in the proletariat, the second in the liberal bourgeoisie.

Now we are again advancing towards revolution. Everybody sees that. *Khvostov himself* says that the mood of the peasants is reminiscent of 1905-06. And again we see *the same* two lines of the revolution, *the same* interrelation of classes, only modified by

the changed international background. In 1905, the whole of the European bourgeoisie was in favour of tsarism, and helped it, either with their billions (the French), or by preparing a counter-revolutionary army (the Germans). In 1914 the European war flared up; the bourgeoisie everywhere temporarily vanquished the proletariat and swept it into the turbid stream of nationalism and chauvinism. In Russia, as hitherto, the petty-bourgeois masses of the people, primarily the peasantry, form the majority of the population. They are oppressed primarily by the landlords. Politically, they are partly dormant and partly vacillate between chauvinism ("Defeat Germany," "Defend the Fatherland") and revolution. The political spokesmen of these masses—and of their vacillations—are, on the one hand, the Narodniki (the Trudoviki and Socialist-Revolutionaries), on the other hand, the opportunist Social-Democrats (*Nashe Dyelo*,* Plekhanov, Chkheidze's fraction, the Organisation Committee), who, since 1910, have been determinedly pursuing the path of liberal labour politics, and by 1915 have reached the social-chauvinism of Messrs. Potresov, Cherevanin, Levitsky, Maslov, or the demand for "unity" with them.

This state of affairs obviously indicates the task of the proletariat. It is to wage a supremely courageous revolutionary struggle against the monarchy (utilising the slogans of the January Conference of 1912, the "three pillars"***), a struggle that will sweep in its wake all the democratic masses, i.e., principally the peasantry. At the same time, it must wage a ruthless struggle against chauvinism, a struggle in alliance with the European proletariat for the socialist revolution in Europe. The vacillations of the petty bourgeoisie are not accidental, but inevitable, for they follow logically from its class position. The military crisis has *strengthened* the economic and political factors which are impelling it, including the peasantry, towards the Left. This is the objective foundation for the full possibility of the victory of the democratic revolution in Russia. There is no need for us to prove here that the objective conditions in Western Europe are fully ripe for a socialist revolution; this was admitted before the war by all influential Socialists in all advanced countries.

To make clear the interrelation of classes in the impending revolution is the principal task of a revolutionary party. This task is evaded by the Organisation Committee, which in Russia remains the faithful ally of *Nashe Dyelo*, and abroad utters meaningless "Left" phrases. This task is incorrectly met in *Nashe Slovo* by Trotsky, who repeats his "original" theory of 1905 and refuses to stop to think why, for ten whole years, life passed by this beautiful theory.

Trotsky's original theory takes from the Bolsheviks their call for a decisive proletarian revolutionary struggle and for the conquest of political power by the proletariat, and from the Mensheviks it takes the "repudiation" of the role of the peasantry. The peasantry, it says, has become divided into strata, differentiated; its potential revolutionary role has dwindled more and more; in Russia a "national" revolution is impossible; "we are living in the era of imperialism," says Trotsky, and "imperialism does not oppose the bourgeois nation to the old regime but the proletariat to the bourgeois nation."

Here we have an amusing example of "playing with a catch-word": imperialism. If in *Russia* the proletariat already stands opposed to the "bourgeois nation," then Russia is immediately facing a *socialist* revolution (!!), then the slogan, "confiscate the lands of the *landlords*" (repeated by Trotsky in 1915, after the January Conference of 1912), is incorrect, then we must speak, not of a "revolutionary workers' government," but of a "workers' *socialist* government"! To what limits Trotsky's confusion goes is evident from his phrase that by its resoluteness the proletariat will also sweep in the "*non-proletarian* [!] popular masses" (No. 217)!! Trotsky did not realise that the proletariat leading the non-proletarian masses to confiscate the lands of the landlords and to overthrow the monarchy would be the consummation of the "national bourgeois revolution" in Russia, that it would be the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry!

The whole decade—the great decade—of 1905-15 proved the existence of two, and only two, class lines of the Russian revolution. The differentiation among the peasantry increased the class

struggle within it; it aroused very many hitherto politically dormant elements; it drew the agricultural proletariat nearer to the urban proletariat (the Bolsheviks have insisted ever since 1906 that the former should be *separately* organised, and they included this demand in the resolution of the Stockholm, Menshevik Congress). But the antagonism between the peasantry, on the one hand, and the Markovs, the Romanovs and Khvostovs, on the other, has become stronger, has grown, has become more acute. This is such an obvious truth that not even the thousands of phrases in scores of Trotsky's Paris articles will "refute" it. Trotsky is in fact helping the liberal labour politicians in Russia who by the "repudiation" of the role of the peasantry mean *refusal* to rouse the peasants to revolution!

But this is the crux of the question at present. The proletariat is fighting, and will fight valiantly, to capture power, for a republic, for the confiscation of the land, *i.e.*, for winning over the peasantry, for making *full* use of its revolutionary powers, for the participation of "*non-proletarian masses of the people*" in freeing *bourgeois* Russia from *military-feudal* "imperialism" (tsarism). And the proletariat will immediately utilise this liberation of bourgeois Russia from tsarism, from the agrarian power of the landlords, not to aid the rich peasants in their struggle against the rural worker, but to bring about the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletarians of Europe.

December (November) 1915.

PART III

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL*

By collapse of the International is sometimes meant simply the formal aspect of the matter, namely, the interruption in international connections between the Socialist Parties of the belligerent countries, the impossibility of convening either an international conference or the International Socialist Bureau, etc. This is the point of view of certain Socialists in the small neutral countries, probably of the majority in the official Parties in those countries, and also of the opportunists and their defenders. In the Russian press this position was defended with a frankness deserving deep gratitude by Mr. V. Kossovsky, in No. 8 of the *Information Bulletin* of the Bund,** whose editors did not say a word to indicate that they disagreed with the author. Let us hope that Mr. Kossovsky's defence of nationalism, in which he went to the length of defending the German Social-Democrats who voted for the war credits, will help many workers finally to realise the bourgeois-nationalist character of the Bund.

For the class conscious workers, socialism is a serious conviction and not a convenient screen with which to conceal petty-bourgeois conciliatory and nationalist oppositional strivings. By the collapse of the International they mean the fact that the majority of the official Social-Democratic Parties have glaringly betrayed their convictions, that they have betrayed the very solemn declarations they made in their speeches at the Stuttgart and Basle International Congresses, and in the resolutions of these congresses, etc.*** Only those can fail to see this treachery *who do not want* to see it, for whom it is disadvantageous to do so. In formulating the question scientifically, *i.e.*, from the point of view of the relations between classes in modern society, we must say that the majority of the Social-Democratic Parties, and primarily the German Party, the greatest and most influential in the

Second International, have gone over to the side of their General Staffs, their governments, their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. This is an event of world-wide historic importance, and it is impossible to refrain from making the fullest possible analysis of it. It has long been conceded that, though they bring horror and misery in their train, wars have this more or less important beneficial result, that they ruthlessly expose, unmask and destroy much that is rotten, obsolete and dead in human institutions. The European war of 1914-15 has also undoubtedly begun to bring benefits to mankind by showing the advanced class of the civilised countries that a hideous festering abscess has grown within its Parties, and that an intolerable putrid stench is issuing from somewhere.

I

Is it a fact that the principal Socialist Parties of Europe have betrayed all their convictions and tasks? Of course, the traitors and those who realise clearly, or hazily guess, that they will have to be friendly and tolerant toward them do not like to discuss this. However unpleasant this may be to various "authorities" in the Second International or to their fellow factionalists among the Russian Social-Democrats, we must face the issues squarely and call things by their proper names; we must tell the workers the truth.

Are there any facts that show how the Socialist Parties regarded their tasks and their tactics before the war and in anticipation of it? Undoubtedly there are. There is the resolution adopted at the International Socialist Congress at Basle in 1912, which we reproduce below,¹ together with the resolutions adopted at the Chemnitz Congress of the German Social-Democratic Party * held in the same year, as a reminder of the "forgotten words" of socialism. Summing up, as it does, the enormous propagandist and agitational literature of all the countries against war, this resolution is the most exact and complete, the most solemn and formal exposition of socialist views on war and on tactics in

¹ These resolutions are not reproduced in this volume; they are reproduced in full in *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, Appendix. Lenin gives the substance of the Basle resolution in Part II of this pamphlet. See page 173.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

relation to war. The very fact that none of the authorities of yesterday's International and of today's social-chauvinism, neither Hyndman nor Guesde, nor Kautsky nor Plekhanov, dares to remind his readers of that resolution and prefers either to remain silent about it, or, like Kautsky, to quote excerpts of secondary importance from it and omit everything that is essential, cannot be described otherwise than as treachery. The most "Left," arch-revolutionary resolutions—and the most shameless forgetfulness and renunciation of these resolutions—are one of the most striking manifestations of the collapse of the International. At the same time, it is one of the most striking proofs that only those whose unexampled simplicity goes hand in hand with a cunning desire to perpetuate their former hypocrisy can now believe that it is possible to "rectify" socialism or "straighten out its line" by means of resolutions alone.

It seems only yesterday that Hyndman, who turned to the defence of imperialism prior to the war, was regarded by all "respectable" Socialists as an unbalanced crank, and nobody spoke of him otherwise than in a tone of disdain. Now the most eminent Social-Democratic leaders of all the countries have sunk to Hyndman's position, and differ from each other only in shade and temperament. And it is utterly impossible for us to use more or less parliamentary language in estimating or characterising the civic courage of persons who, like the writers in *Nashe Slovo*,¹ write of "Mr." Hyndman in tones of contempt, while they speak—or remain silent—about "Comrade" Kautsky with deference (or obsequiousness?). Is it possible to reconcile such an attitude with respect for socialism and for one's convictions generally? If you are convinced that Hyndman's chauvinism is false and fatal, does it not follow that you must direct your criticism and attacks against the *more influential* and more dangerous defender of such views, *viz.*, Kautsky?

Guesde's views have recently been expressed in more detail, perhaps, than elsewhere by the Guesdist, Charles Dumas, in a pamphlet entitled *The Peace That We Desire*.^{*} This Jules Guesde's

¹ *I.e.*, Trotsky and his group.—*Ed.*

"Chef de Bureau," as he describes himself on the title page of the pamphlet, naturally "quotes" the former patriotic declarations of the Socialists (David, the German social-chauvinist, does the same in his latest pamphlet on the defence of the fatherland), but he does not quote the Basle Manifesto! Plekhanov, who with an extraordinary air of self-satisfaction utters social-chauvinist banalities, also keeps quiet about that manifesto. Kautsky behaves like Plekhanov; in quoting the Basle Manifesto he *omits* all the revolutionary passages (*i.e.*, all its vital content!), probably on the pretext of censorship regulations. . . . The police and the military authorities who, by the censorship regulations, have forbidden all references to the class struggle or revolution rendered "timely aid" to the betrayers of socialism!

Perhaps the Basle Manifesto is just a meaningless appeal, devoid of definite content, either historical or tactical, having direct bearing on the present, concrete war?

The very opposite is true. There is less idle declamation and more definite content in the Basle resolution than in other resolutions. The Basle resolution speaks of the *very* war which has now broken out; it speaks of the very *imperialist* conflicts which ultimately broke out in 1914-15. The conflicts between Austria and Serbia over the Balkans, between Austria and Italy over Albania, etc., between England and Germany over markets and colonies in general, between Russia and Turkey, etc., over Armenia and Constantinople—this is what the Basle resolution speaks of in anticipation of precisely the present war.* It is of this present war between "the Great Powers of Europe" that the Basle resolution declares that it "*cannot be justified by the slightest pretext of its being in the interests of the people.*"

And if Plekhanov and Kautsky—to take two of the most typical Socialist authorities close to us (one of whom writes in Russian and the other is translated into Russian by the liquidators)—are now seeking, with the aid of Axelrod, for all sorts of "popular justifications" for the war (or, rather, vulgar ones taken from the bourgeois gutter press); if, with a learned mien and with a stock of false quotations from Marx, they refer to the "examples"

of the wars of 1813 and 1870 (Plekhanov), or of 1854-71, 1876-77, 1897 (Kautsky),* then, in truth, only those without a shadow of socialist conviction, without a shred of socialist conscience, can take such arguments "seriously," can *fail* to call them monstrous Jesuitism, hypocrisy and the prostitution of socialism! Let the General Council ("*Vorstand*") of the German Party anathematise Mehring's and Rosa Luxemburg's new magazine, *Die Internationale*,** for its just criticism of Kautsky; let Vandervelde, Plekhanov, Hyndman and Co. treat their opponents in the same manner with the aid of the police of the Triple Entente; we will reply by simply reprinting the Basle Manifesto, which will show that the leaders have taken a turn that cannot be described otherwise than as treachery.

The Basle resolution does not speak of a national war, of a people's war, examples of which have occurred in Europe, wars that were even typical of the period of 1789-1871; it does not speak of a revolutionary war, which the Social-Democrats never renounced, but of the *present* war, which is the outcome of "capitalist imperialism" and "dynastic interests," the outcome of "the policy of conquest" pursued by *both* groups of belligerent nations, the Austro-German and the Anglo-Franco-Russian groups. Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. positively deceive the workers when they repeat the selfish lie of the bourgeoisie of all countries, which is striving with all its might to paint this imperialist, colonial, predatory war as a people's war, a war of defence (on whatever side), and when they seek for justifications for this war in historical examples of *non-imperialist* wars.

The question as to the imperialist, predatory, anti-proletarian character of the present war has long outgrown the stage of a purely theoretical question. Not only have the main features of imperialism been theoretically appraised as the struggle of the perishing, senile and decaying bourgeoisie for the division of the world and for the enslavement of the "small" nations; not only have these conclusions been repeated thousands of times in the vast newspaper literature of the Socialists in *all* countries; not only, for instance, has a representative of one of our "Allied"

nations, the Frenchman Delaisy, in his pamphlet *The Impending War** (1911), explained in a popular manner the predatory character of the present war as far as the French bourgeoisie was concerned; not only that; at Basle, the representatives of the proletarian parties of all countries unanimously and formally expressed their unshakable conviction that a war of precisely an imperialist character was impending, and they drew *tactical* conclusions from this. For this reason, among others, we must forthwith reject all arguments that the difference between national and international tactics has not been sufficiently discussed (see Axelrod's last interview in *Nashe Slovo*, Nos. 87 and 90**), etc., etc., as sophistry. It is sophistry because an all-sided scientific investigation of imperialism is one thing; such an investigation is just beginning to be made, and is, in essence, as infinite as science itself is infinite. The principles of socialist tactics against capitalist imperialism, however, are quite another thing; these have been outlined in millions of copies of Social-Democratic papers and in the decisions of the International. Socialist Parties are not debating clubs, but organisations of the fighting proletariat. When a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy, they must be named and branded as traitors, and we must not allow ourselves to be "caught" by hypocritical assertions to the effect that "everybody does not understand imperialism in the same way," or that the chauvinist Kautsky and the chauvinist Cuno can write volumes about it, or that the question has not been "sufficiently discussed," etc., etc. Capitalism will *never* be completely and *exhaustively* studied in *all* the manifestations of its predatoriness, and in all the minutest ramifications of its historical development and its national peculiarities. Scholars (particularly pedants) will never cease disputing about details. To abandon the socialist struggle against capitalism, to give up opposing those who have betrayed this struggle "on these grounds" would be ridiculous; and what else is it that Kautsky, Cuno, Axelrod, etc., propose?

Now, after the war has broken out, nobody has even attempted to examine the Basle resolution and to prove that it is wrong!

II

Perhaps sincere Socialists stood for the Basle resolution in the anticipation that the war would give rise to a revolutionary situation, and events upset their calculations and revolution was found to be impossible?

It is precisely by means of such sophistry that Cuno (in his pamphlet *Collapse of the Party?** and in a series of articles) attempts to justify his joining the camp of the bourgeoisie. We find similar "arguments" hinted at in the works of nearly all the other social-chauvinists with Kautsky at their head. The hopes for a revolution proved illusory, argues Cuno, and it is not the business of a Marxist to fight for illusions. But this Struveist ** does not say a single word about the "illusions" that were shared by all the signatories of the Basle Manifesto; like a very noble gentleman, he tries to put the blame on the extreme Lefts, such as Pannekoek and Radek!

Let us examine the substance of the argument that the authors of the Basle Manifesto sincerely anticipated the coming of a revolution but that events upset their calculations. The Basle Manifesto says: 1) that war will create an economic and political crisis; 2) that the workers will regard their participation in war as a crime, a criminal "shooting at each other for the profits of capitalists, for the ambitions of dynasties, for the achievement of the aims of secret diplomatic treaties," that war calls forth "indignation and revolt" among the workers; 3) that it is the duty of Socialists to take advantage of this crisis and of the workers' state of mind in order "to rouse the people and hasten the downfall of capitalism"; 4) that the "governments," all, without exception, can start a war only at "their own peril"; 5) that the governments are "afraid of a proletarian revolution"; 6) that the governments "should remember" the Paris Commune (i.e., civil war), the 1905 Revolution in Russia,*** etc. All these are perfectly clear ideas; they are not a *pledge* that revolution will take place; they lay stress on an exact characterisation of *facts and tendencies*. Whoever, on the basis of these ideas and arguments, declares that the anticipated revolution proved an illusion, dis-

plays not a Marxian, but a Struveist and police-renegade attitude towards revolution.

A Marxist cannot have any doubt that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation; furthermore, not every revolutionary situation leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we point to the following three main symptoms: 1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule in an unchanged form; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes," a crisis in the policy of the ruling class which causes fissures, through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. Usually, for a revolution to break out it is not enough for the "lower classes to refuse" to live in the old way; it is necessary also that the "upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way; 2) when the want and suffering of the oppressed classes have become more acute than usual; 3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who in "peace time" quietly allow themselves to be robbed, but who in turbulent times are drawn both by the circumstances of the crisis and by the "upper classes" themselves into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are not only independent of the will of separate groups and parties, but even of separate classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The sum total of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation. This situation existed in 1905 in Russia and in all epochs of revolution in the West; but it also existed in the sixties of the last century in Germany, and in 1859-61 and 1879-80* in Russia, although no revolution occurred in these cases. Why? Because not every revolutionary situation gives rise to revolution; revolution arises only out of such a situation when, to the above-mentioned objective changes, a subjective change is added, namely, the ability of the revolutionary class to carry out revolutionary mass actions *strong* enough to break (or to undermine) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, "falls," if it is not "dropped."

Such are the Marxian views on revolution, views that have been developed many, many times, have been accepted as indisputable by all Marxists, and which for us Russians were corroborated in a particularly striking fashion by the experience of 1905. What, then, did the Basle Manifesto assume in this respect in 1912, and what happened in 1914-15?

It assumed that a revolutionary situation which it briefly described as "an economic and political crisis" would arise. Has such a situation arisen? Undoubtedly it has. The social-chauvinist Lentsch, who defends chauvinism more straightforwardly, more openly and more honestly than the hypocrites, Cuno, Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co., went so far as to say: "What we are passing through is a *revolution*." (P. 6 of his pamphlet, *German Social-Democracy and the War*, Berlin, 1915.) A political crisis exists; not a single government is sure of the morrow, not a single one is free of the danger of financial collapse, loss of territory, expulsion from its country (as the Belgian government was expelled). All governments are living on a volcano, all of them are *themselves* calling for the initiative and heroism of the masses. The political regime of Europe has been shaken and probably nobody will deny that we have entered upon (and are going ever deeper into—I write this on the day Italy has declared war) an epoch of great political disturbances. When, on October 2, 1914, two months after the declaration of war, Kautsky wrote in *Die Neue Zeit* that "never are governments so strong, never are parties so weak as at the beginning of a war," it was a sample of the falsification of the science of history perpetrated by Kautsky in order to please the Südekums and other opportunists. In the first place, never are governments so much in need of agreement among all the parties of the ruling classes, and of the "peaceful" submission of the oppressed classes to this rule, as in time of war. Secondly, even if "at the beginning of a war" the government *seems* to be all-powerful, particularly in a country that expects a speedy victory—nobody has ever said that a revolutionary situation must necessarily coincide with the "beginning" of a war, and still less has anybody ever identified the "seeming" with the *real*.

Everybody knew, saw and admitted that a European war would

be more severe than any other. The experience of the war is proving this more and more. The war is spreading. The political props of Europe are being shaken more and more. The sufferings of the masses are terrible, and the efforts of the governments, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists to hush up these sufferings are proving to be more and more futile. The war profits obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously, scandalously high. Antagonisms are becoming extremely acute. The sullen indignation of the masses, the vague yearning of the downtrodden and ignorant strata of society for a nice ("democratic") peace, the beginning of murmurings among the "lower classes"—all these are facts. The longer the war drags on, and the more acute it becomes, the more the governments themselves develop, and must develop, the activity of the masses, and call upon them to display super-normal exertion of effort and self-sacrifice. The experiences of the war, like the experiences of every crisis in history, of every great calamity and every sudden turn in human life, stun and break some people, *but they enlighten and harden others*; and, taken on the whole, taking the history of the whole world, the number and strength of the latter, except in individual cases of the decline and fall of this or that state, have proved to be greater than that of the former.

The conclusion of peace will not only fail to terminate all these sufferings and all this sharpening of antagonisms "immediately," but, on the contrary, in many respects it will make the sufferings more keenly felt and more clearly understood by the most backward masses of the population.

In a word, a revolutionary situation in a majority of the advanced countries and the Great Powers of Europe exists. In this respect, the anticipations of the Basic Manifesto have been *fully* realised. To deny this truth directly or indirectly, or to ignore it as Cuno, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Co. do, is tantamount to telling a great falsehood, to deceiving the working class and to serving the bourgeoisie. We have quoted facts (in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, Nos. 34, 40, 41 *) which prove that those who *fear* revolution—petty-bourgeois Christian priests, the General Staffs, mil-

lionaires' newspapers—are compelled to admit the symptoms of a revolutionary situation in Europe.

Will this situation last long? And how much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? These things we do not know, and nobody can know. Only the *experience* of the development of revolutionary sentiments and the transition to revolutionary action on the part of the advanced class, the proletariat, will show that. There can be no talk in this connection about "illusions" or about repudiating "illusions," since no Socialist ever gave a pledge that this war (and not the next one), that today's (and not tomorrow's) revolutionary situation would give rise to revolution. What we are discussing is the undisputed and fundamental duty of all Socialists: the duty to reveal to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, to make clear its scope and depth; to awaken the revolutionary consciousness and the revolutionary determination of the proletariat, to help it pass to revolutionary actions, and to create organisations, suitable for the revolutionary situation, for work in this direction.

Not a single influential or responsible Socialist ever dared doubt that this was precisely the duty of Socialist Parties; and the Basle Manifesto, without spreading or harbouring the slightest "illusion," spoke precisely about this duty of the Socialists: to rouse, to "stir up" the people (and not to lull it to sleep by chauvinism, as Plekhanov, Axelrod and Kautsky do); to "take advantage" of the crisis in order to "*hasten*" the collapse of capitalism; to be guided by the *examples* of the Commune and of October-December 1905. The failure of the present Parties to perform this duty is the mark of their treachery, their political death, their renunciation of their own role, their desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie.

III

But how was it *possible* for the most prominent representatives and leaders of the Second International to betray socialism? We shall deal with this question in detail later, after we have examined the attempts that are being made to justify this treachery "theoretically." First of all we shall try to characterise the main theories of the social-chauvinism of which Plekhanov (who in

most cases reiterates the arguments of the Anglo-French chauvinists, Hyndman and his new adherents) and Kautsky (who advances much more "subtle" arguments, that have the appearance of considerably greater theoretical profundity) may be regarded as the representatives.

Perhaps the most primitive theory is the "instigator" theory, which runs as follows: We have been attacked, we are defending ourselves; in the interests of the proletariat the disturbers of the peace of Europe must be repulsed. This is a repetition of the declarations of all the governments and of the declamations of the whole bourgeois and yellow press the world over. Plekhanov has managed to embellish even this threadbare vulgarity with the Jesuitical reference to "dialectics" to which this writer always resorts; he asserts that in order to be able to appraise the concrete situation, it is necessary first of all to find the instigator and punish him and to postpone all other questions until the situation changes. (See Plekhanov's pamphlet, *The War*, Paris, 1914, and the repetition of its arguments by Axelrod in *Golos*,¹ Nos. 86 and 87.) Plekhanov has beaten the record in the noble sport of substituting sophistry for dialectics. The sophist picks out one of many "arguments," and Hegel long ago correctly observed that it is possible to find "arguments" for everything in the world. Dialectics call for a many-sided investigation of a given social phenomenon in its development; that we reduce the exterior, the apparent, to the fundamental driving forces, to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle. Plekhanov picks out one quotation from the German Social-Democratic press: The Germans themselves, prior to the war, admitted that Austria and Germany were the "instigators," he says, and that's all. He does not mention the fact that the Russian Socialists repeatedly exposed the tsarist plans of conquest in connection with Galicia, Armenia, etc. He does not make the slightest attempt to study the economic and diplomatic history of at least the last three decades, and this history proves irrefutably that it was the conquest of colonies, the grabbing of foreign countries, the squeezing out and

¹ *The Voice*--organ of Trotsky, published in Paris, 1914-15.—Ed. Eng. ed.

ruin of the more successful competitors that was the main axis of the politics of *both* groups of the now belligerent nations.¹

Applied to wars, the main thesis of dialectics, so shamelessly distorted by Plekhanov to please the bourgeoisie, is that "*war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e., violent] means.*"

¹ Very instructive is *The War of Steel and Gold* (London, 1914, a book bearing the date of March 1914!) by the English pacifist Brailsford, who is not averse to parading as a Socialist.

The author clearly realises that the problems of nationality no longer occupy the forefront, that they have been solved (p. 35); that this is not the issue at present, that "the typical question of modern diplomacy" (p. 36) is the Bagdad railway, the contracts of rails for it, the mines of Morocco and the like. The author correctly considers one of the "most instructive incidents in the recent history of European diplomacy" the fact that the French patriots and the English imperialists fought against the attempts of Caillaux, in 1911 and 1913, to make peace with Germany on the basis of an agreement concerning the division of colonial spheres of influence and the quotation of German securities on the Paris Bourse. The *English* and the *French* bourgeoisie, he says, *frustrated* such an agreement. (Pp. 38-40.) The aim of imperialism, he asserts, is the export of capital to the weaker countries. (P. 74.) The profit from such capital amounted in England in 1899 to £90,000,000-£100,000,000 (Giffen); in 1909, to £140,000,000 (Paish); and we will add that in a recent speech Lloyd George calculated it at £200,000,000—almost 2,000,000,000 rubles. Foul machinations and bribing the Turkish nobility, posts for favourite sons in India and Egypt, these are the main things. (Pp. 85-87.) An insignificant minority gains from armaments and wars, he says, but this minority is backed by "Society" and by the financiers, whereas behind the adherents of peace there is a scattered population. (P. 93.) A pacifist who today talks about peace and disarmament may turn out tomorrow to be a member of a party which is dependent on war contractors. (P. 161.) If the Triple Entente is triumphant it will seize Morocco and divide Persia; the Triple Alliance will take Tripoli, strengthen its hold in Bosnia and subordinate Turkey. (P. 167.) London and Paris gave billions to Russia in March 1906, and helped tsarism to crush the movement for freedom (pp. 225-28); now England is helping Russia to throttle Persia. (P. 229.) Russia instigated the Balkan War. (P. 230.)—There is nothing new in this, is there? All this is common knowledge and has been repeated a thousand times in Social-Democratic newspapers all over the world. On the eve of the war, an English bourgeois sees all this as clearly as can be. In face of these simple and commonly known facts, what indecent nonsense, what intolerable hypocrisy, what sugary lies are the theories advanced by Plekhanov and Potresov concerning Germany's guilt, or Kautsky's theory concerning the "prospects" of disarmament and lasting peace under capitalism!

This formula belongs to Clausewitz,¹ one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose ideas were fertilised by Hegel. And this was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded every war as the *continuation* of the politics of the given interested powers—and the *various classes* within these countries—at a given time.

Plekhanov's crude chauvinism is based on exactly the same theoretical position as the more subtle and conciliatory-sentimental chauvinism of Kautsky, when the latter sanctifies the desertion of the Socialists of all countries to the side of "their" capitalists by the following arguments:

It is the right and duty of everyone to defend his fatherland; true internationalism consists in the recognition of this right for Socialists of all nations, including those who are at war with my nation. . . . (See *Die Neue Zeit*, October 2, 1914, and other works by the same author.)

This matchless reasoning is such a boundlessly vulgar travesty of socialism that the best answer to it would be to coin a medal with the portraits of Wilhelm II and Nicholas II on one side and of Plekhanov and Kautsky on the other. True internationalism, mind you, means that we must justify the shooting of German workers by French workers, and of French by the Germans in the name of "defence of the fatherland"!

However, if we examine the theoretical premises of Kautsky's arguments more closely, we will find the very same idea that was ridiculed by Clausewitz about eighty years ago, *viz.*, that when war breaks out, all historically created political relations between the nations and classes cease and that a totally new situation arises! There are "simply" aggressors and defenders, "simply" the repelling of the "enemies of the fatherland"! The oppression of a number of nations, which comprise over half the population

¹ Karl von Clausewitz, "*Vom Kriege*," *Werke*, Berlin, 1834, I Bd., S. 28. Cf. III Bd., S. 139-40: "Everybody knows that wars are called forth only by the political relations of governments and peoples; but ordinarily one pictures the situation as if, with the beginning of the war, these relations cease and a new situation is created subject to its own laws. We assert, on the contrary, that war is nothing but a continuation of political relations with the intervention of other means."

of the globe, by the Great Power imperialist nations; competition between the bourgeoisie of these countries for a share of the loot; the desire of the capitalists to split and oppress the labour movement—all this suddenly disappears from the field of vision of Plekhanov and Kautsky, although it was precisely these "politics" that they themselves were describing for decades before the war.

In this connection, false references to Marx and Engels form the "trump" argument of the two chiefs of social-chauvinism; Plekhanov recalls Prussia's national war of 1813 and Germany's national war of 1870, while Kautsky argues with a most learned air that Marx examined the question of whose success (*i.e.*, the success of which bourgeoisie) was more desirable in the wars of 1854-55, 1859 and 1870-71, and that the Marxists did likewise in the wars of 1876-77 and 1897.¹ It is the method of all the sophists of all times to quote examples from cases that are dissimilar in principle to the ones to which they apply them. The wars of the past, to which they refer, were a "continuation of the politics" of national movements of the bourgeoisie of many years' standing, movements against an alien, foreign yoke, and against absolutism (Turkish and Russian). At that time there could be no other question than the question of whether it was preferable for this or that bourgeoisie to be successful. The Marxists were in a position to *rouse the peoples beforehand* for such wars, to *fan* national hatred as Marx did in 1848 and later, when he called for war against Russia, and as Engels in 1859 fanned the national hatred of the Germans against their oppressors, Napoleon III and Russian tsarism.^{2*}

¹ See note to page 171.*—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² Mr. Gardenin in *Zhizn* ** labels as "revolutionary chauvinism," but none the less as chauvinism, Marx's stand in 1848 for a revolutionary war against the European nations which in fact had shown themselves to be counter-revolutionary, *viz.*, "the Slavs and the Russians in particular." This reproof of Marx reveals once again the opportunism (or—to be more correct, *and*—the total lack of seriousness) of this "Left" Socialist-Revolutionary. We Marxists have always stood, and now stand, for a *revolutionary* war against *counter-revolutionary* nations. For instance, if socialism were *victorious* in America or in Europe in 1920, while, let us say, Japan and China were advancing *their* Bismarcks against us—even if only diplomatically at

To compare the "continuation of the politics" of fighting against feudalism and absolutism—the politics of the bourgeoisie in its struggle for liberty—with the "continuation of the politics" of a decrepit, *i.e.*, imperialist, bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, of a bourgeoisie which has plundered the whole world, a reactionary bourgeoisie which, in alliance with feudal landlords, crushes the proletariat, is like comparing yards with pounds. It is like comparing the "representatives of the bourgeoisie," Robespierre, Garibaldi and Zhelyabov, with such "representatives of the bourgeoisie" as Millerand, Salandra and Guchkov. One cannot be a Marxist without entertaining the deepest respect for the great bourgeois revolutionaries who had a world-historic right to speak in the name of bourgeois "fatherlands," who roused tens of millions of people of new nations to civilised life in the struggle against feudalism. And one cannot be a Marxist without feeling contempt for the sophistry of Plekhanov and Kautsky, who speak of the "defence of the fatherland" in relation to the throttling of Belgium by the German imperialists, or in relation to the pact between the imperialists of England, France, Russia and Italy to plunder Austria and Turkey.

There is another "Marxian" theory of social-chauvinism which runs as follows: Socialism is based on the rapid development of capitalism; the victory of my country will hasten the development of capitalism in it and, therefore, the coming of socialism; the defeat of my country will retard its economic development and, therefore, the coming of socialism. This Struveist theory is developed in Russia by Plekhanov and among the Germans by Lentsch and others. Kautsky argues against this crude theory, against Lentsch, who defends it openly, and against Cuno, who defends it covertly, but he does so only for the purpose of reconciling the social-chauvinists of all countries on the basis of a more subtle, more Jesuitical chauvinist theory.

We need not spend much time examining this crude theory. Struve's *Critical Notes* appeared in 1894,¹ and during these first—we certainly would be in favour of an aggressive revolutionary war against them. It seems strange to you, Mr. Gardenin? But you are a revolutionary of the Ropshin type!

¹ See Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, "The Economic Content of Narodism, etc."—*Ed.*

twenty years the Russian Social-Democrats have become thoroughly familiar with this "manner" of the enlightened Russian bourgeois of advancing his ideas and advocating his desires under the cloak of "Marxism" *purged* of revolutionary content. Struveism is not merely a Russian, but, as recent events prove clearly, an international striving on the part of the bourgeois theoreticians to kill Marxism "with kindness," to crush it in their embraces, to kill it by an alleged acceptance of "all" the "truly scientific" sides and elements of Marxism *except* its "agitational," "demagogic," "Blanquist utopian" side. In other words, they take from Marxism all that is acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, including the struggle for reforms, including the class struggle (without the proletarian dictatorship), including the "general" recognition of "socialist ideals" and the substitution of a "new order" for capitalism, and they repudiate "only" the living soul of Marxism, only its revolutionary content.

Marxism is the theory of the proletarian movement for emancipation. It is clear, therefore, that the class conscious workers must pay the utmost attention to the process of substituting Struveism for Marxism. The driving forces of this process are manifold and varied. We shall point out only the three main ones: 1) the development of science is providing more and more material to prove that Marx was right. This makes it necessary to fight against him hypocritically, not to oppose the foundations of Marxism openly, but to pretend to accept it and at the same time to emasculate it by sophistry, to transform Marxism into a holy "icon" that is harmless for the bourgeoisie; 2) the development of opportunism among the Social-Democratic Parties facilitates such a "revision" of Marxism, and makes it suitable for justifying all sorts of concessions to opportunism; 3) the epoch of imperialism is the epoch in which the world is divided among the "great" privileged nations which oppress all the others. Crumbs of the loot obtained as a result of these privileges and this oppression undoubtedly fall to the share of certain strata of the petty bourgeoisie and of the aristocracy and also to the bureaucracy of the working class. These strata, representing an insignificant minority of the proletariat and of the toiling masses, gravitate

towards "Struveism," because it provides them with a justification for their alliance with "their" national bourgeoisie against the oppressed masses of *all* nations. We shall have occasion to deal with this later in connection with the question of the causes of the collapse of the International.

IV

The most subtle theory of social-chauvinism, most skilfully counterfeited to make it appear scientific and international, is the theory of "ultra-imperialism" advanced by Kautsky.¹ Here is the clearest, most precise and most recent exposition of this theory by the author himself:

"The subsiding of the Protectionist movement in England; the lowering of tariffs in America; the tendency towards disarmament; the rapid decline in the export of capital from France and Germany in the years immediately preceding the war; finally, the growing mutual international interlocking of the various cliques of finance capital—all this has caused me to consider whether the present imperialist policy cannot be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capital. Such a new phase of capitalism is, at any rate, conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question." (*Die Neue Zeit*, No. 5, April 30, 1915, p. 144.)

"... The course and the outcome of the present war may prove decisive in this respect. It may entirely crush the weak rudiments of ultra-imperialism by fanning national hatred also among the finance capitalists to the highest degree, by increasing armaments and the race for them, by making a new world war inevitable. Under such conditions, the thing I foresaw and formulated in my pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, would come true in horrifying proportions; class antagonisms would become sharper and sharper and with it would come the moral decay (*Abwirtschftung*) of capitalism. . . ." (It must be noted that by this pretentious word Kautsky means simply the "hatred" which the "intermediary strata between the proletariat and finance capital," namely, "the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeois, even petty capitalists," entertain towards capitalism.) "... But the war may end otherwise. It may lead to the strengthening of the weak rudiments of ultra-imperialism. . . . Its lessons" (note this!) "may hasten developments for which we would have to wait a long time under peace conditions. If an agreement between nations, disarmament and a lasting peace are achieved, the worst of the causes that led to the growing moral decay of capitalism before the war may disappear. . . ." The new phase of capitalism will, of course, soon bring "new misfortunes, perhaps even worse misfortunes" for the proletariat. But

¹ See *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, chaps. VII and IX, in this volume.—Ed.

"for a time," "ultra-imperialism could create an era of new hopes and expectations within the framework of capitalism." (P. 145.)

How is the justification of social-chauvinism deduced from this "theory"?

It is deduced in a very queer way for a "theoretician," namely, in the following manner: the Left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany assert that imperialism and the wars it gives rise to are not an accident, but an inevitable product of capitalism, which brought about the domination of finance capital. Therefore, they say, it is necessary to pass to the revolutionary mass struggle, for the epoch of comparatively peaceful development has become obsolete. The Right-wing Social-Democrats bluntly declare: since imperialism is "necessary," we too must be imperialists. Kautsky, in the role of the "centre," tries to reconcile these two views. In his pamphlet *The National State, the Imperialist State and the League of States* (Nuremberg, 1915), he writes:

"The extreme Lefts wish to oppose to imperialism socialism, i.e., not only the propaganda of socialism which we have been carrying on in opposition to all forms of capitalist domination for half a century, but the immediate achievement of socialism. This seems very radical, but it can only serve to drive *everyone who does not believe* in the immediate practical achievement of socialism into the camp of imperialism." (P. 17, our italics.)

When Kautsky speaks of the immediate achievement of socialism, he "achieves" a pure subterfuge and takes advantage of the fact that in Germany, particularly under the military censorship, it is not possible to talk about revolutionary action. Kautsky knows very well that what the Left wing is demanding from the Party is *immediate* propaganda in favour of, and preparation for, revolutionary action, and not the "immediate practical achievement of socialism."

From the fact that imperialism is necessary the Left wing draws the conclusion that revolutionary action is necessary. The "theory of ultra-imperialism," however, serves Kautsky as a means by which to *justify the opportunists*, to present the situation in such a light as to make it appear that they have not gone over to the bourgeoisie but simply that they "do not believe" that socialism could come immediately and expect that "perhaps" a new "era" of disarmament and lasting peace will be ushered in. The "theory"

reduces itself to this and *only* to this, that Kautsky utilises the *hope* for a *new* peaceful era of capitalism to justify the opportunists and the official Social-Democratic Parties who joined the bourgeoisie and repudiated revolutionary, *i.e.*, proletarian, tactics during the *present turbulent era*, notwithstanding the solemn declarations of the Basle resolution!

Note that in doing so Kautsky not only fails to state that this new phase necessarily follows from such and such circumstances and conditions, but that on the contrary he openly declares: I cannot even decide as yet whether this new phase can be "*achieved*" or not. Indeed, look at the "tendencies" towards the new era to which Kautsky points. The astonishing thing is that Kautsky included the "tendency towards disarmament" among the economic facts! This means that he is trying to hide from undisputed facts, that cannot be reconciled with the theory of diminishing contradictions, in the shadow of innocent philistine talk and dreams. Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism"—this word, by the way, does not by any means express what the author wants to say—implies a tremendous *blunting* of the contradictions of capitalism. Kautsky speaks of the "subsiding of Protection in England and America." But what is there in this that would suggest the slightest tendency towards a new era? Having been carried to the extreme, American Protection is now subsiding, but Protection remains, in the same way as the privileges, the preferential tariffs of the English colonies in favour of England, have remained. Let us recall what caused the change from the former "peaceful" epoch of capitalism to the present imperialist epoch: free competition was replaced by monopolist capitalist combines, the world was divided up. It is obvious that both these facts (and factors) are really of world-wide significance: Free Trade and peaceful competition were possible and necessary as long as capital was in a position to enlarge its colonies without hindrance, and to seize unoccupied land in Africa, etc., as long as the concentration of capital was still slight and no monopolist undertakings, *i.e.*, undertakings of such magnitude as to dominate a *whole* branch of industry, existed.

The appearance and growth of such monopolist undertakings

(has this process, perchance, been checked in England or in America? Not even Kautsky will dare deny that the war has accelerated and intensified it) make the free competition of former times *impossible*, cut the ground from under its feet, while the division of the world *compels* the capitalists to pass from peaceful expansion to armed struggle for the *re-division* of colonies and spheres of influence. It is ridiculous to think that the *subsiding* of Protection in two countries can change anything in this respect.

Further, for a number of years, he says, there has been a decrease in capital exports from *two* countries. According to Harms' statistics for 1912, the capital invested abroad by the two countries under consideration, France and Germany, amounted to 35,000,000,000 marks (about 17,000,000,000 rubles) each, while England alone had twice the amount.¹ The increase in capital exports has never proceeded evenly under capitalism, nor could it do so. Kautsky dares not even suggest that the accumulation of capital has diminished, or that the capacity of the home market to absorb commodities has undergone a vital change, say, through a marked improvement in the standard of living of the masses. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that a new era is being ushered in on the grounds that the capital exports from two countries during the past few years have diminished.

"The growing international interlocking of the cliques of finance capital," this is the only really general and undoubted tendency, not during the last few years, and not in two countries, but in the whole world, in the whole of capitalism. But why must this tendency lead to disarmament, and not to armaments, as hitherto? Take any one of the world-famous producers of cannon (and of armaments in general), for instance, Armstrong. The English *Economist* recently (May 1, 1915) published figures showing that the *profits* of this firm rose from £606,000 in 1905-06, to £856,000

¹ See Bernhard Harms, *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft* [*Problems of World Economy*], Jena, 1912; George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments in the Colonies," in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. LXXV, 1910-11, p. 167. Lloyd George, in a speech early in 1915, estimated English capital invested abroad at £4,000,000,000, i.e., about 80,000,000,000 marks.

in 1913, and to £940,000 in 1914. The interlocking of finance capital is here very pronounced and it continues to grow: German capitalists "hold shares" in the business of an English firm; English firms build submarines for Austria, etc. Internationally interlocked capital is doing splendid business in armaments and wars. To deduce any economic tendency towards disarmament from the combining and interlocking of various national capitals into one international whole means putting well-intentioned philistine desires for the blunting of class antagonisms in place of the actual sharpening of these antagonisms.

V

Kautsky speaks of the "lessons" of the war in an entirely philistine spirit and depicts them as a sort of moral horror of the miseries of war. This, for instance, is how he argues in the pamphlet entitled *The National State, etc.*:

"It is beyond doubt, and it needs no proof, that there are strata of the population which are very urgently interested in universal peace and disarmament. The petty bourgeois and small peasants, even many capitalists and intellectuals, are not bound to imperialism by any interests that outweigh the damage suffered by these strata as a result of war and armaments." (P. 21.)

This was written in February 1915! The facts prove that all the propertied classes, including the petty bourgeoisie and the "intelligentsia," have joined the imperialists *en masse*, and yet Kautsky, like the "man in the muffler,"¹ with an air of extraordinary self-satisfaction tries to brush facts aside with the aid of sentimental phrases. He judges the interests of the petty bourgeoisie not by its *conduct*, but by the *words* of certain petty bourgeois, although these words are refuted at every step by their deeds. It is the same as if we were to judge the "interests" of the bourgeoisie in general, not by its deeds, but by the benevolent speeches of bourgeois parsons who solemnly vow that the present system is permeated with Christian ideals. Kautsky applies Marxism in such a fashion that all its content evaporates and what remains is

¹ A character in one of Chekhov's stories.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

the catchword "interests" which bears a sort of supernatural, spiritualist meaning, for it implies not real economics, but innocent desires for the common good.

Marxism judges "interests" by the class antagonisms and the class struggles which manifest themselves in millions of facts of everyday life. The petty bourgeoisie dreams and prattles of the blunting of antagonisms and "argues" that their sharpening leads to "harmful consequences." Imperialism is the subjugation of all strata of the propertied classes to finance capital and the division of the world among five or six "great" nations, the majority of which are now participating in the war. The division of the world among the Great Powers means that all their propertied classes are *interested* in possessing colonies and spheres of influence, in oppressing foreign nations, in securing the more or less lucrative posts and privileges connected with belonging to a "Great" Power and an oppressing nation.¹

It is *impossible* to live in the old way, in the comparatively calm, cultured, peaceful surroundings of a capitalism that is smoothly evolving and gradually spreading to new countries, for a new epoch has been ushered in. Finance capital is squeezing out, and will squeeze out, the given country from the ranks of Great Powers, will deprive it of its colonies and spheres of influence (as Germany, which has gone to war with England, threatens to do) and it will deprive the petty bourgeoisie of its "Great Power" privileges and supplementary incomes. This fact has been proved by the war. This is the *outcome* of that sharpening of antagonisms

¹ E. Schultze states that by 1915 the value of securities in the whole world was calculated at 732,000,000,000 francs, including state and municipal loans, mortgages and stocks of commercial and manufacturing corporations, etc. Of this sum, Great Britain's share was 130,000,000,000 francs, that of the United States 115,000,000,000, France 100,000,000,000 and Germany 75,000,000,000, i.e., the share of all four Great Powers was 420,000,000,000 francs, more than half of the total. From this we may judge of the advantages and privileges accruing to the leading Great Powers that have progressed beyond other nations and oppress and plunder them. (Dr. Emil Schultze, *Das französische Kapital in Russland* [*French Capital in Russia*] in *Finanz Archiv*, Berlin, 1915, Vol. XXXII, p. 127.—Ed.) "Defence of the Fatherland" by the Great Powers is the defence of the right to share in the plunder of foreign countries. In Russia, as is commonly known, capitalist imperialism is weaker, while military-feudal imperialism is stronger.

which has long been recognised by all, including Kautsky in his pamphlet *The Road to Power*.*

And now that the armed conflict for Great Power privileges is a fact, Kautsky tries to *persuade* the capitalists and the petty bourgeoisie to believe that war is a terrible thing, while disarmament is a good thing, in exactly the same way, and with exactly the same results, as a Christian parson tries from the pulpit to persuade the capitalist to believe that human love is God's commandment, as well as the yearning of the soul and the moral law of civilisation. The thing that Kautsky calls economic tendencies towards "ultra-imperialism" is precisely a petty-bourgeois attempt to *persuade* the financiers to refrain from doing evil.

Capital exports? *But* more capital is exported to independent countries, such as the United States of America, than to the colonies. Seizure of colonies? *But* they have all been seized, and nearly all of them are striving for liberation.

"India may cease to be a British possession, but as an Empire it will never fall under the sway of another foreign power." (P. 49 of the above pamphlet.) "Every attempt on the part of any industrial capitalist state to acquire for itself a colonial empire sufficient to make it independent of other countries in regard to raw materials must cause all the other capitalist states to unite against it and involve it in endless, exhausting wars without bringing it nearer to its goal. Such a policy would be the surest road towards the bankruptcy of the entire economic life of that state." (Pp. 72-73.)

Is not this a philistine attempt to persuade the financiers to renounce imperialism? To attempt to frighten the capitalists by the prospect of bankruptcy is like advising Stock Exchange brokers not to gamble on the Stock Exchange because "many have lost their fortunes in this way." Capital *gains* by the bankruptcy of a competing capitalist or of a competing nation, because in this way capital becomes more concentrated; hence, the sharper and "keener" economic competition, *i.e.*, the economic driving of a competitor towards bankruptcy, becomes, the more the capitalists strive to add *military* pressure in order to drive him in that direction. The fewer countries that remain to which capital can be exported as profitably as to colonies or dependent states, like Turkey—since in *such* cases the financier reaps a triple profit compared with capital export to a free, independent and civilised

country, like the United States of America—the more *stubborn* is the struggle for the subjugation and the division of Turkey, China, etc. This is what economic theory says about the epoch of finance capital and imperialism. This is what the facts say. As to Kautsky, he turns everything into a trite, petty-bourgeois “moral”: it is not worth while getting excited, and certainly not worth while going to war, over the partition of Turkey, or the seizure of India, since they cannot be held “for long anyway.” And, moreover, it would be better to develop capitalism peacefully. . . . It would be better still, of course, to develop capitalism and expand the home market by increasing wages; this is perfectly “feasible” and it is a very fitting topic for a clergyman to preach on to the financiers. Good Kautsky has almost succeeded in persuading the German financiers that it is not worth while waging war against England for the colonies, because these colonies will soon secure their liberation in any case! . . .

Great Britain’s exports and imports to and from Egypt between 1872 and 1912 have not kept pace with the general growth of British exports and imports, and Kautsky the “Marxist” draws the moral: “We have no reason to suppose that British trade with Egypt would have been less developed as a result of the mere operation of economic factors, without military occupation.” (P. 72.) “The urge of capital to expand can be *best* satisfied, not by the violent methods of imperialism, but by *peaceful democracy*.” (P. 70.)

What a remarkably serious and scientific “Marxian” analysis! Kautsky has magnificently “corrected” old unreasonable history, he has “proved” that there was no need for the English to have taken Egypt from the French, that it was not worth the German financiers’ while to have started the war, to have organised the Turkish campaign and taken other measures in order to drive the English out of Egypt! All this is a mere misunderstanding—it has not yet dawned upon the English that it would be “best” to give up violent methods in Egypt (in order to increase the capital exports *à la Kautsky*!) and to adopt “peaceful democracy.”

“Of course it was an illusion on the part of the bourgeois Free-Traders to think that Free Trade would entirely eliminate the economic antagonisms

generated by capitalism. Neither Free Trade nor democracy can eliminate these. What we are most interested in is that these antagonisms should be lived down in a struggle in such forms as would impose the least amount of suffering and sacrifice on the toiling masses." (P. 73.)

Grant, O Lord! Have mercy, O Lord! What is a philistine? Lassalle used to ask, and he answered by quoting the words of the well-known poet: "An empty gut full of fear and hope; may God have pity on him."

Kautsky has degraded Marxism to unheard-of prostitution and has become a real parson. The parson tries to *persuade* the capitalists to adopt peaceful democracy—and calls this dialectics. If originally, he argues, there was Free Trade, and then came monopolies and imperialism, why should there not be ultra-imperialism and then again Free Trade? The parson *consoles* the oppressed masses by painting the blessings of this ultra-imperialism, although he has not even the courage to say that it can be "achieved"! Feuerbach was right when, in reply to those who defended religion on the ground that it consoles the people, he pointed out the reactionary meaning of consolation: whoever consoles the slave instead of rousing him to revolt against slavery aids the slave-owner.

All oppressing classes need two social functions to safeguard their rule: the function of the hangman and the function of the priest. The hangman is required to quell the protests and the indignation of the oppressed; the priest is required to paint for them the prospects of mitigation of their sufferings and sacrifices (this is particularly easy to do without giving any guarantee that these prospects will be "achieved"), while preserving class rule, and thereby to reconcile them to class rule, wean them from revolutionary action, undermine their revolutionary spirit and destroy their revolutionary determination. Kautsky has turned Marxism into a most hideous and stupid counter-revolutionary theory, into the filthiest clericalism.

In 1909, in his pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, he admitted the unrefuted and irrefutable intensification of antagonisms within capitalism, the approach of a period of wars and revolutions, of a new "revolutionary period." There can be no "premature" revolu-

tion, he said; and he declared that to refuse to count on the possibility of victory in the uprising, even though before the fight there might also be the prospect of defeat, was the "direct betrayal of our cause."

The war came. The antagonisms became *still* sharper. The sufferings of the masses reached gigantic proportions. The war drags on and its area is becoming wider. Kautsky writes pamphlet after pamphlet and, meekly submitting to the dictates of the censor, refrains from quoting the facts about land-grabbing, the horrors of war, the scandalous profits that are being made by war-contractors, the high cost of living and the "military slavery" of the mobilised workers—instead, he keeps on consoling the proletariat; he consoles it by quoting the examples of those wars in which the bourgeoisie was revolutionary and progressive, in regard to which "Marx himself" desired victory for one or the other bourgeoisie; he consoles it by quoting rows and columns of figures to prove that capitalism is "possible" without colonies, without robbery, without wars and armaments, to prove that "peaceful democracy" is preferable. Without daring to deny that the sufferings of the masses are becoming more acute and that a revolutionary situation is arising before our very eyes (one must not talk about this, the censor does not permit it. . .), Kautsky, in his servility to the bourgeoisie and the opportunists, paints a prospect (he does *not guarantee* the "possibility of achieving" them) of forms of struggle in a new phase which will entail "less sacrifice and suffering. . . ." Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg were right when, because of this, they called Kautsky a prostitute (*Mädchen für alle*).

* * *

In August 1905 there was a revolutionary situation in Russia. The tsar had promised to establish the Bulygin Duma to "console" the masses who were in a state of unrest. If the abandoning of armaments by the financiers and their agreeing to a "lasting peace" can be called "ultra-imperialism," then the Bulygin regime of advisory representation¹ might be described as "ultra-autocra-

¹ The Bulygin Duma was to have no power to introduce legislation, and legally was to be only an "advisory" body.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

cy." Let us assume for a moment that tomorrow a hundred of the biggest financiers of the world, "interlocked" as they are in hundreds of colossal undertakings, *promise* the peoples to stand for disarmament after the war (we make this assumption only for a moment in order to draw political conclusions from Kautsky's foolish little theory). Even if that happened, it would be downright treachery to the proletariat to dissuade it from taking revolutionary action, without which all promises, all fine perspectives are a mere mirage.

The war has not only brought the capitalist class gigantic profits and splendid prospects of new plunder (Turkey, China, etc.), new contracts running into billions and new loans at increased rates of interest; it has in addition brought the capitalist class still greater political advantages in that it has split and demoralised the proletariat. Kautsky aids this demoralisation; he sanctifies this international *split* among the fighting proletariat *in the name of unity* with the opportunists of "their own nation," with the Südekums! And still there are people who fail to understand that the unity slogan of the old parties means the "unity" of the proletariat of a given nation with the bourgeoisie of its own nation, and a *split* among the proletariat of the various nations.

VI

The preceding lines were already written when *Die Neue Zeit* of May 28 (No. 9) appeared with Kautsky's concluding arguments on the "collapse of Social-Democracy." (Section 7, his reply to Cuno.) Kautsky sums up all his old sophistries and one new one in defence of social-chauvinism in the following way:

"It is simply not true to say that the war is a purely imperialist one, that at the outbreak of the war the alternative was either imperialism or socialism, that the Socialist Parties and the proletarian masses of Germany, France and, in many respects, also of England, without thinking, at the mere call of a handful of parliamentarians, threw themselves into the arms of imperialism, betrayed socialism and thus caused a collapse unexampled in history."

This is a new sophism and a new deception of the workers: the war, if you please, is not a "purely" imperialist one!

Kautsky vacillates on the question of the character and signi-

ficance of the present war in an astonishing manner, and this Party leader evades the precise and formal declarations of the Basle and Chemnitz Congresses as carefully as a thief avoids the place of his last theft. In his pamphlet, *The National State, etc.*, written in February 1915, Kautsky asserted that "in the last analysis," the war is an "imperialist one." (P. 64.) Now, a new reservation is introduced: not a *purely* imperialist one. What else can it be?

It appears that it is also a national war! Kautsky arrives at this monstrous conclusion by means of the following somewhat "Plekhanovist" quasi-dialectics:

"The present war," he says, "is not only the child of imperialism, but also of the Russian revolution." He, Kautsky, as early as 1904, foresaw that the Russian revolution would give rise to Pan-Slavism in a new form, that "democratic Russia would inevitably fan the desires of the Austrian and Turkish Slavs for national independence. . . . Then the Polish question would also become acute. . . . Austria would fall to pieces because, with the collapse of tsarism, the iron ring which at present binds the centrifugal elements together would then be destroyed." (Kautsky himself quotes this last phrase from his 1904 article.) ". . . The Russian revolution . . . gave a new, powerful impetus to the national strivings of the Orient, adding the Asiatic problems to the problems of Europe. *All these problems* are making themselves felt very strongly in the *present* war and are acquiring very decisive significance for the mood of the *masses of the people*, including the *proletarian* masses, at a time when imperialist tendencies are predominant among the ruling classes." (P. 273, our italics.)

This is another lovely example of the prostitution of Marxism! Since "democratic Russia" would have fanned the strivings of the nations of Eastern Europe towards freedom (which is undisputed), *therefore*, the present war, which is not liberating a single nation, and which, whatever its outcome may be, will enslave many nations, is not a "purely" imperialist war. "The collapse of tsarism" would have meant the dissolution of Austria owing to its undemocratic national structure, *therefore*, temporarily strengthened counter-revolutionary tsarism, which is plundering Austria and is

bringing *still* greater oppression to the nationalities of Austria, has given to "the present war," not a purely imperialist character, but to a certain degree a national character. "The ruling classes" bamboozle the narrow-minded petty bourgeois and browbeaten peasants by means of fables about the national aims of the imperialist war, *therefore* a man of science, an authority on "Marxism," a representative of the Second International, has the right to reconcile the masses to this bamboozling by means of a "formula" to the effect that the ruling classes betray imperialist tendencies, while the "people" and the proletarian masses betray "national" strivings.

Dialectics are transformed into the meanest and basest sophistry!

The national element in the present war is represented *only* by the war of Serbia against Austria (which, by the way, was noted in the resolution of the Berne Conference of our party¹). Only in Serbia and among the Serbs do we find a national liberation movement of long standing, embracing millions of "national masses," and of which the present war of Serbia against Austria is a "continuation." If this war were an isolated one, *i.e.*, if it were not connected with the general European war, with the selfish and predatory aims of England, Russia, etc., it would have been the *duty* of all Socialists to desire the success of the Serbian *bourgeoisie*—this is the only correct and absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the national element in the present war. But Kautsky the sophist, who is now in the service of the Austrian bourgeoisie, clericals and militarists, fails to draw precisely this conclusion!

Further, Marxian dialectics, being the last word in the scientific-evolutionary method, forbid an isolated, *i.e.*, a one-sided and monstrously distorted, examination of an object. The national element of the Serbo-Austrian war has *no* serious significance, and can have none, in the general European war. If Germany wins she will throttle Belgium, another part of Poland, perhaps a part of France, etc. If Russia wins, she will throttle Galicia, another part

¹ See article "Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad," in this volume.—*Ed.*

of Poland, Armenia, etc. If the war ends in a draw, the old national oppression will remain. For Serbia, *i.e.*, perhaps for one per cent of the participants in the present war, the war is a "continuation of the politics" of the bourgeois liberation movement. For ninety-nine per cent, the war is a continuation of the politics of imperialism, *i.e.*, of the decrepit bourgeoisie capable only of raping, not of freeing nations. The Triple Entente, while "liberating" Serbia, is *selling* the interests of Serbian liberty to Italian imperialism in return for the latter's aid in robbing Austria.

All this is common knowledge, and all this is shamelessly distorted by Kautsky for the purpose of justifying the opportunists. There are no "pure" phenomena, nor can there be, either in nature or in society—this is exactly what Marxian dialectics teach us, for dialectics show that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human knowledge, that cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity. There is no "pure" capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find are *admixtures* either of feudalism or of the petty bourgeoisie, or of something else. Therefore, for anyone to argue that the war is not "purely" imperialist when we are discussing the flagrant deception of "the masses of the people" that is being perpetrated by the imperialists, who are deliberately screening the aims of naked robbery by "national" phraseology, shows that he is either an infinitely stupid pedant, or a pettifogger and deceiver. The whole point is that Kautsky *supports* the deception of the people by the imperialists when he says that for "the masses of the people, including the proletarian masses," the problems of national liberation were of "decisive significance," *whereas* for the ruling classes the decisive factors were "imperialist tendencies" (p. 273), and when he "reinforces" this by an alleged dialectical reference to the "infinite variety of reality." (P. 274.) Certainly, reality is infinitely varied. This is gospel truth! But it is equally certain that amidst this infinite variety there are two main and fundamental strains: the objective content of the war is a "continuation of the politics" of imperialism, *i.e.*, the plunder of foreign nations by the decrepit bourgeoisie of the "Great Powers" (and their governments), whereas the prevailing "subjective" ideo-

logy consists of "national" phraseology that is being spread to fool the masses.

Kautsky's old sophism, here again repeated, namely, that "at the beginning of the war" the "Lefts" regarded the situation as presenting the alternative of either imperialism or socialism, has already been analysed. This is a shameless subterfuge, for Kautsky knows very well that the Lefts advanced *another* alternative, *viz.*, either the Parties join in the imperialist plunder and deception, or they preach and prepare for revolutionary action. Kautsky knows also that it is the censorship *alone* that prevents the Lefts in Germany from exposing the stupid fable that he is spreading out of servility towards the Südekums.

As for the relation between the "proletarian masses" and a "handful of parliamentarians," Kautsky advances one of the most threadbare objections:

"Let us leave aside the Germans," he writes, "so as not to plead *pro domo*; but who would seriously assert that men like Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov became imperialists overnight and betrayed socialism? Let us leave aside the parliamentarians and the 'functionaries' [Kautsky is obviously hinting at *Die Internationale*,¹ the magazine issued by Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring, in which the policy of the functionaries, *i.e.*, the official leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party, its General Council, the *Vorstand*, its parliamentary group, etc., are treated with deserved contempt] . . . But who would dare to assert that an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class conscious German proletarians turn right-about-face within twenty-four hours in direct opposition to their former aims? If this were true, it would, of course, be evidence of a terrible collapse, but, not only of our party, but also of the *masses* [Kautsky's italics]. If the masses were such a spineless flock of sheep, we might just as well allow ourselves to be buried." (P. 274.)

Politically and scientifically, Karl Kautsky, the great authority, buried himself long ago by his conduct and his collection of pitiful evasions. Those who fail to understand, or, at least, to feel this, are hopeless as far as socialism is concerned; and precisely for this reason, the tone adopted in *Die Internationale* by Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and their adherents, when they treated Kautsky and Co. as most despicable creatures, was the only correct tone that could have been adopted.

¹ See note to page 171.**—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

Think of it: the *only* people who *could* express their attitude to the war more or less freely (*i.e.*, without being immediately seized and dragged off to barracks, without the immediate risk of being shot) were a handful of parliamentarians, a handful of officials, journalists, etc. (They were free to vote, they had the right to vote; they were quite able to vote against. Even in Russia, no one was beaten up or even arrested for this.) And now, Kautsky nobly throws on the *masses* the blame for the treachery and the spinelessness of that social *stratum*, of whose *connection* with the tactics and ideology of opportunism Kautsky himself has written scores of times in the course of a number of years! The first and most fundamental demand of scientific research in general, and of Marxian dialectics in particular, is that a writer should examine the *connection* that exists between the present struggle of *tendencies* in the socialist movement—between that tendency which is talking, shouting and raising the alarm about treachery, and that tendency which sees no treachery—and the struggle that preceded it for *whole decades*. Kautsky, however, does not say a word about this; he does not even wish to raise the question of tendencies and *trends*. There have been trends up to now, but now there are none! Now, there are only the high-sounding names of “authorities” which the servile-spirited always use as their trump card. And it is particularly convenient in this connection for one to refer to the other and to cover up one another’s “peccadilloes” in a friendly fashion according to the rule: one hand washes the other. How can this be called opportunism, L. Martov exclaimed at a lecture in Berne* (see No. 36, *Sotsial-Demokrat*), “when . . . Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky!” “We must be more careful in accusing men like Guesde of opportunism,” wrote Axelrod. (*Golos*, Nos. 86 and 87.) “I will not defend myself,” Kautsky echoes in Berlin, “but . . . Vaillant, Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov!” The cuckoo praises the cock because the cock praises the cuckoo!¹

In his writings Kautsky sank so low in his servile zeal as to kiss even Hyndman’s hand and make it appear that it was only yesterday that the latter deserted to the side of imperialism. And yet,

* A quotation from one of Krylov’s fables.—Ed. Eng. ed.

this very *Neue Zeit* and scores of Social-Democratic papers all over the world have been writing about Hyndman's imperialism for *many years* past! Had Kautsky interested himself conscientiously in the political biographies of the *persons* he mentions, he would have tried to recall whether there were not in those biographies traits and events which had paved the way for their desertion to imperialism, not "overnight," but during decades; whether Vaillant had not been held captive by the Jaurèsists, and Plekhanov by the Mensheviks and liquidators; whether the Guesdist *tendency* had not been dying out before everybody's eyes in that typically lifeless, colourless, Guesdist magazine, *Le Socialisme*,* which was incapable of taking an independent stand on any important question; whether Kautsky himself (we add this for the benefit of those who, quite correctly, put him alongside Hyndman and Plekhanov) had not been supine on the question of Millerandism, in the beginning of the struggle against Bernsteinism, etc.

But Kautsky does not display the slightest shadow of interest in the scientific examination of the biographies of these leaders. He does not even attempt to see whether these leaders are defending themselves by their *own* arguments or by repeating the arguments of the opportunists and the bourgeoisie; whether the actions of these leaders have acquired serious political significance because of their own unusual influence, or because they joined some other really "influential" tendency which is supported by a military organisation, namely, the bourgeois tendency! Kautsky does not even approach the examination of this question. What he is concerned with is throwing dust in the eyes of the masses, stunning them by the sound of authoritative names, preventing them from putting the disputed question in a clear light and examining it from all sides.¹

¹ Kautsky's references to Vaillant and Guesde, Hyndman and Plekhanov, are characteristic also in another connection. The frank imperialists of the Lentsch and Hänisch variety (not to speak of the opportunists) refer to Hyndman and Plekhanov in order to justify *their* policy, and they have a *right* to do so. They tell the *truth* when they say it is one and the same policy. Kautsky, however, speaks with disdain of Lentsch and Hänisch, the radicals who turned towards imperialism. Kautsky thanks God that he is not like those *sinnere*, that he disagrees with them, that he has remained a *revo-*

“... an order given by a handful of parliamentarians is sufficient to make four million class conscious ... proletarians turn right-about-face. ...”

Every word uttered here is a lie. The German Party organisation had a membership of not four, but one million; the united will of this mass organisation, as is the case with every organisation, was expressed *only* through its united political centre, the “handful,” which betrayed socialism. It was this handful that was asked to express its opinion; it was this handful that was called upon to vote; they were in a position to vote; they were in a position to write articles, etc. As for the masses, they were not asked. Not only were they not allowed to vote, but they were disunited and driven “*by the order*,” not of a handful of parliamentarians, but by the order of the military authorities. The military organisation existed; among the leaders of *this* organisation there was no treachery; it called the “masses” *one by one*, confronted each one with the ultimatum: “Either join the army, as your leaders advise you to, or be shot.” The masses could not act in an organised fashion because their previously created organisation, an organisation embodied in a “handful” of Legiens, Kautskys and Scheidemanns, had betrayed them; and to create a *new* organisation time is required, the determination to throw the old, rotten, obsolete organisation on the scrap heap is required.

Kautsky tries to beat his opponents, the Lefts, by attributing to them the nonsensical idea that the “masses” “in retaliation” to war should, “within twenty-four hours,” make a revolution, should introduce “socialism” as against imperialism, otherwise the “masses” would manifest “spinelessness and treachery.” But this is absolute nonsense, which the compilers of ignorant bourgeois and police booklets have hitherto used to “beat” the revolutionaries; and it is this that Kautsky now flaunts in our faces. The Left opponents of Kautsky know perfectly well that a revolution cannot be “made,” that revolutions *grow out* of objectively (*i.e.*, independently of the will of parties and classes) matured crises

lutionary (*sic!*). As a matter of fact, Kautsky's position is the same as theirs. Kautsky, the hypocritical chauvinist employing sentimental phrases, is much more hideous than the chauvinist simpletons, David and Heine, Lentzsch and Hänisch.

and turns in history, that without organisation the masses lack unity of will, that the struggle against the strong, terrorist military organisation of a centralised state is a difficult and prolonged affair. Owing to the treachery of their leaders, the masses *could not* do anything at the crucial moment, whereas this "handful" of leaders could very well, and it was their duty to vote against the war credits, take a stand against "civil peace" and the justification of the war, express themselves in favour of the defeat of *their own* governments, set up an international apparatus for the purpose of carrying on propaganda in favour of fraternisation in the trenches, organise the publication of illegal literature¹ that preached the necessity of starting revolutionary activities, etc.

Kautsky knows perfectly well that it is precisely such, or rather *similar* actions that the German Lefts have in mind, and that they cannot talk about these things *directly*, openly, under a military censorship. Kautsky's desire to defend the opportunists at all costs leads him to unexampled infamy; hiding behind the backs of the military censors, he attributes obvious absurdities to the Lefts, knowing that the censor will protect him from exposure.

VII

The serious scientific and political question which Kautsky deliberately evades by means of all sorts of tricks, thereby giving enormous pleasure to the opportunists, is this: how *could* the most eminent representatives of the Second International betray socialism?

This question must not be examined, of course, from the stand-

¹Incidentally, it would not have been necessary to close *all* Social-Democratic papers in reply to the government's ban on writing about class hatred and class struggle. To agree not to write about this, as *Vorwärts** did, was mean and cowardly. *Vorwärts* died *politically* when it did this and L. Martov was right when he said so. It was, however, possible to retain the legal papers by declaring that they were non-Party and *non-Social-Democratic*, and served the technical needs of a section of the workers, i.e., that they were *non-political papers*. Underground Social-Democratic literature containing an *estimation* of the war, and legally published labour literature without such an estimation, a literature that does not say what is not true, but keeps silent about the truth—why should this not have been possible?

point of the biography of this or that authority. Their future biographers will have to analyse the problem from this angle as well; but what interests the socialist movement at present is not this, but the study of the historical origin, the conditions, the significance and the strength of the social-chauvinist *trend*. 1) Where did social-chauvinism come from? 2) What gave it strength? 3) How must it be combated? Only such an approach to the question can be regarded as a serious one, whereas the "personal" approach is practically an evasion, a sophist's trick.

To answer the first question we must examine, first, whether the ideological and political content of social-chauvinism is not *connected* with some previous trend in socialism; and, second, what relation there is, from the standpoint of actual political divisions, between the present division of Socialists into opponents and defenders of social-chauvinism and those divisions which historically preceded it.

By social-chauvinism we mean the recognition of the idea of the defence of the fatherland in the present imperialist war, the justification of an alliance between the Socialists and the bourgeoisie and governments of "their own" countries in this war, the refusal to preach and support proletarian-revolutionary action against "one's own" bourgeoisie, etc. It is perfectly clear that the principal political and ideological content of social-chauvinism fully coincides with the principles of opportunism. It is *one and the same* tendency. Opportunism, in the conditions of the war of 1914-15, engenders social-chauvinism. The core of opportunism is the idea of class collaboration. The war drives this idea to its logical conclusion, adds to its ordinary factors and stimuli a whole series of extraordinary ones and by special threats and violence compels the unenlightened, disunited masses to co-operate with the bourgeoisie. This naturally widens the circle of adherents of opportunism and it explains sufficiently why the quondam radicals desert to this camp.

Opportunism is the sacrifice of the fundamental interests of the masses to the temporary interests of an insignificant minority of the workers or, in other words, the alliance of a section of the workers with the bourgeoisie against the mass of the proletariat.

The war makes such an alliance particularly striking and compulsory. For decades the source of opportunism lay in the peculiarities of the period in the development of capitalism when the comparatively peaceful and cultured existence of a stratum of privileged workers made them "bourgeois," gave them crumbs from the profits of their own national capital, and isolated them from the sufferings, miseries and revolutionary sentiments of the ruined and impoverished masses. The imperialist war is the direct continuation and the culmination of this state of affairs, because this is a war for the *privileges* of the Great Power nations, for the re-division of the colonies, for domination over other nations. To defend and to strengthen its privileged position as a petty-bourgeois "higher stratum," or aristocracy (and bureaucracy) of the working class—this is the natural continuation in wartime of the petty-bourgeois opportunist hopes and corresponding tactics, this is the economic foundation of modern social-imperialism.¹

¹ Here are a few examples showing how the imperialists and the bourgeoisie value the importance of "Great Power" and national privileges as a means of dividing the workers and diverting them from socialism. The English imperialist Lucas, in a book entitled *Greater Rome and Greater Britain* (Oxford, 1912), recognises the legal disabilities of coloured people in the present British Empire (pp. 96-97), and remarks: "In our own Empire, where white workers and coloured workers are working side by side, as in South Africa, it would be fair to say that they do not work on the same level, and that the white man is an overruler rather than the fellow workman of the coloured man." (P. 103.) Ervine Belger, a former secretary of the Imperial Alliance against Social-Democrats, in a pamphlet entitled *Social-Democracy after the War* (1915), praises the conduct of the Social-Democrats and declares that they must become a "pure labour party" (p. 43), a "national," a "German labour party" (p. 45), without "international, utopian" "revolutionary" ideas. (P. 44.) The German imperialist Sartorius von Waltershausen, in a book dealing with capital investments abroad (1907), blames the German Social-Democrats for ignoring the "national welfare" (p. 438)—which requires the seizure of colonies—and praises the English workers for their "realism," for instance for their struggle against immigration. The German diplomat Rüdorffer, in a book on the principles of world politics, accentuates the commonly known fact that the internationalisation of capital by no means eliminates the sharpened struggle of national capitalists for power and influence, for the "majority of stock." (P. 161.) The author notes that this sharpened struggle draws the workers into its stream. (P. 175.) The book is dated October 1913, and the author speaks with perfect clarity of the "interests of capital" (p. 157) as the cause of modern wars. He says that the question of "national tendency" becomes the "pivot" of socialism

And, of course, the force of habit, the routine of relatively "peaceful" evolution, national prejudices, fear of sharp changes and lack of faith in them—these were additional circumstances that strengthened both opportunism and hypocritical and cowardly reconciliation with opportunism, ostensibly only for a while, ostensibly only because of unusual causes and motives. The war has modified opportunism which had been nurtured for decades; it has raised it to a higher plane; it has increased the number and the variety of its shadings; it has augmented the ranks of its adherents; it has enriched their arguments by a host of new sophisms; it has merged, so to speak, many new streams and rivulets with the main stream of opportunism, but the main stream has not disappeared. Quite the contrary.

Social-chauvinism is opportunism ripened to such a degree that the existence of this bourgeois abscess inside the Socialist Parties as it has existed *hitherto* has become impossible.

Those who refuse to see the very intimate and indissoluble connection that exists between social-chauvinism and opportunism snatch at individual "cases"—this or that opportunist, they say, has become an internationalist, this or that radical has become a chauvinist. But this is a positively frivolous argument, as far as the development of *trends* is concerned. First, the economic foundation of chauvinism and opportunism in the labour movement is the same; it is an alliance between a numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie who enjoy crumbs of the privileges of "their" national capital, against the masses of the proletarians, the masses of the toilers and the oppressed in general. Secondly, the political and ideological content of both trends is the same. Thirdly, taken as a whole, the old division of Socialists into an opportunist and a revolutionary wing, that was characteristic of the period of the Second International

(p. 176), that the governments have nothing to fear from the international demonstrations of the Social-Democrats (p. 177), who in reality are becoming more and more national. (Pp. 103, 110, 176.) International socialism will be victorious, he says, if it extricates the workers from the influence of nationality, since by violence alone nothing can be achieved, but it will suffer defeat if the national feeling takes the upper hand. (Pp. 173-74.)

(1889-1914), *corresponds* to the new division into chauvinists and internationalists.

To become convinced of the correctness of the last statement one has to remember that in social science, as in science generally, we usually deal with *mass* phenomena, not with individual cases. Take ten European countries: Germany, England, Russia, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Switzerland, France, Belgium. In the first eight countries we find that the new division of Socialists (on the question of internationalism) corresponds to the old one (on the question of opportunism): in Germany the magazine *Sozialistische Monatshefte*,* which was the fortress of opportunism, has become the fortress of chauvinism, whereas the ideas of internationalism are advanced by the extreme Left group. In England, in the British Socialist Party,** about three-sevenths are internationalists (66 votes for an international resolution and 84 against it, as shown by the latest counts), while in the opportunist *bloc* (Labour Party plus Fabians plus Independent Labour Party***) *less* than one-seventh are internationalists.¹ In Russia, the main nucleus of opportunism, the liquidationist *Nasha Zarya*, became the main nucleus of chauvinism. Plekhanov and Alexinsky make more noise, but we know from five years' experience (1910-14) that they are incapable of conducting systematic propaganda among the masses of Russia. The main nucleus of the internationalists in Russia consists of "*Pravda*-ism" and of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour fraction² as the representative of the advanced workers who restored the Party in January 1912.

In Italy, the party of Bissolati and Co., a purely opportunist one, became chauvinist. Internationalism there is represented by the *workers'* party. The *masses* of the workers favour this party;

¹ It is customary to compare the Independent Labour Party *alone* with the British Socialist Party. This is not correct. One must look, not at the organisational forms, but at the essentials. Take the dailies: there were *two* of them, one, the *Daily Herald*, belonging to the British Socialist Party, another, the *Daily Citizen*, belonging to the opportunist *bloc*. The daily papers express the actual work of propaganda, agitation and organisation.

² By "*Pravda*-ism" Lenin means Bolshevism. The word is taken from *Pravda*, the organ of the Bolsheviks. By the fraction is meant the Bolshevik group in the Duma.—Ed.

the opportunists, the parliamentarians, the petty bourgeoisie favour chauvinism. In Italy it was possible during the course of several months to make a free choice, and the choice was made, not casually, but in conformity with the difference in the class position of the rank-and-file proletarians and the petty-bourgeois groups respectively.

In Holland, the opportunist party of Troelstra is reconciled with chauvinism in general (one must not be deceived by the fact that in Holland the petty bourgeoisie, like the big bourgeoisie, hates Germany particularly, because the latter could "swallow" them easiest of all). The consistent, sincere, ardent and convinced internationalists come from the Marxian party headed by Horter and Pannekoek.* In Sweden, the opportunist leader, Branting, is indignant over the fact that the German Socialists are being charged with treachery, while the leader of the Lefts, Höglund,** declares that this is precisely the opinion of some of his adherents. (See *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 36.) In Bulgaria, the opponents of opportunism, the "Tesnyaki,"*** declare in their press (the paper *Novoye Vremya*) that the German Social-Democrats have "committed a filthy act." In Switzerland, the adherents of the opportunist, Greulich, are inclined to justify the German Social-Democrats (see their organ, the *Zürich Volksrecht*), whereas the adherents of the much more radical R. Grimm have turned the Berne paper, *Berner Tagwacht*, into an organ of the German Lefts.**** Only two countries out of the ten, France and Belgium, serve as exceptions to the rule, but even here what we really observe is not an absence of internationalists, but their excessive weakness and depression (due partly to causes easily understood). Let us not forget that Vaillant himself has admitted in *l'Humanité* that he has received letters of an internationalist tendency from his readers and that he has *not published a single one* of these in full!

On the whole, if we take trends and tendencies we cannot fail to admit that it was the opportunist wing of European socialism that betrayed socialism and went over to chauvinism. Whence comes its power, its seeming omnipotence within the official Parties? Kautsky knows very well how to raise historical questions, particularly when he deals with ancient Rome, or similar matters

not very close to real life; but now, when he is personally concerned, he hypocritically pretends that he does not understand. The thing is as clear as can be, however. The gigantic power of the opportunists and chauvinists comes *from their alliance* with the bourgeoisie, with the governments and the General Staffs. This is often overlooked in Russia, where it is assumed that the opportunists are a *section* of the Socialist Parties, that there always have been and will be two extreme wings within those parties, that the thing to do is to avoid "extremes," etc., etc.—all the stuff that one finds in philistine copybooks.

In reality, the formal adherence of the opportunists to workers' parties does not by any means remove the fact that, objectively, they are a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, that they are transmitters of its influence, its agents in the labour movement. When the opportunist Südekum, of Herostratus¹ fame, strikingly demonstrated this social, class truth, many good people gasped with amazement. The French Socialists and Plekhanov pointed the finger of scorn at Südekum (although had Vandervelde, Sembat or Plekhanov looked into a mirror they would have seen nobody but Südekum, with just a few different national traits). The members of the German General Council (*Vorstand*), who now praise Kautsky and are praised by Kautsky, hastened to declare, cautiously, modestly and politely (without naming Südekum), that they "do not agree" with Südekum's line.

This is ridiculous, because in reality, in the practical politics of the German Social-Democratic Party, Südekum, alone, at the crucial moment proved to be stronger than a hundred Haases and Kautskys (just as *Nasha Zarya* alone is stronger than all the tendencies in the Brussels *bloc* which are afraid to split from it).

Why? Because behind Südekum there stand the bourgeoisie, the government, and the General Staff of a Great Power. They support Südekum's policy in a thousand ways, whereas the policy of his opponents is frustrated by all means, including prison and the firing squad. Südekum's voice is broadcast by the bourgeois press

¹ Herostratus burned the temple of Artemis in Ephesus, 356 B.C., in order to perpetuate his name.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

in millions of copies of newspapers (so are the voices of Vandervelde, Sembat, Plekhanov), whereas the voices of his opponents *cannot* be heard in the legal press because of the military censorship!

All agree that opportunism is not an accidental thing, not a sin, not a slip, not the treachery of individual persons, but the social product of a whole historical epoch. Not everybody, however, ponders over the full significance of this truth. Opportunism has been reared by legalism. The labour parties of the period between 1889 and 1914 had to utilise bourgeois legality. When the crisis came, they should have adopted illegal methods of work (but this could not be done without the greatest exertion of effort and determination, combined with a number of military ruses). A *single* Südekum was sufficient to prevent the adoption of illegal methods, because he had the whole of the "old world," speaking in a historico-philosophical sense, behind him, because he, Südekum, has always betrayed and will always betray to the bourgeoisie all the military plans of its class enemy, speaking in the practical political sense.

It is a fact that the whole of the German Social-Democratic Party (and the same is true of the French and *other parties*) does *only that* which pleases Südekum, or which can be tolerated by Südekum. *Nothing else* can be done legally. Everything *honest*, everything really socialistic that is done in the German Social-Democratic Party, is done in *opposition* to its centres, is done by *avoiding* its Central Committee and central organ, is done by *violating* organisational discipline, is done in a *factional* manner in the name of anonymous, new centres of a new party, as was the case, for instance, with the manifesto issued by the German Lefts and published in the *Berner Tagwacht* on May 31 of this year.* As a matter of fact a *new* party is growing up, gaining strength, and being organised, a real workers' party, a real revolutionary Social-Democratic Party, other than the old, rotten, national-liberal party of Legien, Südekum, Kautsky, Haase, Scheidemann and Co.¹

¹ What happened prior to the historic voting of August 4** is extremely characteristic. The official party has cast the cloak of bureaucratic hypocrisy over this event, saying that the majority had decided and that all had voted

It was, therefore, a profound historical truth that the opportunist "Monitor" blurted out when he said in the conservative *Preussische Jahrbücher* that it would be bad for the opportunists (read: the *bourgeoisie*) if present-day Social-Democracy moved *further to the Right*—because the workers would then desert it. The opportunists (and the *bourgeoisie*) need the Party as it is at present, a party *combining* the Right and the Left wings and officially represented by Kautsky, who will reconcile everything in the world by means of smooth, "thoroughly Marxian" phrases. Socialism and revolution in words, for the people, for the masses, for the workers; Südekumism in practice, *i.e.*, joining the *bourgeoisie* in every serious crisis. We say: *every* crisis, because not only in time of war, but in any serious political strike, "feudal" Germany as well as "free and parliamentary" England or France will *immediately* introduce martial law under one name or another. No one of sound mind and in full possession of his senses can have any doubt about this.

From this logically follows the reply to the question raised above, *viz.*, how is social-chauvinism to be combated? Social-chauvinism is opportunism which has ripened to such a degree, which has become so strong and brazen during the long period of comparatively "peaceful" capitalism, so definite in its political ideology, and is in such close proximity to the *bourgeoisie* and the governments, that it is *impossible* to tolerate the existence of *such a trend within* the Social-Democratic Labour Parties. Flimsy

unanimously *for*. Ströbel, in the magazine *Die Internationale*, however, unmasked this hypocrisy and told the truth. It appears that there were *two* groups in the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction, that each one came with its *ultimatum*, *i.e.*, with a factional decision, *i.e.*, with a decision meaning a split. One group, that of the opportunists, about thirty strong, decided to vote *for*, *under all circumstances*; the other, a Left one, of about fifteen men, decided—less resolutely—to vote against. When the "centre" or the "Marsh," which never takes a firm position, voted with the opportunists, the Lefts found themselves crushingly defeated and—they submitted! The talk about the "unity" of German Social-Democracy is sheer hypocrisy, which actually covers up the inevitable submission of the Lefts to the ultimatums of the opportunists.

and thin-soled shoes may be good enough to walk in on the well-paved streets of a small provincial town, but thick hobnailed shoes are required for climbing mountains. Socialism in Europe has passed the comparatively peaceful stage that was confined within the narrow boundaries of nationality. During the war of 1914-15 it entered the stage of revolutionary action, and a complete rupture with opportunism, the expulsion of opportunism from the labour parties, has become an imperative necessity.

It is quite obvious that this definition of the tasks with which the new era of international development confronts socialism does not indicate directly how fast and in what definite forms the process of separation of the workers' revolutionary Social-Democratic parties from petty-bourgeois opportunist parties will take place in the various countries. It does indicate, however, that it is necessary clearly to realise that such a separation is inevitable, and that, accordingly, the policy of the workers' parties must be turned in this direction. The war of 1914-15 marks such a great turn in history that the attitude towards opportunism *cannot* remain as of old. The past cannot be wiped out, and it is impossible to obliterate from the minds of the workers, or from the experience of the bourgeoisie, or from the political lessons of our epoch the fact that, at the moment of crisis, the opportunists proved to be the nucleus of those elements within the labour parties that deserted to the bourgeoisie. Opportunism—to speak on a general European scale—was in its adolescent stage, as it were, before the war. It grew up into manhood with the outbreak of the war, and its “innocence” and youth cannot be restored. A whole social stratum consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, labour officials, privileged employees, and certain strata of the proletariat, has sprung up and has become *merged* with its national bourgeoisie, which was able to appreciate and “adapt” it. The wheel of history cannot be turned back or stopped—we can and must go fearlessly forward, from the preparatory legal organisations of the working class, which are captive to the opportunists, to revolutionary organisations that know how *not* to confine themselves to legality, that are capable of making themselves immune against opportunist treach-

ery, organisations of the proletariat which is entering the "struggle for power," the struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

This, by the way, proves how incorrect are the views of those who befog their minds and the minds of the workers with the question as to what should be done with such outstanding authorities of the Second International as Guesde, Plekhanov, Kautsky, etc. As a matter of fact, no such question arises. If these persons fail to understand the new tasks, they will have to stay outside, or remain in captivity to opportunism. If these persons free themselves from "captivity" they are not likely to encounter *political* obstacles on their way back to the camp of the revolutionaries. At any rate, it is absurd to substitute the question of the role of individual persons for the question of the struggle of trends and the change of epochs in the labour movement.

VIII

Legal mass organisations of the working class are perhaps the most outstanding feature of the Socialist Parties of the epoch of the Second International. In the German Party they were the strongest, and it was here that the war of 1914-15 created the most acute crisis and made the question most acute. It is obvious that the adoption of revolutionary activities would have led to the dissolution of these legal organisations by the police. The old party, from Legien to Kautsky inclusive, sacrificed the revolutionary aims of the proletariat for the sake of preserving the present legal organisations. No matter how much this may be denied, it is a fact. The proletariat's right to revolution was sold for a mess of pottage in the shape of organisations permitted by present police law.

Take the pamphlet by Karl Legien, leader of the German Social-Democratic trade unions, entitled *Why the Trade Union Functionaries Must Take a More Active Part in the Internal Life of the Party*. (Berlin, 1915.) This is a report of an address delivered by the author on January 27, 1915, to a gathering of trade union officials. In the course of this address Legien read—and repro-

duced in his pamphlet—a very interesting document that would not otherwise have been passed by the military censor. This document—the so-called *Notes for Speakers in the District of Niederbarnim* (a suburb of Berlin)—is an exposition of the views of the Left-wing Social-Democrats, of their protest against the Party. The revolutionary Social-Democrats, says the document, did not and could not foresee a certain factor, viz.:

“That the whole of the organised power of the German Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions would take the side of the belligerent government, and that the whole of this power would be used for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary energy of the masses.” (P. 34 of Legien’s pamphlet.)

This is absolutely true. The following statement contained in the same document is also true:

“The vote of the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction on August 4 proved that a different attitude, even had it been deeply rooted in the masses, could have asserted itself, not under the leadership of the tried Party, but only against the will of the leading Party bodies, and by overcoming the resistance of the Party and the trade unions.” (*Ibid.*)

This is absolutely true.

“Had the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction done its duty on August 4, the present form of organisation would probably have been destroyed; the spirit, however, would have remained, the spirit that animated the Party under the Anti-Socialist Law and helped it to overcome all difficulties.” (*Ibid.*)

Legien’s pamphlet notes that the gathering of “leaders,” whom he had brought together to listen to his address and who are called leading trade union officials, *laughed* when they heard this. The idea that it was possible and necessary to organise illegal revolutionary organisations at the moment of crisis (as was done under the Anti-Socialist Law) seemed *ridiculous* to them. Legien, the most faithful watchdog of the bourgeoisie, beat his breast and exclaimed:

“This is an obviously anarchist idea: to wreck the organisation in order to rouse the masses to solve the problem. There is no doubt in my mind that this is an anarchist idea!”

"Quite right!" exclaimed in chorus (*ibid.*, p. 37) the lackeys of the bourgeoisie who call themselves leaders of the Social-Democratic organisations of the working class.

An instructive picture. People are so degraded and dulled by bourgeois legality that they cannot even *conceive* of the need for *other* organisations, *illegal* organisations for the purpose of leading the revolutionary struggle. So low have people fallen that they imagine that legal unions existing with the permission of the police are the limits beyond which it is impossible to go—as if the *preservation* of such unions as *leading* organisations could be conceived of in periods of crisis! This is a striking example of the dialectics of opportunism: the mere growth of legal unions, the mere habit of stupid but conscientious philistines of confining themselves to bookkeeping, creates a situation where, at a time of crisis, these conscientious petty bourgeois prove to be traitors, betrayers, *stranglers* of the revolutionary energy of the masses. And this is no accident. It is necessary to proceed to the building of a revolutionary organisation—this is demanded by the changed historical situation, it is demanded by the epoch of proletarian revolutionary action. But it is possible to proceed in this direction only *over the heads* of the old leaders, the stranglers of revolutionary energy, *over the heads* of the old Party, by *destroying* it.

Of course, the counter-revolutionary philistines cry "anarchism!" as did the opportunist, Eduard David, when he denounced Karl Liebknecht. It appears that in Germany only those leaders have remained honest Socialists whom the opportunists revile as anarchists. . . .

Take the modern army. It is one of the good examples of organisation. This organisation is good only because it is *flexible* and is able at the same time to give to millions of people *a single will*. Today these millions are living in their homes in various parts of the country; tomorrow a call for mobilisation is issued, and they gather at the appointed centres. Today they lie in the trenches, sometimes for months at a stretch; tomorrow they are led to the attack in another formation. Today they perform miracles hiding from bullets and shrapnel; tomorrow they perform miracles in open combat. Today their forward detachments place mines under

the ground; tomorrow they move forward scores of miles, according to the advice of flyers above ground. When, in the pursuit of one aim, animated by one will, millions change the forms of their intercourse and their actions, change the place and the method of their activities, change their tools and weapons in accordance with changing conditions and the requirements of the struggle—this is organisation.

The same holds true for the working class struggle against the bourgeoisie. Today there is no revolutionary situation, the conditions that cause ferment among the masses or heighten their activities do not exist; today you are given a ballot paper—take it. Learn how to organise in order to be able to use it as a weapon against your enemies and not as a means of getting soft parliamentary jobs for men who cling to their seats in fear of having to go to prison. Tomorrow, you are deprived of the ballot paper, you are given a rifle and a splendid quick-firing gun constructed according to the last word of engineering technique—take this weapon of death and destruction, do not listen to the sentimental whiners who are afraid of war. Much has been left in the world that *must* be destroyed by fire and iron in order that the emancipation of the working class may be achieved. And if anger and desperation grow among the masses, if a revolutionary situation arises, prepare to create new organisations and *utilise* these useful weapons of death and destruction *against your government and your bourgeoisie*.

This is not easy, to be sure. It will demand difficult preparatory activities. It will demand grave sacrifices. This is a *new* form of organisation and struggle that *one also has to learn*, and one never learns without making mistakes and suffering defeats. The relation this form of class struggle has to participation in elections is the same as the relation the storming of a fortress has to manœuvring, marching, or lying in trenches. History places this form of struggle on the order of the day *very infrequently*, but its significance and its consequences are felt for decades. The days when *such* methods can and must be put on the programme of struggle are equal to *scores of years* of other historical epochs.

Compare K. Kautsky with K. Legien. Kautsky writes:

"As long as the Party was small every protest against the war had propaganda value as an act of bravery. . . . The admirable conduct of the Russian and Serbian comrades has met with general approval. The stronger a party becomes, the more considerations of propaganda are interwoven with the calculation of practical consequences in the motives of its decisions, the more difficult does it become to pay equal due to both motives, and yet neither of them must be neglected. Therefore, the stronger we become, the more easily differences arise between us in every new complicated situation." (*Internationalism and the War*, p. 30.)

These arguments of Kautsky's differ from Legien's only in that they are hypocritical and cowardly. In substance, Kautsky supports and justifies the Legiens' contemptible renunciation of revolutionary activities, but he does it stealthily, without expressing himself definitely; he makes shift with hints, confines himself to bowing both before Legien and before the revolutionary conduct of the Russians. We Russians have been accustomed to finding such an attitude towards revolutionaries only among the liberals: the liberals are always ready to recognise the "courage" of the revolutionaries; but at the same time they will not renounce their arch-opportunist tactics for anything. Self-respecting revolutionaries will reject Kautsky's "expressions of appreciation" and will indignantly repudiate such a presentation of the question. If there was no revolutionary situation, if it was not necessary to preach revolutionary action, then the conduct of the Russians and Serbians was *incorrect*, then their tactics were wrong. Let such knights as Legien and Kautsky at least have the courage of their convictions, let them say this openly.

If, however, the tactics of the Russian and Serbian Socialists are worthy of "approval," then it is not permissible, it is criminal, to justify the *opposite* tactics of the "strong" Parties, the German, the French, etc. By means of an intentionally vague expression, "practical consequences," Kautsky *concealed* the plain truth that the great and strong Parties were *frightened* by the prospect of their organisations being dissolved, their funds sequestered and their leaders arrested by the government. This means that Kautsky justifies betrayal of socialism by considerations for the unpleasant "practical consequences" that follow from revolu-

tionary tactics. If this is not prostituting Marxism, what is?

"We would have been arrested," one of the Social-Democratic deputies, who voted for the war credits on August 4, is alleged to have declared at a workers' meeting in Berlin. And the workers shouted in reply: "Well, what would have been bad about that?"

In the absence of any other *signal* to convey to the working masses of Germany and France revolutionary sentiments and the idea of the necessity of preparing for revolutionary activities, the arrest of a deputy for a courageous speech would have played a useful role as a call to *unite* the proletarians of the various countries in revolutionary work. It is *not easy* to bring about this unity; the more obligatory, therefore, was it for the deputies on top, who had a view of the whole political field, *to have taken the initiative*.

Not only in war time, but positively in every acute political situation, not to speak of periods of revolutionary mass action of any kind, the governments of even the *freest* bourgeois countries will threaten to dissolve the legal organisations, to seize their funds, to arrest their leaders, and to impose similar "practical consequences." What shall we do then? Justify the opportunists on these grounds, as Kautsky does? But this would mean sanctifying the transformation of the Social-Democratic Parties into national-liberal labour parties.

A Socialist can draw only one conclusion, *viz.*, that pure legalism, the legalism and nothing but legalism of the "European" Parties, has become obsolete and, as a result of the development of capitalism in the pre-imperialist stage, has become the foundation for a bourgeois labour policy. It must be supplemented by the creation of an illegal base, an illegal organisation, illegal Social-Democratic work, while at the same time clinging fast to every legal position. Experience will show *how* this is to be done, if only the desire to take this road, the realisation that it is necessary, exists. In 1912-14, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia proved that this problem can be solved. The workers' deputy Muranov, who conducted himself at the trial bet-

ter than the others,¹ and who was exiled by tsarism to Siberia, proved in practice that, besides *ministerial* parliamentarism (from Henderson, Sembat and Vandervelde down to Südekum and Scheidemann, who are also wholly and entirely "ministerial," although they are not admitted further than the anteroom!), there can be *illegal and revolutionary* parliamentarism. Let the Kossovskys and Potresovs admire the "European" parliamentarism of the lackeys, or make peace with them—we shall not tire of telling the workers that *such* legalism, *such* Social-Democracy as that of Legien, Kautsky, Scheidemann deserve only contempt.

IX

The collapse of the Second International was most strikingly expressed in the flagrant betrayal of their convictions and of their solemn resolutions at Stuttgart and Basle by the majority of the official Social-Democratic Parties of Europe. But this collapse, which implies the complete victory of opportunism, the transformation of the Social-Democratic Parties into national-liberal labour parties, is only the result of the entire historical epoch of the Second International from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The objective conditions of this epoch—the transition from the completion of bourgeois and national revolutions in Western Europe to the beginning of socialist revolutions—gave birth to and fostered opportunism. During this period we observed a split in the labour and socialist movement in some countries of Europe, the general dividing line of which is the attitude towards opportunism (England, Italy, Holland, Bulgaria, Russia), in other countries we observed a long and stubborn struggle of trends along the same line (Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland). The crisis that was created by the Great War has torn off the coverings, has swept away conventions, has opened the abscess that had long become ripe, and has revealed opportunism in its true role of ally of the bourgeoisie. The complete organisational separation

¹ The Bolshevik group in the Duma. See note to page 127.* See also Badayev, *The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma*.—Ed. Eng. ed.

of the labour parties from this element has become a necessity. The imperialist epoch cannot tolerate the existence in a single party of the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat on the one hand, and of the semi-petty-bourgeois aristocracy of the working class, which enjoys crumbs of the privileges of the "Great Power" position of "their" nation, on the other. The old theory that opportunism is a "legitimate shade" of a single party that avoids "extremes" has now become a great deception of the workers and a great hindrance to the labour movement. Open opportunism, which immediately becomes repulsive to the working masses, is not so dangerous and harmful as this theory of the golden mean, which with Marxian catchwords justifies opportunist practice, and by a series of sophisms tries to prove that revolutionary action is premature, etc. Kautsky, the most notable representative of this theory, and also the greatest authority in the Second International, has revealed himself as a first-class hypocrite and a virtuoso in the art of prostituting Marxism. In the million-strong German Party there has not remained a single Social-Democrat at all honest, class conscious and revolutionary, who does not turn away with indignation from such an "authority," who is so ardently defended by the Südekums and Scheidemanns.

The proletarian masses, about nine-tenths of whose old leaders have gone over to the bourgeoisie, found themselves scattered and helpless in the midst of an orgy of chauvinism, under the oppression of martial law and military censorship. However, the objective revolutionary situation which was created by the war, and which is becoming wider and deeper, inevitably gives rise to revolutionary sentiments; it hardens and enlightens the best and most class conscious proletarians. A sudden change in the mood of the masses is not only possible, but is becoming more and more probable, a change similar to that which was observed in Russia early in 1905 in connection with the "Gaponade,"¹ when in the course of several months, and sometimes of several weeks, backward proletarian masses grew into an army of millions which

¹ *I.e.*, the movement led by Father Gapon which culminated in the shooting down of the workers outside the Winter Palace on January 9, 1905.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

followed the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. We cannot tell whether a powerful revolutionary movement will develop immediately after *this* war, or during it, etc. At any rate, *only* work in this direction deserves the name of socialist work. The slogan that generalises and directs this work, that helps to unite and consolidate those who wish to aid the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against its own government and its own bourgeoisie, is the slogan of civil war.

In Russia, the complete separation of the revolutionary Social-Democratic proletarian elements from petty-bourgeois opportunist elements was prepared for by the whole history of the labour movement. Those who disregard this history, who, by declaiming against "factionalism," deprive themselves of the possibility of understanding the real process of formation of a proletarian party in Russia, which was formed in the course of a long struggle lasting many years against various kinds of opportunism, are rendering this movement a bad service. Of all the "Great" Powers that are participating in the present war, Russia alone recently experienced a revolution: the bourgeois content of this revolution, in which, however, the proletariat played the decisive role, could not but give rise to a split between the bourgeois and proletarian trends in the labour movement. During a period of approximately twenty years (1894-1914) when Russian Social-Democracy existed as an organisation connected with the mass labour movement (and not only as an ideological trend, as in 1883-94), a struggle proceeded between the proletarian, revolutionary trend and the petty-bourgeois, opportunist trend. The "Economism" of 1894-1902 was undoubtedly a trend of the latter kind. A number of its arguments and traits of ideology—the "Struveist" distortion of Marxism, references to the "masses" to justify opportunism, etc.—bear striking resemblance to the present vulgarised Marxism of Kautsky, Cuno, Plekhanov, etc. It would be a very grateful task to remind the present generation of Social-Democrats of the old *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*, as a parallel to Kautsky of today.

The "Menshevism" of the following period (1903-08) was the direct successor, both ideological and organisational, to

"Economism." During the Russian revolution it followed tactics that meant, objectively, the dependence of the proletariat upon the liberal bourgeoisie, and expressed petty-bourgeois opportunist trends. When in the following period (1908-14) the main stream of the Menshevik trend gave rise to liquidationism, the petty-bourgeois class significance of this trend became so apparent that the best representatives of Menshevism continually protested against the *Nasha Zarya* group.¹ And it was this group—the only group which has conducted systematic work among the masses in *opposition* to the revolutionary Marxian party of the working class during the past five or six years—that proved to be *social-chauvinist* in the war of 1914-15. And this in a country where absolutism is alive; where the bourgeois revolution is far from having been completed; where forty-three per cent of the population oppresses the majority of "alien" nationalities. The "European" type of development where certain strata of the petty bourgeoisie, especially the intelligentsia, and an insignificant section of the labour aristocracy can "enjoy" the "Great Power" privileges of "their" nation has had its counterpart also in Russia.

Both the working class and the workers' Social-Democratic Party of Russia have been prepared by their whole history for "international," *i.e.*, truly revolutionary and consistently revolutionary, tactics.

* * *

P.S. This article was already set up when a manifesto, jointly issued by Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein, appeared in the press.*

These people have noted that the masses are swinging to the Left and they are, therefore, now ready to "make peace" with the Left wing—naturally, at the price of maintaining "peace" with the Südekums. Verily, a *Mädchen für alle*.

Summer 1915.

¹ For details of these periods see *Selected Works*: for Economism, *Rabochaya Mysl* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*—Vol. II, Part I; for Menshevism and liquidationism—Vol. III and Vol. IV.—*Ed.*

THE FIGHT AGAINST SOCIAL-CHAUVINISM *

THE most interesting and most recent material on this topical question has been furnished by the International Conference of Socialist Women, which has just closed in Berne. The readers will find below a description of the conference and the texts of the resolutions, the one adopted and the one rejected. In the present article we wish to discuss only one side of the question.

The representatives of the women's organisations attached to the Organisation Committee, the Dutch women from Troelstra's party, the Swiss women from organisations which are sharply opposed to the *Berner Tagwacht* because of its alleged excessive radicalism, the French representative, who did not wish to disagree on any important point with the official Party, which, as is known, adheres to the social-chauvinist point of view, the English women, who are hostile to the idea of making a clear division between pacifism and revolutionary proletarian tactics—all agreed with the "Left" German Social-Democrats on the same resolution. The representatives of the women's organisations attached to the Central Committee of our party disagreed with them, preferring to remain in isolation for a time, rather than enter *such a bloc*.

What was the substance of the disagreement? What principles are involved in this conflict and what is its general political significance?

At first glance, the "middle" resolution, which united the opportunists and part of the Left wing, looks very plausible and correct in principle. The war is declared to be imperialist, the "defence of the fatherland" idea is condemned, the workers are called upon to organise mass demonstrations, etc., etc. It would

seem as if our resolution differed from it *only* in that it contained a few sharper *expressions* such as "betrayal," "opportunism," "resign from bourgeois Cabinets," etc.

It is from this standpoint, undoubtedly, that the withdrawal of the representatives of the women's organisations attached to the Central Committee of our party will be criticised.

If we examine the question more carefully, however, and do not confine ourselves to a purely "formal" recognition of this or that truth, we will realise that such criticism would be quite unsound.

Two conceptions of the world, two evaluations of the war and the tasks of the International, two tactics of proletarian parties came into conflict at the conference. One view: the International has not collapsed; there are no profound and serious obstacles to a return from chauvinism to socialism; there is no strong "internal enemy" in the shape of opportunism; there is no direct, undoubted and obvious betrayal of socialism by opportunism. Conclusion: we will not condemn anybody; we will grant an "amnesty" to the transgressors of the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions; we will confine ourselves to advising the adoption of a more radical course and calling upon the masses to demonstrate.

The other view is entirely opposed to this on every one of the above-mentioned points. Nothing is more harmful, more disastrous to the proletarian cause than the continuation of inner Party *diplomacy* in relation to the opportunists and social-chauvinists. The majority resolution proved acceptable to the opportunist delegates and to the adherents of the present-day official Parties, precisely because it is permeated with the spirit of diplomacy. Such diplomacy is like throwing dust in the eyes of the masses of the workers who are *at present* being led by the official social-patriots. The masses of the workers are being imbued with the absolutely wrong and pernicious idea that the present Social-Democratic Parties and their present leading bodies *are capable* of changing their course from a wrong to a right one.

This is not so. This is a profound and fatal illusion. The present-day Social-Democratic Parties, and their leading bodies, are *incapable* of seriously changing their course. *In practice*,

everything will remain as before; and the "Left" wishes expressed in the majority resolution will remain innocent desires; the adherents of Troelstra's party and of the present General Council of the French Party, by their unerring political instinct, realised this when they voted for such a resolution. An appeal for mass demonstrations can have serious practical meaning only when it is most actively supported by the present leading bodies of the Social-Democratic Parties.

Can we expect such support? Obviously not. It is well known that such an appeal will meet, not with support, but with the obdurate (most of the time *covert*) resistance of these leading bodies.

If this were frankly told to the workers, they would know the *truth*; they would know that in order to make the "Left" wishes *effective* it would be necessary to bring about a radical change in the line of the Social-Democratic Parties, to wage a most stubborn struggle against the opportunists and their "centrist" friends. As it is, the conference *lulled* the workers with radical wishes and *refused* to name loudly and clearly the evil that must be combated if those wishes are to be fulfilled.

The diplomatic leaders, those who are now pursuing a chauvinist policy in the present Social-Democratic Parties, will make very good use of the weakness, the indecision, the lack of clarity of the majority resolution. Astute parliamentarians that they are, they will distribute functions among themselves: some of them will say that the "serious" arguments of Kautsky and Co. were not appreciated, not analysed, and that therefore they must be discussed in a wider gathering; others will say: does not the fact that the women adherents of the Troelstra and Guesde-Sembarat parties could agree with the "Left-wing" German women prove that we were right when we said that there were no profound differences?

The women's conference should not have helped Scheidemann, Haase, Kautsky, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Guesde, Sembarat, Plekhanov and others to lull the masses of the workers; on the contrary, it should have tried to rouse them, to declare determined war against opportunism. Had it done that, the practical results

would have been, not the expression of the hope that these "leaders" would "reform," but the gathering of forces for a difficult and earnest struggle.

Take the question of the violation of the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions by the opportunists and "centrists." That is *the central point!* Try to visualise frankly, clearly and without diplomacy what has actually taken place.

Foreseeing war, the International convenes and unanimously decides in case of an outbreak of war to work for "*hastening the collapse of capitalism*"; to work in the spirit of *the Commune, of October and December 1905*¹ (those are the exact words of the Basle resolution!!!); to work in the spirit that regards the shooting "of the workers of one country by the workers of another country" as "*a crime.*"

The line of action, in the international, proletarian, revolutionary spirit, is here indicated quite clearly, so clearly that it was impossible to say it more clearly within the limits of the law.

Then the war came—the very kind of war and exactly along the lines that were foreseen at Basle. The official Parties act in the very opposite spirit: not like internationalists, but like nationalists; not in a proletarian, but in a bourgeois way; not in a revolutionary direction, but in the direction of ultra-opportunism. If we say to the workers that a direct *betrayal* of the socialist cause was committed, we by these words sweep away all evasions and subterfuges, all sophisms *à la* Kautsky and Axelrod. We clearly indicate the depth and the power of the evil, we clearly call for a struggle against it and not for conciliation with it.

What about the majority resolution? Not a word of censure of the traitors, not a single word about opportunism, only a simple *repetition* of the ideas contained in the Basle resolution!!! As if nothing serious had happened; as if an accidental little error had occurred which demanded only the *repetition* of the old decision; as if a disagreement, not deep and not in principle, had appeared, which could be *patched up*!!!

Such an attitude is a downright *mockery* of the decisions of the

¹ The Paris Commune of 1871, and the revolution in Russia.—*Ed.*

International, a mockery of the workers! As a matter of fact, the only thing the social-chauvinists want is the mere *repetition* of the old decisions, as long as nothing is changed in deed. This is, in fact, a tacit, hypocritically concealed *amnesty* for the social-chauvinist adherents of the majorities of the present Parties. We know that the number of those who want to follow this path, to confine themselves to a few radical phrases, is legion. Their road is not ours. We have followed and will follow *another* road; we want to help the labour movement, to help in the building up of a labour party *in deed*, in the spirit of irreconcilability towards opportunism and social-chauvinism.

Some of the German women delegates seem to have been afraid of a definite resolution for reasons exclusively concerning the *rate* of development of the struggle against chauvinism inside a single party, namely their own. Such considerations were obviously out of place and erroneous, since the international resolution did not and could not deal with either the rate or the concrete conditions of the struggle against social-chauvinism in the *individual* countries; in this respect, the autonomy of the various parties is beyond dispute. A decisive rupture with social-chauvinism in the whole direction and character of Social-Democratic work should have been proclaimed from the international tribune. Instead, the majority resolution once again repeated the old error of the Second International, which diplomatically concealed opportunism and discrepancies between words and deeds. *This road*, we repeat, we shall not follow.

June 1915.

REVOLUTIONARY MARXISTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 5-8, 1915 *

THE ideological struggle at the conference was waged between a compact group of internationalists, revolutionary Marxists, and the vacillating near-Kautskyists who formed the Right wing of the conference. The compactness of the former group is one of the most important facts and one of the greatest achievements of the conference. After a whole year of war, the *only* trend in the International which adopted a perfectly definite resolution and also a draft manifesto based on it, and which united the consistent Marxists of Russia, Poland, the Lettish province, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Holland, proved to be the trend that was represented by our party.

What arguments were advanced against us by the vacillating elements? The Germans ** admitted that we were heading for revolutionary battles, but, they said, we must not shout to the whole world about such things as fraternisation in the trenches, political strikes, street demonstrations and civil war. Such things are done, they said, but not talked about. Others added: this is childishness, *putschism*.

The German semi-Kautskyists punished themselves for these ridiculously, indecently contradictory and evasive speeches when they adopted a resolution expressing sympathy for, and a declaration of the necessity of "following the example" of, the members of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour fraction¹ who distributed our central organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which "shouted to the whole world" about civil war.

You follow the bad example of Kautsky, we said to the Germans; in words, you recognise the impending revolution; in prac-

¹ The Bolshevik group in the Duma. See note to page 127.*—Ed. Eng. ed.

tice, you refuse to tell the masses about it openly, to call for it, to indicate the most concrete means of struggle which the masses are to test and legitimise in the course of the revolution. In 1847, Marx and Engels, while living *abroad*—the German philistines were horrified to think that revolutionary methods of struggle should be spoken of *from abroad*!—in the famous *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, called for revolution; they openly and directly spoke of using force; and they declared the attempt to hide revolutionary aims, tasks and methods of struggle to be contemptible.* The Revolution of 1848 proved that Marx and Engels *alone* had approached the events with correct tactics. Several years before the 1905 Revolution in Russia, Plekhanov, then still a Marxist, wrote an unsigned article in the old *Iskra* of 1901, expressing the views of all the editors on the coming insurrection, on ways of preparing for it, such as street demonstrations, and even on technical devices, such as using wire in the fight against the cavalry. The revolution in Russia proved that only the old *Iskra*-ists had approached the events with correct tactics. Now we are faced with this alternative; either we are really and firmly convinced that the war is creating a revolutionary situation in Europe, that all the economic and social-political circumstances of the imperialist epoch are leading to a revolution of the proletariat—in that case we are in duty bound to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, to call for it, to create the necessary organisations, to speak fearlessly and in the most concrete manner of the various methods of violent struggle and of its “technique.” This duty that devolves upon us does not depend upon whether the revolution will be strong enough and whether it will come in connection with the first or second imperialist war, etc. Or we are not convinced that the situation is revolutionary; in that case there is no sense in our just talking about war against war. In that case, we are, in fact, national-liberal labour politicians of the Südekum-Plekhanov, or Kautsky shade.

The French delegates ** also declared that they were convinced that the present situation in Europe would lead to revolution. But, they said, first, “we have not come here to provide a formula for a

Third International"; secondly, the French worker "believes nobody and nothing," he is demoralised and oversaturated with anarchist and Hervé phrases.* The first argument is foolish, because the joint compromise manifesto *does* "provide a formula" for a Third International, though inconsistent, incomplete and not sufficiently thought out. The second argument is very important as a very serious factual argument that takes stock of the peculiar situation in France, not in the sense of defence of the fatherland, or enemy invasion, but in noting the "sore spots" of the French labour movement. The only thing that logically follows from this, however, is that the French Socialists would, perhaps, join the general European revolutionary action of the proletariat *more slowly* than others, and not that such action is unnecessary. The question as to *how quickly*, by which ways, in which particular forms, the proletariat of the various countries is capable of passing to revolutionary action was not and could not have been raised at the conference. The conditions for this are not yet ripe. Our task for the present is jointly to *preach* the right tactics and leave it to events to show the *tempo* of the movement, and the changes in the general trend (according to nation, locality and trade). If the French proletariat has been demoralised by anarchist phrases, it has also been demoralised by Millerandism, and it is not our task to *increase* this demoralisation by *leaving things unsaid* in the manifesto.

It was none other than Merrheim who uttered the characteristic and profoundly correct phrase: "The [Socialist] Party, the Jouhaux [secretary of the General Confederation of Labour] and the government are three heads under one bonnet." This is correct; this is a fact proved by a year's experience of the fight which the French internationalists have waged against the Party and Messrs. Jouhaux. But there is only one way out of this: the government cannot be fought without fighting the opportunist parties and the leaders of anarcho-syndicalism. Unlike our resolution, the joint manifesto only indicated, but did not say all that should have been said about the tasks of the struggle.

One of the Italians, in arguing against our tactics, said: "Your

tactics come either too late" (since the war has already begun) "or too early" (because the war has not yet created the conditions for revolution); "besides," he said, "you propose to 'change the programme' of the International, for all our propaganda has always been conducted 'against violence.'" It was very easy for us to reply to this by quoting Jules Guesde in *En garde* to the effect that not a single influential leader of the Second International ever opposed the use of violence and direct revolutionary methods in general.* Everybody always argued that the legal struggle, parliamentarism and insurrection are interconnected, and *must inevitably* pass from one to the other according to the changes in the conditions of the movement. From the same book, *En garde*, we quoted a passage from a speech delivered by Guesde in 1899, in which he spoke of the possibility of a war for markets, colonies, etc., and went on to say that if there were any French, German and English Millerands in such a war, then "what would become of the international solidarity of the proletariat?" In this speech Guesde condemned himself in advance. As for the preaching of revolution being "inopportune," this objection rests on a confusion of terms customary with the Latin Socialists: they confuse the beginning of a revolution with the open and direct propaganda for revolution. In Russia, nobody places the beginning of the 1905 Revolution before January 22 (9), 1905, whereas revolutionary propaganda, in the very narrow sense of the word, the propaganda and the preparation of mass action, demonstrations, strikes, barricades, had been conducted for *years* before that. The old *Iskra*, for instance, began to preach this at the end of 1900, as Marx did in 1847, when there could have been no thought as yet of the *beginning of a revolution* in Europe.

After the revolution has begun, it is "recognised" even by its liberals and other enemies; they often recognise it in order to deceive and betray it. *Before* the revolution, revolutionaries, foreseeing it, realise its inevitability, make the masses understand its necessity, explain to the masses its course and methods.

By the irony of history, Kautsky and his friends, who tried to take the initiative in convening the conference out of Grimm's

hands, who attempted to disrupt the conference of the Left wing (Kautsky's nearest friends even went on a tour for this purpose, as Grimm disclosed at the conference), were the very ones who pushed the conference *to the Left*. By *their* deeds the opportunists and the Kautskyists prove the correctness of the position taken by our party.

October 24 (11), 1915.

PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY TO THE SECOND SOCIALIST CONFERENCE *

THESES ON POINTS 5, 6, 7A, 7B AND 8 OF THE AGENDA; STRUGGLE FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR; ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, TOWARDS PARLIAMENTARY ACTION AND MASS STRUGGLES, TOWARDS THE CONVOCAION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU.

The International Socialist Committee, in its notice convening the second conference, invites the organisations to discuss the questions enumerated above and to send in their proposals. In reply to this invitation our party submits the following theses:

1. Just as all war is but the continuation by violent means of the politics which the belligerent states and the classes that rule in them have been conducting for many years, sometimes for decades before the outbreak of war, so the peace that succeeds every war can be nothing else than a summing up and registration of the changes in the relation of forces brought about in the course of, and in consequence of, the given war.

2. As long as the foundations of present, *i.e.*, bourgeois, social relations remain intact, imperialist war can lead only to an imperialist peace, *i.e.*, to the consolidation, expansion and intensification of the oppression of weak nations and countries by finance capital, which has grown enormously, not only in the period preceding the present war, but also during the course of the war. The objective content of the politics pursued by the bourgeoisie and the governments of *both* groups of Great Powers, both before and during the war, is leading to the intensification of economic oppression, national enslavement and political reaction. Consequently, if the bourgeois social system is preserved, the peace that emerges from the present war, no matter what its outcome may be,

cannot but serve to perpetuate this worsening of the economic and political conditions of the masses. To assume that it is possible for a democratic peace to emerge from an imperialist war means, in theory, substituting vulgar phrases for a historical study of the politics that were conducted before and during the war. In practice, it means deceiving the masses of the people by obscuring their political consciousness, by covering up and embellishing the actual policies conducted by the ruling classes which are preparing the ground for the coming peace, by concealing from the masses the main thing, namely, that a democratic peace is impossible without a series of revolutions.

3. Socialists do not repudiate the struggle for reforms. For example, even now they must vote in parliament for improvements in the conditions of the masses, however slight, for increased relief to the inhabitants of devastated regions, for lessening national oppression, etc. But it is sheer bourgeois deception to preach reforms as a solution for problems for which history and the actual political situation demand revolutionary solutions. This applies to the problems which the present war has brought to the front. These are the fundamental questions of imperialism, i.e., the question of the very existence of capitalist society, the question of postponing the collapse of capitalism by a new partition of the world to correspond to the new relation of forces between the "Great" Powers, which in the last few decades have developed not only extremely rapidly, but—and this is particularly important—also extremely unevenly. Real political activity that will change the relation of forces in society, and not merely deceive the masses of the people by words, is possible now only in one of two forms: either by helping "one's own" national bourgeoisie to rob other countries (and calling this "defence of the fatherland" or "saving the country"), or by assisting the proletarian socialist revolution, fostering and developing the ferment which is beginning among the masses in all the belligerent countries, by aiding the incipient strikes and demonstrations, etc., by extending and sharpening these as yet feeble expressions of revolutionary mass struggle into a general onslaught of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

Just as all the social-chauvinists are at present deceiving the people by concealing the real, *i.e.*, the imperialist, policy of the capitalists, which is being continued in the present war, with hypocritical phrases about the "dishonest" attack and "honest" defence on the part of one or the other group of predatory capitalists—so the phrases about a "democratic peace" serve only to deceive the people, as if the coming peace, which is already being prepared by the capitalists and diplomats, can "simply" abolish "dishonest" attacks and re-establish "honest" relations, and as if it will not be a continuation, a development, and a perpetuation of this very imperialist policy, *i.e.*, a policy of financial looting, colonial robbery, national oppression, political reaction and intensification of capitalist exploitation in all its forms. The very thing the capitalists and their diplomats stand in need of at the present time are "Socialist" servants of the bourgeoisie to stun, fool and drug the people by phrases about a "democratic peace," and in this way to conceal the real policy of the bourgeoisie, thus making it difficult for the masses to realise the real nature of this policy and diverting them from the revolutionary struggle.

4. The programme of a "democratic peace," on the drafting of which the prominent representatives of the Second International are now engaged, is precisely such a piece of bourgeois deception and hypocrisy. For example, the most authoritative, official and "theoretical" representatives of this International, *i.e.*, Huysmans at the Arnheem Congress and Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*,* formulated this programme as follows: suspension of the revolutionary struggle until the imperialist governments have concluded peace; in the meantime, verbal repudiation of annexations and indemnities, verbal recognition of self-determination of nations, democratisation of foreign politics, courts of arbitration to examine international conflicts between states, disarmament, United States of Europe, and so on and so forth. The real political significance of this "peace programme" was revealed with particular force by Kautsky when, to prove the "unanimity of the International" on this question, he cited the fact that the London Conference (February 1915) and the Vienna Conference (April 1915) ** had unanimously adopted the main point of that programme, namely, the

"independence of nations." Kautsky thus openly, before the whole world, gave his sanction to the deliberate deception of the people perpetrated by the social-chauvinists, who combine verbal, hypocritical recognition of "independence" or self-determination of nations, a recognition that binds nobody and leads nowhere, with support of "their own" governments in an imperialist war, notwithstanding the fact that *both* sides are waging the war in such a way as systematically to violate the "independence" of weak nations and *for the purpose* of tightening and increasing their oppression.

The objective purpose of this cheap "peace programme" is to intensify the subjection of the working class to the bourgeoisie by "reconciling" the workers, who are beginning to develop the revolutionary struggle, with their chauvinist leaders, by toning down the gravity of the crisis now prevailing in the socialist movement with the view to a return to the state of affairs which existed in the Socialist Parties before the war and which caused the desertion of the majority of the leaders to the side of the bourgeoisie. The fact that this "Kautskyan" policy is clothed in plausible phrases and is being pursued, not only in Germany, but in all countries, makes it all the more dangerous for the proletariat. For instance, in England, this policy is pursued by the majority of the leaders; in France, by Longuet, Pressemane and others; in Russia, by Axelrod, Martov, Chkheidze and others; Chkheidze screens the chauvinist idea of "defend the country" in the present war, by the phrase "save the country," and on the one hand approves of Zimmerwald in words and on the other, in an official declaration of his faction, praises Huysmans' notorious Arnheem speech. In fact, however, neither from the Duma tribune nor in the press does he oppose the participation of the workers in the War Industries Committees, and he remains on the staff of newspapers which advocate such participation. In Italy a similar policy is pursued by Treves: see the threat made by the central organ of the Italian Socialist Party, *Avanti*, of March 5, 1916, to expose Treves and other "reformist-possibilists," * to expose those "who resorted to every means to prevent the Party Executive and Oddino Morgari from taking action towards securing unity at Zimmer-

wald and towards the creation of a new International," etc., etc.

5. The principal "peace question" at the present time is the question of annexations. And it is this question that most strikingly reveals both the now prevailing Socialist hypocrisy and the tasks of real socialist propaganda and agitation.

It is necessary to explain what annexations mean, and why and how Socialists must fight against them. Not *every* appropriation of "foreign" territory may be described as annexation, for, generally speaking, Socialists are in favour of abolishing frontiers between nations and the formation of larger states; nor may every disturbance of the *status quo* be described as annexation, for this would be extremely reactionary and a mockery of the fundamental concepts of the science of history; nor may every military appropriation of territory be called annexation, for Socialists cannot repudiate violence and wars in the interests of the majority of the population. The term annexation must be applied only to the appropriation of territory *against the will* of the population of that territory, in other words, the concept annexation is inseparably bound up with the concept self-determination of nations.

The present war, however—precisely because it is an imperialist war for *both* groups of belligerent powers—inevitably had to give rise and did give rise to the phenomenon of the bourgeoisie and the social-chauvinists "fighting" valiantly against annexations, when the enemy state is annexing, or has annexed, foreign territory. Obviously, such a "struggle against annexations" and such "unanimity" on the question of annexations is sheer hypocrisy. Obviously, the French Socialists who defend the war for the sake of Alsace-Lorraine, the German Socialists who refrain from demanding freedom for Alsace-Lorraine, German Poland, etc., to separate from Germany, and the Russian Socialists who describe a war which is being waged for the purpose of enslaving Poland once again to the tsar as a war for "saving the country" and who demand the annexation of Polish territory by Russia in the name of "peace without annexations," etc., etc., are in *fact* annexationists.

In order that the struggle against annexations may not be mere hypocrisy or an empty phrase, in order that it may really edu-

cate the masses in the spirit of internationalism, the question must be presented in a manner that will really open the eyes of the masses to the deception now prevailing in the question of annexations and not help to screen this deception. It is not sufficient for the Socialists in every country to pay lip service to the equality of nations, or to declaim, vow and solemnly declare that they are opposed to annexations. The Socialists in every country must demand immediate and unconditional *freedom of secession* for the colonies and nations that are oppressed by *their own* "fatherland."

Without this condition the recognition of the self-determination of nations and of the principles of internationalism even in the Zimmerwald Manifesto would at best remain a dead letter.

6. The starting point of the Socialists' "peace programme," as well as of their programme of "struggle for the termination of the war," must be the exposure of the lie about a "democratic peace," about the pacific intentions of the belligerents, etc., which the demagogic Cabinet Ministers, the pacifist bourgeoisie, the social-chauvinists and the Kautskyists of all countries are now propagating among the people. Every "peace programme" is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy unless its principal object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolution, and to support, aid and develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses that is starting everywhere (ferment among the masses, protests, fraternisation in the trenches, strikes, demonstrations, letters from the front to relatives—for example in France—urging them not to subscribe to war loans, etc., etc.).

It is the duty of the Socialists to support, extend and intensify every popular movement for the termination of the war. But this duty is really being fulfilled only by those Socialists who, like Liebknecht, appeal from the parliamentary tribune to the soldiers to lay down their arms, who preach revolution and the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war for socialism.

As a positive slogan to draw the masses into the revolutionary struggle and to explain the need for revolutionary measures to make a "democratic" peace possible, we must advance the slogan of repudiation of national debts.

It is not sufficient for the Zimmerwald Manifesto to hint at revolution* by saying that the workers must make sacrifices for their own and not for somebody else's cause. It is necessary clearly and definitely to indicate to the masses the road they must take. The masses must know where they are to go and why they should go there. It is obvious that mass revolutionary action during the war, if successfully developed, can lead only to the imperialist war becoming transformed into civil war for socialism, and it is harmful to conceal this from the masses. On the contrary, this aim must be indicated clearly, no matter how difficult its attainment may appear now, when we are still at the beginning of the road. It is not sufficient to say, as the Zimmerwald Manifesto does, that "the capitalists lie when they speak about the defence of the fatherland" in the present war, and that the workers in their revolutionary struggle must not take into account the military situation of their country; it is necessary to say clearly the thing that is here merely hinted at, namely, that it is not only the capitalists, but also the social-chauvinists and the Kautskyists who lie when they allow the term, "defence of the fatherland," to be applied to the present imperialist war; that revolutionary action during the war is impossible without creating the danger of defeat for "one's own" government; and that defeat of the government in a reactionary war facilitates revolution, which alone is capable of bringing about a lasting and democratic peace. Finally, it is necessary to tell the masses that unless they themselves create underground organisations and a press that is free from military censorship, *i.e.*, an underground press, it will be utterly impossible to render serious support to the incipient revolutionary struggle, to develop it, to criticise each step it takes, to correct its errors, and systematically broaden and sharpen it.

7. In regard to the question of the action of Socialists in parliament, it must be borne in mind that the Zimmerwald resolution not only expresses sympathy for the five Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma who belong to our party and who have been sentenced to exile in Siberia, but it also expresses its solidarity with their tactics. It is impossible to recognise the revolutionary struggle of the masses and at the same time remain con-

tent with exclusively legal activity of Socialists in parliament. This can only rouse legitimate dissatisfaction among the workers and cause them to desert Social-Democracy and go over to anti-parliamentary anarchism or syndicalism. It is necessary to say clearly and publicly that Social-Democratic members of parliament must use their position not only to make speeches in parliament, but also to render all possible assistance outside of parliament to the underground organisation and to the revolutionary struggle of the workers, and that the masses themselves through their illegal organisation must supervise these activities of their leaders.

8. The question of the convocation of the International Socialist Bureau reduces itself to the fundamental question of principle, namely: is the unity of the old parties and of the Second International possible? Every step forward taken by the international labour movement on the road mapped out at Zimmerwald shows more and more clearly the inconsistency of the position taken by the Zimmerwald majority; for, on the one hand, it identifies the policy of the old parties and of the Second International with the *bourgeois* policy in the labour movement, with a policy which pursues the interests not of the proletariat, but of the bourgeoisie (for example, the statement in the Zimmerwald Manifesto that the "capitalists" lie, when they speak of "defence of the fatherland" in the present war; also the still more definite declarations contained in the circular of the International Socialist Committee of February 10, 1916); on the other hand, the International Socialist Committee fears a split with the International Socialist Bureau and promises officially that it will dissolve when the Bureau is convened again.*

We declare that not only was such a promise never voted on; it was never even discussed at Zimmerwald.

The six months that have passed since Zimmerwald have proved that *real* work in the spirit of Zimmerwald—we do not speak of empty phrases but of work—is bound up throughout the world with a deepening and widening split. In Germany illegal manifestoes against the war are being published in spite of the decisions of the Party, *i.e.*, schismatically. When Deputy Otto Rühle, Karl Liebknecht's closest comrade, openly declared that there are

already two parties in existence, one that helps the bourgeoisie and the other that fights against it, many, including the Kautskyists, reviled him, but no one refuted him. In France, Bourderon, a member of the Socialist Party, is a determined opponent of a split; but at the same time he submits a resolution to his party disapproving of the Central Committee of the Party and of the parliamentary group (*désapprouver Comm. Adm. Perm. et Gr. Parl.**), which would certainly have caused an immediate split had it been adopted. In England, a member of the Independent Labour Party, T. Russel Williams, in the pages of the moderate *Labour Leader*, openly admits that a split is inevitable and in this finds support in letters written by local workers. The example of America is perhaps still more instructive, because even there, in a neutral country, two irreconcilably hostile trends in the Socialist Party have become revealed: on the one hand, the adherents of so-called "preparedness," i.e., of war, militarism and navalism; on the other, Socialists like Eugene Debs, former presidential candidate of the Socialist Party, who openly preaches civil war for socialism precisely in connection with the impending war.

A split actually exists already throughout the world: two entirely irreconcilable working class policies in relation to the war have already revealed themselves. We must not close our eyes to this fact; to do so would result in confusing the masses of the workers, in obscuring their consciousness, in hampering that revolutionary mass action with which all Zimmerwaldists officially sympathise and in strengthening the influence over the masses of those leaders whom the International Socialist Committee, in its circular of February 10, 1916, openly accuses of "misleading" the masses and of preparing a "conspiracy" ("*Pakt*") *against socialism*.

It is the social-chauvinists and Kautskyists of all countries who will restore the bankrupt International Socialist Bureau. The task of the Socialists is to explain to the masses that a split with those who pursue a bourgeois policy under the flag of socialism is inevitable.

April 1916.

THE YOUTH INTERNATIONAL*

A Review

SINCE September 1, 1915, a publication bearing the above title has been appearing in Switzerland in the German language which is described as the "Militant and Propaganda Organ of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations." Altogether six issues of this publication have appeared. This publication is worthy of general notice and should be strongly recommended to the attention of all members of our party who are able to come into contact with the foreign Social-Democratic Parties and youth organisations.

The majority of the official Social-Democratic Parties of Europe at the present time advocate the lowest and vilest form of social-chauvinism and opportunism. This applies to the German and the French Parties, the Fabian Society and the "Labour" Party in England, the Swedish, the Dutch (Troelstra's party), the Danish, the Austrian Parties, etc.¹ In the Swiss Party, notwithstanding the secession (to the great benefit of the labour movement) of the extreme opportunists and their organisation in the *non-Party* "Grütli League," ** there still remain within the Social-Democratic Party itself numerous opportunist social-chauvinist and Kautskyan leaders who exercise *tremendous* influence on the affairs of the Party.

In the circumstances thus prevailing in Europe, on the League of Socialist Youth Organisations falls the tremendous, grateful but difficult task of fighting *for* revolutionary internationalism, *for* true socialism and against the prevailing opportunism which has deserted to the side of the imperialist bourgeoisie. The *Youth*

¹ For a description of the state of affairs in the Socialist Parties of Western Europe during the war, see "The Collapse of the Second International" in this volume.—*Ed.*

International has published a number of good articles in defence of revolutionary internationalism, and the whole publication is permeated with a fine spirit of intense hatred for the betrayers of socialism who "defend the fatherland" in the present war, and with an earnest desire to purge the international labour movement of the corroding influence of chauvinism and opportunism.

Of course, the youth organ *still* lacks theoretical clarity and consistency and perhaps it may never acquire this, precisely because it is the organ of seething, turbulent, inquiring youth. However, our attitude towards the lack of theoretical clarity on the part of *such* people must be entirely different from what our attitude is and should be towards the theoretical muddle in the heads, and the lack of revolutionary consistency in the hearts, of our "O.C.-ists,"¹ "Socialist-Revolutionaries," Tolstoy-ists, anarchists, the European Kautskyists ("centre"), etc. Adults who pretend to lead and teach, but who mislead the proletariat, are one thing: against such people a *ruthless* struggle must be waged. Organisations of *youth*, however, which openly declare that they are still learning, that their main task is to train Party workers for the Socialist Parties, are quite another thing. Such people must be assisted in every way. We must be patient with their faults and strive to correct them gradually, mainly by *persuasion* and not by fighting them. Frequently the middle-aged and the aged *do not know how* to approach the youth in the proper way, for, necessarily, the youth must come to socialism *in a different way, by other paths, in other forms, in other circumstances* than their fathers. Incidentally this is why we must be decidedly in favour of the *organisational independence* of the Youth League, *not only* because the opportunists fear this independence, but because of the very nature of the case; for unless they have complete independence, the youth *will be unable* either to train good Socialists from their midst or prepare themselves to lead socialism *forward*.

¹ *i.e.*, Mensheviks—the adherents of the Menshevik centre, known as the Organisation Committee.—*Ed.*

We stand for the complete independence of the Youth Leagues, but also for complete freedom for comradely criticism of their errors! We must not flatter the youth.

Of the errors to be noted in the excellent organ mentioned above, reference must first of all be made to the following three:

1) On the question of disarmament (or "disarming"), an incorrect position is taken, which we have criticised in a preceding article.* There is ground for believing that this error arises entirely out of the laudable desire to emphasise the necessity of striving for the "complete destruction of militarism" (which is perfectly correct); but the role of civil wars in the socialist revolution is forgotten.

2) On the question of the differences between Socialists and anarchists in their attitude towards the state, Comrade Nota-Bene¹ in his article (in issue No. 6) falls into a very serious error (as he also does on several other questions, for instance, our *reasons* for combating the "defence of the fatherland" slogan). The author wishes to present "a clear picture of the state in general" (together with that of the imperialist, predatory state). He quotes several statements by Marx and Engels, and *inter alia* comes to the following two conclusions:

a) ". . . It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between Socialists and anarchists in the fact that the former are in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to organise social production on new lines, centralised, *i.e.*, technically the most progressive method of production, whereas decentralised, anarchist production would mean retrogression to obsolete technique, to the old form of enterprises." This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference in the attitude of Socialists and anarchists *towards the state*. But he does not answer *this* question, but *another*, namely the difference in the attitude of Socialists and anarchists towards the economic foundation of future society. This, of course,

¹ See note to page 241.*—Ed. Eng. ed.

is an important and necessary question to discuss. But that does not mean that the *main* point of difference in the attitude of Socialists and anarchists towards the state should be ignored. The Socialists are in favour of utilising the present state and its institutions in the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they also urge the necessity of utilising the state for the peculiar form of transition from capitalism to socialism. This transitional form is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is *also* a state.

The anarchists want to "abolish" the state, to "blow it up" (*sprengen*) as Comrade Nota-Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously ascribing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists—unfortunately the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject rather incompletely—hold that the state will die out, will "gradually" "fall asleep" *after* the bourgeoisie has been expropriated.

b) "Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its hostility to the state in principle. . . . The present war has shown how deeply the state idea has penetrated the souls of workers," writes Comrade Nota-Bene. In order to "emphasise" our "hostility" to the state "in principle" we must indeed understand it clearly. This clarity, however, our author lacks. His remark about the "state idea" is entirely muddled. It is un-Marxian and un-socialistic. The point is not that "state" has clashed with the repudiation of the state, but that opportunist policy (*i.e.*, the opportunist, reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) has clashed with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (*i.e.*, the revolutionary Social-Democratic attitude towards the bourgeois state and towards utilising the state against the bourgeoisie, in order to overthrow it). These are entirely different things. We hope to return to this very important subject in a separate article.*

3) The "declaration of principles of the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations," published in issue No. 6 as the

"Secretariat's Draft," contains not a few inaccuracies but it does not contain the *main* thing: a clear comparison of the *three* fundamental tendencies (social-chauvinism, the "centre" and the Left) which are now contending against each other in the socialist movement in all countries.

We repeat, these errors must be refuted and explained; at the same time we must exert every effort to find means of contact and friendship with the youth organisations and help them in every way, but we must find the *proper* manner of approach to them.

December 1916.

BOURGEOIS PACIFISM AND SOCIALIST PACIFISM*

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) I

The Turn in World Politics

THERE are symptoms that such a turn has taken place, or is about to take place; that is, a turn from imperialist war to imperialist peace.

The undoubtedly severe exhaustion of both imperialist coalitions; the difficulty of continuing the war any longer; the difficulty for the capitalists generally, and for finance capital in particular, to skin the people more than they have done already, in the way of outrageous "war" profits; the satiation of finance capital in the neutral countries, the United States, Holland, Switzerland, etc., which has made enormous profits out of the war and finds it difficult to continue this "profitable" business owing to the shortage of raw materials and food supplies; the strenuous efforts being made by Germany to induce one or other of the allies of her principal imperialist rival, England, to desert her; the pacifist pronouncements of the German government followed by similar pronouncements by the governments of a number of neutral countries—these are the outstanding symptoms.

Are there any chances for a speedy cessation of the war or not?

It is very difficult to give a positive reply to this question. In our opinion, two possibilities present themselves rather definitely.

The first is that a separate peace has been concluded between Germany and Russia, although it may not have been concluded in the usual form of a formal written treaty. The second is that such a peace has not been concluded, that England and her allies are really able to hold out for another year or two, etc. If the first assumption is correct, the war will come to an end, if not immediately, then in the very near future, and no important

changes in its progress can be expected. If the second assumption is correct, then the war may continue indefinitely.

We will examine the first possibility.

There is not the slightest doubt that negotiations for a separate peace between Germany and Russia have been going on quite recently, that Nicholas II himself, or an influential court clique, is in favour of such a peace, that in world politics a turn has taken place from an imperialist alliance between Russia and England against Germany, to a no less imperialist alliance between Russia and Germany against England.

The fact that Stürmer has been displaced by Trepov, the public declarations of tsarism that Russia's "right" to Constantinople has been recognised by all the Allies and the fact that Germany has set up a separate Polish state are signs that seem to indicate that the negotiations for a separate peace have ended in failure. Perhaps tsarism entered into these negotiations *solely* in order to blackmail England, to induce her formally and unambiguously to recognise Nicholas the Bloody's "right" to Constantinople and to give certain "weighty" guarantees for this right?

In view of the fact that the main, fundamental purpose of the present imperialist war is to decide the division of the spoils among the three principal imperialist rivals, the three pirates, Russia, Germany and England, there is nothing improbable in this assumption.

On the other hand, the clearer it becomes to tsarism that it is practically impossible by military means to regain Poland, to win Constantinople, to break the iron front of Germany, which the latter is magnificently straightening out, shortening and strengthening by its recent victories in Rumania, the more tsarism is *compelled* to conclude a separate peace with Germany, *that is to say*, to abandon its imperialist alliance with England against Germany and enter into an imperialist alliance with Germany against England. Why not? Was not Russia on the verge of war with England as a consequence of the imperialist rivalry between the two powers over the division of the spoils in Central Asia? Were not negotiations carried on between England and Germany in 1898 for an alliance *against* Russia? England and Germany

then secretly agreed to divide the colonies of Portugal between themselves "in the event" of Portugal not being able to meet her financial obligations!

Increased strivings on the part of the leading imperialist circles of Germany towards an alliance with Russia against England were already clearly defined several months ago. The basis of this alliance apparently is to be the partition of Galicia (tsarism deems it very important to strangle the centre of Ukrainian agitation and Ukrainian liberty), Armenia and *perhaps Rumania!* Was there not a "hint" in a German newspaper that Rumania might be divided among Austria, Bulgaria and Russia? Germany might agree to other "small concessions" to tsarism if only she could achieve an alliance with Russia, and perhaps also with Japan, against England.

A separate peace might be concluded between Nicholas II and Wilhelm II secretly. Cases have occurred in the history of diplomacy when treaties have been concluded and, except for two or three persons, no one has known about them, not even the Cabinet Ministers. Cases have occurred in the history of diplomacy when the "Great Powers" have gathered at "European" congresses after the principal rivals had secretly decided the main questions among themselves (for example, the secret agreement between Russia and England to plunder Turkey, prior to the Berlin Congress of 1878). It would not be at all surprising if tsarism rejected a formal separate peace between the governments for the reason, among others, that in the present situation in Russia it might lead to Milyukov and Guchkov, or Milyukov and Kerensky taking over the government; but at the same time it may have concluded a secret, informal, but none the less "durable" treaty with Germany to the effect that the two "high contracting parties" undertake jointly to pursue *such and such* a policy at the forthcoming peace congress!

It is impossible to decide whether this assumption is correct or not. At all events it is a thousand times nearer to the *truth*, it is a far better description of the *truth* than the innumerable sentimental phrases that are uttered about peace between the present governments, or between any bourgeois governments for that mat-

ter, on the basis of no annexations, etc. These phrases either express innocent desires or are hypocrisy and lies uttered for the purpose of concealing the truth. The truth at the present time, about the present war, about the present attempts to conclude peace, is the *division of the imperialist spoils*. This is the quintessence of the whole thing; and to understand this truth, to express it, "to speak the truth," is the fundamental task of socialist policy as distinct from bourgeois policy, the principal aim of which is to conceal, to gloss over this truth.

Both imperialist coalitions have grabbed a certain amount of loot, and the two principal and most powerful of the pirates, Germany and England, have grabbed most. England has not lost a foot of her territory or her colonies; but she has "acquired" the German colonies and part of Turkey (Mesopotamia). Germany has lost almost all her colonies; but she has acquired immeasurably more valuable territory in Europe, by seizing Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, part of France, part of Russia, etc. The fight now is over the division of the loot, and the "chief" of each of the pirate gangs, i.e., England and Germany, must to some degree reward his allies, who with the exception of Bulgaria and to a less extent Italy have lost a great deal. The weakest of the allies have lost most: in the English coalition, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania have been crushed; in the German coalition, Turkey has lost Armenia and part of Mesopotamia.

Up to now Germany has undoubtedly secured far more loot than England. Up to now Germany has won; she has proved to be far stronger than anyone anticipated before the war. Naturally, therefore, it would be to Germany's advantage to conclude peace as speedily as possible, for her rival might still be able at the most favourable opportunity conceivable (although not very probable) to mobilise a larger reserve of recruits, etc.

This is the *objective* situation. Such is the present position in the struggle for the division of the imperialist loot. It is quite natural that *this* situation should give rise to pacifist strivings, to declarations and pronouncements, mainly on the part of the bourgeoisie and the governments of the German coalition and of the neutral countries. It is equally natural that the bourgeoisie

and its governments are compelled to exert every effort to hoodwink the people, to conceal the hideous nakedness of imperialist peace, the division of the loot, by phrases, by utterly false phrases about democratic peace, about the liberty of small nations, about reducing armaments, etc.

But while it is natural for the bourgeoisie to strive to hoodwink the people, how do the Socialists fulfil their duty? This we shall deal with in the next article (or chapter).

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) II

The Pacifism of Kautsky and Turati

Kautsky is the most authoritative theoretician of the Second International, the most prominent leader of the so-called "Marxian centre" in Germany, the representative of the opposition which organised a separate group in the Reichstag, the "Social-Democratic Labour Group"* (Haase, Ledebour and others). A number of Social-Democratic newspapers in Germany are now publishing articles by Kautsky on the terms of peace, which paraphrase the official declaration made by the "Social-Democratic Labour Group" on the German government's well-known note proposing peace negotiations.** This declaration calls upon the German government to propose definite terms of peace and contains the following characteristic statement:

"... In order that this note [the German government's] may lead to peace, all countries must unequivocally renounce all thought of annexing alien territory, of the political, economic or military subjection of any people whatsoever by any other state power. . . ."

In paraphrasing and concretising this postulate, Kautsky, in his articles, "argues" with great thoroughness that Constantinople must not be given to Russia and that Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone.

We shall examine these political slogans and arguments of Kautsky and his associates as closely as possible.

In a matter that affects Russia, i.e., the imperialist rival of Germany, Kautsky advances, not abstract, not "general," but a very concrete, precise and definite demand: Constantinople must

not be given to Russia. By that he *exposes* the *real* imperialist designs . . . of Russia. In a matter that affects Germany, however, *i.e.*, the country in which the majority of the party which regards Kautsky as its member (and which appointed him the editor of its principal, leading, theoretical organ, *Die Neue Zeit*) is helping the bourgeoisie and the government to conduct an imperialist war, Kautsky does *not* expose the *concrete*, imperialist designs of *his own* government, but confines himself to a "general" *desideratum* or postulate: Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone!!

In what way does Kautsky's policy, in substance, differ from that of the militant, so to speak, social-chauvinists (*i.e.*, Socialists in words but chauvinists in deeds) of France and England, who, while frankly exposing the concrete imperialist actions of Germany, make shift with "general" *desiderata* or postulates when it concerns the countries or nations conquered by England and Russia, who shout about the seizure of Belgium and Serbia but say nothing about the seizure of Galicia, Armenia, the African colonies?

As a matter of fact, both the policy pursued by Kautsky and that pursued by Sembat and Henderson help *their* respective imperialist governments by concentrating attention principally on the insidiousness of their rival and enemy, while throwing a veil of vague, general phrases and sentimental wishes around the *equally* imperialist conduct of "*their own*" bourgeoisie. We would cease to be Marxists, we would cease to be Socialists generally, if we confined ourselves to the Christian, so to speak, contemplation of the benignity of benign general phrases and refrained from exposing their *real* political significance. Do we not see the continuous spectacle of the diplomacy of all the imperialist powers flaunting magnanimous "general" phrases and "democratic" declarations in order to *screen* their robbery, violation and strangulation of small nations?

"Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone. . . ." If I say no more than that, I create the impression that I stand for the complete freedom of Turkey. As a matter of fact, I am only repeating a phrase that is usually uttered by German diplomats

who are *deliberately* lying and deceiving, who employ this phrase in order to conceal the *fact* that Germany *has already* converted Turkey into her financial and military vassal! And if I am a German Socialist, my "general" phrases are extremely *useful* to German diplomacy, for their real significance lies in that they put German imperialism *in a good light*.

"... All countries must renounce all thought of annexations . . . of the economic subjection of any people whatsoever. . . ." What magnanimity! The imperialists "renounce the thought" of annexations and of the financial strangulation of weak nations a thousand times, but should we not compare these renunciations with the *facts* which show that any one of the big banks of Germany, England, France and of the United States *do hold* small nations "*in subjection*"? Can the bourgeois government of a wealthy country *really* renounce annexations and the economic subjugation of alien peoples when billions and billions have been invested in the railways and other enterprises of weak nations?

Who really fights against annexations, etc.? Is it those who utter magnanimous phrases, the objective significance of which is the same as that of the Christian holy water that is sprinkled on the crowned and capitalist pirates? Or is it those who explain to the workers that it is impossible to put an end to annexations and financial strangulation without overthrowing the imperialist bourgeoisie and its governments?

Here is an Italian illustration of the kind of pacifism that Kautsky preaches.

Avanti, the central organ of the Socialist Party of Italy, of December 25, 1916, contains an article by the well-known reformist, Filippo Turati, entitled "Abracadabra," in which he writes that on November 22, 1916, the Socialist group in the Italian parliament moved a resolution in favour of peace. In this resolution the group declared that "the principles proclaimed by the representatives of England and Germany were identical, and these principles should lie at the base of a possible peace," and invited "the government to open negotiations for peace through the mediation of the United States and other neutral countries." This is Turati's own account of the Socialist proposal.

On December 6, 1916, the Chamber "buries" the Socialist resolution by "adjourning" the debate on it. On December 12, the German Chancellor in the Reichstag proposes the very thing proposed by the Italian Socialists. On December 22, Wilson issues his note which, in the words of Turati, "paraphrases and repeats the ideas and arguments of the Socialist proposal." On December 23, other neutral countries come on the scene and paraphrase Wilson's note.

We are accused of having sold ourselves to the Germans, exclaimed Turati. Have Wilson and the neutral countries also sold themselves to Germany?

On December 17, Turati delivered a speech in parliament, one passage of which caused an unusual and deserved sensation. This is the passage, quoted from the report in *Avanti*:

"Suppose a discussion like that proposed by Germany is able, in the main, to settle questions like the evacuation of Belgium and France, the restoration of Rumania, Serbia and, if you will, Montenegro; I will add the rectification of the Italian frontiers in regard to what is indisputably Italian and corresponds to guarantees of a strategical character. . . ." At this point the bourgeois and chauvinist Chamber interrupts Turati, and from all sides the shout goes up: "Excellent! So you too want all this! Long live Turati! Long live Turati! . . ."

Apparently, Turati realised that there was something wrong about the enthusiasm of these bourgeois and tried to "correct" himself and "explain":

"Gentlemen," he said, "cease this irrelevant jesting. It is one thing to admit the relevance and right of national unity, which we have always recognised, but to provoke, or justify, war for this aim is quite another thing."

But neither Turati's "explanation" nor the articles in *Avanti* in his defence, nor Turati's letter of December 21, nor the article by a certain "B.B." in the Zürich *Volksrecht* can "correct" or explain away the fact that *Turati fell into the trap!* . . . Or it would be more correct to say that not Turati, but the whole of socialist pacifism represented by Kautsky, and, as we shall see below, the French "Kautskyists," fell into the trap. The Italian bourgeois press was right in scizing upon this passage in Turati's speech and exulting over it.

The above-mentioned "B.B." tries to defend Turati by arguing that the latter referred only to "the right of nations to self-determination."

A bad defence! What has this to do with "the right of nations to self-determination," which, as everyone knows, is that part of the Marxian programme—and has always been that part of the programme of international democracy—which deals with the defence of oppressed nations? What has it to do with the imperialist war, *i.e.*, with a war for the division of colonies, a war for the *oppression* of foreign countries, a war *among* predatory and oppressing powers to decide *which* of them shall oppress *more* foreign nations?

In what way does this argument about self-determination of nations in defence of an imperialist war, and not a national war, differ from the speeches delivered by Alexinsky, Hervé and Hyndman who argue that *republican* France is opposed to monarchical Germany, in spite of the fact that everyone knows that this war has nothing to do with the conflict between republican and monarchist principles, but is a war for the division of colonies, etc., between two imperialist coalitions.

Turati explained and pleaded that he does not "justify" the war *in the least*.

We will take the reformist, Kautskyan Turati's word for it that he did not *intend* to justify the war. But who does not know that in politics it is not intentions that count, but deeds, not good desires, but facts, not the imaginary, but the real?

Suppose we admit that Turati did not want to justify the war and that Kautsky did not want to justify Germany's placing Turkey in the position of a vassal to German imperialism; the *fact* remains that these two benign pacifists *did justify the war!* That is the point. Had Kautsky declared that "Constantinople must not be given to Russia, Turkey must not be made a vassal state to anyone" not in a magazine which is so dull that nobody reads it, but in parliament, before a lively, impressionable, bourgeois audience, full of southern temperament, it would not have been surprising if the witty bourgeois had exclaimed: "Excellent! Hear! Long live Kautsky!"

Whether he wished to or not, deliberately or not, the fact is that Turati expressed the point of view of a bourgeois broker proposing a friendly deal between imperialist pirates. The "liberation" of Italian soil belonging to Austria would, *in fact*, be a concealed reward to the Italian bourgeoisie for participating in the imperialist war of a gigantic imperialist coalition; it would be a small sop thrown in, in addition to the share of the African colonies and spheres of influence in Dalmatia and Albania. Perhaps the reformist Turati adopts the point of view of the bourgeoisie naturally; but Kautsky really differs in no way from Turati.

In order not to embellish the imperialist war, in order not to help the bourgeoisie falsely to represent this war as a national war, as a war for the liberation of nations, in order to avoid taking up the position of bourgeois reformism, one must speak, not in the language of Kautsky and Turati, but in the language of Karl Liebknecht: one must tell *one's own* bourgeois that they are hypocrites when they talk about national liberation, one must say that this war cannot result in a democratic peace unless the proletariat "turns its guns" against *its own* governments.

Such and only such could be the position of a genuine Marxist, of a genuine Socialist and not a bourgeois reformist. It is not he who repeats the general, meaningless, non-committal, goody-goody desires of pacifism who really works for a democratic peace but it is he who exposes the imperialist character of the present war and of the imperialist peace that is being prepared, he who calls upon the peoples to rise in revolt against the criminal governments.

Some people sometimes try to defend Kautsky and Turati with the argument that it is impossible openly to do more than drop "hints" against the government and that the pacifists of this sort do "hint" at this kind of thing. The reply to this is, first, that the impossibility of speaking the truth openly is an argument, not in favour of concealing the truth, but in favour of the need for an illegal organisation and press, *i.e.*, an organisation and press free from the surveillance of the police and the censorship. Secondly, that moments occur in history when a Socialist *is called upon* to throw off all legality. Thirdly, that even in serf-ridden Russia, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky managed to speak the truth, for

example, by their silent comment on the Manifesto of March 3 (February 19), 1861,* and the ridicule and abuse they hurled against the liberals of their day who made exactly the same kind of speeches as those made today by Turati and Kautsky.

In the next article we shall deal with French pacifism, which found expression in the resolutions passed by the two recently held congresses of the labour and Socialist organisations of France.

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) III

The Pacifism of the French Socialists and Syndicalists

The congresses of the C.G.T. (Confédération générale du Travail¹) of France and of the Socialist Party of France have just been held.** At these congresses the true significance and true role of Socialist pacifism at the present moment were quite definitely revealed.

The following is the resolution passed *unanimously* at the trade union congress, including the majority of the ardent chauvinists headed by the notorious Jouhaux, the anarchist Broutchoux and . . . the "Zimmerwaldian" Merrheim:

"This Conference of National Corporative Federations, trade unions and labour exchanges takes cognisance of the Note of the President of the United States*** which 'invites all nations now at war with each other to publicly expound their views as to the terms upon which the war might be brought to an end'—

"requests the French government to agree to this proposal;

"invites the government to take the initiative in making a similar proposal to its allies in order to speed the hour of peace;

"declares that the federation of nations, which is one of the guarantees of a final peace, can be achieved only with the independence, territorial inviolability and political and economic liberty of all nations, great and small.

"The organisations represented at this conference pledge themselves to support and spread this idea among the masses of the workers in order to bring an end to the present indefinite and ambiguous situation, which can only benefit secret diplomacy, against which the working class has always protested."

There you have an example of "pure" pacifism, entirely in the spirit of Kautsky, a pacifism approved by an official labour organisation which has nothing in common with Marxism, and the ma-

¹ General Confederation of Labour.

majority of whose members are chauvinists. We have before us an outstanding document, deserving the most serious attention, of the *political* unity of the chauvinists and the "Kautskyists" on a platform of empty pacifist phrases. In the preceding article we tried to explain the *theoretical* basis of the unity of ideas of the chauvinists and the pacifists, of the bourgeois and the Socialist reformists. Now we see this unity achieved *in practice*, in another imperialist country.

At the conference at Zimmerwald, September 5-9, 1915, Merrheim declared: "*Le parti, les Jouhaux, le gouvernement, ce ne sont que trois têtes sous un bonnet*" (The party, the Jouhaux and the government are three heads under one bonnet, i.e., they are all one). At the conference of the C.G.T. of December 26, 1916, Merrheim voted *together with Jouhaux*, for a pacifist resolution. On December 23, 1916, one of the frankest and most extreme organs of the German social-imperialists, the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, published a leading article entitled "The Disintegration of the Bourgeois Parties and the Restoration of Social-Democratic Unity." In this article, of course, the praises are sung of the peace-loving Südekum, Legien, Scheidemann and Co., of the whole of the majority of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany and also of the German government, and it is proclaimed that: "the first Party congress that is convened after the war must restore Party unity, with the exception of the few fanatics who refuse to pay Party dues" (i.e., the adherents of Karl Liebknecht!); "... Party unity on the basis of the policy of the Executive of the Party, of the Social-Democratic Reichstag group and of the trade unions."

This is a very clear expression of the idea and the proclamation of the policy of "unity" between the obvious social-chauvinists of Germany and Kautsky and Co., the "Social-Democratic Labour Group"—unity on the basis of pacifist phrases—"unity" as achieved in France on December 26, 1916, between Jouhaux and Merrheim!

The central organ of the Socialist Party of Italy, *Avanti*, in a leading article in its issue of December 28, 1916, writes:

"Although Bissolati and Südekum, Bonhommi and Scheidemann, Sembat and David, Jouhaux and Legien have deserted to the camp of bourgeois nationalism and have betrayed [*hanno tradito*] the ideological unity of the internationalists, which they promised to serve faithfully and loyally, we shall stay together with our German comrades like Liebknecht, Ledebour, Hoffmann, Meyer, and with our French comrades like Merrheim, Blanc, Brizon, Raffin-Dugens, who have not changed and have not vacillated."

Note the confusion that is expressed here:

Bissolati and Bonhommi were *expelled* from the Socialist Party of Italy as reformists and chauvinists before the outbreak of the war. *Avanti* puts them on the same level as Südekum and Legien, and quite rightly, of course; but Südekum, David and Legien are at the head of the alleged Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which, in fact, is a social-chauvinist party, and yet this very *Avanti* is opposed to their expulsion, opposed to a rupture with them, and opposed to the formation of a Third International. *Avanti* quite correctly describes Legien and Jouhaux as deserters to the camp of bourgeois nationalism and contrasts their conduct with that of Liebknecht, Ledebour, Merrheim and Brizon. But we have seen that Merrheim *votes on the same side as Jouhaux*, while Legien, in the Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, declares that he is confident that Party unity will be restored, with the *single* exception, however, of the adherents of Liebknecht, i.e., "unity" with the Social-Democratic Labour Group (including Kautsky) to which Ledebour belongs!!

This confusion arises from the fact that *Avanti* confuses bourgeois pacifism with revolutionary Social-Democratic internationalism, while experienced politicians like Legien and Jouhaux perfectly well understand the *identity* of Socialist and bourgeois pacifism.

Why, indeed, should not M. Jouhaux and his organ, the chauvinist *La Bataille*, rejoice at the "unanimity" between Jouhaux and Merrheim when, *in fact*, the unanimously adopted resolution, which we have quoted in full above, contains nothing but bourgeois pacifist phrases; *not a shadow* of revolutionary consciousness, *not a single* socialist idea!

Is it not ridiculous to talk about "the economic liberty of all nations great and small" and yet not say a word about the fact

that, until the bourgeois governments are overthrown and the bourgeoisie expropriated, the phrase "the economic liberty" of nations is just as much a *deception* of the people as the phrase "the economic liberty" of the individual in general, of the small peasants and the rich peasants, of the workers and the capitalists, in modern society?

The resolution which Jouhaux and Merrheim voted for unanimously is thoroughly imbued with the very ideas of "bourgeois nationalism" which Jouhaux expresses, as *Avanti* quite rightly points out, while, strangely enough, *failing* to observe that Merrheim expresses the same ideas.

Bourgeois nationalists always and everywhere flaunt "general" phrases about a "federation of nations" *in general* and about "economic liberty of all nations great and small." But Socialists, unlike the bourgeois nationalists, have always said and now say: rhetoric about "economic liberty of all nations great and small" is disgusting hypocrisy as long as *certain* nations (for example, England and France) invest abroad, that is to say, lend at usurious interest to small and backward nations *scores and scores of billions of francs*, and as long as the small and weak nations are in bondage to them.

Socialists could not have allowed *a single sentence* of the resolution, for which Jouhaux and Merrheim voted unanimously, to pass without strong protest. In direct contrast to that resolution, Socialists would have declared that Wilson's pronouncement is a downright lie and sheer hypocrisy, because Wilson is the representative of a bourgeoisie which has piled up billions out of the war, because he is the head of a government that has frantically armed the United States obviously in preparation for a *second* great imperialist war; that the French bourgeois government is tied hand and foot by finance capital, whose slave it is, and by the secret, imperialist, thoroughly predatory and reactionary treaties with England, Russia, etc., and therefore cannot do or say anything except utter the same lies about a democratic and a "just" peace; that the struggle for such a peace cannot be waged by repeating general, vapid, benign, sentimental, meaningless and non-committal pacifist phrases, which merely serve to embellish the

foulness of imperialism; it can be waged only by telling the people the *truth*, by telling the people that, in order to obtain a democratic and just peace, the bourgeois governments of all the belligerent countries must be overthrown, and that for this purpose advantage must be taken of the fact that millions of the workers are armed and that the high cost of living and the horrors of the imperialist war have roused the anger of the masses of the population.

This is what Socialists should have said instead of voting for the Jouhaux-Merrheim resolution.

The Congress of the Socialist Party of France, which took place in Paris simultaneously with that of the C.G.T., not only refrained from saying this, but passed a resolution that is *even worse* than the one mentioned above. This resolution was passed by 2,838 votes against 109, while 20 abstained, that is to say, by a *blot* between the social-chauvinists (Renaudel and Co., the so-called "*majoritaires*") and the *Longuet-ists* (the adherents of Longuet, the French Kautskyists)!! Moreover, the Zimmerwaldian Bourderon and the Kienthalian Raffin-Dugens voted for this resolution!!

We shall not quote the full text of this resolution because it is inordinately long and totally uninteresting: it contains benign, sentimental phrases about peace, *immediately followed* by declarations of readiness to continue to support the so-called "national defence" of France, *i.e.*, to support the imperialist war which France is conducting in alliance with bigger and more powerful pirates like England and Russia.

Unity between the social-chauvinists and the pacifists (or Kautskyists) and a section of the Zimmerwaldists in France has become a fact, not only in the C.G.T., but also in the Socialist Party.

ARTICLE (OR CHAPTER) IV

Zimmerwald at the Cross-roads

The French newspapers containing the report of the Congress of the C.G.T. were received in Berne on December 28, and on December 30 the Socialist newspapers of Berne and Zürich published another manifesto issued by the Berne I.S.K. ("*Internationale Sozialistische Kommission*"), the International Socialist Com-

mittee, the executive body of Zimmerwald. This manifesto, dated the end of December 1916, refers to the peace proposals made by Germany and by Wilson and the other neutral countries, and all these governmental pronouncements are described, and quite rightly described, of course, as a "farcical game of peace," "a game to deceive their own peoples," "hypocritical pacifist gesticulations of diplomats."

As against this farce and falsehood the manifesto declares that the "only force" capable of bringing about peace, etc., is the "firm determination" of the international proletarians to "turn their weapons, not against their brothers, but against the enemy in their own country."

The passages we have quoted clearly reveal the two fundamentally distinct policies which have lived side by side, as it were, up to now in the Zimmerwald group, but which have now finally parted company.

On the one hand Turati quite definitely and correctly states that the proposals made by Germany, Wilson, etc., were a "*paraphrase*" of Italian "Socialist" pacifism; the declarations of the German social-chauvinists and the voting of the French have shown that both fully appreciate the value of the pacifist screen for *their* policy.

On the other hand, the manifesto of the International Socialist Committee describes the pacifism of all belligerent and neutral governments as a farce and hypocrisy.

On the one hand, Jouhaux joins with Merrheim; Bourderon, Longuet and Raffin-Dugens join with Renaudel, Sembat and Thomas, while the German social-chauvinists, Südekum, David and Scheidemann, announce the forthcoming "restoration of Social-Democratic unity" with Kautsky and the "Social-Democratic Labour Group."

On the other hand the manifesto of the International Socialist Committee calls upon the "Socialist minorities" to fight strenuously against "their own governments" and "against their social-patriotic hirelings" (*Söldlinge*).

• Either one thing or the other.

Either expose the vapidness, stupidity and hypocrisy of bourgeois

pacifism, or "paraphrase" it into "Socialist" pacifism. Fight against the Jouhaux, the Renaudels, the Legiens and the Davids as the "hirelings" of the governments, or join with them in making empty pacifist declamations on the French or German models.

This is now the dividing line between the Right wing of Zimmerwald, which has always strenuously opposed a split from the social-chauvinists, and the Left wing, which had the foresight at the Zimmerwald Conference publicly to dissociate itself from the Right and to put forward, at the conference and after it in the press, its own platform. The approach of peace, or at least the intense discussion of the question of peace by certain bourgeois elements, not accidentally, but inevitably gave rise to a particularly marked divergence between the two policies. Bourgeois pacifists and their "Socialist" imitators, or followers, have always pictured, and now picture, peace as being something in principle distinct from war, for the pacifists of both shades have never understood that "war is the continuation of the politics of peace and peace is the continuation of the politics of war." Neither the bourgeoisie nor the social-chauvinists wanted, nor do they wish to see that the imperialist war of 1914-17 is the continuation of the imperialist politics of 1898-1914, if not of an earlier period. Neither the bourgeois pacifists nor the Socialist pacifists see that if the bourgeois governments are not overthrown by revolution peace *now* can only be an imperialist peace, a continuation of the imperialist war.

In the same way as they approached the question of appraising the present war with silly, vulgar, philistine phrases about aggression or defence in general, so they are approaching the question of appraising the peace with the same philistine commonplaces, forgetting all about the concrete historical situation, the actual concrete struggle between the imperialist powers. And it was quite natural for the social-chauvinists, these agents of the governments and of the bourgeoisie in the workers' parties, to seize upon the approach of peace, or even upon mere peace talk, in order to gloss over the depths of their reformism and opportunism which the war has exposed and in order to restore their damaged influence over the masses. Hence, the social-chauvinists in Germany

and in France, as we have seen, are making strenuous efforts to "unite" with the soft, unprincipled pacifist section of the "opposition."

No doubt, efforts will be made also in Zimmerwald to gloss over the divergence between the two irreconcilable lines of policy. One can foresee these efforts being made along two lines. A "practical business" conciliation will take the form of mechanically combining loud revolutionary phrases (like those in the manifesto of the International Socialist Committee) with opportunist and pacifist practice. This is what happened in the Second International. The arch-revolutionary phrases in the manifestoes of Huysmans and Vandervelde and in certain congress resolutions merely served as a screen for the arch-opportunist practice of the majority of the European Parties, but they did not change, disrupt or combat this practice. It is doubtful whether these tactics will again be successful in Zimmerwald.

The "conciliators in principle" will strive to falsify Marxism by advancing such arguments: reform does not exclude revolution; an imperialist peace with certain "improvements" in the frontiers of certain nationalities, or in international law, or in expenditure on armaments, etc., is possible side by side with the revolutionary movement as "one of the aspects of the development" of this movement, and so on and so forth.

This would be a falsification of Marxism. Of course, reforms do not exclude revolution. But this is not the point at issue at the present moment. The point is that revolutionaries must not efface *themselves* before the reformists, *i.e.*, that Socialists should not substitute reformist work for their revolutionary work. Europe is experiencing a revolutionary situation. The war and the high cost of living are making this situation more acute. The transition from war to peace will not necessarily alter this situation, for there are no grounds whatever for believing that the millions of workers who now have excellent weapons in their hands will necessarily permit themselves to be "peacefully disarmed" by the bourgeoisie instead of following the advice of Karl Liebknecht, *i.e.*, turning their weapons against *their own* bourgeoisie.

The question is not as it is put by the pacifist Kautskyists: either

a reformist political campaign or else the renunciation of reforms. This is a bourgeois presentation of the question. The question is: either revolutionary struggle, the by-product of which, in the event of its not being quite successful, is reforms (the whole history of revolutions throughout the world has proved this), or nothing but talk about reforms and the promise of reforms.

The reformism of Kautsky, Turati and Bourderon, which now comes out in the form of pacifism, not only leaves aside the question of revolution (this *in itself* is a betrayal of socialism), not only abandons in practice all systematic and persistent revolutionary work, but even goes to the length of declaring that organising street demonstrations is the work of adventurers (Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, November 26, 1915). It goes to the length of advocating unity and uniting with the outspoken and determined opponents of revolutionary struggle, the Südekums, Legiens, Renaudels, Thomases, etc., etc.

This reformism is absolutely irreconcilable with revolutionary Marxism, the duty of which is to take the utmost possible advantage of the present revolutionary situation in Europe in order openly to preach revolution, the overthrow of the bourgeois governments, the conquest of power by the armed proletariat, while at the same time not renouncing and not refusing to utilise reforms, for the purpose of developing the revolutionary struggle and in the course of that struggle.

The immediate future will reveal how the progress of events in Europe in general, and the struggle between reformist pacifism and revolutionary Marxism, in particular, including the struggle between the two sections of Zimmerwald, will develop.

January 1, 1917.

PART IV

IMPERIALISM AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION *

THESES

1. *Imperialism, Socialism and the Liberation of Oppressed Nations*

IMPERIALISM is the highest stage of development of capitalism. Capital in the advanced countries has outgrown the boundaries of national states. It has established monopoly in place of competition, thus creating all the objective prerequisites for the achievement of socialism. Hence, in Western Europe and in the United States of America, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the capitalist governments, for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, is on the order of the day. Imperialism is forcing the masses into this struggle by sharpening class antagonisms to an immense degree, by worsening the conditions of the masses both economically—trusts and high cost of living, and politically—growth of militarism, frequent wars, increase of reaction, strengthening and extension of national oppression and colonial plunder. Victorious socialism must achieve complete democracy and, consequently, not only bring about the complete equality of nations, but also give effect to the right of oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession. Socialist Parties which fail to prove by all their activities now, as well as during the revolution and after its victory, that they will free the enslaved nations and establish relations with them on the basis of a free union—and a free union is a lying phrase without right to secession—such parties are committing treachery to socialism.

Of course, democracy is also a form of state which must disappear when the state disappears, but this will take place only in the process of transition from completely victorious and consolidated socialism to complete communism.

2. *The Socialist Revolution and the Struggle for Democracy*

The socialist revolution is not one single act, not one single battle on a single front, but a whole epoch of intensified class conflicts, a long series of battles on all fronts, *i.e.*, battles around all the problems of economics and politics, which can culminate only in the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. It would be a fundamental mistake to suppose that the struggle for democracy can divert the proletariat from the socialist revolution, or obscure, or overshadow it, etc. On the contrary, just as socialism cannot be victorious unless it introduces complete democracy, so the proletariat will be unable to prepare for victory over the bourgeoisie unless it wages a many-sided, consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy.

It would be no less mistaken to delete any of the points of the democratic programme, for example, the point of self-determination of nations, on the ground that it is "impossible," or that it is "illusory" under imperialism. The assertion that the right of nations to self-determination cannot be achieved within the framework of capitalism may be understood either in its absolute, economic sense, or in the conventional, political sense.

In the first case, the assertion is fundamentally wrong in theory. First, in this sense, it is impossible to achieve such things as labour money, or the abolition of crises, etc., under capitalism. But it is entirely incorrect to argue that the self-determination of nations is *likewise* impossible. Secondly, even the one example of the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905 is sufficient to refute the argument that it is "impossible" in this sense. Thirdly, it would be ridiculous to deny that, with a slight change in political and strategical relationships, for example, between Germany and England, the formation of new states, Polish, Indian, etc., would be quite "possible" very soon. Fourthly, finance capital, in its striving towards expansion, will "freely" buy and bribe the freest, most democratic and republican government and the elected officials of any country, however "independent" it may be. The domination of finance capital, as of capital in general, cannot be abolished by *any* kind of reforms in the realm of political demo-

cracy, and self-determination belongs wholly and exclusively to this realm. The domination of finance capital, however, does not in the least destroy the significance of political democracy as the freer, wider and more distinct *form* of class oppression and class struggle. Hence, all arguments about the "impossibility of achieving," economically speaking, one of the demands of political democracy under capitalism reduce themselves to a theoretically incorrect definition of the general and fundamental relations of capitalism and of political democracy in general.

In the second case, this assertion is incomplete and inaccurate, for not only the right of nations to self-determination, but *all* the fundamental demands of political democracy are "possible of achievement" under imperialism, only incompletely, in a mutilated form and as a rare exception (for example, the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905). The demand for the immediate liberation of the colonies, as advanced by all revolutionary Social-Democrats, is also "impossible of achievement" under capitalism without a series of revolutions. This does not imply, however, that Social-Democracy must refrain from conducting an immediate and determined struggle for *all* these demands—to refrain would merely be to the advantage of the bourgeoisie and reaction. On the contrary, it implies that it is necessary to formulate and put forward all these demands, not in a reformist, but in a revolutionary way; not by keeping within the framework of bourgeois legality, but by breaking through it; not by confining oneself to parliamentary speeches and verbal protests, but by drawing the masses into real action, by widening and fomenting the struggle for every kind of fundamental, democratic demand, right up to and including the direct onslaught of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, to the socialist revolution, which will expropriate the bourgeoisie. The socialist revolution may break out not only in consequence of a great strike, a street demonstration, a hunger riot, a mutiny in the forces, or a colonial rebellion, but also in consequence of any political crisis, like the Dreyfus affair,* the Zabern incident,** or in connection with a referendum on the secession of an oppressed nation, etc.

The intensification of national oppression under imperialism

makes it necessary for Social-Democracy not to renounce what the bourgeoisie describes as the "utopian" struggle for the freedom of nations to secede, but, on the contrary, to take more advantage than ever before of conflicts arising *also* on this ground, for the purpose of rousing mass action and revolutionary attacks upon the bourgeoisie.

3. *The Meaning of the Right to Self-Determination and its Relation to Federation*

The right of nations to self-determination means only the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free, political secession from the oppressing nation. Concretely, this political, democratic demand implies complete freedom to carry on agitation in favour of secession, and freedom to settle the question of secession by means of a referendum of the nation that desires to secede. Consequently, this demand is by no means identical with the demand for secession, for the partition and for the formation of small states. It is merely the logical expression of the struggle against national oppression in any form. The more closely the democratic system of state approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for secession be in practice; for the advantages of large states, both from the point of view of economic progress and from the point of view of the interests of the masses, are beyond doubt, and these advantages increase with the growth of capitalism. The recognition of self-determination is not the same as making federation a principle. One may be a determined opponent of this principle and a partisan of democratic centralism and yet prefer federation to national inequality as the only path towards complete democratic centralism. It was precisely from this point of view that Marx, although a centralist, preferred even the federation of Ireland with England to the forcible subjection of Ireland to the English.*

The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the present division of mankind into small states, and all-national isolation, not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge them. And in order to achieve this aim, we must, on the one hand, explain to the masses the reactionary nature of the ideas of Renner

and Otto Bauer concerning so-called "cultural national autonomy" * and, on the other hand, demand the liberation of the oppressed nations not only in general, nebulous phrases, not in declamations devoid of content, not by "postponing" the question until socialism is established, but in a clearly and precisely formulated political programme which shall particularly take into account the hypocrisy and cowardice of the Socialists in the oppressing nations. Just as mankind can achieve the abolition of classes only by passing through the transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can achieve the inevitable merging of nations only by passing through the transition period of complete liberation of all the oppressed nations, *i.e.*, their freedom to secede.

4. The Proletarian-Revolutionary Presentation of the Question of the Self-Determination of Nations

Not only the demand for the self-determination of nations but *all* the items of our democratic minimum programme were advanced *before us*, as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by the petty bourgeoisie. And the petty bourgeoisie continues to this day to advance *all* these demands in a utopian way, without seeing the class struggle and the fact that it has become intensified under democracy, and believing in "peaceful" capitalism. The idea of a peaceful union of equal nations under imperialism, which deceives the people, and which the Kautskyists advocate, is precisely of this nature. As against this philistine, opportunist utopia, the programme of Social-Democracy must advance the thesis that the fundamental, essential and inevitable division of nations under imperialism is that between oppressing nations and oppressed nations.

The proletariat of the oppressing nations cannot confine itself to the general hackneyed phrases that may be repeated by any pacifist bourgeois against annexations and for the equal rights of nations, in general. The proletariat cannot evade the question that is particularly "unpleasant" for the imperialist bourgeoisie, namely, the question of the frontiers of states that are based on national oppression. The proletariat cannot but fight against the forcible

retention of the oppressed nations within the boundaries of a given state, and this is exactly what the struggle for the right of self-determination means. The proletariat must demand the right of political secession for the colonies and for the nations that "its own" nation oppresses. Unless it does this, proletarian internationalism will remain a meaningless phrase; mutual confidence and class solidarity between the workers of the oppressing and oppressed nations will be impossible; the hypocrisy of the reformist and Kautskyan advocates of self-determination, who maintain silence about the nations which are oppressed by "their" nation and forcibly retained within "their" state, will remain unexposed.

The Socialists of the oppressed nations, on the other hand, must particularly fight for and maintain complete, absolute unity (also organisational) between the workers of the oppressed nation and the workers of the oppressing nation. Without such unity it will be impossible to maintain an independent proletarian policy and class solidarity with the proletariat of other countries in the face of all the subterfuge, treachery and trickery of the bourgeoisie; for the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations always converts the slogan of national liberation into a means for deceiving the workers; in internal politics it utilises these slogans as a means for concluding reactionary agreements with the bourgeoisie of the ruling nation (for instance, the Poles in Austria and Russia, who entered into pacts with reaction in order to oppress the Jews and the Ukrainians); in the realm of foreign politics it strives to enter into pacts with one of the rival imperialist powers for the purpose of achieving its own predatory aims (the policies of the small states in the Balkans, etc.*).

The fact that the struggle for national liberation against one imperialist power may, under certain circumstances, be utilised by another "Great" Power in its equally imperialist interests should have no more weight in inducing Social-Democracy to renounce its recognition of the right of nations to self-determination than the numerous cases of the bourgeoisie utilising republican slogans for the purpose of political deception and financial robbery, for ex-

ample, in the Latin countries, have had in inducing them to renounce republicanism.¹

5. *Marxism and Proudhonism on the National Question*

In contrast to the petty-bourgeois democrats, Marx regarded all democratic demands without exception not as an absolute, but as a historical expression of the struggle of the masses of the people, led by the bourgeoisie, against feudalism. There is not a single democratic demand which could not serve, and has not served, under certain conditions, as an instrument of the bourgeoisie for deceiving the workers. To single out one of the demands of political democracy, namely, the self-determination of nations, and to oppose it to all the rest, is fundamentally wrong in theory. In practice, the proletariat will be able to retain its independence only if it subordinates its struggle for all the democratic demands, not excluding the demand for a republic, to its revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in contrast to the Proudhonists, who "denied" the national problem "in the name of the social revolution," Marx, having in mind mainly the interests of the proletarian class struggle in the advanced countries, put into the forefront the fundamental principle of internationalism and socialism, viz., that no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations. It was precisely from the standpoint of the interests of the revolutionary movement of the German workers that Marx in 1848 demanded that victorious democracy in Germany should proclaim and grant freedom to

¹ Needless to say, to repudiate the right of self-determination on the ground that logically it means "defence of the fatherland" would be ridiculous. With equal logic, i.e., with equal shallowness, the social-chauvinists of 1914-16 apply this argument to every one of the demands of democracy (for instance, to republicanism), and to every formulation of the struggle against national oppression, to justify "defence of the fatherland." Marxism arrives at the recognition of defence of the fatherland, for example, in the wars of the Great French Revolution and the Garibaldi wars in Europe,* and at the repudiation of defence of the fatherland in the imperialist war of 1914-16, from the analysis of the specific historical circumstances of each separate war, and not from some "general principle," or some separate item of a programme.

the nations that the Germans were oppressing.* It was precisely from the standpoint of the revolutionary struggle of the English workers that Marx in 1869 demanded the separation of Ireland from England, and added: "although after the separation there may come federation."¹ Only by putting forward this demand did Marx really educate the English workers in the spirit of internationalism. Only in this way was he able to oppose the revolutionary solution of a given historical problem to the opportunists and bourgeois reformism, which even now, half a century later, has failed to achieve the Irish "reform." Only in this way was Marx able—unlike the apologists of capital who shout about the right of small nations to secession being utopian and impossible, and about the progressive nature not only of economic but also of political concentration—to urge the progressive nature of this concentration in a non-imperialist manner, to urge the bringing together of the nations, not by force, but on the basis of a free union of the proletarians of all countries. Only in this way was Marx able, also in the sphere of the solution of national problems, to oppose the revolutionary action of the masses to verbal and often hypocritical recognition of the equality and the self-determination of nations. The imperialist war of 1914-16 and the Augean stables** of hypocrisy of the opportunists and Kautskyists it exposed have strikingly confirmed the correctness of Marx's policy, which must serve as the model for all the advanced countries; for all of them now oppress other nations.²

¹ See note to page 270.*—Ed. Eng. ed.

² Reference is often made—recently, for instance, by the German chauvinist Lentzsch, in *Die Glocke*, No. 8-9—to the fact that Marx's hostility to the national movement of certain peoples, for example, the Czechs in 1848, refutes the necessity of recognising the self-determination of nations from the point of view of Marxism. This is incorrect, for in 1848 there were historical and political grounds for drawing a distinction between "reactionary" and revolutionary democratic nations. Marx was right when he condemned the former and defended the latter. The right to self-determination is one of the demands of democracy which must naturally be subordinated to the general interests of democracy. In 1848 and subsequent years, those general interests were concentrated primarily in the struggle against tsarism.

6. *Three Types of Countries in Relation to Self-Determination of Nations*

In this respect, countries must be divided into three main types:

First, the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe and the United States of America. In these countries the bourgeois, progressive, national movements came to an end long ago. Every one of these "great" nations oppresses other nations in the colonies and within its own country. The tasks of the proletariat of these ruling nations are the same as those of the proletariat in England in the nineteenth century in relation to Ireland.¹

Secondly, Eastern Europe: Austria, the Balkans and particularly Russia. Here it was the twentieth century that particularly developed the bourgeois-democratic national movements and intensified the national struggle. The tasks of the proletariat in these countries—in regard to the consummation of their bourgeois-democratic reformation, as well as in regard to assisting the socialist revolution in other countries—cannot be achieved unless it champions the right of nations to self-determination. In this connection, the most difficult but most important task is to merge the class struggle of the workers in the oppressing nations with the class struggle of the workers in the oppressed nations.

Thirdly, the semi-colonial countries, like China, Persia, Turkey and all colonies, which have a combined population amounting to a billion. In these countries the bourgeois-democratic movements

¹ In some small states which have remained out of the war of 1914-16—for example, Holland and Switzerland—the bourgeoisie strongly urges the slogan "self-determination of nations" to justify participation in the imperialist war. This is one of the motives that induces the Social-Democrats in such countries to repudiate self-determination. In this case the correct proletarian policy, namely, the repudiation of "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war is defended by wrong arguments. What results is a distortion of Marxian theory, while in practice we have a peculiar small-nation narrow-mindedness, which forgets about the *hundreds of millions* of the population of nations that are enslaved by the "Great Power" nations. Comrade Horter, in his excellent pamphlet *Imperialism, the War and Social-Democracy*, wrongly rejects the principle of self-determination of nations, but correctly applies it, when he demands the *immediate* granting of "political and national independence" to the Dutch Indies and exposes the Dutch opportunists who refuse to put forward this demand and to fight for it.

have either hardly begun, or are far from having been completed. Socialists must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without compensation—and this demand in its political expression signifies nothing more nor less than the recognition of the right to self-determination—but they must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and assist their rebellion—and if need be, their revolutionary war—*against* the imperialist powers that oppress them.

7. *Social-Chauvinism and Self-Determination of Nations*

The imperialist epoch and the war of 1914-16 have particularly brought to the forefront the task of fighting against chauvinism and nationalism in the advanced countries. On the question of the self-determination of nations, there are two main shades of opinion among the social-chauvinists, i.e., the opportunists and the Kautskyists, who embellish the reactionary imperialist war by declaring it to be a war in "defence of the fatherland."

On the one hand, we see the rather frank servants of the bourgeoisie who defend annexations on the ground that imperialism and political concentration are progressive and who repudiate the right to self-determination on the ground that it is utopian, illusory, petty-bourgeois, etc. Among these may be included Cuno, Parvus and the extreme opportunists in Germany, a section of the Fabians and the trade union leaders in England, and the opportunists, Semkovsky, Liebman, Yurkevich, etc., in Russia.

On the other hand, we see the Kautskyists, including Vandervelde, Renaudel, and many of the pacifists in England, France, etc. These stand for unity with the first-mentioned group, and in practice their conduct is the same as its, in that they advocate the right to self-determination in a purely verbal and hypocritical way. They regard the demand for the freedom of political secession as being "excessive" ("*zu viel verlangt*"—Kautsky, in *Die Neue Zeit*, May 21, 1915); they do not advocate the need for revolutionary tactics, especially for the Socialists in the oppressing nations, but, on the contrary, they gloss over their revolutionary duties,

they justify their opportunism, they make it easier to deceive the people, they evade precisely the question of the *frontiers* of a state which forcibly retains subject nations, etc.

Both groups are opportunists who prostitute Marxism and who have lost all capacity to understand the theoretical significance and the practical urgency of Marx's tactics, an example of which he gave in relation to Ireland.

The specific question of annexations has become a particularly urgent one owing to the war. But what is annexation? Clearly, to protest against annexations implies either the recognition of the right of self-determination of nations, or that the protest is based on a pacifist phrase which defends the *status quo* and opposes *all* violence including revolutionary violence. Such a phrase is radically wrong and incompatible with Marxism.

3. *The Concrete Tasks of the Proletariat in the Immediate Future*

The socialist revolution may begin in the very near future. In that event the proletariat will be faced with the immediate task of capturing power, of expropriating the banks and of introducing other dictatorial measures. In such a situation, the bourgeoisie, and particularly the intellectuals like the Fabians and the Kautskyists, will strive to disrupt and to hinder the revolution, to restrict it to limited democratic aims. While *all* purely democratic demands may—at a time when the proletarians have already begun to storm the bulwarks of bourgeois power—serve, in a certain sense, as a hindrance to the revolution, nevertheless, the necessity of proclaiming and granting freedom to *all* oppressed nations (i.e., their right to self-determination) will be as urgent in the socialist revolution as it was urgent for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, for example, in Germany in 1848, or in Russia in 1905.

However, five, ten and even more years may pass before the socialist revolution begins. In that case, the task will be to educate the masses in a revolutionary spirit so as to make it impossible for Socialist chauvinists and opportunists to belong to the workers'

party and to achieve a victory similar to that of 1914-16. It will be the duty of the Socialists to explain to the masses that British Socialists who fail to demand the freedom of secession for the colonies and for Ireland; that German Socialists who fail to demand the freedom of secession for the colonies, for the Alsatians, for the Danes and for the Poles, and who fail to carry direct revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary mass action to the field of struggle against national oppression, who fail to take advantage of cases like the Zabern incident to conduct widespread underground propaganda among the proletariat of the oppressing nation, to organise street demonstrations and revolutionary mass actions; that Russian Socialists who fail to demand freedom of secession for Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, etc., etc.—are behaving like chauvinists, like lackeys of the blood- and mud-stained imperialist monarchies and the imperialist bourgeoisie.

9. *The Attitude of Russian and Polish Social-Democracy and of the Second International to Self-Determination*

The difference between the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Russia and the Polish Social-Democrats on the question of self-determination came to the surface as early as 1903 at the congress which adopted the programme of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, and which, despite the protest of the Polish Social-Democratic delegation, inserted in that programme point 9, which recognises the right of nations to self-determination. Since then the Polish Social-Democrats have never repeated, in the name of their Party, the proposal to delete point 9 from our programme, or to substitute some other formulation for it.

In Russia—where no less than 57 per cent, *i.e.*, over 100,000,000 of the population, belong to oppressed nations, where those nations mainly inhabit the border provinces, where some of those nations are more cultured than the Great Russians, where the political system is distinguished by its particularly barbarous and mediæval character, where the bourgeois-democratic revolution has not yet been completed—the recognition of the right of the nations oppressed by tsarism to free secession from Russia is absolutely

obligatory for Social-Democracy in the interests of its democratic and socialist tasks. Our party, which was re-established in January 1912, adopted a resolution in 1913 reiterating the right to self-determination and explaining it in the concrete sense outlined above.* The orgy of Great-Russian chauvinism raging in 1914-16 among the bourgeoisie and the opportunist Socialists (Rubanovich, Plekhanov, *Nashe Dyelo*, etc.) impels us to insist on this demand more strongly than ever and to declare that those who reject it serve, in practice, as a bulwark of Great-Russian chauvinism and tsarism. Our party declares that it emphatically repudiates all responsibility for such opposition to the right of self-determination.

The latest formulation of the position of Polish Social-Democracy on the national question (the declaration made by Polish Social-Democracy at the Zimmerwald Conference**) contains the following ideas:

This declaration condemns the German and other governments which regard the "Polish provinces" as a hostage in the forthcoming game of compensations and thus *"deprive the Polish people of the opportunity to decide its own fate."* The declaration says: "Polish Social-Democracy emphatically and solemnly protests against the *recarving and partition of a whole country....*" It condemns the Socialists who left to the Hohenzollerns "the task of *liberating the oppressed nations.*" It expresses the conviction that only participation in the approaching struggle of the revolutionary international proletariat, in the struggle for socialism, *"will break the fetters of national oppression and abolish all forms of foreign domination, and secure for the Polish people the possibility of all-sided, free development as an equal member in a League of Nations."* The declaration also recognises the present war to be "doubly fratricidal" *"for the Poles."* (Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee in Berne,*** No. 2, September 27, 1915, p. 15.)

There is no material difference between these postulates and the recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, except that their political formulation is still more diffuse and vague than the majority of the programmes and resolutions of the Second

International. Any attempt to express these ideas in precise political formulæ and to determine whether they apply to the capitalist system or only to the socialist system will prove still more strikingly the error committed by the Polish Social-Democrats in repudiating the self-determination of nations.

The decision of the International Socialist Congress held in London in 1896,* which recognised the self-determination of nations, must, on the basis of the above-mentioned postulates, be supplemented by references to: 1) the particular urgency of this demand under imperialism; 2) the politically conditional nature and the class content of all the demands of political democracy, including this demand; 3) the necessity of drawing a distinction between the concrete tasks of the Social-Democrats in the oppressing nations and those in oppressed nations; 4) the inconsistent, purely verbal, and, therefore, as far as its political significance is concerned, hypocritical recognition of self-determination by the opportunists and Kautskyists; 5) the actual identity of the chauvinists and those Social-Democrats, particularly the Social-Democrats of the Great Powers (Great Russians, Anglo-Americans, Germans, French, Italians, Japanese, etc.), who fail to champion the freedom of secession for the colonies and nations oppressed by "their own" nations; 6) the necessity of subordinating the struggle for this demand, as well as for all the fundamental demands of political democracy, to the immediate revolutionary mass struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois governments and for the achievement of socialism.

To transplant to the International the point of view of some of the small nations—particularly the point of view of the Polish Social-Democrats, who, in their struggle against the Polish bourgeoisie which was deceiving the people by nationalist slogans, were misled into repudiating self-determination—would be a theoretical error. It would be a substitution of Proudhonism for Marxism and in practice would result in rendering involuntary support to the most dangerous chauvinism and opportunism of the Great Power nations.

EDITORS OF "SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT"
CENTRAL ORGAN OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

Postscript. In the latest issue of *Die Neue Zeit*, dated March 3, 1916, Kautsky openly extends a Christian hand of reconciliation to the representative of the filthiest German chauvinism, Austerlitz. He rejects the freedom of secession for the nations oppressed by the Austria of the Hapsburgs, but accepts it for *Russian* Poland, thus rendering lackey's service to Hindenburg and Wilhelm II. A better self-exposure of Kautskyism could not be desired!

March 1916.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT AND THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION*

THE Zimmerwald Manifesto, like the majority of the programmes or the resolutions on tactics of the Social-Democratic Parties, proclaims the "right of nations to self-determination."** Comrade Parabellum, in Nos. 252 and 253 of the *Berner Tagwacht*,¹ declares the "struggle for the non-existent right to self-determination" to be "illusory"; this struggle he *contrasts* with the "revolutionary mass struggle of the proletariat against capitalism," and at the same time he *assures* us that "we are opposed to annexations" (this assurance is repeated *five times* in Comrade Parabellum's article), and to all violence against nations.

The arguments Comrade Parabellum advances in support of his position reduce themselves to the assertion that now all national problems, like those of Alsace-Lorraine, Armenia, etc., are problems of imperialism; that capital has outgrown the framework of national states; that "it is impossible to turn back the wheel of history" to the obsolete ideal of national states, etc.

Let us see whether Comrade Parabellum's arguments are correct.

First of all, it is Comrade Parabellum who is looking backward and not forward when, in stepping out to oppose the acceptance by the working class "of the ideal of a national state," he directs his glance towards England, France, Italy, Germany, *i.e.*, towards countries where the national movement for liberation is a thing of the past, and not towards the Orient, towards Asia, Africa and the colonies, where this movement is a thing of the present and the future. Suffice it to mention India, China, Persia, Egypt.

Further: imperialism means that capital has outgrown the

* Lenin refers to an article by Karl Radek, entitled "Annexations and Social-Democracy," signed "Parabellum," published in the *Berner Tagwacht* of October 28-29, 1915.—*Ed.*

framework of national states; it means the extension and sharpening of national oppression on a new historical basis. Hence, Comrade Parabellum notwithstanding, we must *connect* the revolutionary struggle for socialism with the revolutionary programme on the national question.

In the name of the socialist revolution, Comrade Parabellum scornfully rejects a consistently revolutionary programme in the sphere of democracy. This is wrong. The proletariat cannot be victorious except through democracy, *i.e.*, by introducing complete democracy and by combining every step of its struggle with democratic demands formulated in the most determined manner. It is absurd to contrast the socialist revolution and the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with *one* of the questions of democracy, in this case, the national question. We must *combine* the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with a revolutionary programme and revolutionary tactics relative to *all* democratic demands: a republic, a militia, election of officials by the people, equal rights for women, self-determination of nations, etc. While capitalism exists, these demands can be achieved only in exceptional cases, and in an incomplete, distorted form. Basing ourselves on democracy as already achieved, exposing its incompleteness under capitalism, we demand the overthrow of capitalism, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, as a necessary basis both for the abolition of the poverty of the masses and for the *complete* and *all-sided* achievement of *all* democratic reforms. Some of these reforms will be started before the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, others *in the process* of this overthrow, and still others after it. The social revolution is not a single battle, but represents a whole epoch of numerous battles around all the problems of economic and democratic reforms, which can be consummated only by the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. It is for the sake of this final aim that we must formulate *every one* of our democratic demands in a consistently revolutionary manner. It is quite conceivable that the workers of a certain country may overthrow the bourgeoisie *before* even one fundamental democratic reform has been accomplished in full. It is entirely inconceivable, however, that the proletariat, as a historical class, will be able to defeat the bour-

geoisie if it is not prepared for this task by being educated in the spirit of the most consistent and determinedly revolutionary democracy.

Imperialism is the progressing oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers; it is an epoch of wars among these powers for the extension and consolidation of national oppression; it is the epoch in which the masses of the people are deceived by the hypocritical social-patriots, *i.e.*, people who *under the pretext* of "freedom of nations," "right of nations to self-determination," and "defence of the fatherland," justify and defend the oppression of a majority of the world's nations by the Great Powers.

This is precisely why the central point in the Social-Democratic programme must be the distinction between oppressing and oppressed nations, which is the *essence* of imperialism, which is *falsely* evaded by the social-chauvinists, and by Kautsky. This distinction is not important from the point of view of bourgeois pacifism, or the petty-bourgeois utopia of peaceful competition among independent nations under capitalism, but it is most important from the point of view of the revolutionary struggle against imperialism. From this distinction must logically follow *our* consistently democratic and revolutionary definition of the "right of nations to self-determination," which is *in accord* with the general task of the immediate struggle for socialism. It is in the name of this right, and fighting for its sincere recognition, that the Social-Democrats of the oppressing nations must demand the freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, for otherwise recognition of the equal rights of nations and of the international solidarity of the workers in reality remains an empty phrase, mere hypocrisy. The Social-Democrats of the oppressed nations, however, must put in the forefront the unity and the fusion of the workers of the oppressed nations with the workers of the oppressing nations, because otherwise these Social-Democrats would involuntarily become the allies of one or the other national *bourgeoisie*, which *always* betrays the interests of the people and of democracy, and which in its turn is *always* ready to annex and oppress other nations.

The manner in which the national problem was presented at the end of the sixties of the nineteenth century may serve as an instructive example. The petty-bourgeois democrats, to whom the class struggle and the socialist revolution were totally alien ideas, pictured to themselves a utopia of peaceful competition among free and equal nations under capitalism. The Proudhonists utterly "denied" the national question and the right of self-determination of nations, precisely from the point of view of the immediate tasks of the social revolution. Marx scoffed at French Proudhonism and showed its affinity to French chauvinism. ("All Europe can and must sit quietly on its behind until the gentlemen of France abolish 'la misère et l'ignorance.' . . ." ". . . By the negation of nationalities he¹ appeared quite unconsciously to understand their absorption into the model French nation."*) Marx demanded the separation of Ireland from England "although after the separation there may come federation,"** and he demanded it not from the standpoint of the petty-bourgeois utopia of a peaceful capitalism, not from considerations of "justice for Ireland," but from the standpoint of the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of the *oppressing*, i.e., the *English*, *nation* against capitalism. The freedom of *that* nation was cramped and mutilated by the fact that it oppressed another nation. The internationalism of the *English* proletariat would remain a hypocritical phrase if it did not demand the secession of Ireland. Although Marx never was in favour of small states, or of splitting up states, or of the federation principle, he considered the secession of an oppressed nation to be a step towards federation; consequently, not towards the splitting of nations, but towards concentration, towards political and economic concentration, concentration on the basis of democracy. From Comrade Parabelum's standpoint, Marx must have fought an "illusory struggle" when he demanded the secession of Ireland. In reality, however, this demand *alone* represented a consistent revolutionary programme, it alone corresponded to internationalism, it alone advocated concentration along *non-imperialist* lines.

¹ Lafargue.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

The imperialism of our days has brought about a situation in which the oppression of nations by the Great Powers is a common phenomenon. It is precisely the standpoint of struggle against the social-chauvinism of the Great Power nations, which are now waging an imperialist war for the purpose of increasing the oppression of nations, which are oppressing the majority of the nations of the world and the majority of the world's population—it is precisely this standpoint that must become the decisive, cardinal, basic point in the Social-Democratic national programme.

Glance at the present-day trends of Social-Democratic thought on this question. The petty-bourgeois utopians who dreamed of equality and peace among nations under capitalism have given way to the social-imperialists. In fighting against the former,* Comrade Parabellum is tilting at windmills and thereby involuntarily plays into the hands of the latter. What is the programme of the social-chauvinists on the national question?

They either entirely deny the right to self-determination, using arguments like those advanced by Comrade Parabellum (Cuno, Parvus, the Russian opportunists Semkovsky, Liebman, etc.), or they recognise that right in an obviously hypocritical fashion, namely, without applying it to precisely those nations which are oppressed by *their own* nation or by the military allies of their own nation (Plekhanov, Hyndman, all the Francophile patriots, Scheidemann, etc., etc.). It is Kautsky, however, who gives the formulation of the social-chauvinist lie that is most plausible and therefore most dangerous for the proletariat. In words, he is for self-determination of nations; in words, he says that the Social-Democratic Party "*die Selbständigkeit der Nationen allseitig [!] und rückhaltlos [??] achtet und fordert.*"¹ (*Die Neue Zeit*, No. 33, II, p. 241, May 21, 1915.) In *deeds*, however, he adapts the national programme to the prevailing social-chauvinism; he distorts and mutilates it without clearly defining the duties of the Socialists of the oppressing nations, and he even falsifies the democratic principle itself when he says that to demand "state independence"

¹ The Social-Democratic Party "all-sidedly and determinedly respects and demands the independence of nations." Lenin is quoting from an article by Kautsky in *Die Neue Zeit*, No. 33, entitled "Again About Our Illusions."—Ed.

("staatliche Selbständigkeit") for every nation would mean demanding "too much" ("zu viel"). (*Die Neue Zeit*, No. 33, II, p. 77, April 16, 1915.) "National autonomy" is enough—if you please!! Kautsky thus evades the principal question, the very question which the imperialist bourgeoisie will not permit to be discussed, namely, the question of the *frontiers of a state* which is built upon the oppression of nations; and to please the bourgeoisie he throws the most essential thing out of the programme. The bourgeoisie will willingly promise "national equality" and "national autonomy," if only the proletariat remains within the framework of legality and peacefully submits to the bourgeoisie on the question of the state *frontiers!* Kautsky formulates the national programme of Social-Democracy, not like a revolutionary, but like a reformist.

Comrade Parabellum's national programme, or more correctly his *assurances* that "we are opposed to annexations," is eagerly subscribed to by the German *Parteivorstand*,¹ Kautsky, Plekhanov and Co., precisely because that programme does not expose the predominating social-patriots. Bourgeois pacifists would also agree to sign this programme. Parabellum's splendid *general* programme ("revolutionary mass struggle against capitalism") serves him, as it did the Proudhonists of the 'sixties, not to work out an uncompromising programme on the national question, in conformity with the general programme, with its spirit and equally revolutionary, but only to clear the field for the social-patriots! In our imperialist epoch the majority of the Socialists of the world belong to nations that oppress other nations and strive to widen the scope of this oppression. This is why our "struggle against annexations" will be meaningless and not at all terrifying to the social-patriots if we do not declare that the Socialist of an oppressing nation, who does not conduct propaganda, both in peace time and war time, in favour of the freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, is not a Socialist and not an internationalist, but a chauvinist! The Socialist of an oppressing nation who does not

¹ General Council of the German Social-Democratic Party.—Ed.

conduct such propaganda in defiance of the government prohibitions, *i.e.*, in the free, *i.e.*, in the illegal, press is one whose adherence to national equality is sheer hypocrisy.

About Russia, which has not yet completed its bourgeois-democratic revolution, Comrade Parabellum writes only *one* sentence:

“Selbst das wirtschaftlich sehr zurückgebliebene Russland hat in der Haltung der polnischen, lettischen, armenischen Bourgeoisie gezeigt, dass nicht nur die militärische Bewachung es ist, die die Völker in diesem ‘Zuchthaus der Völker’ zusammenhält, sondern Bedürfnisse der kapitalistischen Expansion, für die das ungeheure Territorium ein glänzender Boden der Entwicklung ist.”¹

This is not a “Social-Democratic,” but a liberal-bourgeois point of view, not an internationalist but a Great-Russian chauvinist point of view. Apparently, Comrade Parabellum, who fights the German social-patriots so excellently, knows very little about Russian chauvinism! In order to convert Comrade Parabellum’s sentence into a Social-Democratic postulate and to draw Social-Democratic conclusions from it, it must be changed and amended in the following way:

Russia is a prison of peoples not only because of the military-feudal character of tsarism, not only because the Great-Russian bourgeoisie supports tsarism, but also because the Polish, etc., bourgeoisie has sacrificed the freedom of nations and democracy in general for the interests of capitalist expansion. The Russian proletariat cannot march at the head of the people towards the victorious democratic revolution (which is its immediate task), or fight side by side with its brothers, the proletarians of Europe, for a socialist revolution, without demanding at once full and “rückhaltlos” freedom of secession from Russia for all the nations oppressed by tsarism. This we demand, not as something separate from our revolutionary struggle for socialism, but because this struggle would remain an idle phrase if it were not

¹ “Even economically very backward Russia proved, in the stand taken by the Polish, Lettish and Armenian bourgeoisie, that it is not only the military guard that keeps the peoples in that ‘prison of peoples’ together, but also the need for capitalist expansion, for which the vast territory is a splendid ground for development.”—*Ed.*

linked up with a revolutionary approach to all the questions of democracy, including the national question. We demand the freedom of self-determination, *i.e.*, independence, *i.e.*, the freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we dream of economic disintegration, or because we cherish the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we are in favour of large states and of the closer unity and even the fusion of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly international basis, which is *inconceivable* without the freedom of secession. In the same way that Marx in 1869 demanded the separation of Ireland, not for the purpose of splitting England, but for the subsequent free alliance of Ireland with England, not for the sake of "justice for Ireland," but in the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the English proletariat, so we at the present time consider the refusal of the Socialists of Russia to demand freedom of self-determination for the nations, in the sense indicated by us above, a direct betrayal of democracy, internationalism and socialism.

November 1915.

A CARICATURE OF MARXISM AND "IMPERIALIST ECONOMISM"*

5. "MONISM AND DUALISM"¹

REPROACHING us for "interpreting the demand dualistically,"² P. Kievsky says:

"Dualistic *propaganda* is substituted for the monistic *action* of the International."

This sounds quite Marxian and materialistic: action which is monistic is contrasted with propaganda which is "dualistic." Unfortunately, after examining this more closely we are compelled to say that this sort of "monism" is just as *verbal* as was the "monism" of Dühring. "If I include a shoe brush in the unity of mammals," Engels wrote in his controversy over Dühring's "monism," "this does not help it to get lacteal glands."**

This means that we can *declare* only such things, qualities, phenomena and actions to be a "unity" which are a unity in objective reality. It was just this "*detail*" that our author forgot! He thinks we are "dualists," first, because we call upon the workers in the oppressing nations to do *something different*—in relation only to the national problem—from that which we call upon the workers in the oppressed nations to do.

In order to determine whether or not P. Kievsky's "monism" is the same as Dühring's "monism," we must see what the *objective* situation is.

Is the *actual* condition of the workers in the oppressing nations the same as that of the workers in the oppressed nations from the standpoint of the national problem?

¹ Only Part 5 of this pamphlet is given in this volume. For the complete pamphlet, see *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.—Ed.

² I.e., the demand for the self-determination of nations.—Ed.

No, they are not the same.

1) *Economically*, the difference is that sections of the working class in the oppressing nations receive crumbs of the *super-profits* which the bourgeoisie of the oppressing nations obtain by the extra exploitation of the workers of the oppressed nations. Moreover, economic data show that a *larger* percentage of the workers of the oppressing nations become "skilled workers" than the workers of the oppressed nations, i.e., a *larger* percentage rise to the position of the *labour aristocracy*.¹ This is a fact. *To a certain degree* the workers of the oppressing nation share with *their* bourgeoisie in the plunder of the workers (and the masses of the population) of the oppressed nations.

2) *Politically*, the difference is that the workers of the oppressing nations occupy a *privileged* position in many spheres of political life compared with the workers of the oppressed nation.

3) *Intellectually*, or *spiritually*, the difference is that the workers of the oppressing nations are taught, at school and in everyday life, to regard the workers of the oppressed nations with disdain and contempt. Every Great Russian, for example, who has been brought up or who has lived among Great Russians, has *experienced* this.

Thus, *all along the line*, we see differences in the objective situation, i.e., there is "dualism" in the objective world, which is independent of the will and consciousness of individual persons.

That being the case, what is to be said about P. Kievsky's phrase: the "monistic" action of the International?

It is an empty, sonorous phrase, and nothing more.

In order that the action of the International, which in *real life* consists of workers who are *divided* into those belonging to oppressing nations and those belonging to oppressed nations, may be *monistic* action, propaganda must be carried on *differently* in each case. This is how we must argue from the point of view of real (not Dühring) monism, from the point of view of Marxian materialism!

¹ See, for instance, Hurwich's book on immigration and the condition of the working class in America, *Immigration and Labour*.

An example? We have (in the legal press over two years ago!) given the example of Norway, and nobody has attempted to refute us.¹ In this concrete case taken from life, the *action* of the Norwegian and Swedish workers was "monistic," unified, internationalist, *only* because and in so far as the Swedish workers *unconditionally* championed the right of Norway to secede, while the Norwegian workers raised the question of secession *only conditionally*. If the Swedish workers had not been *unconditionally* in favour of the right of the Norwegians to secede they would have been *chauvinists*, brothers-in-arms of the chauvinist Swedish landlords, who wished to "retain" Norway by force, by war. If the Norwegian workers had *not* raised the question of secession *conditionally*, *i.e.*, so that even members of the Social-Democratic Party could conduct propaganda and vote against secession, the Norwegian workers would have failed in their duty as internationalists and would have sunk to narrow, *bourgeois*, Norwegian nationalism. Why? Because the separation was effected by the *bourgeoisie*, and not by the proletariat! Because the Norwegian bourgeoisie, like any other bourgeoisie, *always* strives to drive a wedge between the workers of its own country and the workers of foreign countries! Because every democratic demand (including self-determination) is, for the class conscious workers, *subordinated* to the higher interests of socialism. If, for example, the secession of Norway from Sweden had created the certainty or probability of war between England and Germany, the Norwegian workers, *for this very reason*, would have had to oppose secession, while the Swedish workers would have had the right and the opportunity, without ceasing to be Socialists, to carry on agitation against secession *provided* they conducted a systematic, consistent and constant struggle *against* the Swedish government for the *right* of Norway to secede. Otherwise, the Norwegian workers and the Norwegian people *would not and could not* have believed in the sincerity of the advice offered by the Swedish workers.

¹ In Lenin's article, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," chapter VI, in which he refers to the secession of Norway from Sweden; see *Collected Works*. Russian edition, Vol. XVII.—*Ed.*

The trouble with the opponents of self-determination is that they make shift with dead abstractions, and are *afraid* to analyse to the end even a single concrete case taken from real life. The concrete statement in our theses,¹ that a new Polish state is quite "possible" at the *present* time, given a certain combination of purely military, strategic conditions, was never objected to either by the Poles, or by P. Kievsky. But no one cared to *draw the logical deduction* from this tacit admission that we were right. The logical deduction is obviously that the *propaganda* conducted by internationalists *cannot* be the same for the Russians and the Poles if it is to train both for "monistic action." It is the duty of the Great-Russian (and the German) worker to stand unconditionally for Poland's right to secession; if he does not do that he will *in fact* be serving as the lackey of Nicholas II or of Hindenburg. The Polish worker *could* stand for separation *only* conditionally, because to gamble (as does the "fraki"²) on the victory of one or the other imperialist bourgeoisie is equivalent to becoming *its* lackey. To fail to understand this difference, which is a prerequisite for the "monistic action" of the International, is on a par with failing to understand why "monistic action" against the tsarist army, say near Moscow, demands that the revolutionary forces marching from Nizhni should proceed westward, while those from Smolensk should proceed eastward.

* * *

Secondly, our new advocate of Dühring monism reproaches us for not troubling about "the closest organisational unity of the various national sections of the International," in the event of a social revolution.

Under socialism, writes P. Kievsky, self-determination falls away, since the state itself falls away. This is supposed to be an argument against us! But in our theses we state clearly and definitely in *three* lines, in the three last lines of the first section, that "democracy is also a form of state which must disappear

¹ See Theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in this volume.—*Ed.*

² The Right-wing faction of the Polish Socialist Party.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

when the state disappears.”¹ It is precisely this truism that P. Kievsky repeats—to “refute” us, of course!—over *several pages* of his section c (chapter 1), while at the same time *distorting* it. “We picture to ourselves,” he writes, “and have always pictured the socialist system as a strictly democratic” (!?), “centralised, economic system under which the state, as the apparatus for the domination of one part of the population over the other, disappears.”

This is confusion, because democracy *also* represents the domination “of one part of the population over the other,” it is *also* a form of state. Our author obviously does not understand what is meant by the state *withering away* after the victory of socialism, nor does he understand what the conditions of this process are.

The main point, however, is his “objections” regarding the epoch of the social revolution. Hurling the frightfully abusive epithet, “Talmudists of self-determination” at us, the author says: “We picture this process” (the social revolution) “as the united action of the proletarians of all” (!) “countries, who break down the frontiers of the bourgeois” (!) “state, who remove the frontier posts” (in addition to “breaking down the frontiers”?), “who blow up” (!) “national unity and establish class unity.”

At the risk of incurring the wrath of the stern judge of the “Talmudists,” we must say: there is much phrasemongering here, but no “sense.”

The social revolution cannot be the united action of the proletarians of *all* countries, for the simple reason that the majority of the countries and the majority of the inhabitants of the globe have not even reached the capitalist stage of development, or are only at the beginning of that stage. We stated this in section 6 of our theses,² but P. Kievsky, either because he is inattentive, or because he is unable to think, “failed to observe” that this section was deliberately inserted for the purpose of refuting caricaturist distortions of Marxism. The advanced countries

¹ See Theses, “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in this volume, p. 267.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

of Western Europe and of North America *alone* are ripe for socialism, and in Engels' letter to Kautsky (*Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*), P. Kievsky may find a concrete illustration of the real and not merely promised "*idea*" that to dream of the "united action of the proletarians of *all* countries" means postponing socialism to the Greek Kalends, *i.e.*, for ever.*

Socialism will be achieved by the united action of the proletarians, not of all countries, but of a minority of countries, namely, of the countries that have reached the stage of development of *advanced* capitalism. P. Kievsky's failure to understand this point is the cause of his error. In *those* advanced countries (England, France, Germany, etc.), the national problem has been solved for a long time; national unity has long outlived its purpose; *objectively*, there are no "national tasks" to be fulfilled. Hence, only in those countries is it possible now to "blow up" national unity, and establish class unity.

In the *undeveloped* countries, which we singled out (in section 6 of our theses) in paragraphs 2 and 3, namely, in the whole of Eastern Europe and all the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the situation is entirely different. In those countries as a general rule, we *still have* oppressed and capitalistically undeveloped nations. Objectively, these nations still have national tasks to fulfil, namely, *democratic* tasks, the tasks of *throwing off foreign oppression*.

As an example of precisely such nations, Engels quoted India, and said that she may make a revolution against victorious socialism, for Engels was remote from that ridiculous "*imperialist economism*" which imagines that the proletariat, having achieved victory in the advanced countries, will "automatically," without definite *democratic* measures, abolish national oppression everywhere. The victorious proletariat will reorganise the countries in which it has achieved victory. This cannot be done all at once; nor indeed is it possible to "vanquish" the bourgeoisie all at once. We deliberately emphasised this in our theses, and P. Kievsky has again failed to stop and think *why* we stressed this point in connection with the national problem.

The undeveloped and oppressed nations are not waiting, they are not ceasing to live, they are not disappearing, while the proletariat of the advanced countries is overthrowing the bourgeoisie and repelling its attempts at counter-revolution. If, to rise in rebellion, they (the colonies, Ireland), take advantage of an imperialist bourgeois crisis like the war of 1914-16, which is only a minor crisis compared with social revolution, we can be quite sure that they will take advantage of the *great crisis* of civil war in the advanced countries.

The social revolution cannot come about except in the form of an epoch of proletarian civil war against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries combined with a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including movements for national liberation, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.

Why? Because capitalism develops unevenly, and objective reality gives us highly developed capitalist nations side by side with a number of nations only slightly developed economically, or totally undeveloped. P. Kievsky has absolutely failed to study the *objective* conditions of the social revolution from the point of view of the economic maturity of the various countries. Hence, the reproach he hurls at us for "inventing" cases for applying self-determination falls not on our head, but on his own.

With a zeal worthy of a better cause, P. Kievsky repeatedly quotes Marx and Engels to the effect that "we must not invent things out of our own head, but, by using our head, we must discover in existing material conditions the means to free humanity from social evils."* When I read these oft-repeated quotations I cannot help recalling the "Economists" of sad memory who, like P. Kievsky, tiresomely chewed the cud over their "new discovery" about the victory of capitalism in Russia. P. Kievsky wants to "shock" us with these quotations, because, he claims, we invent, out of our own head, the conditions for applying national self-determination in the epoch of imperialism! But in P. Kievsky's own article we find the following "unguarded admission":

"The very fact that we are *opposed* [author's italics] to defence of the fatherland is clear enough evidence that we will actively resist the suppres-

sion of a national uprising, for in doing so we will be fighting against our mortal enemy, imperialism." (Chapter 2, section c of P. Kievsky's article.)

One cannot criticise an author, one cannot *reply* to him, unless one quotes in full at least the main postulates he propounds. But as soon as we quote in full even one of P. Kievsky's propositions, we immediately find that every sentence contains two or three errors, or unfinished thoughts, which distort Marxism!

1) P. Kievsky failed to observe that a national uprising is *also* "defence of the fatherland." A little reflection, however, would convince anyone that this is so, since *every* "nation in revolt" "defends" itself, its language, its country, its fatherland, against the oppressing nation.

All national oppression calls forth the resistance of the *broad masses* of the people; and the resistance of a nationally oppressed population always *tends* towards national revolt. Frequently (particularly in Austria and Russia), the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations *merely talks* about national revolt, while in actual practice it enters into reactionary agreements with the bourgeoisie of the oppressing nations behind the backs of, and against, its own people. In such cases the criticism of revolutionary Marxists must be directed, not against the national movement, but against its being degraded, vulgarised and reduced to a petty squabble. By the way, many Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats forget this and in their *legitimate* hatred of the petty, vulgar and sordid national squabbles, as for example, over the question as to which language shall have precedence on street signs,¹ they refuse to support the national struggle. We shall not "support" playing at republics in, say, the principality of Monaco, or the "republican" adventures of "generals" in the small states of South America, or in any of the Pacific Islands, but this does not mean that we must forget the slogan of a republic for the serious democratic and socialist movements. We do and must ridicule the sordid national squabbles and haggling of nations in Russia and Austria, but this does not mean

¹ In certain dual language countries the demand is made for the names of streets to be written in both languages and disputes arise as to which language shall be written on the top line of the name plate and which shall be written on the lower line.—*Ed. Eng. ed.*

that we can withhold support from a national uprising or from any serious popular struggle against national oppression.

2) If national uprisings are impossible in the "imperialist epoch," P. Kievsky has no right to speak of them. If they are possible, all his endless phrases about "monism," about our "inventing" examples of self-determination under imperialism, etc., etc., simply evaporate into thin air. P. Kievsky defeats himself.

If "we" "actively resist the suppression" "of a national uprising"—which P. Kievsky *himself* regards as possible—what follows?

It follows that we get a twofold—or if we may be permitted to employ a philosophical term as inappropriately as our author does—a "dualistic" *action*: a) in the first place, it is the "action" of a nationally oppressed proletariat and peasantry *jointly* with the nationally oppressed bourgeoisie *against* the oppressing nation; b) secondly, it is the "action" of the proletariat, or of the class conscious section of it, in the oppressing nation, *against* the bourgeoisie and all the elements that follow it, in the oppressing nation.

The innumerable phrases against a "national *bloc*," "national illusions," the "poison" of nationalism, against "fanning national hatred" and the like, that P. Kievsky piles up, prove to be nonsense because, when he advises the proletariat of the oppressing countries (let us not forget that the author regards this proletariat as a serious force) to "actively resist the suppression" "of a national uprising," he thereby *fans* national hatred, he *supports* the establishment of a "*bloc*" between the workers and the bourgeoisie in the oppressed nations.

3) If national uprisings are possible under imperialism, so are national wars. Politically, there is no important difference between them. The military historians are perfectly right when they put rebellions in the same category as wars. Without thinking, P. Kievsky has defeated not only himself, but also Junius¹ and the "International" group* who deny that national wars are pos-

¹ The pseudonym of Rosa Luxemburg.—Ed.

sible under imperialism. And this denial is the only conceivable theoretical ground for the view which repudiates self-determination of nations under imperialism.

4) What is a "national uprising"? It is an uprising that has for its aim the *political* independence of the oppressed nation, *i.e.*, the establishment of a *separate* national state.

If the proletariat of the oppressing nation is a serious force (as our author assumes, and must assume, in the epoch of imperialism), does not the determination of that proletariat to "actively resist the suppression" "of a national uprising" imply *active assistance* in creating a separate national state? Of course it does.

Hence, our brave repudiator of the "possibility" of self-determination argues that the class conscious proletariat of the advanced countries must *assist* in the achievement of the "impossible."

5) *Why* must "we" "actively resist" the suppression of a national uprising? P. Kievsky advances only one reason; he says: "... we will be fighting against our mortal enemy, imperialism." All the *strength* of this argument lies in the *strong word* "mortal," which is in keeping with the author's general practice of employing strong and sonorous words like "driving a stake into the quivering flesh of the bourgeoisie" and similar stylistic embellishments in the spirit of Alexinsky, instead of employing strong arguments.

But this argument is *wrong*. Imperialism is as much our "mortal" enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, it is *not* our duty to support *every* struggle against imperialism. We will *not* support the struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will *not* support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism.

Consequently, if the author admits that we must support an uprising of oppressed nations (to "actively resist" the suppression means supporting the uprising), he also admits that a na-

tional uprising is *progressive*, he admits that the establishment of a new, separate state, of new frontiers, etc., in the event of the uprising being successful, is *progressive*.

The author fails to draw the logical conclusion from a *single one* of his political arguments.

The Irish Rebellion of 1916, which took place *after* our theses were published in *Vorbote*,¹ No. 2, proved, by the way, that it was not idle to speak of national uprisings *even* in Europe! ²

¹ *Vorbote* (*The Herald*), the organ of the Zimmerwald Left wing.—*Ed.*

² On the Irish Rebellion, see next article in this volume.—*Ed.*

DISCUSSION ON SELF-DETERMINATION SUMMED UP *

10. THE IRISH REBELLION OF 1916 ¹

OUR theses ² were written before this rebellion broke out, but it must serve as material for testing our theoretical views.

The views of the opponents of self-determination lead to the conclusion that the vitality of small nations oppressed by imperialism has already been sapped, that they cannot play any role against imperialism, that support of their purely national strivings will lead to nothing, etc. The imperialist war of 1914-16 has provided *facts* which refute such conclusions.

The war proved to be an epoch of crisis for the West European nations, for imperialism as a whole. Every crisis casts off the conventional, it tears away outer wrappings, sweeps away the obsolete and reveals the deeper springs and forces. What has it revealed from the standpoint of the movement of oppressed nations? In the colonies there has been a series of attempts at rebellion, which of course the oppressing nations did all they could to hide from the world by means of the military censorship. Nevertheless, it is known that in Singapore the English brutally suppressed a mutiny among their Indian troops; that there were attempts at rebellion in French Annam (see *Nashe Slovo*) and in the German Cameroons (see Junius' pamphlet ³), that in Europe, on the one hand, there was a rebellion in Ireland, which the "freedom-loving" English, who did not dare to extend conscription to Ireland, suppressed by executions; and, on the other, the Austrian govern-

¹ Only Part 10 of this pamphlet is given in this volume. For the complete pamphlet, see *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.—Ed.

² See "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in this volume.—Ed.

³ A pamphlet written by Rosa Luxemburg entitled *The Crisis in German Social-Democracy*.—Ed.

ment sentenced to death the deputies of the Czech Diet "for treason," and shot whole Czech regiments for the same "crime."

This list is far from complete, of course. Nevertheless, it proves that, *owing* to the crisis of imperialism, the flames of national revolt burst out in the colonies *and* in Europe, that national sympathies and antipathies have manifested themselves in spite of draconic threats and measures of repression. And yet the crisis of imperialism has far from reached the highest point of its development: the power of the imperialist bourgeoisie has not yet been undermined (a war of "exhaustion" may bring that about, but it has not been brought about yet); the proletarian movements in the imperialist countries are still very feeble. What will happen when the war has caused complete exhaustion, or when, in at least one state, the power of the bourgeoisie is shaken under the blows of proletarian struggle, as was the power of tsarism in 1905?

In the *Berner Tagwacht*, the organ of the Zimmerwaldists, including some of the Lefts, an article on the Irish Rebellion appeared in the issue of May 9, 1916, entitled "A Played Out Song" and signed with the initials K.R.¹ In this article the Irish Rebellion was declared to be nothing more nor less than a "putsch," for, the author argues, "the Irish question was an agrarian question," the peasants had been appeased by reforms, and the nationalist movement remained only as a "*purely urban petty-bourgeois movement* which, notwithstanding the sensation it caused, had not much social backing."

It is not surprising that this monstrously doctrinaire and pedantic opinion coincides with the opinion of a Russian national-liberal Cadet, Mr. A. Kulisher (*Rech*, No. 102, April 28 [15], 1916), who also dubbed the rebellion "the Dublin putsch."*

It is to be hoped that, in accordance with the adage, "it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good," many comrades who fail to realise the morass they are sinking into by repudiating "self-determination," and by treating the national movements of small nations with disdain, will have their eyes opened by the fact that

¹ Karl Radek.—*Ed.*

the opinion of a representative of the imperialist bourgeoisie and that of a Social-Democrat "accidentally" coincides.

The term "putsch," in the scientific sense of the word, may be employed only when the attempt at insurrection has revealed nothing but a circle of conspirators or stupid maniacs, and has aroused no sympathy among the masses. The century-old Irish national movement, having passed through various stages and combinations of class interests, expressed itself, *inter alia*, in a mass Irish National Congress in America (*Vorwärts*, March 20, 1916*) which passed a resolution calling for Irish independence—it expressed itself in street fighting conducted by a section of the urban petty bourgeoisie and a *section of the workers* after a long period of mass agitation, demonstrations, suppression of papers, etc. Whoever calls *such* an uprising a "putsch" is either a hardened reactionary, or a doctrinaire hopelessly incapable of picturing to himself a social revolution as a living phenomenon.

To imagine that social revolution is *conceivable* without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without the revolutionary outbursts of a section of the petty bourgeoisie *with all its prejudices*, without the movement of non-class conscious proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against the oppression of the landlords, the church, the monarchy, the foreign nations, etc.—to imagine that means *repudiating social revolution*. Only those who imagine that in one place an army will line up and say, "we are for socialism," and in another place another army will say, "we are for imperialism," and that this will be the social revolution, only those who hold such a ridiculously pedantic opinion, could vilify the Irish Rebellion by calling it a "putsch."

Whoever expects a "pure" social revolution will *never* live to see it. Such a person pays lip service to revolution without understanding what revolution is.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It consisted of a series of battles in which all the discontented classes, groups and elements of the population participated. Among these there were masses imbued with the crudest

prejudices, with the vaguest and most fantastic aims of struggle; there were small groups which accepted Japanese money; there were speculators and adventurers, etc. *Objectively*, the mass movement broke the back of tsarism and paved the way for democracy; for that reason the class conscious workers led it.

The socialist revolution in Europe *cannot be anything else* than an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all and sundry of the oppressed and discontented elements. Sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the backward workers will inevitably participate in it—without such participation, *mass struggle is impossible*, without it *no* revolution is possible—and just as inevitably will they bring into the movement their prejudices, their reactionary fantasies, their weaknesses and errors. But *objectively* they will attack *capital*, and the class conscious vanguard of the revolution, the advanced proletariat, expressing this objective truth of a heterogeneous and discordant, motley and outwardly incohesive, mass struggle, will be able to unite and direct it, to capture power, to seize the banks, to expropriate the trusts (hated by all, though for different reasons) and introduce other dictatorial measures which in their totality will amount to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the victory of socialism, which, however, will by no means immediately “purge” itself of petty-bourgeois slag.

“Social-Democracy,” we read in the Polish theses (I, 4¹), “must utilise the struggle of the young colonial bourgeoisie against European imperialism *in order to sharpen the revolutionary crisis in Europe.*” (Author’s italics.)

Is it not clear that it is least of all permissible to contrast Europe to the colonies in *this* respect? The struggle of the oppressed nations *in Europe*, a struggle capable of going to the lengths of insurrection and street fighting, of breaking down the iron discipline in the army and martial law, will “sharpen the revolutionary crisis in Europe” infinitely more than a much more developed rebellion in a remote colony. A blow delivered against the English imperialist bourgeoisie by a rebellion in Ireland is a hundred times more significant politically than a blow of equal weight delivered in Asia or in Africa.

¹ See note to page 267.*—Ed. Eng. ed.

The French chauvinist press recently reported that the eightieth issue of an illegal newspaper, *Free Belgium*, had appeared in Belgium. Of course, the chauvinist press of France very often tells lies, but this piece of news resembles the truth. While the chauvinist and Kautskyan German Social-Democracy refrained from establishing a free press for itself during the two years of war, and has servilely borne the yoke of military censorship (only the Left radical elements, to their honour be it said, published pamphlets and manifestoes, in spite of the censorship)—an oppressed, civilised nation replied to a military oppression unparalleled in its ferocity, by establishing an organ of revolutionary protest!* The dialectics of history is such that small nations, powerless as an *independent* factor in the struggle against imperialism, play a part as one of the ferments, one of the bacilli, which help the *real* power against imperialism to come on the scene, namely, the socialist proletariat.

The General Staffs in the present war assiduously strive to utilise all national and revolutionary movements in the camp of their enemy: the Germans utilise the Irish Rebellion, the French—the Czech movement, etc. From their standpoint they are acting quite properly. A serious war would not be treated seriously if advantage were not taken of the slightest weakness of the enemy, if every opportunity that presented itself were not seized, the more so since it is impossible to know beforehand at what moment, where and with what force a powder magazine will “explode.” We would be very poor revolutionaries if, in the great proletarian war for emancipation and socialism, we did not know how to utilise *every* popular movement against *each separate* disaster caused by imperialism in order to sharpen and extend the crisis. If, on the one hand, we were to declare and to repeat in a thousand keys that we are “opposed” to all national oppression and, on the other hand, we were to describe the heroic revolt of the most mobile and intelligent section of certain classes in an oppressed nation against its oppressors as a “putsch,” we would be sinking to the stupid level of the Kautskyists.

The misfortune of the Irish is that they rose prematurely, when the European revolt of the proletariat had *not yet* matured. Capitalism is not so harmoniously built that the various springs of rebellion can immediately merge of their own accord, without reverses and defeats. On the other hand, the very fact that revolts break out at different times, in different places, and are of different kinds, guarantees wide scope and depth to the general movement; only in *premature*, partial, sporadic and therefore unsuccessful, revolutionary movements will the masses gain experience, acquire knowledge, gather strength, get to know their real leaders, the socialist proletarians, and in this way prepare for the general onslaught, in the same way as separate strikes, demonstrations, local and national, mutinies in the army, outbreaks among the peasantry, etc., prepared the way for the general onslaught in 1905.

October 1916.

**SPEECH ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION AT THE ALL-
RUSSIAN APRIL CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.,
MAY 12 (APRIL 29), 1917 ***

EVER since 1903, when our party adopted its programme, we have been encountering the desperate opposition of the Poles. A study of the minutes of the Second Congress reveals that even then the Poles advanced the same argument that they are advancing now, and that the Polish Social-Democrats left the congress because our recognition of the right of nations to self-determination was unacceptable to them. And we have been confronted with this question ever since. Though imperialism was already in existence in 1903, no mention was made of it in the arguments that were then advanced. Both then and now, the position of Polish Social-Democracy is a strange and monstrous error. These people wish to reduce the position of our party to that of the chauvinists.

Owing to Russia's age-long oppression of Poland the policy of Poland is thoroughly nationalistic, and the entire Polish people are thoroughly imbued with but one idea—revenge on the Muscovites. No one has oppressed the Poles so much as have the Russian people. In the hands of the tsars the Russian people have served as the executioner of Polish freedom. No one dislikes Russia so intensely as do the Poles, and this has brought about a peculiar situation. Owing to the Polish bourgeoisie, Poland has become an obstacle in the path of the socialist movement. Let the whole world burn, as long as Poland is free. Of course, to put the question in this way is to mock at internationalism. Of course, violence now reigns in Poland, but for the Polish nationalists to count on Russia liberating Poland is treason to the International. The Polish nationalists have so imbued the Polish people with their spirit, however, that this view prevails.

The great historical merit of our comrades, the Polish Social-

Democrats, is that they have advanced the slogan of internationalism, that they have said: we treasure the fraternal alliance of the proletariat of all countries more than anything else and we shall never go to war for the liberation of Poland. This is their great merit, and this is why we have always regarded only these Social-Democratic comrades in Poland as Socialists. The others are patriots, Polish Plekhanovs. But this unique situation, in which, in order to safeguard socialism, it was found necessary to fight against rabid, morbid nationalism, has been productive of a strange phenomenon: comrades come to us and say that we must renounce the freedom of Poland, its right to secession.

Why should we, Great Russians, who have been oppressing a greater number of nations than any other people, why should we repudiate the right of secession for Poland, the Ukraine, Finland? We are asked to become chauvinists, because by doing so we would ease the position of the Social-Democrats in Poland. We do not claim the liberation of Poland because the Polish people dwell between two states which are capable of fighting—they say. But instead of saying that the Polish workers should argue in this way, *viz.*, only those Social-Democrats remain democrats who consider that the Polish people ought to be free, for there is no place for chauvinists in the ranks of the Socialist Party—the Polish Social-Democrats argue that precisely because they find the union with the Russian workers advantageous, they are opposed to Poland's secession. They have a perfect right to do so. But these people do not wish to understand that in order to strengthen internationalism there is no need to reiterate the same words; what we in Russia do is to stress the right of secession for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unite. The right to unite implies the right to secede. We Russians must emphasise the right to secede, while the Poles must emphasise the right to unite.

We notice here a number of sophisms leading to the complete renunciation of Marxism. Comrade Pyatakof's standpoint is a rep-

etition of Rosa Luxemburg's standpoint. . . .¹ (Holland is an example.) This is how Comrade Pyatakov argues, and this is also how he confutes himself. Theoretically he is opposed to the right of secession, but to the people he declares that he who is opposed to the right of secession is no Socialist. What Comrade Pyatakov said here was evidence of incredible confusion. In Western Europe most of the countries settled their national question long ago. When people say that the national question has been settled, they mean Western Europe. Comrade Pyatakov applies this where it does not belong, to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position.

Think of the terrible mess that results! Finland is right at our side. Comrade Pyatakov gives no definite answer as to Finland; he is in utter confusion. In yesterday's *Rabochaya Gazeta* we read that separatism is growing in Finland. Finns arriving here inform us that separatism is maturing in their country, because the Cadets have refused to grant it complete autonomy. There, a crisis is maturing; dissatisfaction with Governor-General Rodichev is rife, but *Rabochaya Gazeta* insists that the Finns ought to wait for the constituent assembly, that then an agreement will be concluded between Finland and Russia.* An agreement; what about? The Finns must maintain that they are entitled to determine their own destiny in their own way, and any Great Russian who denies this right is a chauvinist. It would be another thing entirely if we said to the Finnish worker: decide as you think fit. . . .¹

Comrade Pyatakov simply rejects our slogan when he says that this means giving no slogan for the socialist revolution, but he himself has not offered any slogan. The method of accomplishing a socialist revolution under the slogan, "down with frontiers," is utterly absurd. We were not able to publish the article in which I described this view as "imperialist economism."** What does the "method" of socialist revolution under the slogan, "down with frontiers," mean? We maintain that the state is necessary, and the existence of a state presupposes frontiers. The state may, of

¹ An omission in the minutes.—Ed.

course, be ruled by a bourgeois government, while we want Soviets. But even Soviets are confronted with the question of frontiers. What does "down with frontiers" mean? This is the beginning of anarchy. . . . The "method" of socialist revolution under the slogan, "down with frontiers," is a hodge-podge. When the time is ripe for a socialist revolution, when the revolution finally occurs, it will sweep across into other countries, and we shall help it to do so, but how, we do not know. "The method of socialist revolution" is a mere phrase, devoid of content. In so far as the bourgeois revolution has left some problems unsolved, we stand for their solution. As regards the separatist movement, we are indifferent, neutral. If Finland, if Poland, if the Ukraine break away from Russia, there is nothing bad about that. What is there bad about it? Anyone who says there is, is a chauvinist. It would be madness to continue the policy of Tsar Nicholas. Norway separated from Sweden. . . . Once upon a time Alexander I and Napoleon traded peoples, once upon a time tsars traded portions of Poland. Are we to continue these tactics of the tsars? This is the repudiation of the tactics of internationalism, this is chauvinism of the worst brand. Suppose Finland does secede, what is there bad about that? Among both peoples, among the proletariat of Norway and that of Sweden, mutual confidence increased after separation. The Swedish landlords wanted to wage war, but the Swedish workers resisted this and said: we shall not go to such a war.

All that the Finns want now is autonomy. We stand for giving Finland complete liberty; that will increase their confidence in Russian democracy, and when they are given the right to secede they will not do so. While Mr. Rodichev goes to Finland to haggle over autonomy, our Finnish comrades come here and say: we must have autonomy. But fire is opened on them from the whole battery and they are told: "Wait for the constituent assembly." We, however, say: "Any Russian Socialist who denies freedom to Finland is a chauvinist."

We say that frontiers are determined by the will of the population. Russia, don't dare fight over Courland! Germany, withdraw

your armies from Courland! This is our solution of the problem of secession. The proletariat cannot resort to violence, for it must not interfere with the freedom of peoples. The slogan, "down with frontiers," will become a true slogan only when the socialist revolution has become a reality, and not a method. Then we shall say: comrades, come to us. . . .

Now war is an entirely different matter. When necessary, we shall not refuse to wage a revolutionary war. We are not pacifists. . . . But while we have Milyukov, and while he sends Rodichev to Finland, where he shamefully haggles with the Finnish people, we say to the Russian people: don't dare rape Finland; no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations. In our resolution concerning Borgbjerg,* we state: withdraw your armies, and let the nation settle this question itself. But if the Soviet seizes power tomorrow, it will no longer be a "method of socialist revolution"; we shall then say: Germany, withdraw your armies from Poland; Russia, withdraw your armies from Armenia—otherwise, the whole thing will be a deception.

Regarding his oppressed Poland, Comrade Dzerzhinsky tells us that everybody is a chauvinist there. But why does not any Pole tell us what we ought to do with Finland, what we ought to do with the Ukraine? We have been arguing about this question so much, ever since 1903, that it is difficult to say much about it now. Go where you please. . . . He who does not accept this point of view is an annexationist, a chauvinist. We are for the fraternal union of all nations. If there is a Ukrainian republic and a Russian republic, there will be closer contact, greater confidence between the two. If the Ukrainians see that we have a Soviet republic, they will not break away. But if we retain the Milyukov republic, they will break away. When Comrade Pyatakov, contradicting his own views, said that he is opposed to the forcible retention of nations within the frontiers, he really admitted the principle of self-determination. We do not in the least want the peasant in Khiva to live under the Khan of Khiva. By developing our revolution we shall

influence the oppressed masses. Agitation among the oppressed masses should be carried on only in this manner.

But any Russian Socialist who does not recognise the freedom of Finland and the Ukraine is bound to degenerate into a chauvinist. And no sophisms, no references to his own "method" will help him to justify himself.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

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PAGE 3.* Lenin calls his book *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, a "popular outline." As a matter of fact this book occupies an exceptional place in Marxian literature on imperialism. It is one of Lenin's major works and is a direct sequel to Marx's *Capital*. Lenin's theory of imperialism, which is developed in it, is the direct continuation of Marx's theory of capitalism. Marx revealed the fundamental economic and class contradictions of capitalism and the laws of its development. By this he provided a scientific economic basis for his theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. But neither Marx nor Engels lived to see flourishing imperialism. They merely witnessed its first steps, principally in England. For this reason they were only able to foresee, in the most general outline, the peculiar features and consequences of this new, higher stage in the development of capitalism. In the development of capitalist combines (joint stock companies, trusts and syndicates), in the growing centralisation and concentration of production, its concentration in the hands of small groups of giant capitalists ("the magnates of capital"), and in the growth of their *monopoly*, i.e., their exclusive domination over national economy, Marx and Engels already discerned the approach of an epoch in which further capitalist development would become impossible and capitalism would collapse. It is precisely this epoch that Marx had in mind when he wrote in Volume I of *Capital*:

"Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation [i.e., the transformation that capitalism brings about in the technique of production and in the whole of national economy—Ed.], grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (*Capital*, Vol. I, chapter XXXII, pp. 836-37, Kerr edition.)

And it is this stage in the development of capitalism, as its highest and last stage, that Engels has in view in his book *Socialism Utopian and Scientific*, page 81, when he speaks about the "monopoly" of the trusts. He

writes that "no nation will put up with production conducted by trusts, with so bare-faced an exploitation of the community by a small band of dividend mongers." And he goes on to say that not even the transference of production to the capitalist state (i.e., state capitalism in a bourgeois state) will save capitalism from collapse, because with this transference, "The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head. But, brought to a head, it topples over." (Engels, *Socialism Utopian and Scientific*, pp. 81-84.) But these were merely the most general forecasts. Marx and Engels were not yet able to observe the special features of the new epoch of monopolist capitalism (in other words, imperialism) in their *developed* state. It fell to the lot of Lenin to reveal these peculiar features, to show the new and acuter forms the economic and class contradictions of capitalism developed in the epoch of imperialism, how they transformed this epoch into the "eve of socialism" and the epoch of proletarian revolutions, and created all the necessary premises for this. This task he fulfilled in his book *Imperialism*. The theory of imperialism which Lenin develops in this book served as the foundation of the whole of the subsequent development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the years of the imperialist war and after it, and, in particular, it was the foundation of the proposition laid down by Lenin on the possibility of the victory of socialism in single capitalist countries. The Leninist conception of "imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism" was placed at the base of the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the programme of the Communist International.

The Second International, represented by "theoreticians" such as Hilferding and Co., bases its social-fascist policy of betraying the working class and serving the bourgeoisie on the theory of so-called "organised capitalism," i.e., capitalism which, it is alleged, is capable, precisely in the epoch of imperialism, of abolishing the contradictions that rend it and of creating systematically developing production that knows no crises. On this theory, the Second International bases its repudiation of and struggle against the proletarian revolution, and on it it bases its theory, which it borrowed from the old, pre-war revisionism (Bernsteinism), that capitalism will grow into socialism with the co-operation of the bourgeoisie through what is called "political and industrial democracy." One of the sources of this theory of "organised capitalism," the first expression of it, was Kautsky's theory of "ultra-imperialism," which arose simultaneously with Lenin's theory of imperialism in the period of the imperialist war, and which was constructed for the purpose of justifying social-chauvinism. This theory foretold the development of an imperialism that would remove the contradictions of capitalism primarily in the international sphere by "the unification of the imperialisms of the whole world" and the abolition of war by "internationally united finance capital." In his book *Imperialism* (cf. chapter VII) and in one of his earlier works *The Collapse of the Second International* (cf. chapters IV and IX in this volume), Lenin subjects this theory of ultra-

imperialism to annihilating criticism and calls it "ultra-nonsense," an anti-Marxian reformist theory of the *blunting of the contradictions of capitalism*. By this criticism, and by the whole of his theory of imperialism as the epoch of the enormous *intensification* of all the contradictions of capitalism, Lenin created an indispensable weapon for the struggle against the modern opportunist theory of organised capitalism, advocated by the leaders of the Second International.

As Comrade Stalin points out in his letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, entitled "Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism" (*cf.* Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II), in 1905 Trotskyism borrowed the semi-Menshevik theory of permanent revolution from the German Lefts of that time, Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus, and in the years of the war, it copied from Rosa Luxemburg her semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, transforming both the one and the other into a weapon of the struggle against Leninism. Like the German Lefts, it was in its conception of imperialism directly associated with Kautskyism. This fully corresponded to the transition of Trotskyism from the centrist, concealed liquidationism that it was in 1908-14, to the centrist, concealed social-chauvinism of the Kautskyan type that it became in the years of the war. In the latter period Trotsky opposed Lenin's slogans of transforming the imperialist war into civil war and of the defeat of one's own government. He also counterposed to Lenin's thesis of the victory of the proletarian revolution and of socialism first in one or several countries, the Kautskyan slogan, which was rejected by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, *viz.*, a "United States of Europe," without monarchies or standing armies, *i.e.*, a slogan for the bourgeois-democratic amalgamation of Europe, which, in his opinion, was to be an absolute condition for the victory of the socialist revolution. With Kautsky, this slogan followed logically from his theory of "the unification of the imperialisms of the whole world," and with Trotsky it followed logically from the postulate that imperialism fulfils "the really liberating, historical mission of building up a united world economy independent of national boundaries and state tariff barriers" (article "A Programme of Peace" in the book *War and Revolution*), *i.e.*, a paraphrase of Kautsky's ultra-imperialism. During the war Trotsky reinforced this Kautskyan "theory" of "building up a united world economy" by imperialism itself, with his "theory of permanent revolution," in which he emphasised the denial of the possibility of a durable victory of the proletarian revolution and of socialism in any single country, and particularly in Russia. Trotsky's struggle against Leninism in the period of the war was based on Kautskyism, and so it remained in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat right up to the period of 1925-27 when Trotskyism became transformed from a faction of communism, which it had been temporarily since 1917, into the vanguard of bourgeois counter-revolution. Lenin's theory of imperialism and his annihilating criticism of Kautskyism, and of that variety of it, Trotskyism in the period of the war, provided an indispensable weapon for smashing Trotskyism in the period of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Similarly, it provided an indispensable weapon in the struggle against Right opportunism, represented by Comrade Bukharin, which slipped into the theory of "organised capitalism," in regard to the interpretation of modern imperialism.

Comrade Bukharin first revealed this slip in his work *World Economy and Imperialism*, which he wrote as far back as 1915 when he regarded himself as being on the "extreme Left," and when his position and that of Comrade Pyatakov was similar to that of the Left Polish and German Social-Democrats. In this work, which was first published in the magazine *Kommunist*, and later published as a separate book in a slightly revised form, first in 1915 and then in 1916, Comrade Bukharin developed a theory of imperialism which differed from Lenin's theory. He admitted the "abstract theoretical possibility" of the formation, under imperialism, of a "single world organisation" of economy, of a "universal trust." It is true that he denied the "real probability of this" and argued that "social-political reasons would not permit" the existence of such a trust, therefore, also denying the real possibility of Kautskyan "ultra-imperialism." But while he drove "organised capitalism" out of one door, he let it in by another: while denying that organised capitalism was possible on an international scale, he based this very denial on the recognition of the existence of "organised capitalism" in each separate imperialist country. He asserted that under imperialism, the "national economy" in every such country assumes the form of an alliance, of a "union of unions" and becomes transformed into a "state capitalist trust," that within the limits of a given "national economy" competition is "reduced to a minimum" and as a consequence of all this the "national economy" enters "the arena of the world market as a homogeneous, organised whole, well endowed with unusual economic strength." He described these "national economies" as "gigantic, consolidated and organised economic bodies." (*World Economy and Imperialism*, chap. 10, pp. 119-20.) Thus, in this work, Comrade Bukharin causes the economic contradictions of capitalism of the imperialist epoch to disappear in each separate imperialist country, and transfers them exclusively to the "arena of the world market." He reduces the whole concrete process of economic development under imperialism to the development of these contradictions only "through the medium of the intensified struggle of the state capitalist trusts," these "organised economic bodies" within each imperialist country. Hence, the inevitability of a number of "wars" which alone give rise to the world proletarian revolution. When he was already leader of Right-wing opportunism, Comrade Bukharin still further developed this theory of organised capitalism within imperialist countries and of the transference of all the contradictions of imperialism to the sphere of international relationships, and applied it to contemporary imperialism in his articles in *Pravda* of May 26 and June 30, 1929. ("Certain Problems of Contemporary Capitalism According to Bourgeois Theoreticians" and "Theory of Organised Mismanagement.") In these articles Comrade Bukharin again speaks about

organised capitalism in separate imperialist countries in the form of "state capitalism," which in his opinion "implies the dying out of competition *within* each capitalist country and the enormous *intensification* of competition between capitalist countries." Again all the economic contradictions of imperialism are reduced to the struggle between imperialist countries "in the arena of the world market," and all the possibilities of world revolution are linked up with imperialist wars coming as a result of this struggle. Bukharin's "state capitalism" in imperialist countries and his "dying out of competition" within these countries imply nothing more nor less than the possibility of the planned development of capitalism in each capitalist country without crises and, consequently, not the sharpening, but the blunting of the contradictions of capitalism within these countries. The opportunism of this theory, its extreme similarity to the arguments of the "theoreticians" of the Second International about organised capitalism, and its complete incompatibility with the Leninist theory of the imperialist epoch as the epoch of the enormous sharpening of the contradictions of capitalism, not only international but also internal, are obvious. In subjecting the views of Kautsky and the bourgeois economists on imperialism to severe criticism in his book *Imperialism*, Lenin casts aside all talk about the possibility of planned economy under imperialism without crises as a "fable spread by bourgeois economists who at all costs desire to place capitalism in a favourable light." He proves, on the contrary, that in this epoch "when monopoly appears in *certain* branches of industry, it increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in capitalist production *as a whole*," *in spite* of the growth of the amalgamation of capital, in spite of the efforts of monopolist capitalism to destroy free competition within each country. The corresponding passages in Lenin's book seem to be deliberately directed against contemporary Right opportunism and its interpretation of the present period of imperialism.

Lenin's *Imperialism*, while being the basis of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution, at the same time serves as a key to the understanding of Lenin's position and slogans in the period of the imperialist war, and in the period of the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship in Russia (1917). At the same time it serves as a key to the fight on "two fronts" which Lenin waged against all the varieties of social-chauvinism on the one hand, and against the "Left" deviation in the ranks of Bolshevism at that time (the Bukharin-Pyatakoff group), on the other.

PAGE 5.* The articles to which Lenin here refers were published in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (the central organ of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—Bolsheviks), in *Kommunist* and in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, published in Switzerland. In 1917 they were published in a separate book entitled *Against the Stream*, to which Lenin refers the reader. These articles are reproduced in Volumes XVIII and XIX of the *Collected Works*. Some of these articles, including one of the most important of them, *The Collapse of the Second International*, are included in this volume.

PAGE 7.* This preface was first published, a year after it was written, in the *Communist International*, No. 18, 1921, under the title *Capitalism and Imperialism*.

PAGE 9.* The Brest-Litovsk peace, concluded between the Soviet government on the one side, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other, was signed by the Soviet delegation in the town of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 and ratified at the Fourth Special Congress of Soviets on March 15, after the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the motion of Comrade Lenin and the Central Committee of the Party, had adopted a resolution in favour of concluding peace. The signing of the peace treaty was preceded by protracted negotiations with Germany which began on December 2, and by an equally protracted struggle in favour of concluding peace waged within the Party and on the Central Committee against the "Left Communists," headed by Comrade Bukharin, and against Trotsky. Lenin categorically insisted on the necessity of concluding peace in order, "by conceding space, to gain time," to gain a "respite" in order to consolidate the proletarian dictatorship, to organise a Red Army, to break the sabotage and resistance of the counter-revolution in the country and thus preserve the first and only proletarian state as a bulwark and instrument for developing the world proletarian revolution.

The "Left Communists" waged a struggle against Lenin on the grounds that the conclusion of peace would be a betrayal of the world proletarian revolution. The Moscow Regional Bureau of the Party, led by Comrade Bukharin, passed a resolution in which they advanced what Lenin called the "strange and monstrous" postulate that "in the interests of the international revolution it is expedient to risk the loss of the Soviet government," which, the resolution stated, by concluding peace was becoming "formal." In this same resolution the Moscow Bureau expressed lack of confidence in the Central Committee led by Lenin. Trotsky adopted a position that was expressed in the formula: "neither the continuation of the war nor the signing close to that of the "Left Communists," and advocated a policy that was of peace."

Lenin subjected the point of view of the "Left Communists" and of Trotsky to severe criticism in his speeches, particularly at the Seventh Congress of the Party, as well as in the press. The resistance put up by the "Left Communists" and the position taken by Trotsky considerably delayed the conclusion of peace, and, finally, peace had to be concluded on much worse terms than could have been obtained in December 1917. According to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, Soviet Russia was deprived of Latvia, Esthonia and part of White Russia, and Germany annexed the parts of Poland and Lithuania which she had occupied during the war. The Soviet government also undertook to "withdraw" from the Ukraine and Finland. The Brest-Litovsk treaty was annulled by the Soviet government in November 1918 when the revolution broke out in Germany.

PAGE 9.** The Versailles Peace, concluded at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, between Germany and her allies on the one side, and Great Britain, France, the United States, Serbia, Italy and Japan, on the other, as an outcome of the imperialist war of 1914-18.

While the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty (see above) revealed the predatory aims of Germany, the Versailles Peace, in its turn, confirmed the predatory aims of France, England and their allies. As a result of the Versailles Peace, Germany and Austria lost part of their territories in Europe, while Germany had to surrender all her colonies to her conquerors. In addition, Germany was almost completely disarmed, and her armaments, including her navy, were handed over to the Allies. Moreover, Germany had to pay a huge indemnity, partly in gold and partly in kind—coal, building materials, machinery, dyestuffs, etc. The burden of these indemnities, or “reparations,” as is known, weighs heavily on the working class and other toilers of Germany who were reduced to extreme poverty. By the “agreement” concluded in Lausanne in 1932, Germany was to be relieved of the payment of reparations if the inter-Allied war debts were annulled. But the United States refuses to discuss the annulment of war debts.

PAGE 12.* Communards—the proletariat of Paris together with the urban poor and a section of the petty bourgeoisie following its lead, who rose in rebellion in 1871, during the Franco-Prussian War, and having seized power, established the Paris Commune—the first government of the proletarian dictatorship in history. The Communards waged a heroic struggle against the bourgeoisie and its government, which had fled to Versailles, hence the term “Versaillese.” The bourgeois government concentrated its counter-revolutionary forces and, with the aid of the Prussian troops, besieged Paris and finally drowned the Commune in the blood of the workers.

PAGE 13.* The Spanish-American War waged by the United States against Spain in 1898 for the possession of the Antilles, the Philippines and other islands in the Atlantic and the Pacific, on the pretext of “liberating” these islands from the Spanish yoke. This war serves to illustrate Lenin’s thesis on the struggle of the imperialist countries for the re-division of the world. The larger of the Antilles (Cuba and Porto Rico) serve as a base for the domination and control of Mexico, the Central American republics and the northern part of South America. By seizing these islands in the Atlantic, the United States obtained possession of the key to the Panama Canal (see note to page 52 *) which unites the Atlantic with the Pacific. On the other hand, the Philippines serve the United States as a base in the Pacific for penetration into China and Indo-China, for checking Japan and Australia, and for controlling European maritime traffic to Eastern Asia. All these circumstances were decisive in causing the war between the United States and Spain.

The Spanish-American War was brought to an end by the treaty of Paris

signed on December 10, 1898. By this treaty Spain was obliged to withdraw from Cuba, Guam, Porto Rico and the Philippines. Cuba was declared to be an "independent" state, but when the Spanish forces were withdrawn, the United States troops remained and with their aid the United States government began to govern the island as if it were her colony. Later, by acts of legislation and treaties with Cuba in 1901 and in subsequent years, the latter officially became a colony of the United States. In order to convert the Philippines into her colony, the United States waged another war against the Philippines in 1901, which ended in the "pacification" of the latter. (See note to page 112.**)

PAGE 13.** The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, waged by England against the Boer republics—the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—in South Africa. The Boers—from a Dutch word meaning peasants—were the descendants of Dutch settlers who migrated to South Africa as far back as the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century they formed the above-mentioned republics, which were independent of Holland and of all other European states. England, which had been gradually surrounding these two republics, by acquiring new territories in South Africa, made repeated attempts to convert them into her colonies. At the end of the last century, when the diamond and gold fields began to be worked there, the English first made a raid on the Transvaal—the notorious Jameson raid—and then officially declared war on the two republics which had concluded an alliance with each other. The war, marked by alternating victories and defeats on either side, lasted four years, and finally ended in the victory of the British forces. Against a total Boer population of 645,000 the British government mobilised, at home and in the colonies, a force of 500,000 officers and men. The British imperialists, keen on securing a profitable field for the investment of their capital, ruthlessly suppressed the Boer troops and the civil population. The war cost the British tax payers about £200,000,000. Ultimately, the two independent republics were abolished and their territories united with Cape Colony in what is now the Union of South Africa, a British Dominion.

PAGE 13.*** Lenin has in mind, in the main, chapter II of Hilferding's *Finance Capital*. In this chapter, Hilferding tries to "deepen" and "correct" Marx by quoting facts regarding Austrian and Indian economics. In his introduction to *The Critique of Political Economy* and in *Capital*, Vol. I, chapter III, Marx determines the value of paper currency by the value of metal money (gold), for which paper currency serves as a substitute. According to Marx, the laws governing the circulation of paper currency can be understood on the basis of the laws governing the circulation of gold. In opposition to Marx, however, Hilferding asserts that "where paper currency is exclusively in circulation. . . paper currency. . . becomes completely independent of the value of gold and directly reflects the value of commodities." (Our italics.—Ed.) (Cf. Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, fifth German edition, p. 20.)

In chapters III and VIII of the present work, and in the preface to the French and German editions of it, Lenin points to other "defects" in Hilferding's *Finance Capital*, in addition to his attempts to revise Marx's theory of money, and points out in particular that in such an important question as the parasitism and decay of capitalism in the imperialist epoch, the "Marxist Hilferding" "takes a step backward compared with the non-Marxist, Hobson." And the "inclination to reconcile Marxism with opportunism," to which Lenin refers, transformed Hilferding, the ex-Marxist, first, into a comrade-in-arms of Kautsky, and one of the chief exponents of bourgeois reformist policy, and later, together with Kautsky, into one of the most prominent theoreticians and leaders of contemporary social-fascism. It goes without saying that this was accompanied by the complete abandonment of what was valuable and Marxian in *Finance Capital*. Hilferding became, and is now, an advocate of the social-fascist theory of imperialism, according to which contemporary imperialism is organised capitalism, which is directly growing into socialism on the basis of political and economic co-operation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

PAGE 47.* Prodigol—the Russian abbreviated title of the Russian Donetz Basin Mineral Fuel Trading Company—a combine of eighteen large coal companies formed in 1906 and closely connected with French capital. From ninety to one hundred per cent of the capital of these huge enterprises belonged to French capitalists. Before the war, the Prodigol raised the price of coal in the coal field by 67 per cent, and on the Moscow Coal Exchange by 162 per cent above the price prevailing in the Yuzovka coal district (Donetz Basin). In order to force up prices Prodigol restricted output, and this caused a fuel famine.

PAGE 47.** Prodameta—the Russian abbreviated title of the Russian Metallurgical Trading Company, a syndicate formed in 1901 as a result of a decision arrived at by a conference of South Russian iron foundry owners, called in October 1901 to discuss the causes of the crisis then prevailing and the measures to be taken to combat it. The Prodameta was in fact a combine of five syndicates engaged in the sale of particular types of foundry goods (sheet iron, girders, tires, axles and iron pipes), and consisted of the largest metallurgical enterprises in the South of Russia, each having a capital ranging from 6,000,000 to 41,000,000 rubles. The leading role in these enterprises was played by foreign capital, mainly French, which directed their operations through the medium of the big St. Petersburg banks. The syndicate charged high prices for its goods on the home market (20 to 30 per cent higher than those on the foreign market) and was able to do this by cutting down the supply to such an extent that in 1911 there was actually a shortage of foundry goods.

PAGE 52.* The French Panama scandal arose in connection with the cutting of the Panama Canal through the Isthmus of Panama, which joins North and South America. Work was commenced on the canal in 1882 by the French firm Lesseps, which, however, went bankrupt in 1888. The canal was completed only in 1913 by the United States. The investigation into the bankruptcy of the French firm revealed wholesale corruption, bribery and forgery, in which prominent French statesmen like Clemenceau, Loubet and others were involved. From that time on, the word "Panama" came to be synonymous with swindling on a large scale.

PAGE 52.** Bagdad, a city on the River Tigris in Arabia. Germany planned to build a railway stretching from Berlin to Bagdad, the object of which was to consolidate her domination in Asia Minor and in Arabia and open the way for her economic penetration into India and Egypt. It thus threatened Great Britain's rule in these countries. As against this plan the British imperialists had a plan for the building of a Cape-to-Cairo railway, while the Russian imperialists had a plan for the building of a railway from St. Petersburg to the Persian Gulf. The German and Russian plans were, of course, wrecked by the defeat of Germany in the imperialist war and by the October Revolution.

PAGE 59.* The commercial treaty between France and Russia was concluded in September 1905, at a time when the tsarist autocracy, faced with the spreading Russian revolution, was compelled to turn to France for financial assistance. The treaty provided for the export of large quantities of goods from France to Russia. The number of items of goods to be imported into Russia from France was nearly three times as large as those exported from Russia to France. Russia exported exclusively raw materials, such as grain, hides, lumber, oil, etc., while France exported to Russia manufactured goods, such as manufactured food products, perfumes, automobiles, etc. The Russian import duties on French goods were lower than the French import duties on Russian goods.

PAGE 59.** The commercial treaty between France and Japan concluded August 19 (September 1, new style), 1911, was obviously to the advantage of France, since she obtained preference in all the Japanese colonies, while Japan obtained preferences only in the French colony of Algiers, which hardly imported Japanese silk goods. Moreover, France obtained preferences on the imports of French goods into Japan itself, such as sardines, wines, soap, perfumes, automobiles, machinery, etc., while Japan obtained preferences only on raw silk imports into France.

PAGE 60.* A tariff war is an economic war waged between two or more countries by means of one country raising its tariffs, or customs duties, against the other. The latter, in retaliation, raises its tariffs higher against

the former country, which calls forth a still further increase in the tariffs of the first country. This war may be carried to the lengths of placing an embargo on imports of goods of one country to the other. Tariff wars are the prelude to armed wars between the capitalist countries. The tariff war between Austria and Serbia commenced in the early part of 1906. The formal pretext for this war was the agreement concluded between Serbia and Bulgaria which affected the interests of Austria. As a protest against this, Austria imposed an embargo on Serbian imports, which was a severe blow to the commercial bourgeoisie and landlords in Serbia, who sold cattle to Austria. After a brief respite, the tariff war was resumed in the latter part of 1906, when Austria demanded the opening of the Serbian market for the sale of the manufactures of her armament industries.

PAGE 75.* The imperialism of ancient Rome, which pursued a predatory policy of conquest and which subjected a number of countries in Europe, Asia and Africa to its rule by force of arms, must not be confused with modern imperialism any more than the usurers' capital which existed before the capitalist epoch must be confused with usurers' bank capital in the epoch of imperialism. The difference between the predatory policy of conquest of ancient Rome and the predatory policy of modern imperialism is that in ancient Rome it was the policy of the big landlords and of the merchant capitalists, whose rule was based on the exploitation of slaves, while under modern imperialism, it is the policy of finance capital, i.e., bank capital merged with industrial capital, the rule of which is based on the exploitation of wage labour. This, by the way, shows how wrong it is to define modern imperialism as a "policy" only and not as a whole system of capitalist economy.

PAGE 84.* In speaking of the importance of Bagdad for England as a base for operations against Germany, Lenin has in mind its importance in the struggle British imperialism was waging at that time against Germany's predatory designs in Asia Minor, on the Persian Peninsula, in India and Egypt, and particularly against Germany's scheme for the building of the Berlin-Bagdad railway. (See note to page 52.**)

PAGE 98.* In this preface Engels wrote:

"... During the period of England's industrial monopoly the English working class have, to a certain extent, shared in the benefits of the monopoly. These benefits were very unequally parcelled out amongst them; the privileged minority pocketed most, but even the great mass had, at least, a temporary share now and then. . . . With the breakdown of that monopoly, the English working class will lose that privileged position." (Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, Preface, p. xvii.)

PAGE 105.* Engels speaks of this almost in the same words as Lenin, in a footnote in *Capital*, Vol. III, chapter VI, section II, p. 142, Kerr edition.

PAGE 110.* The Boxer Rebellion—the rebellion of the peasants of Northern China in the spring of 1900 against the foreign imperialists. The rebellion was supported by the Chinese bourgeois who used the peasant movement for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the monarchist government of China of that day. It was called forth by the famine that prevailed in the country, as a result of the failure of the harvest for a number of years, and vast masses of the peasantry were drawn into the movement. The movement was led by societies known as the Yi He-chuan (The Fist of Harmony and Justice) and Ta Chuan-hui (The Big Fists) and others, hence the name of Boxers given to the rebels. The world bourgeoisie formed a united front against the rebellion and, with the aid of the united forces of American, Russian, West European and Japanese troops, ruthlessly suppressed it. When the rebellion was suppressed the Great Powers submitted predatory demands to the Chinese government for new, and the extension of old, concessions in the largest towns of China, such as Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai and other places. They also demanded the right to maintain their own armed forces on Chinese territory and the payment of an enormous indemnity, which is still known as the Boxer indemnity. The government of the U.S.S.R. abandoned the claim to the Russian share of this indemnity and by this gave a striking illustration of the policy of the proletariat and of its party which are fighting for the abolition of all oppression including the national and national-capitalist oppression of imperialism.

PAGE 112.* Alsace and Lorraine—two provinces which belonged to France before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. After the defeat of France in this war, the two provinces were annexed by Prussia. As a result of the defeat of Germany in the imperialist war of 1914-18 they were re-annexed by France. Lenin describes the question of Alsace-Lorraine as a "topical and important point," because these two provinces were the object of the war between the German and French imperialists; and the German social-chauvinists who defended "their" bourgeoisie tacitly ignored the fact that Germany had annexed the two provinces in 1871.

PAGE 112.** The Philippine Islands in the Pacific Ocean were annexed by the United States by armed force after the Spanish-American War of 1898. (See note to page 13.)* They were officially annexed by the United States as one of the terms of the peace treaty. But the United States achieved its victory over Spain to a very large extent due to the aid of the Philippine army, numbering 30,000 and led by the Filipino revolutionary Aguinaldo, who had been induced to take up arms by the promise of independence in the event of victory. When the Spanish forces were withdrawn, the United States declared that it would take over the administration of the islands. In answer to this Aguinaldo declared the islands an independent republic. The United States sent an army of 140,000 men against him. After a war lasting nearly two years, the Philippine forces were routed and their leader Aguinaldo taken

prisoner. In this struggle the Filipinos, according to American accounts, lost 600,000 men.

PAGE 112.*** Korea, in the Far East of Asia, for many years was the object of a stubborn struggle between China and Japan. In the nineties of the last century, the struggle for the exploitation of Korea shifted to that between Russia and Japan. After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Korea was annexed by Japan.

PAGE 123.* The manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party was written by Lenin and was first published in November (October) 1914, in the central organ of the Party, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 33. The publication of the manifesto was preceded by a conference of Bolsheviks held on September 19 and 20, 1914, in Berne, Switzerland, at which Lenin submitted his first theses on the war. (See *Collected Works*, Eng. ed., Vol. XVIII, pp. 61-64.) The conference adopted Lenin's theses which were then sent to Russia to be discussed by the Russian section of the Central Committee and by the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma, and were adopted by them. These theses, which already contained the main ideas expressed by the manifesto, served as the basis of this historically important document. This manifesto was in fact the continuation of the struggle Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had long been carrying on against opportunism and social-chauvinism in international Social-Democracy. It served to expose the final betrayal of socialism by the Second International and its desertion to the bourgeoisie, and it was the first decisive blow against this treachery in the conditions of war. At the same time it was a call for the formation of the Third International. As against the chauvinist slogan of "defence of the fatherland," it advanced the slogan of defeat of one's own government; in answer to the world butchery, it proclaimed to the workers of the whole world the slogan, convert the imperialist war into civil war, and placed the socialist revolution on the order of the day. The position taken up by Lenin and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on the war was a logical deduction from Lenin's theory of imperialism as the "eve of socialism," as the epoch of proletarian revolutions. Unlike the social-chauvinists of the Second International, Lenin and the Central Committee of the Party revealed to the masses of the workers the predatory, imperialist character of the war. The manifesto declares that the whole burden and disaster of the war would be thrust upon the shoulders of the toilers of the belligerent countries, principally upon the proletariat, and would intensify class antagonisms in those countries to the utmost degree. By that, it would revolutionise the masses of the proletariat, who at first would be affected by chauvinist intoxication to a considerable degree, and bring them face to face with the only possible answer to the disaster of the war—the task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie. The war had to create a revolutionary situation. Under these conditions the task of a really proletarian party, of a party which is really

the vanguard of the proletariat and not the servant of the bourgeoisie, was to create all the possibilities for transforming the revolutionary situation in the belligerent countries in the West into a proletarian revolution. In the West European parties, this task was appreciated only by a few, numerically small groups, which had remained revolutionary Social-Democrats. Hence, the duty of fighting for the realisation of these tasks was left to the Russian Bolshevik Party. The manifesto of the Central Committee of the Party placed this task of the international proletariat on the order of the day.

While for the advanced countries of Western Europe the manifesto gave the slogan "convert the imperialist war into civil war" as the slogan of the socialist revolution—for Russia, where the overthrow of tsarism and the abolition of all the remnants of feudalism were on the order of the day, the manifesto gave the slogan of "the bourgeois-democratic revolution." This did not mean, however, that the slogan of socialist revolution did not apply to Russia. As in the period of the Revolution of 1905-07, it merely meant that, in order to reach the road of the proletarian revolution, Russia had to pass through the bourgeois-democratic revolution, but not to halt at it. In his subsequent articles, "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis," "A Few Theses," "The Two Lines of the Revolution" (in this volume), Lenin, as in 1905-07, speaks very clearly of the transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. Incidentally, as one of the first steps in the proletarian revolution in Europe, the manifesto advocates the slogan of forming a United States of Europe, and links this up with the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war. It must be pointed out, however, that this slogan was never repeated in any other Party document. Very soon this slogan was withdrawn by Lenin. (See article "The United States of Europe Slogan," in this volume.)

PAGE 123.** The main causes that gave rise to the war of 1914-18 were the struggle for world domination, the struggle for the re-division of the world and for *colonies*, principally between Great Britain, at the head of the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia), and Germany, at the head of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey).

Until the end of the last century, Great Britain was regarded as the possessor of the most powerful colonial empire. She possessed the largest mercantile fleet in the world. British goods and capital ruled in every part of the globe. Germany had hardly any colonies at all. But during the quarter of a century preceding the war, German capitalist economy had been developing at a very rapid rate, far exceeding the rate of development of British capitalist economy. On the continent of Europe, including Russia, German goods began successfully to compete with British goods and gradually to squeeze them out of the market. The export of German goods to England itself began to grow. Great Britain's market in Europe began to shrink, while for rapidly growing German imperialism the European market became inadequate. The struggle between British and German

imperialism for world domination and for colonies became inevitable. Having a magnificent army, Germany, during the ten or twelve years before the World War, built a powerful navy, but was not able to bring it to the level of the British navy. She realised that it would be difficult for her to fight Great Britain on the sea. She therefore chose the other way, of threatening the British colonies, India and Egypt. In 1908, Germany finally came to an agreement with Turkey concerning the building of the Berlin-Bagdad railway. (See notes to pages 52 ** and 84.*) Great Britain fully appreciated this danger. The rivalry between the British and the German imperialists for world domination increased and inevitably had to lead to an open conflict.

In addition to these main antagonisms between the British and German bourgeoisie, there were economic and political antagonisms between the ruling classes of France and Germany, Russia and Germany, Russia and Austria, and Russia and Turkey.

The French bourgeoisie had long been striving to secure the return of Alsace-Lorraine, important industrial areas which had been annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Moreover, for the further development of her metallurgical industries, France needed the coal and iron ore of the German provinces of the Saar and Ruhr. The interests of France and Germany also came into conflict over the question of colonies. A struggle had long been going on between them over Morocco, for example.

The ground for the open struggle was prepared by the growth of all these antagonisms. In order to "surround" her powerful neighbour, Germany, France, in 1892, concluded an alliance with Russia; huge subsidies were paid to the Russian government. In 1913, on the eve of the war, the French government guaranteed the issue of loans on the Paris Stock Exchange to the amount of 400,000,000 to 500,000,000 francs every year. On her part, Russia undertook to build strategical railways to the German frontiers and to increase the peace strength of her standing armies. The visit of the French Premier, Poincaré, to Russia in July 1914 had for its object the co-ordination of the attack of these two allies against Germany.

As far back as 1907, this alliance was joined by Great Britain. Thus, on the basis of a struggle against Germany, a triple alliance was formed between England, France and Russia, which came to be known as the Triple Entente. The three countries put all their age-long quarrels among themselves into the background for a time in order to establish a united front against Germany. Russia was brought into the alliance in order, of course, to increase the military forces against Germany, and also because tsarist Russia was a semi-colonial country which was a market for foreign goods and a field for the investment of foreign capital. Tsarist Russia represented a huge reserve of western imperialism and the junction point of all the contradictions of imperialism.

But the ruling classes of Russia were no less interested, economically and politically, in a war against Germany, Austria and Turkey, than the

French and British bourgeoisie. The peculiar situation in Russia consisted in that the interests of the landlord class became interwoven with those of the young imperialist bourgeoisie. Germany had long served as a market for the produce of Russian agriculture, but, as a consequence of the tariff policy pursued by Germany, the German market for Russian agricultural produce had begun to shrink towards the end of the last century. For thirty years before the war, an uninterrupted struggle went on between Russia and Germany for the reduction of German import duties on Russian grain. The shrinking of the German markets affected the pockets, not only of the Russian landlords, but also those of the Russian finance capitalists, for the export of grain was carried on through the medium of the banks, which were closely connected with both Russian industry and Russian agriculture. Moreover, the Russian industrial and finance capitalists had their own independent interests in the struggle against Germany. The increasing import of German manufactures was seriously affecting the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie as well as the interests of the British, French and Belgian bourgeoisie who had invested large amounts of capital in Russian industry.

Another cause of the impending conflict was the Near Eastern interests of growing Russian imperialism. The latter was in need of markets. After the defeat of Russia in the Far East, in her war against Japan in 1905, practically the only foreign markets left for Russian manufactures were Persia and Turkey, in the Near East. Here, Russian industry could successfully compete with foreign industry. Moreover, the Russian landlords and capitalists strove to secure an independent outlet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, which was commanded by Turkey by her possession of the Dardanelles straits; in 1913 about fifty per cent of Russian exports passed through these straits. Russia strove for the possession of Constantinople; but Turkey was an ally of Germany and Austria which, in their turn, were interested in exercising their economic influence and domination over her, and so Russia's predatory striving in relation to Turkey brought her into conflict with the Triple Alliance.

Thus the World War inevitably arose out of the growing antagonisms between two groups of countries headed by Great Britain and Germany, respectively. The assassination of the Austrian Grand Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Serbia, served only as the pretext for a war, the ground for which had been prepared long before that.

The "dynastic interests of the most backward East European monarchies" mentioned in the manifesto refer principally to the Romanov "dynasty." The autocracy itself was interested in war as a means of checking the rise of the revolutionary movement which had begun in 1912, and which, by 1914, had reached the stage of barricade fighting. (See note to page 126.***) It blindly believed that its own power would be strengthened by a successful war. Kaiser Wilhelm II also counted on the strengthening of the monarchy in Germany as a result of a successful war.

PAGE 126.* The immediate impetus to the revolution in France in 1871 was the defeat of the French armies by the Prussians, the surrender of Napoleon III and his army of 70,000 men and the siege of Paris by the Prussians. A republic was proclaimed and a new bourgeois government was formed which negotiated a peace treaty with the Prussians. The terms of peace were exceedingly humiliating for France. Germany annexed the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and in addition imposed a heavy indemnity on France. This, however, did not prevent the French bourgeoisie and the Prussian *Junkers*, who only yesterday had been enemies, from concluding an alliance for the purpose of crushing the Paris Commune, which they both hated. When the Paris workers rose in rebellion, the government fled from Paris to Versailles, and the head of the government, Thiers, whom Marx described as the "most consummate intellectual expression of class corruption" of the French bourgeoisie, began to form a regular army for the purpose of crushing the Commune. For this purpose, however, the Versailles forces were insufficient and Thiers appealed to Bismarck, the Prussian Chancellor, to release the French prisoners of war in Germany. To this Bismarck agreed. The Versailles troops were allowed to pass through the neutral zone which had been established by the Prussians, and Prussian guns bombarded Paris.

In speaking of "the French Socialists who took ministerial posts in the government of the very bourgeoisie which had betrayed its fatherland and allied itself with Bismarck to crush the Commune," Lenin has in mind Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat, whom the Socialist Party of France, after the declaration of war in 1914, had delegated to the Ministry of "National Defence." The former joined the Cabinet as minister without portfolio, while the latter was Minister of Public Works.

PAGE 126.** The revival of the labour movement in Russia, which was observed in 1912-14, became particularly marked in the middle of 1914, on the very eve of the war. On March 25, the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma introduced an interpellation on the poisoning of large numbers of workers in a rubber works and a tobacco factory. This interpellation was supported by a strike of 53,000 workers. At a large number of factories mass demonstrations were organised, at which revolutionary songs were sung. The police tried to disperse the demonstrators, but encountered strenuous resistance. This was the first big outbreak of the movement in 1914.

On July 17, the police attacked a meeting of workers at the Putilov Works in St. Petersburg, which was called to express sympathy with the oil workers on strike in Baku. As a result of the attack, two workers were killed, fifty were injured, and one hundred and fifty were arrested. As a protest against this, most of the factories in St. Petersburg went on strike, and in the Vyborg district, huge mass meetings were held, at which the speakers called upon the workers to overthrow the autocracy. Cossacks were called out to reinforce the police. They beat the workers with whips and shot at the windows of the workers' houses. This still further stimulated the wave of

protest strikes, which now spread over the whole of St. Petersburg. For six days—July 19 to 25—300,000 workers were on strike. The meetings and demonstrations continued without interruption, and on July 21, the day the French Premier Poincaré arrived in St. Petersburg, they assumed enormous dimensions. The troops and the police shot at the demonstrators. In the Vyborg district, the conflicts with the police were particularly sanguinary; the workers put up barricades and offered stubborn resistance. In several other districts barricades were put up on July 22. Children collected stones and brought them to the workers who were fighting on the barricades. Fighting with the police continued throughout the day. There were many killed and injured among both the workers and the police. The whole movement during the July days bore a strikingly expressed political character. The bourgeoisie was disturbed and, in retaliation to the strike, locked out 60,000 workers employed in the largest works in the town (Putilov, Nevsky, the shipbuilding yard, etc.). But on the eve of the declaration of war, in order to ensure a "peaceful" mobilisation, the government brought pressure to bear upon the employers to open the factories, and the workers resumed work.

PAGE 126.*** This refers to the speeches against the war delivered by the Italian Socialists at a conference of Italian and Swiss Socialists held in Lugano on September 27, 1914, and also the reply of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party of Italy to the German Social-Democrat, Südekum, who in September 1914 had come to Italy for the purpose of trying to induce the government to join the war as an ally of Germany.

PAGE 127.* Lenin here refers to the action of the Bolshevik fraction in the State Duma on August 8, 1914, immediately following the declaration of war. This was the first and last time that the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma acted jointly with the Menshevik fraction in connection with the war. The Menshevik fraction, led by Chkheidze, took up a centrist position, i.e., a concealed defencist position, on the war. But in the first days of the war, under pressure of the Bolsheviks, and after prolonged negotiations and wavering, it agreed to the drawing up of a joint declaration and to joint action with the Bolsheviks in the Duma. The declaration, when it was drawn up, did not satisfy the Bolsheviks. However, they secured the insertion of the statement that the war was caused by the "policy of conquest and violence pursued by all the capitalist states," that "the unity of the people with the government" was impossible, and expressed the conviction that "the international solidarity of the proletariat of the whole world will provide the means for the speedy cessation of the war" and that "the terms of the peace treaty will be dictated . . . by the people who will take their fate into their own hands." The Bolsheviks also secured the agreement of the Mensheviks jointly to refuse to vote for war credits and demonstratively to leave the Duma.

Soon after this, Vandervelde, the Belgian "Socialist," and member of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International, who on the declaration of war had joined the Belgian government, appealed to the Menshevik and Bolshevik fractions in the Duma to support the tsarist government and the Anglo-French imperialists in the war. The Mensheviks in their reply to Vandervelde's appeal hastened to declare that "the active participation" of the Socialists of all countries in the "European conflict," i.e., the war, gives grounds for hoping that this "conflict" will be settled in the "interests of international socialism." And while thus declaring that the betrayal of socialism, the desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, by "the Socialists of all countries" serves the interests, not of the bourgeoisie, but of international socialism, the Menshevik fraction added: "we declare to you that in our activities in Russia we shall not hinder prosecution of the war." And not only did it not hinder, but it definitely assisted the tsarist government in the prosecution of the war, and took a direct part in the work of the bourgeoisie in the direction of so-called national defence. The Bolshevik fraction, on the other hand, in its reply to Vandervelde, emphatically stated that "the Russian proletariat cannot under any circumstances march side by side with tsarism," and that it considered its task to be to take advantage of the crisis created by the war "to further the struggle against the political system prevailing in Russia and for the immediate revolutionary slogans." And it carried on strenuous work to fulfil these tasks. Not restricting themselves to St. Petersburg, the members of the Bolshevik fraction visited the industrial centres for this purpose. Very soon, the tsarist government arrested the members of the Bolshevik fraction and put them on trial. On November 17, 1914, on the initiative and with the participation of the fraction, a conference of representatives of several of the Bolshevik organisations (St. Petersburg, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kharkov and Riga) was held at Ozerki, near St. Petersburg, at which the principal item on the agenda was the discussion of Lenin's September theses. (See note to page 123.*) It was during this conference that the Bolshevik Duma deputies were arrested. The conference had just managed to discuss the theses and adopt them, with some slight amendment, when the police entered. The delegates to the conference were arrested on the spot, while the Duma deputies were arrested the next day. At the trial they were sentenced to deportation to Eastern Siberia. For details of the activities of the Bolshevik Duma fraction during the war, their arrest and trial, see Badayev's *The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma*, and also Lenin's article given as an appendix in that book, entitled "What the Trial of the R.S.D.L.P. Fraction Proved." (For the latter see also *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.)

PAGE 127.** In a declaration, signed by Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin, that was written on September 10 and published on October 30, in the Swiss Social-Democratic paper, the *Berner*

Tagwacht, the signatories expressed their disagreement with the official policy of the German Social-Democratic Party. They wrote:

"We, and undoubtedly many other German Social-Democrats, regard the war, its causes and its character, and also the role of Social-Democracy in the present situation, from a point of view which does not in the least correspond to the point of view of Comrades Südekum and Fischer [two prominent German social-chauvinists—*Ed.*]. The military situation prevents us for the time being from publicly advocating our views."

PAGE 127.*** In regard to France, this refers to the votes of a numerically small opposition in the French trade unions against the chauvinism of the *Confédération du Travail*. This opposition was grouped around the journal *La Vie Ouvrière*, and was led by Merrheim and Bourderon. This group was not consistently internationalist, however, and subsequently its representatives at Zimmerwald, Merrheim and Bourderon, joined the centrist, Kautskyan majority and not the Zimmerwald Left wing led by Lenin. (See also notes to page 227.)

In England the voice of protest against the war and imperialism was raised by the Scottish Socialist, John MacLean. During the war he conducted active revolutionary anti-war work. In 1915 he was arrested for sedition, and in 1916 he was again arrested for organising mass strikes at munition works, affecting tens of thousands of workers. Released after fifteen months' detention in prison, he resumed his revolutionary activities and was again arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He was released after going on a hunger strike. After the formation of the Communist International he joined the Communists. Died in 1923.

PAGE 129.* This refers to the following:

1. An article by E. Smirnov, entitled "War and European Democracy," published in the liberal-bourgeois newspaper *Russkiye Vyedomosti* (*Russian News*), No. 202, September 16 (3), 1914. In this article, Smirnov adopted a sharply patriotic position; he justified the action of the French Socialists in sending their representatives into a bourgeois Cabinet for the purpose of defending "their country" against the "threat of enslavement and the brutal invasion of the German mailed fist." Under such conditions, wrote Smirnov, the class war recedes into the background; for all classes equally "burn with the desire to defend the strength and independence of their country."

2. A letter written by Maslov to the same newspaper, published in issue No. 207, September 23 (10), 1914, under the heading "War and Trading Agreements," in which he defended the legitimacy and necessity of resisting German militarism. Maslov argued in the following way: on the one hand, Germany's attack on democratic France and Belgium threatens the establishment of the political dictatorship of the Prussian *Junkers* in Europe; on the other hand, Germany's victory over Russia would lead to the

economic enslavement of the latter and to its conversion by armed force into a German colony. The Russian workers, like the bourgeoisie, are interested in the development of home industry, no less than the Russian landlords and peasants are interested in the development of agriculture. From this he drew the conclusion that it was necessary for all classes in Russia to take part in the defence of the country.

3. A lecture delivered by Plekhanov in Lausanne on October 11, 1914, entitled "The Attitude of the Socialists Towards War," in the course of which, criticising the conduct of the German Social-Democrats, and justifying the position adopted by the French Socialists who had accepted ministerial posts, he employed the very same arguments as those used by Smirnov and Maslov, as outlined above. Lenin took part in the discussion that followed this lecture and subjected Plekhanov's position to severe criticism, exposing its social-chauvinist nature. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 65-66.)

PAGE 130.* This refers to the Paris Commune of 1871, which transformed the Franco-Prussian War into a war against the French bourgeoisie and for its overthrow. (See note to page 12.)*

PAGE 131.* The World War, which caused an acute crisis in the European Socialist Parties, also caused confusion and vacillation among certain unstable Bolsheviks, particularly among certain Bolsheviks who were living outside of Russia. Some of these Bolsheviks even voluntarily joined the belligerent armies. The manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on the war, issued in 1914, laid down the main line on the attitude to be taken towards the war and advanced the main slogans. Nevertheless, it did not entirely check the wavering in the Bolshevik ranks. The confusion prevailing among a certain section of the Bolsheviks and the necessity of uniting all the revolutionary elements among the Socialists of other countries dictated the necessity of adopting a common decision that would establish ideological unity among the Bolsheviks on all questions of tactics. It was quite impossible, in view of the conditions prevailing during the war, to convene a Party congress or even a wide conference, and so Lenin decided to convene a conference of the representatives of the Bolshevik sections situated abroad. This conference was held in Berne, March 12-17, 1915, and was attended by representatives of the Bolshevik organisations in Paris, Zürich, Geneva, Berne, Lausanne, and Bojio. The London organisation authorised Comrade Krupskaya to represent it. In addition, Comrades E. Bosch and G. Pyatakov, who had escaped from exile in Siberia via Japan, were also present. The following items were on the agenda: reports from the local organisations; the war and the tasks of the Party; the tasks of the organisations abroad; the central organ and a new newspaper; attitude towards colonial affairs; the election of a committee of the organisations abroad; miscellaneous. The report on the question of the war was made by Lenin,

who took the manifesto of the Central Committee as his basis. The resolution on the war, written by Lenin and adopted by the conference, deepened and developed certain postulates in the manifesto of the Central Committee, and indicated the concrete steps to be taken towards transforming the imperialist war into civil war in the West and in Russia. An opposition group, consisting of Bukharin, Krylenko, Rosmirovich and others, was formed at the conference, and put forward its own resolution. While accepting the slogan of civil war, it categorically protested against the slogan of defeat, on the ground that agitation in favour of this slogan among the masses, who were intoxicated with patriotism, would rouse their indignation and repel them from the Party. They proposed that the slogan of civil war be supplemented by the slogan of "fight for peace." The conference rejected this proposal on the ground that a fight for peace not reinforced by revolutionary action against *one's own* bourgeoisie could only lead to the abandonment of the class struggle; propaganda in favour of this slogan was incompatible with the slogan of civil war. "It, in fact," wrote Lenin, "would imply petty-bourgeois snivelling. And we, even in time of war, must remain revolutionaries. We must preach *class war* also among the troops." (Lenin, *Miscellany*, Russian edition, Vol. II, p. 205.)

This opposition group also advocated the slogan of the United States of Europe, which by that time had become the slogan of the Trotsky group and was disputed by Lenin. (See note to page 138.*)

The position taken up by the Bukharin group on the questions of defeat, the struggle for peace and the United States of Europe, as well as the general position taken up by this group during the period of the war, was very close to that of Trotsky. It is not surprising, therefore, that on the question of the attitude to be taken towards the Trotsky group, represented by the newspaper *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*), the Bukharin group occupied a conciliatory position and proposed that closer organisational ties be established with it. The conference rejected this proposal and confirmed the necessity of dissociating the Bolsheviks from all pronounced and tacit chauvinist groups in Russian Social-Democracy, including the Trotsky group.

The Berne Conference was of great historical significance because it drew up a genuinely internationalist platform for the amalgamation of all the revolutionary elements in the international as well as in the Russian labour movement. Its resolutions on the war were published in No. 40 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, dated March 29, 1915, under the heading "Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad." A detailed explanation of these resolutions is given by Lenin in a pamphlet entitled *Socialism and War*, written in August of that year in conjunction with Zinoviev. (See *Little Lenin Library*, No. 3; also *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.) In the preface to this pamphlet the authors, in explaining the significance of the decisions of the Berne Conference compared with the manifesto of the Central Committee of 1914, say that the resolutions of the conference "express more precisely our principles and our tactics."

PAGE 134.* By the policy of "national peace" is meant the suspension of the class struggle by Social-Democrats in wartime. In England, for example, it was called "class truce." In Germany, the Social-Democrats, at the dictates of the imperialist government, adopted the slogan of *Burgfrieden*, "civil peace, i.e., peace between the classes; *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, published an article in which it hinted that the French and German workers were drawn into the war against their will. For this the *Vorwärts* was closed down by the military authorities. After that the Social-Democrats agreed to the order of the military authorities not to refer to the class struggle, and the paper was allowed to resume publication.

The slogan of alliance of the working class and the Socialists with the bourgeoisie (the *bloc nationale*) was fully realised also in France. It was proclaimed by the French bourgeoisie and taken up by the French Socialists.

PAGE 136.* The "oppositional," Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper, *Mysl* (*Thought*), was published in Paris from November 28, 1914, to March 1915, under the direction of Chernov, Kamkov and others. In regard to the war, the newspaper occupied a centrist position, and advocated organisational unity with the social-chauvinists.

PAGE 136.** On Menshevik liquidationism, see Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, particularly the article "Controversial Questions." During the war the leading liquidators, who were grouped around the journal *Nasha Zarya* (*Our Dawn*), were pronounced social-patriots and defencists, and supported tsarism and the bourgeoisie in the imperialist war. The Menshevik Organisation Committee, formed in 1912 at a conference of liquidators organised and led by Trotsky in August of that year, consisted mainly of the Mensheviks who were grouped round *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (*Voice of the Social-Democrat*). During the period of reaction and the new revival of the revolutionary movement, the *Golos*-ites (so called from the title of the newspaper they supported) had occupied a concealed and therefore more dangerous liquidationist position. During the war this position of concealed liquidationism was transformed into equally concealed, centrist social-chauvinism. This was most strikingly manifested in the struggle which the Organisation Committee in a united front with Trotsky and the pronounced social-patriots waged against the Bolshevik slogan of "defeat of one's own government." As against this slogan the Organisation Committee and Trotsky advanced the slogan of "neither victory nor defeat," which, as Lenin said, in his article, "Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War" (in this volume), was "nothing but a paraphrase of the 'defence of the fatherland' slogan."

PAGE 136.*** In principle the position of the Bund in no way differed from that of the Russian centrists as represented by the Organisation Committee

(see preceding note). The attitude of the Bund towards the war was defined in the manifesto, adopted by the Central Committee of the Bund in November 1914 and published in *Information Bulletin*, No. 7, in which the slogan "fight for peace by bringing organised pressure on the governments of all the belligerent countries" was given as the slogan defining the tactics of the proletariat. In speaking of the pro-German chauvinism of the Bund, Lenin apparently has in mind the lecture delivered in Berne by the prominent Bundist, Kossovsky, and the latter's article entitled "The Liberation Legend," published in *Information Bulletin*, No. 7, in which he tried to show, notwithstanding the assertions of Plekhanov and other defencists to the contrary, that the victory of Germany over Russia would not retard the economic and political development of the latter.

PAGE 136.**** The Brussels bloc was an anti-Bolshevik alliance formed at a "unity" conference convened on July 16 and 17, 1914, in Brussels by the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International for the purpose of uniting the various factions and groups in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. At this conference, members of the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau, including Vandervelde and Kautsky, as well as representatives of the Menshevik Organisation Committee, of the Bund, of Trotsky's *Borba* group, of Plekhanov's *Yedinstvo* group, of the Polish Socialist Party, of the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party, of the Social-Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, of the Polish Social-Democratic Opposition and of the Lettish Social-Democratic Party, were present. Representatives of the Bolshevik Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party were also present at the conference and defended the point of view that was developed in the special report of the Central Committee to the conference that was drawn up by Lenin. In this report, the main disagreements were explained and it was proved that unity with the liquidators was impossible as long as they retained their positions or, as was stated in the report, "until they cease to be liquidators." The main condition for unity that was advanced was the endorsement of the decisions of the Party which condemned liquidationism, the recognition that every attempt to weaken the role of the illegal Party was incompatible with membership of the R.S.D.L.P., the recognition of the main revolutionary slogans (a democratic republic and confiscation of the landlords' lands) and the unconditional submission of the Party minority to the majority. The resolution passed by the Brussels Conference, on which the representatives of the Bolshevik Central Committee and of the Lettish Social-Democrats abstained from voting: 1) denied the existence of any disagreements that could justify the "continuation of the split"; 2) on the question of the illegal Party it stated that since all the groups recognised the programme of the Party, "it goes without saying that they also recognise the Party," and that at the given moment the Party organisation necessarily had to be illegal; 3) spoke of the necessity of convening "a general congress for the purpose of settl-

ing controversial programme questions," and 4) refused to criticise the "past" of certain groups as being "fruitless" and "harmful" and spoke in general terms about the need for unity. The decisions of this conference had no practical significance whatever, and once again the attempt of the opportunists to "squash" Bolshevism by this sort of "unity" failed.

PAGE 136.***** At the time the resolution of the Berne Conference was passed (March 1915), the newspaper *Nashe Slovo*, which was published in Paris, grouped around itself the so-called Menshevik Internationalists and Trotskyists. The Menshevik Organisation Committee (see note to page 136 **) was represented on the editorial board of *Nashe Slovo* by Martov, who however was recalled in June by the Foreign Secretariat of the Organisation Committee. After that *Nashe Slovo* passed entirely into the hands of the Trotsky group.

PAGE 136.***** Mankov—the Menshevik deputy from the Irkutsk Gubernia to the Fourth State Duma. An outspoken defencist. In January 1915 voted for the Budget in the Duma and was expelled from the Menshevik Duma fraction, which in a centrist manner abstained from voting for the Budget, merely in order to conceal its own social-chauvinism from the workers.

PAGE 138.* This article was published in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 44, September 5, 1915. The slogan, "a United States of Europe," occurred in the manifesto on the war issued by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party (published in this volume). It was discussed at the Berne Conference at which, in conjunction with the slogan, "fight for peace," it was defended by the Bukharin group and included in a resolution that was submitted by the group but rejected by the conference. (See note to page 131.*) As is evident from Lenin's introductory lines to the resolutions of this conference (see article "Conference of the Sections of the R.S.D.L.P. Abroad," in this volume), and in the opening lines of the present article, the conference decided to postpone the discussion of this question "pending a discussion in the press on the economic side of the question." In writing this article Lenin carried out the decision of the conference and expressed himself most categorically against the slogan of the United States of Europe. In studying this article it must be borne in mind that Trotsky began to advocate this slogan before the Berne Conference.

In his article Lenin strikes at this slogan from the point of view of the conception of imperialism which later he developed in his book, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. But the historical and theoretical significance of this article is much greater than the fact that it strikes at the slogan of the United States of Europe. In it, for the first time in Marxian literature, he advances the idea of the possibility of the victory not only of the proletarian revolution, but also of the building of socialism in a single country, and bases this idea on his conception of imperialism and, in

particular, on the law of the uneven development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism. This postulate of Lenin's, subsequently developed by Comrade Stalin, served as one of the most powerful weapons in the struggle against the Trotsky-Zinoviev *bloc* in 1926-27, and helped to smash the opposition *bloc* in those years. It also was, and remains, a powerful theoretical bulwark in all the victories which the dictatorship of the proletariat in a single country—the U.S.S.R.—in the first, and for the time being, the only attempt to build socialism, has been achieving.

PAGE 142.* This article, which appeared in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 43, August 8, 1915, was written in defence of the slogan "defeat of one's own government," which was one of the most important Bolshevik slogans issued during the war, and which was contained in the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and in the resolutions adopted by the Berne Conference of the Party. This slogan is inseparably connected with the slogan of transforming the imperialist war into civil war, and it draws a sharp line of demarcation between the revolutionary-proletarian tactical line during the war and the line of both pronounced and tacit defensism and social-chauvinism. It served as a touchstone by which the true character of the "internationalism" of the concealed social-chauvinists of the type of Kautsky, Trotsky, Martov and the adherents of the Menshevik Organisation Committee was most easily exposed. At the same time it served as the touchstone by which the firmness of the members of the Bolshevik Party itself, among whom there were certain elements (the Bukharin group, Kamenev) who refused to adopt this slogan, was tested; hence, the defence of this slogan and the fight against its opponents were very important matters. Lenin continued the struggle throughout the period of 1914-16. In this article, which is specially devoted to the question of the defeat of one's own government, Lenin most fully develops this point of view.

PAGE 142.** Lenin quotes this passage from an Open Letter written by Trotsky to *Kommunist*, a magazine published at the end of 1915 by the editorial board of the Bolshevik organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, in conjunction with the Bukharin-Pyatakov group. In this letter, Trotsky stated that he was resigning from the staff of the magazine owing to his disagreement in principle with the position of the Bolsheviks. He also defended the conduct of the Menshevik Duma fraction, led by Chkheidze, and the concealed chauvinist, centrist position it had taken up.

PAGE 144.* This refers to the huge demonstrations in Vienna, and the barricades put up in Prague, which were an echo of the 1905 Revolution in Russia. As a result of the revolutionary action of the Austrian proletariat, the Austrian government passed a Reform Act which extended the franchise of the workers. (See *Selected Works*, Vol. III, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution.")

PAGE 149.* This article and the two following ones, "A Few Theses" and "The Two Lines of the Revolution," are inseparably connected with each other. Written in the period of September-November 1915, the three articles take as their starting point the defeat of Russia in the imperialist war and the revival of the revolutionary movement, which had become quite evident at that time. Hence, they speak of the impending revolution in Russia, of the relation of class forces and parties in this revolution, and of its perspectives; they also develop the slogans of the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party issued in 1914, and of the Berne Conference of 1915 in relation to Russia. The first of these articles was not published at that time; it was published for the first time by the Lenin Institute in *Pravda* on November 7, 1928. The second and third articles were published in Nos. 47 and 48 of *Sotsial-Demokrat* of October 26 and December 3, 1915, respectively. Notwithstanding the enormous difference between 1905 and 1915 (the considerably higher stage of development of capitalism in Russia, the considerably greater growth of imperialism there compared with 1905, the tremendous sweep of the war and the unprecedented sufferings it entailed for the broad masses of the proletariat and the peasantry), the relation of class forces, as Lenin says in his article, "The Two Lines of the Revolution," remained unchanged in the main, and for that reason the revival of the social movement in 1915 proceeded, as in 1905, along two main lines of the revolution, the line of decisive victory for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was calculated to grow into a socialist revolution, and the bourgeois-reformist line.

The struggle of the proletariat, which was interrupted by the outbreak of the imperialist war, was resumed in April 1915, and reached its climax in September of that year. According to official statistics, which are obviously an underestimation, out of a total of 539,500 factory workers involved in strikes in 1915, 113,800 went on strike in the beginning of September. The renewed struggle of the proletariat bore a definitely expressed revolutionary character, and was waged under the slogan, overthrow tsarism. In spite of the severe conditions of underground work in wartime, the Bolshevik Party led this movement, and in its press carefully noted every step it took.

The labour movement resumed its old path. The bourgeoisie also resumed its old path. In the first year of the war, the bourgeoisie did everything to help the autocracy, under the slogan "we put no conditions or demands," which was advanced by Milyukov, the leader of the Constitutional-Democrats in the Duma at the very beginning of the war. Owing to the defeats suffered by Russia, the bourgeoisie turned to the "Left," organised "pressure" upon the autocracy by means of negotiations with the tsarist government and deputations to the tsar himself. They submitted loyal petitions to appoint a Cabinet consisting of persons "enjoying the confidence of the country," by which, of course, they meant Constitutional-Democrats, Octobrists, etc., like Guchkov, Milyukov, Shingarev, Kononov, etc., who subsequently, at various times, were members of the Provisional Government of 1917. In

a speech he delivered in 1915, Milyukov formulated these tactics of the bourgeoisie as follows: "to bring about a peaceful revolution behind the backs and with the sanction of the government itself, by lulling the vigilance of the ruling bodies of the latter, by outward and ostentatious declarations of the loyalty of the Cadets." It was on this platform that the so-called "progressive bloc," to which Lenin refers at the beginning of his article, "The Defeat of Russia and the Revolutionary Crisis," was formed. Actually this was a bourgeois-landlord bloc between the Constitutional-Democrats and the so-called Progressives (a small group of representatives of the "Lefts" among the upper strata of the industrial bourgeoisie) on the one side, and the Octobrists and still more conservative groups represented in the Duma and the State Council, including such pronounced Black Hundred elements as the well-known reactionary and anti-Semite, V. Shulgin, on the other. The main slogan of this bloc was the "formation of a government consisting of persons enjoying the confidence of the country" for the purpose of prosecuting the war to a victorious conclusion. This bloc stood in opposition to the so-called "Black bloc," which was formed around Nicholas II, his wife and Rasputin, and which was scheming to conclude a separate peace with Germany. As a matter of fact, the immediate aim of the "progressive bloc" was merely to take the place of the "Black bloc" and capture influence over the tsar. The "Black bloc" retaliated to the formation of the "progressive bloc," and the negotiations it was conducting, by adjourning the Duma. During the "interregnum" the further organisation of the forces of the bourgeoisie on the platform of the "progressive bloc" proceeded. For this purpose the so-called War Industries Committees (see note to page 154*) and the All-Russian Unions of Towns and Zemstvos for Assisting the Sick and the Wounded, formed for the purpose of helping in the prosecution of the war in the interests of the capitalists, were mobilised. At the congresses of the Unions of Towns and Zemstvos held in September, the demands of the "progressive bloc" were adopted and both congresses elected deputations to go to the tsar to submit a petition to re-assemble the State Duma and "renovate the government" on the basis of "the confidence of the country and unity with its legitimate representative." The tsar simply refused to receive the joint deputation of the two congresses. In this way the attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to "attack" the autocracy and bring about a "peaceful revolution" fizzled out. The attitude of the "progressive bloc," not towards this "peaceful revolution," but towards genuine revolution, emerging from the masses of workers, can be seen from the speech delivered by the leader of this bloc, the Constitutional-Democrat Milyukov, in June 1915, in which he exclaimed: "God save us from this conflagration! It would not be a revolution, it would be the 'awful Russian riot, senseless and ruthless' which made Pushkin tremble. It would be . . . a bacchanalia of the mob."

By that time the proletariat was beginning to make the bourgeoisie tremble in fear of a "ruthless riot" by its strike movement, demonstrations

and vast mass meetings. And the proletarian Bolshevik Party, represented by Lenin, formulated, in the articles here referred to, the tasks of this "riot." Taking as his starting point the fact that the relation of class forces had remained unchanged, Lenin, as in 1905, puts before the proletariat of Russia, and its party, the immediate task of bringing about the democratic revolution together with the whole of the peasantry and of establishing the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasantry, and from this revolution, from this dictatorship, *immediately* to pass to the socialist revolution. In speaking of this task of transforming the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, which he and the Party had quite definitely raised as far back as 1905, Lenin at the same time emphasised the close connection that existed between the revolutionary crisis in Russia in the conditions of the imperialist war, and the general revolutionary crisis in Western Europe, which had put the socialist revolution in Europe on the order of the day. As in 1905, he did not consider the victory of this revolution in the West a condition for the victory of the revolution in Russia. On the contrary, from his conception of imperialism, and the law of the uneven development of capitalism under imperialism, he drew the conclusion that not only was the lasting victory of the proletarian revolution possible in a single country, but so also was the victory of socialism possible in a single country. (See article "The United States of Europe Slogan" in this volume.) From the connection between the revolutionary crisis in Russia and the general revolutionary crisis in Western Europe he drew another conclusion. In conjunction with the task of the democratic revolution and of immediately utilising it for the purpose of bringing about the socialist revolution in Russia "in alliance with the proletariat of the West," he, as in 1905, put before the Russian proletariat the task of—with the same allies—kindling the socialist revolution in the West; he showed how very similar these tasks had become in the conditions of the revolutionary crisis caused by the war in the West, and urged that it was possible, under these conditions, to transform the Russian revolution from a prologue to the European socialist revolution, into a constituent part of it. Such are the main ideas that run through these three articles.

PAGE 149.** The Bulygin Duma—so-called after the Minister for the Interior, Bulygin, who, in 1905, drafted a law for the convening of a State Duma on a franchise that practically excluded the workers. This Duma was never convened owing to the rise of the revolutionary wave in 1905. (See article "The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the Insurrection" in *Selected Works*, Vol. III.) The First, so-called Witte, Duma was convened in the spring of 1906 on the basis of a law passed by the tsarist government during the December uprising in Moscow, providing for a wider franchise than that on which the Bulygin Duma was based. This Duma was dissolved as a consequence of the peasant movement in the spring and summer of 1906 and the discussion in the Duma of the agrarian question and the proposal of

an appeal to the people that was to be issued by the Duma in connection with this movement. Concerning the First Duma see article, "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat," and the explanatory notes to this article, in *Selected Works*, Vol. III.

PAGE 152.* The Second Duma was dissolved on June 3 (June 16, new style) after the arrest of the Social-Democratic deputies. At the same time a new election law was promulgated which provided for a franchise ensuring the predominance of the landlords and upper stratum of the bourgeoisie in the Duma. After this the reaction, led by the Stolypin government, became still more entrenched. That is why the regime established by the Stolypin government was known as the "Third of June regime." For further particulars, see, in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, Part I, articles: "On to the High Road," "The Social Structure of the Government, etc.," and the explanatory notes to them.

PAGE 154.* Soon after the war broke out, the organisation of the Russian bourgeoisie, known as the Council of the Congress of Representatives of Trade and Industry, set up a committee to distribute government war contracts among the various manufacturers and their trusts, syndicates, etc. This committee was known as the Central War Industries Committee. Local committees of a similar kind were set up in all the important towns. In July 1915, a national congress of all these organisations was held, at which the rules governing these committees were drawn up and adopted. Later, these rules were endorsed by the Duma and the tsar. Desiring to follow the example of the West European bourgeoisie, the Russian bourgeoisie tried to enlist the workers for active participation in the prosecution of the war "to final victory," and inserted a clause in the rules of these War Industries Committees authorising the workers to elect their representatives to them. The Bolsheviks carried on agitation among the workers urging them to boycott these committees, since they were a bourgeois trap, and at the same time carried on anti-war agitation at workers' election meetings. The majority of the workers did boycott these committees. The pro-war Mensheviks, who were in favour of the workers being represented on these committees, managed to induce only an insignificant section of the workers to send their representatives to them. With the aid of this insignificant section the Mensheviks formed a "workers' fraction" on the Central War Industries Committee, notwithstanding the boycott by the majority of the St. Petersburg workers. At the head of the "workers' fraction" was the Menshevik Gvozdev who subsequently became Vice-Minister of Labour in the Coalition Provisional Government in 1917.

PAGE 155.* Lenin here has in mind the considerable progress of the rural districts on the road of development of capitalism since 1905. On this road of development of peasant farming, the middle peasant gets washed away; on

the one hand, the kulak, or capitalist farmer element, grows and becomes stronger, and, on the other hand, there is a much greater numerical increase in the number of poor peasants and rural proletariat, i.e., agricultural labourers. This process of differentiation in the rural districts was greatly facilitated after 1905 by the Stolypin agrarian laws which permitted and encouraged the peasants to leave the village communes and to set up their own homesteads. It was the well-to-do and kulak elements of the rural districts who took advantage of these laws, and this is exactly what Stolypin had in view, as his policy was to build up a reliable stronghold of tsarism in the rural districts. (For further particulars see articles, "The Agrarian Question and the Present State of Russia" and "The Question of the [General] Agrarian Policy of the Present Government," and the explanatory notes to these articles, in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV.) By "homestead landlords" Lenin, of course, means the kulaks who had set up their own homesteads and farmed their lands by exploiting the labour of agricultural labourers and the rural poor. In addition to this, the yoke of landlordism continued to oppress the countryside. This yoke was not removed by the Stolypin agrarian laws; on the contrary, it was maintained by the landlord autocracy. It is this yoke that Lenin calls the oppression of the "Markovs and Co." (Markov was a deputy in the Duma representing the feudal landlords; he was a prominent reactionary.) In another article, "The Two Lines of the Revolution," Lenin calls this landlord clique the "Markov-Romanov-Khvostov" clique. (Romanov was the dynastic name of the tsar, while Khvostov at that time was Minister for the Interior.) Thus Lenin included in this clique the tsar and his ministers, and he went on to say that the antagonism between the countryside as a whole, between the peasants as a whole, and this clique had not diminished, but, on the contrary, had increased, precisely because the oppression of the Markovs, Romanovs and Co. had not been abolished, but had become more burdensome.

PAGE 158.* Lenin here refers to an article by Plekhanov, entitled "The Two Lines of the Revolution," in the magazine, *Prizyv (The Call)*, published in Paris by the social-chauvinist Socialist-Revolutionaries and Social-Democrats jointly. In this article Plekhanov wrote: "Let us assume that in our country the revolution proceeds in the same way as—according to the indisputably correct observation of Marx—the Great French Revolution. That would mean that, at first, power would pass into the hands of *our* constitutionalists, the Left Octobrists, the Progressives and the Cadets. Then it would pass to the *Trudoviki*" (petty-bourgeois democrats, representatives of the peasants—*Ed. Eng. ed.*). "Finally, after all these preliminary phases had been passed, after the revolution had assumed the widest dimensions, power would pass to the *Socialists*. But how would our extreme Lefts feel when they saw that events were tending in this direction? The experience of past years leaves no room for the slightest doubt on this score. They would be deeply chagrined. They

would shout that the cause of the revolution was doomed. And they would do all that lay in their power to prevent the revolution from proceeding along this—ascending—line.” (*Prizyv*, No. 3, 1915.)

PAGE 158.** In this article Plekhanov quotes the following passage from Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, pp. 36-37:

“In the first French Revolution the rule of the *Constitutionalists* is followed by the rule of the *Girondins* and the rule of the *Girondins* by the rule of the *Jacobins*. Each of these parties supported itself on the more progressive party. As soon as it has brought the revolution far enough to be unable to follow it further, still less to go ahead of it, it is thrust aside by the bolder ally that stands behind it and sent to the guillotine. The revolution thus moves along an ascending line.

“It is the reverse with the Revolution of 1848. The proletarian party appears as an appendage of the petty-bourgeois democratic party. It is betrayed and dropped by the latter on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. The democratic party, in its turn, leans on the shoulders of the bourgeois-republican party. The bourgeois-republicans no sooner believe themselves well established than they shake off the troublesome comrade and support themselves on the shoulders of the Party of Order. The Party of Order hunches its shoulders, lets the bourgeois-republicans tumble and throws itself on the shoulders of armed force. It fancies it is still sitting on its shoulders when, one fine morning, it perceives that the shoulders have transformed themselves into bayonets. Each party strikes from behind at that pressing further and leans from in front on that pressing back. No wonder that in this ridiculous posture it loses its balance and, having made the inevitable grimaces, collapses with curious capers: the revolution thus moves in a descending line. It finds itself in this state of retrogressive motion before the last February barricade has been cleared away and the first revolutionary authority constituted.”

PAGE 158.*** In his pamphlet *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, and also in *The Class Struggles in France*, Marx, in analysing the relation and disposition of class forces in the Revolution of 1848, repeatedly emphasises the betrayal of the proletariat by the petty-bourgeois democrats and points to this as one of the causes of the defeat of the revolution. Lenin's reference to Marx's observations on the alliance of the French bourgeoisie with the peasantry in 1789 apparently applies to the following passage in an article by Marx, entitled “The Feudal Imposts Bill,” published in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, July 29, 1848: “The French bourgeoisie in 1789 did not for one moment abandon its allies—the peasants. It realised that the basis of its power was the destruction of feudalism in the rural districts, the restoration of a free, landowning class of peasants.”

PAGE 160.* Concerning the Menshevik tactics of “adaptation” to the liberals in connection with the Bulygin Duma of 1905 and the First and Second Dumas of 1906 and 1907, see articles “The Boycott of the Bulygin Duma and the

Insurrection," "Should We Boycott the State Duma?" "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat" and "The Boycott," in *Selected Works*, Vol. III.

PAGE 161.* *Nashe Dyelo (Our Cause)* was published in St. Petersburg in place of *Nasha Zarya (Our Dawn)*, which had been closed down by the government. Like *Nasha Zarya*, it was issued by the Menshevik-liquidationist group, which during the war became social-chauvinist. (See also note to page 136.**)

PAGE 161.** According to Russian folklore the earth is supported in space by three whales. In this case the term "whales" (translated "pillars") is applied to the three main slogans adopted by the Prague Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1912, viz., a democratic republic, confiscation of the land of the landlords and an eight-hour day. These slogans were to guide the Bolsheviks in their leadership of the reviving labour movement and, indeed, it was under these slogans that the labour movement of 1912-14 and the election campaign for the Fourth Duma were conducted.

PAGE 162.* By this Lenin means Trotsky's "theory of permanent revolution." Comrade Stalin describes this theory as a variety of Menshevism, as an instrument in the struggle against Bolshevism, as the rejection of the Leninist doctrine of bourgeois-democratic revolution and proletarian revolution and of the growth of the one into the other, of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the possibility of a durable victory of the proletarian revolution and of socialism in a single country, particularly Russia. Comrade Stalin states further that the theory of "permanent revolution" also served ultimately to convert Trotskyism into "the vanguard of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie." Originally, as far back as 1905, Trotsky borrowed this theory from Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus. Its main feature was that it ignored the agrarian-peasant social and economic content of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, underestimated and almost completely denied the revolutionary possibilities of the peasant movement in this revolution, displayed lack of faith in the power of proletarian leadership of the peasant masses; from this logically followed: 1) the denial of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, 2) leaping across this dictatorship directly to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and 3) the forecast that, as a consequence of the inevitable conflict between the proletarian state and the peasantry, including the poor and middle peasants, the dictatorship of the proletariat must perish unless it is supported by "the state aid of the victorious proletariat of the West." Trotsky revived this theory on the basis of the semi-Menshevik, Kautskyan theory of imperialism which he also borrowed from the Lefts in the Second International headed by Rosa Luxemburg. (See Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, "Questions Concerning

the History of Bolshevism.") In 1915, when Russia was suffering defeat and the revolutionary crisis was rising in Russia (with which Lenin deals in this and in the two preceding articles), Trotsky, in the August 26 and September 1-4 issues of *Nashe Slovo* (*Our Word*), issued in Paris by his group, wrote an article entitled "The Military Disaster and the Political Perspectives," in which he wrote that the bourgeois-capitalist development of Russia had gone so far to develop the "class antagonisms among the peasantry," to split it up into separate social groups, that "now, very much more than in 1905, the problem is to win over to our side the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the rural districts, *but not the peasants as a class*." However, he regarded the possibility of winning over even the semi-proletarians of the rural districts to the side of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle as problematical and, if possible, only up to a certain "limit," which he himself could not define, and beyond which, apparently, the proletariat had to come into conflict with them. "To what extent the socialist vanguard of the proletariat succeeds in this struggle in rallying round itself the lower strata of the people, i.e., the rural and urban poor, and to what limits it can lead them, can only be a matter of extreme conjecture," says Trotsky. Thus, the proletariat must remain alone in the field in the fight against the tsarist autocracy. The more so since "the cry, 'down with the war,' which is the point of departure for the whole future movement of the proletariat, brings Social-Democracy into opposition to all the parties of bourgeois society." From this he drew the conclusion that it was now out of place to speak of the national bourgeois revolution in Russia, but that it was necessary to speak of the revolution of the proletariat. "If the 'national revolution' of 1905 could not be consummated, then history cannot even raise the question of a repetition of the national revolution, i.e., a revolution that would unite the 'nation' against the old regime." (Trotsky's italics.) Therefore, all talk about a bourgeois revolution should be dropped. But, according to Trotsky, in the conditions of imperialism, which is fulfilling its "truly liberating," progressive task of uniting the world into a single economic whole, the proletarian revolution is impossible in a single country. (See note to page 138.*) Hence, "only an international socialist revolution can give rise to the situation and bring to the front the forces that can carry the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of Russia to the end." These are the main arguments Trotsky used in 1915 in support of his old "original theory" of permanent revolution. These arguments, and this dizzy leap across the peasants, across the as yet unfulfilled tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which Trotsky recommends to the proletariat, are examined by Lenin in his article. As against Trotsky's theory, Lenin advocates the winning of the peasantry as a whole to the side of the proletariat, the utilisation to the utmost of all the revolutionary forces of the peasants for the purpose of overthrowing tsarism and the landlords, and the creation by these means of the possibility of passing over, *immediately* after this, to the socialist revolution in alliance with the proletariat of the West, and, of course, with the rural poor in Russia, at the same time neutral-

ising the middle peasants in the first period. In this article Lenin does not deal with the question of the possibility of the durable victory of the proletarian revolution and of socialism in a single country (in this case Russia). This subject is dealt with in the article "The United States of Europe Slogan," in this volume.

PAGE 167.* "The Collapse of the Second International" was published in 1915 in No. 1-2 of the magazine *Kommunist* (concerning which see note to page 142**). It develops and gives the grounds for the postulates concerning the opportunist degeneration of the parties of the Second International which were advanced by Lenin in the manifesto of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party and in the resolutions of the Berne Conference. (See pages 123-37 in this volume.) In these historically important documents it was stated that the war had fully revealed the complete victory of opportunism and the transformation of the latter into social-chauvinism in the Socialist Parties in the West and in Russia, with the exception of the Bolshevik Party. It also revealed the transformation of these parties into weapons in the struggle for the imperialist interests of the bourgeoisie of their respective countries. The Bolsheviks regarded imperialism as the "eve of socialism," and the imperialist war as the beginning of the collapse of capitalism. In order to mobilise the forces of the proletariat for the purpose of transforming the imperialist war into civil war, they had to wage a ruthless struggle against social-chauvinism which prevailed in the Socialist Parties in the West and which dimmed the class consciousness of the proletariat. The Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, fulfilled this task during the war and, in doing so, it continued the line it had pursued since the Party had been formed in 1903, viz., rupture with the opportunists of all shades in the Second International. It was the only party that consistently pursued this line; and long before the war it completely broke with opportunism and centrism (which is a variety of opportunism) in Russia, and consistently fought against them in the West. The numerically small Left elements in the Second International in the West, mainly the Lefts in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, led by Rosa Luxemburg, rendered some service in the struggle against opportunism, and particularly against centrism in the Second International; but both before and during the war, in their theories and their practical activities, they were far from being as consistent as the Bolsheviks in this struggle. Unable to overcome their organisational and ideological weaknesses, they "wavered again and again between Bolshevism and Menshevism," opposed their own "semi-Menshevik theories" (organisational views, theory of permanent revolution, theory of imperialism, views on the national and colonial questions, etc.) to Bolshevism, and, as Lenin said (see *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX, "The Pamphlet by Junius"), Rosa Luxemburg and the other German and Polish Lefts were "entangled on all sides in the vile net of Kautskyan hypocrisy, pedantry, 'friendship for the op-

portunists.' " (See Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, "Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism," p. 395.) As a result of all this they feared to draw the logical conclusions from revolutionary slogans, they feared to break away from opportunism and from its centrist variety, Kautskyism, both before and during the war, in spite of the fact that, in Rosa Luxemburg's own words, German Social-Democracy (and the whole of the Second International) was a "stinking corpse." There still weighed upon them the burden of the accursed traditions of "unity" with the venal (Scheidemann, Legien, David and Co.) and spineless (Kautsky, Hilferding and Co.) gang of servants of capital, which caused the delay in the split and in the formation of Communist Parties in the West.

On the question of the split, the Lefts in the West dragged at the tail of the centrists (Kautsky and Co.). Right up to the war the centrists were regarded as "orthodox" Marxists, but as a matter of fact, under cover of preserving "Party unity," "peace in the Party," they had long been slipping, and finally landed, into opportunism. As Comrade Stalin says: "Formally, the Second International was headed by 'orthodox' Marxists like Kautsky and others. Actually, however, its fundamental work followed the line of opportunism. Because of their petty-bourgeois adaptable nature, the opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie; as for the 'orthodox,' they adapted themselves to the opportunists in order to 'maintain unity' with the latter, to maintain 'peace within the Party!' As a result, opportunism dominated; because the links between the policy of the bourgeoisie and the policy of the 'orthodox' were joined." (Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. I, "Foundations of Leninism," p. 20.)

Simultaneously with the complete exposure of the opportunist degeneration of the Socialist Parties of the Second International and of its centrist "orthodox" leaders, the rottenness, uselessness and unprincipled character of the unity of these parties and of its international federation—the Second International—were also exposed.

The Stuttgart Congress of the Second International held in 1907 passed a resolution pointing to the danger of war that was already looming at that time. The resolution was moved by Bebel and in its original draft was, as Lenin stated, "dogmatic, one-sided and dead." But after an amendment, moved by Lenin and backed by the Left elements at the congress, was adopted, the final resolution called upon the working class of all countries to exert every effort to prevent war in the event of its threatening. In case war should break out, continued the resolution, it was the duty of the working class to strive to bring it to a speedy end and to take advantage of the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the masses in order to hasten the downfall of capitalist rule. This resolution was endorsed at the special International Socialist Congress held in Basle in 1912. Thus the Second International pledged itself to take advantage of the crisis that war would inevitably cause in order to bring about the socialist revolution.

But this promise could be fulfilled when war had actually broken out only

by stubborn and persistent organisational, propagandist and agitational work in the direction of transforming the imperialist war into civil war. Instead of doing this, the parties of the Second International carried on agitation and propaganda in favour of "class truce" with the bourgeoisie, in favour of "national defence." The Right-wing opportunists openly carried on this propaganda and agitation, while the centrists carried it on in a concealed way, screened by "Marxian" phrases. The Right opportunists acted openly on the side of "their" bourgeoisie. The centrists screened their own and the Right opportunists' treachery by "justifying it theoretically." "Revolutionary" phrases, references to Marx, to the history of their respective parties and of the International—all this they resorted to in order to conceal from the workers the treachery of the Rights and their own treachery. Under these circumstances, *the principal enemy that misled the working class was the centrists*. Therefore, fire had to be concentrated on the centrists, they had to be exposed as concealed opportunists; their influence over the masses had to be destroyed, they had to be ejected with the opportunists from the proletarian party. At the same time it was necessary to build up a proletarian army for the direct struggle for the proletarian revolution in all the advanced belligerent countries in the West, but this was hindered by the opportunists and centrists who helped the bourgeoisie to fool the working class. A split in the parties in all countries and in the Second International became an imperative necessity, the urgent task of the day. The speedy organisation of the genuinely revolutionary Socialists in an independent party in each country, uniting these internationally, the organisation of a new, revolutionary, Third International to take the place of the bankrupt Second International—such were the tasks of the day confronting the revolutionaries in all countries. The object of "The Collapse of the Second International" was to explain these tasks.

PAGE 167.** This bulletin was published in Geneva. The article by Kossovsky, to which reference is made, was entitled "How to Restore the International," published in issue No. 8, in May 1915.

PAGE 167.*** For Lenin's report on the Stuttgart Congress, see the article "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart," in Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, and the explanatory notes to it. For a summary of the Stuttgart resolution, see note to page 167 * in this volume.

PAGE 168.* The Chemnitz Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany was held in September 1912, just before the Basle Congress of the Second International. At this congress the resolution on imperialism to which Lenin refers was adopted. This resolution stated that the growth of capitalist production gives rise to a race between the capitalists for new markets; hence, the shameless policy of plunder and conquest. The pursuit of this predatory policy leads to an unprecedented growth of armaments. The quarrel over territories leads to conflicts between the imperialist states

and to a world war. All the bourgeois parties have completely taken the path of imperialism. Hence the task of Social-Democracy is to fight against imperialist and chauvinist strivings and to train the proletariat in the spirit of international solidarity. In conclusion the resolution states:

"The Party congress expects every member of the Party to exert all efforts to develop the political, industrial and co-operative organisations of the class conscious proletariat in order, with increased energy, to fight against imperialism until it is overthrown."

PAGE 169.* The pamphlet by C. Dumas was published in Paris in 1915.

PAGE 170.* Concerning the conflict between Austria and Serbia, the resolution of the Basle Congress states:

"The Social-Democratic Parties of Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina must exert every effort to continue the fruitful activities against the attempt of the Danube monarchy (*i.e.*, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy) to attack Serbia. Now, as in the past and in the future, their task is to counteract the plan to deprive Serbia of the fruits of war by force of arms, to convert her into a colony of Austria, and, for the sake of dynastic interests, to subject the peoples of Austria-Hungary, as well as all the nations of Europe, to extreme danger."

Concerning the conflict between Austria and Italy over Albania, the resolution states:

"The Social-Democratic Parties of Austria-Hungary and the Socialists in Italy must pay special attention to the Albanian question. The congress recognises the right of the nation to autonomy. But it does not agree that, under cover of autonomy, Albania should fall a victim to Austro-Hungarian and Italian strivings for predominance. The congress regards this not only as a danger to Albania, but also as a menace to peace between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the near future."

The resolution also warned the working class against the predatory aims of Russian tsarism. It stated:

"If tsarism succeeds in again coming forward as the liberator of the Balkan nations, it will be only in order, under this pretext, to secure predominance in the Balkans by means of a sanguinary war. The congress hopes that the growing urban and rural proletariat of Russia, Finland and Poland will tear down this web of lies, will counteract every military venture, will fight against every attempt on the part of tsarism to attack Armenia, Constantinople, etc., and concentrate all their efforts on resuming the revolutionary struggle for liberation."

The main thing in the war of 1914 was the struggle between England and Germany for markets, for colonies and for the command of the seas. The congress foresaw this also, and in its resolution particularly emphasised it. The resolution stated:

"The Congress regards as a serious danger to peace the artificially fostered antagonisms between Great Britain and the German Empire. . . . The removal of the antagonism between Germany, on the one side, and England and France, on the other, would remove the very serious danger that threatens to disturb the peace, would shake the power of tsarism, which is exploiting these antagonisms, would avert an attack by Austria-Hungary on Serbia, and would guarantee the peace of the world. Therefore, all the efforts of the International must be directed towards this end."

PAGE 171.* This refers to wars that were typical of the epoch of 1789-1871, i.e., the epoch of the formation of national bourgeois states on the continent of Europe. This epoch commenced with the Great French Revolution in 1789, which abolished feudalism in France and set up the bourgeois state, and ended with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. It was in the course of these eighty-two years that nearly all the big modern capitalist states of Europe, France, Germany, Austria and Italy, were formed. The process of formation of national bourgeois states was accompanied by a number of wars. In the period 1789-94, France was obliged to fight almost the whole of Europe in order to defend the gains of the revolution and to preserve her independence. Germany, in the process of unification, waged war against Austria and France; Italy waged war against Austria, etc. These wars waged in the process of formation of national bourgeois states are called national wars by Lenin. The Basle resolution speaks not of national wars, but of the imperialist war. The resolution states:

"The congress calls upon the workers of all countries to oppose to capitalist imperialism the might of the international solidarity of the proletariat. It would be utter blindness or madness for the governments not to understand that the mere thought of a monstrous world war will rouse the indignation and anger of the working class. The proletariat considers it a crime to shoot at each other for the sake of increasing the profits of the capitalists, for the ambitions of dynasties, or for the glory of the secret treaties of diplomacy."

The wars enumerated by Plekhanov and Kautsky with false references to Marx were not imperialist wars. The wars of 1813 and 1870, to which Plekhanov referred, were: the war of 1813 between Prussia and France for the independence of Prussia, and the war of 1870-71, the Franco-Prussian War, which preceded the Paris Commune. The wars of 1854-71, the war of 1876-77 and the war of 1897 to which Kautsky referred were: 1) the war of England and France and their allies against tsarist Russia (the Crimean War of 1854-56); 2) the war of Sardinia in alliance with France against Austria for the unification of Italy (1859); 3) the Austro-Prussian War for the unification of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia (1866); 4) the above-mentioned Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71; 5) the Balkan War of the Bulgarians, Serbians and Rumanians against Turkey for their independence (1876-77), in which tsarist Russia intervened for the purpose of seizing

Constantinople from Turkey and of securing an outlet from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, on the pretext of fighting for her "brother Slava," and 6) the war of Greece against Turkey for the possession of the Isle of Crete (1897). The general character of these wars and the falseness of the references of Plekhanov and Kautsky to Marx are explained by Lenin in chapter III of this article.

PAGE 171.** The first and only number of *Die Internationale* was published in April 1915. The magazine was suppressed by the German government, and Mehring, who was seventy years old at the time, had to pay the penalty of imprisonment. This magazine was published by the German Lefts (headed by Rosa Luxemburg) who later (1916) organised a group under the same title of "International," and still later, the Spartacus League. On the position of this group see notes to pages 167,* 241,* 267,* and 298.*

PAGE 172.* The pamphlet by the French Socialist Delaisy was published in Paris in 1911 by *La Guerre Sociale* Publishers conducted by Gustave Hervé, who at that period carried on anti-militarist agitation of an anarchist character against *all* war, and, consequently, against revolutionary wars. See also note to page 229.*

PAGE 172.** The two issues of Trotsky's *Nashe Slovo* mentioned contained an interview with the Menshevik Axelrod, in which the latter tried to show that Lenin was wrong in demanding a split from the Socialists who had deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie.

PAGE 173.* The pamphlet by the German Social-Democrat Cuno entitled *Collapse of the Party?* was published in 1915.

PAGE 173.** Struveist, from the name of P. B. Struve. In the nineties of the last century Struve regarded himself as a Marxist and belonged to the Social-Democrats. In the beginning of this century he went over to the liberals, and at the end of 1905, he joined the Constitutional-Democrats. From that time right up to the October Revolution he was a member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional-Democratic Party and the leader of its Right wing. At the present time he is living abroad and is a rabid counter-revolutionary monarchist. When he was with the Social-Democrats in the nineties of the last century, he was one of the most prominent representatives of "legal Marxism," which, in the guise of Marxism, championed the interests of growing Russian capitalism. In his book *Critical Remarks on the Economic Development of Russia*, Struve criticised the Narodnik view that Russia would avoid the capitalist stage of development and argued that capitalism was progressive compared with serfdom and its survivals in Russian economy, but he did not mention the slavery that capitalism brought to the workers,

or the class contradictions and class struggle in capitalist society; he denied that the collapse of capitalism and proletarian revolution were inevitable and necessary and instead of advocating class struggle against the bourgeoisie he urged "society" to "learn from capitalism." For Lenin's criticism of Struve, see the article "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book" in *Selected Works*, Vol. I.

Thus, by Struveism Lenin means the aim of making the working class movement serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, an aim which was *de facto* pursued by Menshevism from its inception.

PAGE 173.*** The passage in the Basle Manifesto reads as follows:

"The governments should remember that in the present situation in Europe and with the present temper of the working class they can release the fury of war only at their own peril; they should remember that the Franco-Prussian War was followed by the Commune, that the Russo-Japanese War set the revolutionary forces of the peoples of the Russian Empire in motion, that the growth of military and naval armaments has caused the class conflicts in England and on the continent to become acute to an unprecedented degree and has led to great strikes."

PAGE 174.* The revolutionary situation in the 'sixties in Germany arose in connection with the unification of the German state. After the defeat of Austria in the war of 1859 (see note to page 171*), the Prussian government decided to hasten the elimination of Austria from the unification of Germany and it began to prepare for war against her. For this purpose the Prussian government had to strengthen its army. In 1860 the government introduced a bill in the Prussian Landtag (parliament) for the reorganisation of the Prussian army, and demanded a vote of 10,000,000 thalers per annum for this purpose. The bourgeoisie, which had a majority in the Landtag, wanted to have a stronger army, but feared that it would be used, not for the purpose of uniting Germany, but for increasing the power of the king and of the landlords in Prussia. For that reason, they did not reject the Army Reorganisation Bill, neither did they, however, agree to vote the government the money required for this organisation; they voted 10,000,000 thalers for one year only. They wanted to have a guarantee that the military forces of Prussia would be used to serve bourgeois aims; but the government gave no such guarantees. A conflict arose between the government and the Landtag, which was accompanied by considerable excitement throughout Germany. The petty bourgeois and the workers began to be drawn into the movement against the government. The frightened king dissolved the Landtag and called into office the reactionary Bismarck who, even his friends said, "reeked of blood." Public discontent was so great that on calling Bismarck to office the king said to him: "You are becoming a minister only in order to go to the gallows. . . and I the king will follow you there." The

king's fears were unfounded, however. The bourgeoisie itself, frightened by the movement of the masses, agreed to make concessions to the landlords and to the king in order to strangle the incipient revolutionary movement.

The revolutionary situation in 1859-61 in Russia arose after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War of 1854-56, which clearly revealed the economic backwardness of the country and the impossibility of her economic development as long as serfdom existed. This increased the discontent of the young Russian bourgeoisie with the serf system. The defeat also intensified the poverty of the serf peasants and intensified their struggle against serfdom. In 1859-60 a wave of peasant rebellions broke out over the whole of Russia. Simultaneously, the bourgeois liberal movement grew. The government was compelled to introduce a number of reforms from above in order to avert a peasant revolution from below. These reforms (the "abolition" of serfdom, the introduction of rural and urban "local government," the reform of the judiciary, etc.) were all of a very curtailed character. In particular the "abolition" of serfdom was carried out in such a way that the bondage, the semi-serf dependence and exploitation of the peasants by the landlords remained; they were finally abolished only by the October Revolution of 1917.

The revolutionary situation of 1879-80 in Russia arose as a result of twenty years of development of capitalism which proceeded simultaneously with the preservation of considerable remnants of serfdom in the rural districts after the "peasant" reform of 1861. In the rural districts, to the yoke of the semi-feudal landlords was added the yoke of capital, as capitalism developed step by step. This double yoke caused the rise and growth of the revolutionary Narodnik movement of the 'seventies. This movement expressed the democratic strivings of the whole of the peasantry, its desire to liberate itself completely from the fetters of serfdom. But by its petty-bourgeois, utopian socialism and its denial of the capitalist path of development in Russia, this movement reflected the strivings of the small, ruined peasantry to save their peasant economy from the new, growing yoke of capital, from the new capitalist fetters. Willy nilly, the revolutionary Narodnik movement was compelled to seek support among the masses of the workers in the towns and there seek recruits for its ranks. In this way, by its propaganda in the factories it helped to rouse the working class movement and to give birth to the first labour organisations precisely at the end of the 1870's when the revolutionary Narodnik movement represented by the *Narodnaya Volya* (*People's Will*) began its direct struggle with tsarism by means of terrorism. The liberal bourgeoisie, and particularly the liberal landlords, i.e., the landlords who were adopting capitalist methods of farming, in their turn, tried to take advantage of the terroristic struggle waged by *Narodnaya Volya* against tsarism in order to induce the tsar to grant liberal reforms. A considerable impetus to the upsurge of the revolutionary and liberal movements at the end of the 'seventies, and to the creation of the revolutionary situation in 1879-80, which caused a certain amount

of consternation in the ranks of the tsarist government, was given by the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-77 which: 1) by its burdens increased the ruin of the peasantry and the poverty of the working class, 2) intensified the attack of tsarism on the revolutionary Narodnik movement and the White terror against it, and 3) roused against the government the liberal bourgeois who were dissatisfied with the results of Russia's victory over Turkey because it did not bring them the command of the Dardanelles straits and of Constantinople. A revolutionary situation arose, but it did not lead to revolution. Although the revolutionaries were well organised and heroic, they were only a handful after all, and since they had not behind them anything in the nature of a mass peasant movement, and particularly a strong labour movement, which although awakened was still in the stage of infancy, the tsarist government soon scored a victory over them. That is why the revolutionary situation of 1879-80 was followed by the period of stark reaction of the 'eighties.

PAGE 176.* Lenin here refers to his articles: "One German Voice on the War" and "Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy," published in the indicated issues of *Sotsial-Demokrat* in 1915. (See *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 90-92 and 180-82.) In these articles Lenin quotes passages from bourgeois newspapers and magazines which refer to the possibility of a revolution as a result of the war. For example, an English bourgeois magazine, the *Economist*, on February 13, 1915, stated: "The outlook is for bloody revolutions and fierce wars between labour and capital, or between the masses and the governing classes of Continental Europe."

PAGE 181.* In 1848 Marx wrote the following concerning war with Russia:

"Only war with Russia would be a war of revolutionary Germany... in which it could wash away the sins of the past... in which it could vanquish its own autocrats, in which—as befits a people throwing off the fetters of long, dull slavery—it purchases the propaganda of civilisation with the sacrifice of its sons, and frees itself internally by freeing itself externally."

Marx called upon Germany to declare war on Russia during the German Revolution of 1848. At that time Russia was the bulwark of counter-revolution. In their fight against the revolution in their own countries, the reactionary forces of Germany and Austria counted on the support of Russia. These calculations were quite sound. Nicholas I helped Austria to strangle the Hungarian revolution. Marx was of the opinion that a war waged by revolutionary Germany against counter-revolutionary Russia might lead to the creation of a united German democratic republic out of the separate principalities and kingdoms of Germany, for war against Russia would not only be a war against foreign counter-revolutionary forces, but also a war against the German counter-revolution.

In 1859, during the European crisis which ended in the Austro-Italian War, the international situation became so acute that an attack on the German state was expected on the part of France in the South and of Russia in the North. Engels was of the opinion that Germany would have to exert her efforts to the very utmost in order to repel these attacks. This would compel the nation to unite in spite of the princes, the kings and other reactionary forces. To achieve this the nation would have to resort to the leadership of the most energetic and revolutionary party in Germany, i.e., the party of the proletariat. "Long live war," wrote Engels. "If we are simultaneously attacked by the French and the Russians, if we are drawing near to doom, in this desperate situation, all parties, from those at present ruling to Zietz and Blum [representatives of the radical bourgeoisie—*Ed.*], are bound to wear themselves out, and in order to save itself the nation will have to turn at last to the most energetic party."

PAGE 181.** Lenin refers to an article written by the Socialist-Revolutionary, Victor Chernov, entitled "The Bayonet of a Socialist," published in the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper, *Zhizn* (*Life*), of March 30, 1915, signed Gardenin.

PAGE 190.* In an article entitled "Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism" (December 1914), Lenin compared Kautsky's pamphlet *The Road to Power*, published in 1909, with Kautsky's chauvinistic statements after the war broke out, and wrote:

"Kautsky's pamphlet, *The Road to Power*, is the most complete enunciation of the tasks of our epoch, most favourable to the German Social-Democrats (from the point of view of the hopes they roused), that has ever come from the pen of the most authoritative writer of the Second International."

And Lenin goes on to outline the main contents of Kautsky's pamphlet as follows:

"Social-Democracy is a 'revolutionary party' (the opening sentence in the pamphlet) not only in the sense that it is revolutionising like a steam engine, but 'also in another sense.' It strives for the conquest of political power by the proletariat, for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Pouring ridicule on those who 'have doubts in the revolution,' Kautsky wrote: 'Of course, in every big movement and uprising we must count on the possibility of defeat. Only a fool can be absolutely certain of victory before the struggle.' But the refusal to count with the possibility of victory would be 'downright treachery to our cause.' Revolution in connection with war is possible during the war and afterwards. It is impossible to determine when precisely the intensification of class antagonisms will lead to revolution, but 'I can very definitely assert that the revolution which war will bring with it will break out either during the war or immediately after it'; 'there is nothing more banal than the theory of the "peaceful growth into socialism. . . ." 'We have every reason to believe that we are entering a period of struggle for state power'; this

struggle may drag on for decades, we do not know but 'in all probability it will in the not distant future lead to the considerable strengthening of the proletariat' if 'not to its sovereignty in Western Europe'. . . 'the proletariat can no longer speak of a *premature*' (Kautsky's italics) 'revolution . . .' 'undoubtedly we have entered a revolutionary period.' That is what Kautsky wrote in the long, long past, five whole years ago. . . ." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.)

Like all of Kautsky's works of the pre-war period, the pamphlet *The Road to Power*, in spite of all its merits, reveals an *opportunist* interpretation of the proletarian revolution. In the materials he collected for his work, *State and Revolution*, Lenin analyses Kautsky's *The Road to Power* and points out that there is not a word in the pamphlet about smashing the military-bureaucratic state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, or about fighting against the superstitious belief in the state, or about replacing parliamentary institutions and state officials by proletarian institutions of the type of the Paris Commune. (Lenin, *Miscellany*, Russ. ed., Vol. XIV, pp. 363 and 369.) Hence, there is not a word in the pamphlet about the main feature which characterises the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and which was strongly emphasised by Marx and Engels as far back as 1852. This fully corresponds to Kautsky's attitude towards the dictatorship of the proletariat and the proletarian revolution which Lenin points to in these materials in referring to other works of Kautsky (his *Social Revolution*, his articles against Pannekoek, and his book against Bernstein). Quoting a number of opportunist passages from these works, Lenin comes to the conclusion that even before the war Kautsky was of the opinion that socialism would come "*without* revolution," that even before the war Kautsky's Marxism was "*utterly bankrupt*," that he had "*forgotten* all the lessons and doctrines of Marx and Engels of 1852-91" and that by his arguments about the dictatorship of the proletariat he had "*vulgarised*" Marxism. (*Ibid.*, pp. 379, 381, 383.)

PAGE 199.* On December 16, 1914, in Berne, Switzerland, Martov delivered a lecture, "War and the Crisis of Socialism," in which he adopted a masked social-chauvinist position. In the course of his lecture, Martov referred to the revolutionary past of Guesde and Kautsky—who had openly or tacitly joined the ranks of the chauvinists—and asked how such people could be accused of opportunism.

PAGE 200.* *Le Socialisme*, a weekly paper, published by the French Socialists (Guesdeists), began publication in 1907. In January 1914, it amalgamated with a journal published by the Socialist Party of Belgium and assumed the title *Le socialisme et la lutte de classes*.

PAGE 202.* *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, in the beginning of the war tried to put up a feeble opposition to the

social-chauvinist majority of that party. After the government had temporarily suppressed the paper, and after the Administrative Council of the Party had changed the editorial staff of the paper, *Vorwärts* adopted a definitely social-chauvinist position.

PAGE 206.* From the middle of the nineties of the last century onwards, the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, the theoretical organ of the German Social-Democrats, was actually the organ of the opportunists who revised the teachings of Marx. During the war, the opportunists who were grouped around this magazine became out and out social-chauvinists.

PAGE 206.** The British Socialist Party was formed in 1912. During the imperialist war two trends contended against each other in the party: one, led by Hyndman, was a social-chauvinist trend and the other, led by John MacLean, was the internationalist trend (concerning MacLean see note to page 127 ***). The fight ended with the Hyndman group leaving the Party.

PAGE 206.*** The Labour Party in England was formed for the purpose of securing the return of Labour members to parliament. The membership consisted of affiliated organisations, such as the trade unions and the Fabian Society. Up to 1933 the Independent Labour Party was affiliated, but in that year it decided to disaffiliate. As a result of this a split occurred in the I.L.P., the minority breaking away and forming a separate organisation which re-affiliated to the Labour Party. The rules of the Labour Party also provide for individual membership. During the war the Labour Party pursued a chauvinist policy. A number of its leaders, Henderson, Clynes and others, were members of the Cabinet. The party disrupted the strikes of the workers employed in munition works and helped to suppress the outbreaks of discontent of the oppressed masses in the British colonies. In all its actions and propaganda the Labour Party was not in any way distinguished from the bourgeois parties.

The Fabian Society is an organisation of bourgeois intellectuals, the object of which is to divert the workers from the class struggle by preaching reform and the gradual development of socialism under capitalism.

The Independent Labour Party was formed in 1893. It was never a Marxian party although it declares that its aim is socialism. During the war it adopted a flabby pacifist position. While advocating peace it did not wage any serious struggle against the war and against the bourgeoisie. At the Derby Conference in April 1933 the I.L.P. decided to disaffiliate from the Second International and to open negotiations with the Communist International with a view to co-operation. These negotiations have not led to any results owing to the disruptive tactics of the leaders.

PAGE 207.* The Social-Democratic Labour Party of Holland was formed in 1893. In 1903 a railway strike broke out in Holland which developed into

a general strike. The leaders of the Party, headed by the opportunist, Troelstra, betrayed the strike and it was suppressed. An opposition arose against the opportunists in the Party, but at first this was very feeble. The revolution in Russia in 1905 stimulated and encouraged this opposition. It began a struggle against the opportunist Party leadership, still headed by Troelstra, and for a fundamental change in the tactics of the Party. In 1907 the opposition began to issue its own monthly magazine and daily newspaper. The opportunist majority decided to get rid of the opposition and at the Party Congress in 1909 expelled it. The opposition then formed a new party called the Social-Democratic Party of Holland. In 1916, a small opposition group of Socialist intellectuals, led by Roland-Holst, joined the Party. During the war, the Party, led by Horter and Pannekoek, whom Lenin mentions, adopted an internationalist position, although on a number of questions it disagreed with the Zimmerwald Left which was led by Lenin. In 1919, the Party affiliated to the Communist International as the Communist Party of Holland.

PAGE 207.** The Social-Democratic Party of Sweden was formed in 1889. At its very first congress, two tendencies revealed themselves. One, the opportunist tendency, led by Hjalmar Branting, and the other, the radical tendency, led by Axel Danielsson. At the congress the Branting tendency was victorious and from that time on moderation and opportunism became the characteristic features of the Party. Right up to 1909 all the activities of the Party were concentrated on securing an extension of the franchise. After the passing of the Reform Act in 1909, opportunism and compromise became still more marked in the Party. As soon as the war broke out, Branting, in the name of the Party, hastened to assure the government that it could count on the complete confidence of the "united nation." On several occasions since the war the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden has been in the government.

The opportunist policy pursued by Branting and his followers roused considerable discontent among the Left elements in the Party. Strong support was rendered the opposition and the radicals by the Swedish Young Social-Democratic League, which was formed in 1903 by a section that broke away from the Swedish Young Socialist (actually anarchist) League. In 1912 the Left-wing members of the Social-Democratic group in the Riksdag (parliament) broke away from the main group led by Branting and formed a Left-wing group; but Branting managed to avert a split in the Party. During the war, the differences in the Party increased; the Lefts adopted an internationalist position, as did also the Young Social-Democratic League led by Höglund and Grimlund. The League convened a special congress of labour organisations to discuss measures for combating chauvinism and the danger of war. The Party prohibited the congress, but it was held, nevertheless. The Party press waged a campaign against this congress that far excelled that of the bourgeois press and of the government.

The Left opposition then decided to take determined action. On May 13, 1917, it convened a congress of all Left opposition groups of the Party and there formed an independent, so-called Left Social-Democratic Party. All those who were discontented with Branting's leadership joined the new party; as a result its membership was rather mixed. Three tendencies revealed themselves: a Left, revolutionary tendency, led by Höglund, Kilbom and others, who had come from the Young Social-Democratic League; a centrist tendency, which advocated pacifism, and a so-called "humanist" tendency, which was a mixture of socialism, petty-bourgeois utopianism and philanthropy. The Left wing of the Party joined the Left wing of the Zimmerwald Conference. After the formation of the Communist International, the Party at its third congress, by a majority vote, decided to affiliate. The centrists and the "humanists," who were in the minority, refused to submit to this decision and left the Party. Later, the former leaders of the Party, Höglund and Kilbom, betrayed communism and became renegades.

PAGE 207.*** In 1903, the Social-Democratic Party of Bulgaria split into two sections: the Social-Democratic Party, the "Tesnyaki," or "narrow" Socialists, and the Social-Democratic Party, the "Shiroki," or "broad" Socialists. The "broad" Socialists were in favour of co-operation with the bourgeois-democratic elements, while the "narrow" Socialists demanded a proletarian class policy. In their theories, the "broad" Socialists supported the revisionists, while the "narrow" Socialists fought against revisionism. In 1905 a split occurred among the "narrow" Socialists, and a group called "anarcho-liberals," led by Bakalov and Harlakov, broke away. This group accused the Party, and particularly its leaders, Blagoyev and Kirkov, of isolating itself from the class and becoming a "secret society," because it adhered to the principle of having a strictly centralised Party organisation. In 1908 another group, calling itself "progressive," led by Ilyev, broke away from the "narrow" Socialists. This group demanded unity with the "broad" Socialists and with other socialist organisations in Bulgaria. Thus, even before the war, the "narrow" Socialists, who represented the best elements of the Bulgarian Socialists, had purged their ranks of opportunists. But neither before the war nor during it were they as consistent revolutionary Marxists as the Bolsheviks. In the Second International they were associated with the German Lefts (Rosa Luxemburg and others). During the Balkan War in 1912, and during the World War, they adopted an internationalist position, condemned social-chauvinism in its pronounced as well as covert centrist form, and stood for the formation of a Third International. But in this, too, they were not consistent, they did not accept the Bolshevik slogans of Lenin, and although they joined the Zimmerwald Conference, they did not adhere to the Zimmerwald Left. Only gradually did the "narrow" Socialists overcome this half-heartedness of their position. After the formation of the Communist International the "narrow" Socialists reorganised their party into the Communist Party of Bulgaria, and affiliated to the Communist International.

PAGE 207.**** As in the parties in the other countries during the war, three tendencies were revealed in the Swiss Party: 1) a Right chauvinist tendency, led by Greulich, Pflüger and others, whose views were expressed in the Zürich newspaper *Volksrecht*; 2) a centrist tendency, led by Robert Grimm (Lenin here calls it "more radical"); 3) a Left tendency, led by Fritz Platten, which was singled out later. At the time Lenin wrote this article this Left trend had not yet broken away from the supporters of Grimm.

PAGE 209.* The manifesto of the German Lefts, printed in the *Berner Tagwacht*, was written by Karl Liebknecht in May 1915 after Italy had entered the war. It was entitled "The Chief Enemy Is In Your Own Country." After describing the policy of German imperialism during the period of the war, Liebknecht calls upon the workers to fight against imperialism with all their might and revolutionary determination. "The historical moment imperatively calls for an international proletarian class struggle against the international sanguinary annihilation of nations," he wrote. And he concluded with the following words: "The chief enemy is in your own country! The chief enemy of Germany is in Germany: it is German imperialism, the German war party, German secret diplomacy. It is against this enemy in our own country that the German people must fight, must fight in the political struggle in alliance with the proletarians of other countries who are fighting against their imperialists."

PAGE 209.** This refers to the voting for war credits by the Social-Democratic fraction in the German Reichstag. Before the war the Social-Democratic Party of Germany solemnly declared that it would not permit the German government to send German proletarians to be butchered; on August 4, 1914, it unanimously voted to grant the government money for the purpose of conducting an imperialist war and declared: "In the moment of danger we shall not leave our fatherland to its fate." Only fourteen out of the seventy-eight Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag were opposed to voting for the war credits, and the most consistent of these was Karl Liebknecht. He explained his position in a special declaration in which he said: "This war is an imperialist war instigated for the purpose of securing the political domination of industrial and bank capital over the principal spheres of exploitation." This war "has been provoked by the German and Austrian military parties in the gloom of semi-absolutism and secret diplomacy for the purpose of forestalling their opponents." "At the same time this war is a Bonapartist attempt to weaken and destroy the labour movement." The German slogan "against tsarism," he said, was merely a hypocritical attempt "to rouse the noble strivings, the revolutionary principles and the ideals of the nation for the purpose of intensifying its hatred towards another nation." On August 4, however, Liebknecht still submitted to the decision of the Reichstag group, and together with the thirteen other deputies, who were at first opposed to voting for the war credits, voted for them. At the second voting of war credits on December 2, 1914, Liebknecht was the only

deputy in the Reichstag to vote against them. His speeches against voting for war credits were the continuation of the determined fight he had been waging against militarism and were a constituent part of the active work he had been carrying on—notwithstanding all the mistakes he and the other German Lefts committed—during the war to expose imperialism; they were part of his anti-war agitation and struggle against social-chauvinism, particularly in his capacity as one of the principal leaders of the Spartacus League. For the latter, see note to page 298.*

PAGE 221.* In June 1915, Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein published a manifesto in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, entitled "The Moment Demands," the contents of which may be summed up as follows: before, Germany waged a defensive war; now, however, since March 1915, this war has become a war of conquest. The manifesto went on to say: "On August 4 we declared that we condemn every war of conquest. The present moment demands that we endorse our condemnation."

"Among the broad masses," said the writers of the manifesto, "there is a very distinct striving for peace; Social-Democracy must take a very determined step forward to meet these strivings." And in conclusion the manifesto said: "If our party lacks sufficient strength to take this determined step, then we alone shall pursue our policy in the direction that we think proper." This vapid and non-committal manifesto was called forth by the growth of discontent among the masses of the workers with the policy of Social-Democracy; it pursued but one aim, viz., to induce the social-chauvinists to condemn the predatory aims of the German bourgeoisie in words and, by this, once again to throw dust in the eyes of the masses of the workers.

PAGE 222.* Lenin's article "The Fight Against Social-Chauvinism" gives an estimation of the International Conference of Socialist Women which was held in Berne, Switzerland, on March 26-28, 1915, and which was the first international socialist conference to be held since the outbreak of the war. It was convened by the International Bureau of Women Socialists, at the head of which was Comrade Clara Zetkin. The initiative in calling the conference was taken by the Russian women Bolsheviks. As far back as November 1914, Comrade Krupskaya, Armand and others, in correspondence with Comrade Zetkin, urged the necessity of convening an international women's conference for the purpose of learning the attitude of women Socialists towards the war and towards the collapse of the Second International. To this Comrade Zetkin agreed and, in December 1914, she issued a manifesto to all women Socialists calling upon them to fight for peace. She began her preparations for the conference in neutral Holland, as it was impossible to do this in Germany. In Holland, she managed to establish contacts with women socialist organisations of other countries and, finally in March 1915, the conference was convened. There were twenty-five delegates at the conference: four from England, one from France, two from

Switzerland, seven from Germany, three from Holland, one from Italy, one from Poland, and six from Russia. Of the latter, four were Bolsheviks and two Mensheviks. The pronounced and tacit social-chauvinists predominated, and there was one semi-bourgeois pacifist delegate from England. The delegates from Germany belonged to the opposition minority of the German Social-Democratic Party. At the conference, reports were delivered by the representatives of the various countries, and this was followed by a discussion on the main question: the international action of women Socialists in favour of peace. In the course of the discussion two opposite tendencies came into conflict: one represented by the Bolshevik delegates, a consistent revolutionary tendency, and the other, a centrist tendency, to which the overwhelming majority of the delegates belonged. The German Left delegates, led by Comrade Clara Zetkin, adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the centrist majority. They justified their position on the grounds that at a time when jingo intoxication and nationalist agitation were rife, it was extremely necessary to have the *unanimous* action of all the delegates of the conference, and that such unanimity would be the best demonstration of the international solidarity of women Socialists. In this was revealed the half-heartedness of the position taken up by all the German Lefts, and their common attitude towards centrism. (See note to page 167.*) This position was most characteristically expressed by the fact that the Spartacus League, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, joined the Kautskyan "Independent Party" (see note to page 267*) and left it only at the end of 1918. The conference adopted a resolution, drawn up by a commission composed of representatives of the majority with the participation of Comrade Clara Zetkin. This resolution pointed out that the war was an imperialist war and that the slogan "defence of the fatherland" was wrong. The resolution called upon the workers to "fight for peace." It did not contain a single word about the conduct of the Socialists and about the collapse of the Second International. The Bolshevik delegates moved a resolution in opposition to that submitted by the commission. The Bolshevik resolution exposed the imperialist character of the war and its antagonism to the interests of the working class, and on these grounds rejected the slogan "defence of the fatherland." The resolution went on to say that the representatives of the majorities in the Socialist Parties had "actually betrayed socialism by substituting nationalism for it." Appealing to the workers, the resolution urged the necessity of "putting an end to the capitalist system and of finally overthrowing capitalism," for the objective conditions for the achievement of socialism had already matured in the countries of Europe. This resolution was rejected and the resolution proposed by the commission adopted. The minority had its resolution published simultaneously with the resolution adopted at the conference.

In the present article dealing with this conference, Lenin sharply reproaches the Left German delegates for having failed to take advantage of the first international socialist conference convened since the outbreak of the

war, to tell the workers the truth about the treachery of the majority Socialists, to point to the collapse of the Second International and to the antagonisms between the revolutionaries and the pronounced and tacit chauvinists that were revealed at the conference. This article *struck a blow at conciliation with the Rights and centrists*. This blow was particularly important for the purpose of rallying and uniting the forces of the internationalists, because a conciliatory attitude towards the Rights, and particularly towards the centrists, was a very widespread phenomenon among internationalists in the West European Socialist Parties in the first months of the war.

PAGE 227.* The article, "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915," was written soon after this conference and printed in *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 45-46, October 24, 1915. It contrasted the position of the genuinely revolutionary minority of this first Zimmerwald Conference with the position of its centrist Kautskyan majority. The conference took place in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, from which the conference took its name. The story of how it was convened is as follows: on the outbreak of the war certain Socialist Parties in the neutral countries (Italy, Switzerland and Holland), failing to understand that the Second International had utterly collapsed, and believing that it could be restored simply by convening an international conference through the medium of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International, tried to bring pressure upon the Bureau in order to induce it to convene a conference. As might have been expected these attempts were fruitless. But the Italian Party held a conference with the Swiss Party in Lugano in September 1914, at which *inter alia* they discussed and in part approved Lenin's September theses on war, and after another attempt to influence the International Socialist Bureau had failed, the Central Committee of the Italian Party, in conjunction with the Central Committee of the Swiss Party, set to work to convene a conference on their own account. At the same time Lenin and the representatives of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad set to work to unite the genuinely revolutionary groups and elements which had sprung up by that time in the old Social-Democratic Parties in Germany, Switzerland, Poland, etc. In July 1915, the representatives of the Central Committee of the Italian Party, in conjunction with the Swiss Party, convened a preliminary conference in Berne for an exchange of opinion as to who should be invited to the proposed international socialist conference. The representative of the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, who was present at this conference, urged that only *Left* revolutionary Social-Democrats be invited to the conference. The representatives of the Italian and Swiss Socialists and of the Menshevik Organisation Committee insisted that the conference be of a more widely representative character. That is to say, they wanted to invite the *centrists* also. The representative of the Bolsheviks was in the minority. The majority decided to invite *centrists* of the type of Kautsky, Haase, etc. This decision stimulated the efforts of the Bolshevik Central Committee abroad,

and of Lenin, to unite the genuine internationalists in order to set up a united front against the centrists at the proposed international conference. Among the countries represented at the conference there were: Russia (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks of the Organisation Committee, and Socialist-Revolutionary centrists), France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Poland, Switzerland and the Balkan countries. As a result of the decision of the preliminary conference in Berne, the centrists and semi-centrists had a decisive majority, having over twenty votes against the seven or eight internationalists grouped around Lenin. The proceedings of the conference were marked by the fierce struggle which the Left wing of the conference waged against the centrists.

The position of the Lefts at the Zimmerwald Conference had been formulated by Lenin as early as July 1915, when he wrote: "In our opinion, the Lefts should make a common *ideological* declaration containing: 1) absolute condemnation of the social-chauvinists and opportunists; 2) a programme of revolutionary action (whether to say civil war or revolutionary mass action is not important); 3) opposition to the slogan 'defence of the fatherland,' etc." (Lenin, *Miscellany*, Vol. II, Russ. ed., "Letter to Comrade Kollontai," p. 231.) Taking this as their starting point, the Lefts submitted to the conference their draft of a manifesto to the workers of all countries, in which the war was characterised as a predatory war; it pointed to the treachery of the Social-Democratic leaders; over the heads of the leaders, a call was issued to the masses to compel the Socialist deputies in parliament to vote against the war credits and to recall the Socialist ministers from the bourgeois governments; a call was issued to the masses to fight for the overthrow of the bourgeois governments. (For complete text of this draft manifesto and also of the resolution on the war proposed by the Lefts, see Documents in Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII.)

This draft manifesto was rejected by the centrist majority of the conference which drew up its own manifesto. Owing to the pressure of the Lefts, this manifesto assumed a bolder character than the centrists desired. Nevertheless, it did not speak directly about the treachery of the parties of the Second International, or about the collapse of the International, and glossed over the revolutionary tasks of the working class. Writing to Comrade Kollontai in America, in November 1915, after the conference, Lenin said: "The Zimmerwald Manifesto is inadequate: Kautsky and Co. are prepared to be reconciled with it *on the condition*: 'Not a step further.' We will not agree to this because this is *sheer hypocrisy*. So that if there are people in America who are even afraid of the Zimmerwald Manifesto, spit on them and select only those who are to the Left of the *Zimmerwald Manifesto*." (Lenin on America, Letter to A. Kollontai, November 9, 1915.)

In addition to the manifesto, the conference published a joint declaration by the German and French delegations, and passed a resolution "expressing sympathy and solidarity" with the victims of the war and those Socialists who were being persecuted by bourgeois governments (including the members

of the Bolshevik fraction of the Fourth Duma). An International Socialist Committee (the majority consisting of centrists) was elected at the conference for the purpose of maintaining contacts between the Parties and groups which were affiliated to the Zimmerwald Conference, and to conduct the business of the conference. The International Socialist Committee had its headquarters at Berne and published a bulletin from time to time, as materials for it were collected. In its work, the International Socialist Committee reflected the policy of the Zimmerwald majority. To counterbalance the I.S.C., the Left wing of the Zimmerwald Conference, led by Lenin, immediately after the conference organised its own bureau, which published the draft manifesto and resolutions of the minority and then systematically criticised the centrists who had found refuge in the Zimmerwald Right. The present article by Lenin represents one of the attacks of the Zimmerwald Left against the Zimmerwald Right.

PAGE 227.** The delegates from Germany at the Zimmerwald Conference represented various tendencies: the centrists, led by Ledebour, the representatives of the international group (later the Spartacus League), E. Meyer and A. Thalheimer, who belonged to the Left, but who at the conference wavered between the Lefts and the centrists, and Borchardt, editor of the Left-wing journal *Lichtstrahlen*, who spoke and voted with the Lefts. The Right wing at Zimmerwald gathered round Ledebour, and he acted as the principal opponent of the Zimmerwald Left and of the Bolsheviks.

PAGE 228.* The Communist Manifesto says (concluding paragraph): "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling class tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!"

PAGE 228.** There was no official representative of the French Socialists at the conference. One of the delegates, the Socialist Bourderon, was present at the conference as the representative of the Coopers' Union and another delegate, Merrheim, represented the Metal Workers' Union. Both delegates belonged to the Right centrist section of the Zimmerwald Conference.

PAGE 229.* This refers to the agitation carried on before the war by the French anarcho-syndicalist, Hervé, against militarism and war in general. Starting from the quite correct position that the workers have no fatherland, but wrongly interpreting this position, Hervé drew the conclusion that the working class must fight against *all war*, no matter what its character might be. He called upon the workers to respond to the declaration of war "no matter by whom," by "a strike against war, and rebellion," without taking into consideration the character of the war and the social-political conditions

prevailing in the given country at the given moment. Lenin gives a detailed analysis of Hervé's views before the war in his article, entitled "Militant Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy," in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV. When war actually broke out in 1914, Hervé threw aside his anti-war propaganda and became one of the most rabid French defencists and social-chauvinists. He is now one of the most bitter enemies of the U.S.S.R. and of the Communists.

PAGE 230.* The passage to which Lenin refers is taken from a speech delivered by Guesde at the Congress of the French Socialist Party in 1899. This speech is included in the collection of Guesde's articles and speeches to which Lenin refers and which was published in 1911 in Paris. These articles and speeches deal with a number of important problems of the socialist movement, as, for example, the attitude towards parliamentarism, towards joining bourgeois governments, towards anarchism, etc.

PAGE 232.* The main slogan of the Zimmerwald Manifesto was the slogan, "fight for peace," but only a very vague reference was made to the revolutionary character of this fight. Even the theoreticians (Kautsky) and the practical men (Huysmans, the secretary of the International Socialist Bureau) of the Second International began to preach "fight for peace" *without* fighting for revolution, for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Towards the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916, the discontent of the broad masses of the people found open expression in the spontaneous striving for peace. Kautsky in his articles, and Huysmans in his speeches, proclaimed the need for bringing pressure to bear upon the governments of the belligerent countries in order to induce them to conclude peace. In so far as the centrist majority at the Zimmerwald Conference refused to declare that the struggle for peace could only be waged in the form of a struggle for a proletarian revolution, the difference between the centrists who had affiliated to Zimmerwald and the centrists who clung to the International Socialist Bureau almost disappeared after these articles by Kautsky and the speeches by Huysmans. Advantage had to be taken of this circumstance to expose the Zimmerwald centrists and to accelerate the rupture between them and the Left, revolutionary Socialists in all countries. The Zimmerwald Conference could not develop into a new International as long as the centrists imposed their line of conduct upon it. And the centrists inevitably remained the masters in the Zimmerwald Conference as long as the Left Socialists in the West European Parties lacked the courage openly to break with the centrists, and as long as they restricted themselves only to criticising their inconsistencies and vacillations. The "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference," written by Lenin, and printed on the eve of this conference in the Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee, No. 4, and after the conference in No. 54-55 of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, June 1916, attacks the unnatural cohabitation of the Lefts and the centrists. The

main idea of this proposal may be formulated as follows: without a split with the social-chauvinists of all shades, without exposing them, without a determined and consistent struggle against them, there can be no revolutionary policy, there can only be the clouding of the consciousness of the masses of the workers and the hindering of their revolutionary class struggle. Thus, the "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., etc.," represented, on the one hand, a fighting platform on which to combine the really revolutionary elements at the forthcoming second Zimmerwald Conference and, on the other hand, a challenge to the centrist majority of the Zimmerwald Conference. The centrists had to choose between proclaiming Kautsky's policy of "bringing pressure" upon the governments and the policy of the revolutionary mass struggle for the overthrow of these governments, the policy of proletarian revolution.

The second Zimmerwald Conference was held April 24-30, 1916, in the town of Kienthal, Switzerland, from which it became known as the Kienthal Conference. Forty-five delegates from various countries were present. Of these, twelve were Lefts, five to seven waverers, who often joined with the Lefts, and the rest were centrists. Thus, in Kienthal as in Zimmerwald, the Lefts were in the minority. But this time, owing to the pressure of the Lefts and the influence of the growing mass movement in all countries, the Zimmerwald centrists shifted slightly to the Left. The resolutions of the Kienthal Conference were more clear and definite than those of the Zimmerwald Conference. But it did not bring about a rupture with the social-chauvinists. In a letter he wrote to Comrade Shlyapnikov dated May 1916, Lenin described the Kienthal Conference in the following words: "The Kienthal Manifesto marks a step forward . . . a resolution was adopted criticising pacifism and another resolution was adopted sharply criticising the International Socialist Bureau. On the whole, notwithstanding a host of defects, it is, *for all that*, a step forward towards a rupture with the social-patriots."

PAGE 234.* The Arnheim Congress was the congress of the Socialist Party of Holland that took place in January 1916. At this congress Huysmans, in his speech of greetings, enunciated the programme to which Lenin refers. Kautsky's article was published in *Die Neue Zeit* and was entitled "Again About Our Illusions."

PAGE 234.** The London and the Vienna Conferences strikingly revealed the disintegration of the Second International. At the London Conference, which took place in February 1915, only Socialists from the Entente countries (England, France, Belgium and Russia) were present. The Russians were represented by the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Comrade Litvinov, the representative of the Bolsheviks, left the conference soon after it was opened because the chairman refused to permit him to read the declaration

of the Bolshevik Central Committee. The purpose of the conference was to organise a united front of the Socialists of the Entente countries to assist the bourgeoisie of the Entente. The conference declared the war of the Entente against Germany to be a war of "liberation."

The Vienna Conference was convened in April 1915 by the Socialists of the Austro-Hungarian and German coalition to counteract the London Conference. At this conference it was resolved that Socialists must defend their "fatherland"

Both at the London and at the Vienna Conferences, the social-chauvinists masked their treachery by arguing that it was necessary to defend "national independence." Under this mask the Anglo-French Socialists helped their respective bourgeoisie to hound the toilers of England and France against the toilers of Germany, while the Austro-German Socialists helped the German and Austrian bourgeoisie to drive the German and Austrian workers to the slaughter. Kautsky, however, regarded this as proof of the "unanimity" of the International.

PAGE 235.* During the war the Italian Socialist, Treves, took up a Right-centrist (a concealed chauvinist) position. In the journal *Critica Sociale*, Treves published an article attacking the editors of *Avanti*, the central organ of the Socialist Party of Italy. *Avanti's* reply, to which Lenin refers, described Treves' attack as the beginning of the opportunist offensive and threatened to expose it before the workers.

PAGE 238.* The hint at revolution in the Zimmerwald Manifesto was the call upon the workers to fight *for socialism*. The particular passage in this manifesto reads as follows: "We, representatives of Socialist Parties, trade unions, and their minorities . . . have gathered together for the purpose of restoring the interrupted international communications and to call upon the working class to remember their duty to themselves and to begin the fight for peace." "This fight is a fight for liberty, for the brotherhood of nations, for socialism."

PAGE 239.* In this circular the slogan, "defence of the fatherland," was condemned as a "crude deception for the purpose of subordinating the peoples to imperialism." The circular demanded that the Social-Democrats cease all participation in the defence of the country and vote against the war credits. It contained an appeal to the workers to organise strikes, demonstrations and fraternisation, and to use every other means for the revolutionary struggle. This circular also sharply criticised the policy of the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International as a violation of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle International Socialist Congresses. In a previous declaration to the International Socialist Bureau, published in No. 2 of the Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee, on November 27, 1915, the Committee wrote concerning itself:

"This Committee does not stand in opposition to the International Socialist Bureau as a rival organisation. It is a temporary organisation and will dissolve as soon as the *International Socialist Bureau commences a struggle against war in accordance with the decisions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basle Congresses*, and as soon as it ceases to subordinate its tactics to those Socialist Parties which, in their respective countries, support the war policy of the ruling classes."

PAGE 240.* Bourderon's proposal was that the various organisations of the Socialist Party of France should declare that the Central Committee and parliamentary group of the Party do not express the opinion of the Party.

PAGE 241.* The article "The Youth International," published in *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, No. 2, of December 1916, is a review of a magazine, bearing this title, that was published in Switzerland by the International League of Socialist Youth Organisations, the first number of which was issued in September 1915.

The International League of Socialist Youth Organisations was formed before the war but in the beginning of the war was inactive. Its Bureau, which had its headquarters in Vienna, in spite of the demands of a number of affiliated organisations, refused to convene an international conference of socialist youth organisations for the purpose of defining the attitude of the League to the war. The Bureau itself adopted a centrist position. On the initiative of the Swiss Young Socialist League, an international conference was convened in spite of the Bureau. This conference met on April 5 and 6, 1915, and passed a resolution in which it declared: "The war is in irreconcilable contradiction to the interests of the working class." It condemned the policy of civil peace and called for determined action for the purpose of compelling the ruling classes to conclude peace. The conference dismissed the old Bureau and elected a new one. The new Bureau maintained contact with the Zimmerwald Lefts and placed the columns of its journal at the disposal of the Left Zimmerwaldists. Among the contributors to *The Youth International* were Lenin, Zinoviev, Karl Liebknecht, Bukharin, Radek, Kollontai and others.

In pointing to a number of distortions of the line of revolutionary Marxism in this "militant and propagandist organ" of the International League of Youth Organisations, Lenin particularly deals with the denial of the difference of opinion between Marxists and anarchists concerning the state, contained in an article written by Bukharin, entitled "The Imperialist Predatory State," and signed *Nota Bene*. Comrade Bukharin's mistake was not an accidental one; it revealed the deviation common to the Bukharin-Pyatakoff group in the direction of "Left," semi-anarchist phrasemongering, against which Lenin fought strenuously throughout the period of the imperialist war. This deviation to the "Left" did not prevent Bukharin from having points of contact with the "Right," with Trotskyism and Kautskyism (similarity in the

interpretation of imperialism, the slogans of United States of Europe, fight for peace; see notes to pages 3 * and 131 * in this volume).

At that time, Lenin wrote an article in reply to Bukharin (it was not published at the time, however), entitled "The Nascent Tendency of 'Imperialist Economism,'" in which he pointed to this feature in Bukharin's views of that time and referred to it as "curveting to the Right" and "curveting to the Left." From the fact that imperialism predominated in the world and that it tended to unite the world in a single economic whole, Bukharin, like Rosa Luxemburg and Pyatakov, drew the conclusion that the slogan, "right of nations to self-determination," could not be adopted under imperialism. In this way he came close to the position of the social-chauvinists, including the social-chauvinists who were concealed under Trotskyist and Kautskyan phrases ("curveting to the Right"). From the fact that imperialism dominated over the world and that imperialism placed on the order of the day the question of the socialist revolution, he drew the conclusion that there could be no democratic revolutions under imperialism (even in Russia, where tsarism had not yet been overthrown), no struggle for democracy and no democratic slogans because, he alleged, this would be absolutely incompatible with the struggle for the socialist revolution ("curveting to the Left").

Bukharin's denial that there was any difference in the views on the state between Marxism and anarchism, and his associating himself with the anarchist "blowing up" of the state, was also a "curveting to the Left," in this case to anarchism. Anarchism is opposed to the state in any form, including the *proletarian* state. Therefore, to argue that Marxism agrees with anarchism on the question of the state is tantamount to denying the need for the proletarian state in the transition epoch. On the other hand, to accept the anarchist "blowing up" of the state (even if it is a bourgeois state as Bukharin later explained it to mean) is to confuse and to fail to understand the enormous difference between the anarchist postulate of "blowing up" the state and the Marxian postulate of "breaking up the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie." For further details on this point see Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U." It is against this anarchist "curveting to the Left," which was particularly dangerous for a Youth International, which was just beginning to organise itself independently, that Lenin's article was directed.

PAGE 241.** The Grütli League was formed in 1838 by the members of the Swiss Workers' Educational Society. The majority of the members of the League were artisans. Up to 1871 the League was a typical petty-bourgeois educational organisation. With the growth of the labour movement in Switzerland in the 'seventies, the workers began to bring socialist opinions into the League. At a congress of the League held in Lucerne, in 1878,

a socialist programme was adopted. The tactics and activities of the League remained petty-bourgeois, however. It remained entirely on the basis of bourgeois democracy, avoided all revolutionary pronouncements, avoided the class struggle and engaged in reformism of the purest water. During the war, the League occupied a chauvinist position.

PAGE 243.* Lenin here refers to an article he wrote entitled "The Disarmament Slogan" published in No. 2 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*. In examining this slogan Lenin explains that he does not refer to the "Kautskyan preaching of 'disarmament' to the present governments of the imperialist great powers," but to the propaganda carried on by a section of the *revolutionary* Social-Democrats (including the magazine *The Youth International*) "in favour of replacing the old point in the Social-Democratic minimum programme about a 'militia,' or the 'armed nation,' by a new point, viz., 'disarmament,' or, in other words, by the demand for the abolition of *all* military systems." In this connection Lenin says: "One of the fundamental assumptions in favour of disarmament is the not always frankly expressed argument: we are opposed to war, against all war in general, and the most definite and clear expression of this view is the demand for disarmament." To this argument, which seemed extremely Left and revolutionary to those who advanced it, Lenin made the following reply: 1) "Socialists cannot be opposed to all war without ceasing to be socialists. We must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the present imperialist war. The typical wars of the imperialist epoch are precisely wars between 'Great' Powers; but democratic wars and rebellions, for example, of oppressed nations against their oppressors, for their liberation from oppression, are not by any means impossible. Civil wars waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie for socialism are inevitable. Wars are possible between one country where socialism has been victorious and bourgeois or reactionary countries. Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. In socialist society there will be no war, hence, disarmament will be realised. But he who expects the realisation of socialism *without* a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power relying directly on *violence*. Violence in the epoch of the twentieth century, as in the epoch of civilisation generally, is not a fist, and not a club, but *troops*. To put 'disarmament' in the programme is tantamount to saying in general: we are opposed to the use of arms. In this there is not a grain of Marxism, any more than there would be if we said: we are opposed to the use of violence." 2) "The arming of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is one of the biggest, fundamental and important facts of modern capitalist society. And in the face of such a fact it is proposed that revolutionary Social-Democrats should put forward the 'demand' for 'disarmament'! This is equivalent to the complete abandonment of the point of view of the class struggle, to renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: arm the proletariat for the purpose

of conquering, expropriating and disarming the bourgeoisie. . . . Only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world historical mission, to throw all weapons on the scrap heap; and the proletariat will certainly do so, but only after it has done this, not before." 3) One of the main reasons the slogan of disarmament is unsuitable is that it weakens the struggle against pronounced and tacit opportunism. Opportunism "tacitly ignores," "conceals" the connection between war and revolution and all the concrete questions of this revolution. Those who advance the slogan of "disarmament" also evade these concrete questions of revolution, and primarily the question that is connected with war, *viz.*, turning the weapons against the bourgeoisie. "Or is it," asks Lenin, "that the supporters of disarmament stand for an entirely new form of unarmed revolution?" Lenin expresses the opinion that to carry on propaganda in favour of the slogan of disarmament is tantamount to refusing to carry on propaganda in favour of arming the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and that, therefore, "it would be far better not to utter pompous phrases about international revolutionary Social-Democracy, about the socialist revolution and about war against war." Thus, this seemingly Left slogan, like all other slogans which deviate from revolutionary Marxism towards Left revolutionary phrases, is a slogan which links up this sort of "Leftism" with Right opportunism.

This article is published in *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX. The same volume contains another article dealing with the slogan of disarmament, entitled "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution," which was published in 1917 in the magazine *The Youth International*.

PAGE 244.* Lenin made preparations to write this article, or rather book, bearing the title *Marxism and the State*, in the beginning of 1917. By February of that year, he had already collected an enormous amount of material—including a large number of extracts from numerous articles, pamphlets and letters by Marx and Engels, and also extracts from the writings of Kautsky, who had distorted Marxism even in his best works in the past—and had written extensive commentaries on this material. (This material has been published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. XIV.) Lenin was able to begin to work up this material only in August and September 1917, in the period of his enforced leisure, when he was compelled to go into hiding from the persecution of the Provisional Government, first in Sestroretsk, near Petrograd, and later in Finland. Finally, in 1918, the book was published under the title *State and Revolution*. This book is reproduced in *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, and also in *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Book II.

PAGE 246.* At the time this article was written two groups, a centrist, opportunist majority, and the Zimmerwald Left, had definitely formed themselves in the Zimmerwald Conference. As has already been stated in note to page 227,* the Zimmerwald Left set up its own bureau, as distinct

from the International Socialist Committee which was controlled by the centrists, published its own manifestoes, and in its press systematically criticised the centrists who represented the Zimmerwald Right. Events proved that in all this the Zimmerwald Left, led by Lenin, was correct.

At the end of 1916, two and a half years after the war had broken out, the bourgeoisie in the belligerent countries had achieved certain results. The war was started for the purpose of plunder. The two and a half years of war caused the bourgeoisie of Germany to lose its colonies, but on the other hand, it acquired Belgium, Poland and a part of France. England had managed to secure the German colonies and take Mesopotamia from Turkey. Austria had lost part of Galicia, but had acquired considerable possessions in the Balkans, etc. At that time Germany was in the best position. Her spoils were much more valuable than those of the others. Naturally, under such circumstances Germany would not be disinclined to conclude peace. Moreover, the German bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the other belligerent countries had begun to be disturbed by the growing frequency of manifestations of discontent by the masses, and so they began to sound each other about the possibility of sharing the loot. Talk began about a "democratic" peace, disarmament, etc. In December 1916, the German government published very vague proposals for peace (see note to page 250 **) and President Wilson offered to act as intermediary between the belligerent powers.

At that moment the true nature of the centrists as concealed social-chauvinists, as the secret accomplices of the bourgeoisie, became fully revealed. It was enough for the bourgeoisie to hint that it was not disinclined to proceed to share the loot by concluding peace for the centrists immediately to offer their services. Apart from Kautsky, the Zimmerwaldists, Merrheim, Bourderon, and Raffin-Dugens, forgetting their socialism, came forward in the role of "conciliators." Phrases about socialist struggle for peace quickly gave way to open bourgeois pacifism. The absolute irreconcilability between social-chauvinism and revolutionary Marxism was revealed in the conduct of the Zimmerwald majority. The only thing the centrist majority of Zimmerwald was capable of was bourgeois pacifism.

This article was written to characterise and explain the position that arose in the Zimmerwald Conference in the beginning of 1917. The question of breaking completely with the centrists in the Zimmerwald Conference, which had entered into an open alliance with the Right social-chauvinists, had become a matter of life or death for the genuine internationalists—such is the main idea that runs through this article.

PAGE 247.* The conflict between tsarist Russia and England over the "division of the spoils" in Central Asia, where England's colonies adjoined those of Russia, was of long standing. This conflict was most acute in connection with Afghanistan, which England regarded as an important buffer between her Asiatic colonies and Russia, and which Russia regarded as "the

key to the gates of India." By 1880, England had already converted Afghanistan into its "clandestine" colony. The tsarist government, by methods of armed force and bribery, like those employed by England, tried to get possession of the "key" to India and at one time (in 1878) the Emir of Afghanistan even declared that he had handed this "key" to Russia. This gift, however, resulted in the smashing of Afghanistan by the armed forces of England in that same year, and also in 1879. In the 1880's, tsarist Russia again moved troops towards Afghanistan when the latter, in carrying out England's will, tried to enlarge her possessions at the expense of Russia's "spheres of influence" in Central Asia. The final "division of the spoils" in Central Asia between Russia and England took place in 1907 when, by a treaty concluded between these two powers, Russia was obliged to recognise Afghanistan as being "outside her sphere of influence" and also to recognise the right of England to intervene in the affairs of Afghanistan if "the Emir fails to fulfil his obligations to His Britannic Majesty's Government." England's negotiations with Germany in 1898 concerning an alliance against Russia were connected with the plans of the tsarist government to organise a campaign against India at the time when England was preparing for the Anglo-Boer War (concerning the latter see note to page 13 **).

PAGE 250.* The Social-Democratic Labour Group was formed by a number of Social-Democratic deputies in the Reichstag. The leaders of this group were Ledebour and Haase. In the beginning of June 1915, Kautsky, Haase and Bernstein, influenced by the revolutionary ferment among the masses, issued the manifesto which is mentioned in note to page 221.* In December 1915, twenty Social-Democratic members of the Reichstag voted against the war credits, and in March 1916 the same group of deputies voted against the Budget, upon which the majority of the Social-Democratic fraction in the Reichstag, led by Scheidemann, expelled the group from the fraction. The expelled group then formed the Social-Democratic Labour Group. Like its leaders, Kautsky, Haase and Ledebour, the group occupied a centrist position. Instead of organising the masses for revolution, it engaged in pacifist talk. Later, in 1917, the group, and the members of the Social-Democratic Party who were dissatisfied with the pronounced chauvinist policy of the Party leaders, and who affiliated to the group, formed a separate party which they called the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. Subsequently, the working class majority of this party left it and joined the Communist Party. The I.S.D.P. then affiliated to the Two-and-a-Half International, and later rejoined the party of Scheidemann and Noske and went back to the fold of the Second International.

PAGE 250.** On December 12, 1916, the German government published peace proposals which were very vague and ambiguous. Before that, on November 8, the German government had announced the terms upon which it was prepared

to conclude peace. These terms provided for the retention by Germany of the territories she had occupied in tsarist Russia, viz., Poland, Lithuania and Courland, for the annexation of the Belgian region of Liège, the annexation of the French regions of Briey and Longwy, the payment of an indemnity by France, the annexation of the Belgian Congo and the inclusion of the Duchy of Luxembourg in the German Empire. On December 13, Kaiser Wilhelm delivered a speech in which he called for the winning of such a "victorious peace." The Entente imperialists made no reply to Germany's peace proposals of December 12, 1916.

PAGE 256.* The Manifesto of March 3 (February 19), 1861, issued by Alexander II on the so-called "emancipation of the serfs." (See note to page 174.)*

PAGE 256.** The General Confederation of Labour and the Socialist Party of France both adopted a social-chauvinist position during the war. The congresses of these organisations, to which Lenin refers, took place in December 1916 and endorsed this position. The resolution adopted at the Congress of the General Confederation of Labour is quoted by Lenin. The resolution adopted by the Congress of the Socialist Party declared that in the interests of "national defence" "the Party is of the opinion that the Allied governments must arouse among their peoples the material forces and support the spiritual forces, the weakening of which may undermine the power of resistance and activity of the people."

PAGE 256.*** On December 18, 1916, President Wilson, in the name of the United States government, addressed a note to the governments of the belligerent countries inviting them to communicate to him the terms on which they would be prepared to conclude peace. At the same time he offered to act as mediator between the belligerent countries and to meet their representatives for preliminary negotiations with him.

PAGE 267.* The theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," were printed in *Vorbote* (*The Herald*), the theoretical organ of the Zimmerwald Left (see note to page 227*), in issue No. 2 of April 1916. The theses were directed against the repudiation of the right of nations to self-determination by the Polish adherents of the Zimmerwald Left (Karl Radek and others) and by the group led by Bukharin and Pyatakov. Strictly speaking, the point of view of the Polish Left Zimmerwaldists, which was enunciated in the "Theses on Imperialism and National Oppression," published in *Gazeta Robotnicza*, was the old point of view of Rosa Luxemburg and her adherents which Lenin had opposed even before the war, in 1914, in his article "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination." (See *Selected Works*, Vol. IV.) In the conditions of the imperialist war, these

old theses of the Polish and German Lefts led by R. Luxemburg were only slightly renovated, and this only served to bring out more strikingly what Comrade Stalin said about them in his "Letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*," viz.: "They developed a semi-Menshevik theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of the self-determination of nations in its Marxist sense (including separation and formation of independent states), rejected the thesis of the important revolutionary significance of the liberation movement of the colonies and oppressed countries, rejected the theory of the possibility of a united front between the proletarian revolution and the movement for national emancipation, and put all this semi-Menshevik hodge-podge, representing an out-and-out underestimation of the national and colonial question, in opposition to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks." (See Stalin, *Leninism*, Vol. II, "Questions Concerning the History of Bolshevism.") This "semi-Menshevik hodge-podge," which as Comrade Stalin points out "was later taken up by Trotsky and used as a weapon of struggle against Leninism," served as the foundation of the theses published in *Gazeta Robotnicza*. The main postulates of these theses were the following: 1) Self-determination of nations is impossible under imperialism, as imperialism inevitably intensifies and spreads all over the world the oppression of weak nations, and this oppression can only be abolished by abolishing imperialism, i.e., by the socialist revolution; 2) Self-determination of nations would be harmful, as it would restore the frontiers of states that have already been abolished by imperialism, or would set up "new frontier posts," and this would be an obstacle to the development of the united struggle of the masses of all nations against imperialism; 3) Self-determination is unnecessary even after the socialist revolution, as socialism will abolish all frontier posts. Hence, the only slogan against national oppression is the slogan, "overthrow imperialism." Starting from these postulates, the Polish Left Zimmerwaldists considered it permissible for the proletariat to support only colonial movements among the national liberation movements, as the liberation of the colonies would directly serve to destroy imperialism and facilitate the victory of the socialist revolution in the imperialist countries. These theses (they are reproduced in full in the Appendix to Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX) were written by Karl Radek and printed simultaneously with Lenin's theses in the above-mentioned issue of *Vorbote*. As regards the Bukharin-Pyatakov group, they, in November 1915, sent to the Central Committee of the Party the theses, "The Slogan of the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," which had been written by Bukharin. These theses merely expressed in other words and slightly supplemented the ideas expressed in the theses of the Polish Lefts. The final conclusion drawn by the Bukharin-Pyatakov group in their theses was: "We do not under any circumstances support the government of the Great Power that suppresses the rebellion or the outburst of indignation of an oppressed nation; but, at the same time, we ourselves do not mobilise the proletarian forces under the slogan 'right of nations to self-determination.' In such a case, our task is to mobilise the forces of the proletariat of both

nations (jointly with others) under the slogan, 'civil class war for socialism,' and conduct propaganda against the mobilisation of forces under the slogan, 'right of nations to self-determination.' In his theses and in a number of articles on the national question written in the period of the war (some of which are reproduced in this volume), Lenin particularly points out that the "extreme Leftism" of the repudiation of the slogan, "right of nations to self-determination," is really the betrayal of revolutionary Marxism, and that this brings the "extreme Lefts" close to the Right opportunists and social-chauvinists. He shows that the correct Marxian interpretation of imperialism and of the tasks of the socialist revolution, which imperialism and the imperialist war have put on the order of the day, and precisely the task of internationally uniting the proletariat for the purpose of bringing about this revolution, calls for the recognition by the proletarian parties of the right of nations to self-determination.

Even after the war in 1917, at the April Conference of the Party, and later, in 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Party, Lenin had again to fight against the "extreme Leftism" of Comrades Bukharin and Pyatakov on the national question. The solution of this problem by the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. along the lines of Leninism proves how right Lenin was in his struggle, and how extremely harmful was the point of view of the extreme Lefts. Later on, Lenin developed these theses in greater detail and subjected the position of the "extreme Lefts" on the national question to exhaustive criticism in his long article "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," Part 10 of which is reproduced in this volume. It is published in full in Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.

PAGE 269.* The Dreyfus affair was the case of a Jewish officer in the French General Staff, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, who in 1894 was unjustly convicted on the charge of espionage. The case was brought against him by the anti-Semites, of whom there were a large number among the French bourgeoisie and particularly in the French military clique. The case revealed the profound political crisis existing in France and the corruption of the General Staff, the judiciary, etc. Around this case a furious struggle was waged between the progressive and reactionary elements in French society. As a result of the tremendous campaign waged at the time, the government was compelled to order a new trial which was heard in 1899. By this new trial, however, Dreyfus was again convicted. Subsequently, he was pardoned.

PAGE 269.** The Zabern incident, which attracted universal attention at the end of 1913, was one of the most marked manifestations of the growth of the power of the reactionary military clique in Germany. The story of this incident is as follows: in the town of Zabern, in Alsace-Lorraine, a German officer named Forstner, belonging to one of the regiments quartered there, systematically persecuted the local Alsatian population. When the local population, having lost patience with Forstner's outrageous conduct, tried

to put some restraint upon him, he called out his men, arrested a score or so of people, set up a military dictatorship in the town, and terrorised the population. Notwithstanding the indignation of all political parties, including the bourgeois parties, Forstner continued to maintain his military regime in the town and was supported in this by the higher military authorities. The case was brought up in the Reichstag, and the Chancellor, at that time, Bethman Holweg, and the Minister for War tried to defend Forstner, but the Reichstag, by an overwhelming majority of 293 votes against 52, passed a vote of no confidence in the Chancellor.

PAGE 270.* This refers to letters written by Marx and Engels in the period from 1867 to 1869 on the question of the independence of Ireland. Lenin quotes some of these letters in chapter VIII of his article written in 1914, entitled "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." (See *Selected Works*, Vol. IV.)

In one of these letters Marx wrote:

"I have become more and more convinced:—and the only question is to bring this conviction home to the English working class—that it can never do anything decisive here in England until it separates its policy with regard to Ireland in the most definite way from the policy of the ruling classes, until it not only makes common cause with the Irish, but actually takes the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801 and replacing it by a free federal relationship. And, indeed, this must be done, not as a matter of sympathy with Ireland, but as a demand made in the interests of the English proletariat. If not, the English people will remain tied to the leading-strings of the ruling classes, because it must join with them in a common front against Ireland." (See Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelman*, November 29, 1869, pp. 95-96.)

PAGE 271.* According to the theory of "cultural national autonomy," nations are based on a common "character and culture." With this definition as a starting point, this theory demands that school instruction, and culture generally, in each state should be divided according to nationalities, that these affairs should be taken out of the hands of the state and be placed in the hands of special national organisations. The inventors of this theory were the Austrian Social-Democrats, Bauer and Renner (Springer). In Russia, the demand for cultural national autonomy was advanced by the Bund, the organisation of the Jewish Social-Democrats, and in the period of reaction and of the revival of the movement (1908-14), it was supported by the Menshevik liquidators. The reason Lenin regarded this theory as a reactionary one can be seen from the following passage in one of his articles: "This would lead merely to perpetuating the isolation of nations, while we must strive to bring them nearer to each other. This would lead to the growth of chauvinism, while we must strive to bring about the closest alliance between the workers of all nations, their joint struggle against *all* chauvinism, against *all* national exclusiveness, against *all* nationalism. The educational policy of the workers of all nations is the same, viz., freedom for the native

language, a democratic and *secular* school." "Real democracy, with the working class at the head, raises the banner of complete equality of nations and the merging of the workers of all nations in their class struggle. From this point of view we reject so-called 'cultural national' autonomy."

PAGE 272.* In speaking of the foreign policy of the bourgeoisie of the Balkan states, Lenin has in mind the Balkan War of 1912-13, and also the participation of Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania in the imperialist war of 1914-18. The Balkan War was waged for the partition of Macedonia, which was ruled by Turkey. Claims were made to Macedonia by the Serbs, the Bulgarians and the Greeks. In this war Serbia was supported by Russia, and also by England and France, while Bulgaria enjoyed the protection of Austria and Germany. In the war of 1914-18, Serbia fought on the side of the Entente and strove to settle old accounts with Austria. The Austro-Serbian conflict served as the beginning of the World War. In this war Bulgaria fought on the side of Austria and Germany, joining them on October 5, 1915, in the hope of being able, with the assistance of the latter, to enlarge her territories at the expense of Serbia and Greece. Rumania entered the war in the autumn of 1916 on the side of Russia and her allies in the hope of receiving Hungarian Transylvania.

PAGE 273.* The Garibaldi wars were wars for the national unification and independence of Italy against the Pope of Rome, Austria and France. They were waged by Garibaldi, or under his leadership, in the periods 1848-50 and 1859-67.

PAGE 274.* Marx's view on this question was expounded in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. In the columns of this paper Marx and Engels strongly protested against the policy of the German bourgeoisie of suppressing the revolutionary national movement in Italy, Poland, Bohemia, etc., which had arisen in connection with the revolution. Marx pointed out that this policy of the bourgeoisie would be fatal for the revolution because it would destroy the confidence of the oppressed nations towards the Germans, would disunite the peoples in their struggle against reaction. "The French," he wrote, "even where they came as enemies, knew how to obtain recognition and sympathy. The Germans are nowhere recognised, nowhere do they meet with sympathy." "And justifiably," continued Marx, "a nation which, throughout its whole past, has permitted itself to be used as an instrument of oppression against all other nations, such a nation must first of all prove by deeds that it is really revolutionised." The renunciation of the "whole past," the proclamation of the liberty of all oppressed nations—this must be the proof that it is really revolutionary. "Revolutionary Germany, especially in relation to its neighbouring peoples, should have renounced its whole past. Simultaneously with its own liberty it should have proclaimed the liberty of all the nations which it had hitherto oppressed."

PAGE 274.** "The Augean stables" refers to the fable about the Greek King Augeas who owned a large number of horses and whose stables were never cleaned until the coming of the Greek hero Hercules. In modern parlance, cleaning the Augean stables means clearing out corruption and mismanagement.

PAGE 279.* In speaking of the restoration of the Party in 1912, Lenin refers to the conference of the Party held in Prague in that year at which "the determined policy of rupture with the opportunists of all brands, which was carried out by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904-12)," referred to by Comrade Stalin in his "Letter to *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*," found complete organisational expression in the formation of a purely Bolshevik Central Committee. The resolution on the national question, to which Lenin refers, was adopted by this Central Committee at the August Conference of the Central Committee with the Party Workers. The main resolutions of this conference are reproduced in *Selected Works*, Vol. III.

PAGE 279.** The representatives of Polish Social-Democracy at the Zimmerwald Conference were Warski, Ganetsky and Radek.

PAGE 279.*** Bulletin of the International Socialist Committee in Berne (*Internationale Sozialistische Kommission zu Bern Bulletin*)—the official organ of the Zimmerwald Conference, published in Berne in German, French and English in 1915-17. Six issues were published.

PAGE 280.* The resolution on the national question adopted at the London International Congress reads as follows: "The congress declares that it stands for the complete right to self-determination of all nations and expresses its sympathy with the workers of all countries who at the present time suffer from the yoke of military, national and other absolutism; the congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the workers of all countries, who are conscious of their class interests, in order jointly with them to fight for the overcoming of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of international Social-Democracy."

PAGE 282.* The article, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," was written by Lenin before he wrote his theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." It is a reply to an article by Radek (signed Parabellum), entitled "Annexations and Social-Democracy," and deals with the same mistakes committed by the Polish Left Zimmerwaldists as those dealt with in the theses. (See note to page 267.*) It also deals with the attitude of the social-chauvinists towards the slogan, "right of nations to self-determination," and shows what a dangerous path of social-chauvinism concealed by Left phrases the opponents of this slogan were taking.

PAGE 282.** The passage in the Manifesto referring to this reads as follows:

"It is necessary to take up the struggle for peace without annexations or war indemnities. *Such a peace, however, is only possible if every thought of violating the rights and liberties of nations is condemned.* Neither the occupation of entire countries nor of separate parts of countries must lead to their violent annexation. No *annexation*, whether open or concealed, and no *forcible economic attachment* which is made still more unbearable by inevitable political disfranchisement! *Self-determination of nations must be the unshakable foundation of national relationships.*" (See Appendix to Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII, p. 475.)

PAGE 285.* The passage from Marx which Lenin quotes is taken from a letter from Marx to Engels dated June 20, 1866, in which Marx writes about a meeting of the Council of the First International which had taken place on the previous day. At this meeting, Marx says "... the representatives of 'young France' (*non-workers*) came out with the announcement that all nationalities and even nations were 'antiquated prejudices'." (Author's italics.) The passage quoted by Lenin is a reply to this Proudhonist thesis. (*The Correspondence of Marx and Engels*, Marx's Letter to Engels, June 20, 1866, No. 87.)

PAGE 285.** Lenin here refers to a letter from Marx to Engels dated Nov. 2, 1867, which begins as follows: "I used to think the separation of Ireland from England impossible. I now think it inevitable, although after the separation there may come *federation*." (*The Correspondence of Marx and Engels*, Marx's Letter to Engels, November 2, 1867, No. 101.) The way in which Marx linked up the question of the separation of Ireland from England with the tasks of the revolution may be seen from the passage quoted in note to page 270.* It is to this passage that Lenin refers later on.

PAGE 286.* In this case Radek (*Parabellum*) is fighting against the Alsatian Socialist Z. Grumbach (then a Right opportunist and now a social-fascist), who published a number of his speeches in a pamphlet entitled *The Fate of Alsace-Lorraine*. In this pamphlet Grumbach expounds the following ideas: Alsace-Lorraine should be liberated from the Germans and annexed to France because the population of Alsace-Lorraine desires it. The population desires this because the Germans have roused hatred against themselves by their terrorism. Moreover, Alsace-Lorraine has been the apple of discord between the French and the Germans. It must be restored to France in order that the constant pretext for war concerning the western frontiers of Germany may be removed. Grumbach did not take class interests as the basis for his arguments, as Marxism requires, but the abstract principles of justice and equality of nations.

PAGE 290.* This article was written in October 1916 in reply to an article by Comrade Pyatakov (signed P. Kievsky) entitled "The Proletariat and the

Right of Nations to Self-Determination in the Epoch of Finance Capital." In this article Comrade Pyatakov developed the views expounded in the theses of the Bukharin-Pyatakov group of November 1915. (See note to page 267.)* Both Lenin's article and that of Comrade Pyatakov were intended for No. 3 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata*, which the Bolsheviks at that time published in Switzerland. But this issue failed to appear, and the articles were not published. Lenin's article was published for the first time by the Lenin Institute in 1924 and the manuscript of Comrade Pyatakov's article is preserved in the archives of the Institute. Owing to lack of space only Part 5 of Lenin's article is given in this volume. In this part a reply is given to one of the parts of Comrade Pyatakov's article, entitled "The Dualistic Interpretation of Demands," in which he opposed Lenin's thesis on the difference in the tactics of the proletarian parties in oppressed and oppressing countries respectively. (See section 4 of the theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" in this volume.) He expresses the opinion that "dualism" in tactics is incompatible with Marxism which demands "monism" in the explanation of phenomena and in action, and consequently in tactics. The part of Lenin's article given in this volume examines Comrade Pyatakov's arguments about monism and dualism. But the principal significance of this part of Lenin's article is not so much the explanation he gives in it of the *tactics* to be pursued on the national question, which were incorrectly interpreted by the Bukharin-Pyatakov group, as the really remarkable ideas which he develops on the place and significance of national liberation movements, and democratic movements generally, in the world proletarian revolution, and the characterisation he gives of this revolution on the basis of the law of the uneven development of capitalism. These are some of Lenin's most valuable contributions to the theory of proletarian revolution. An essential supplement to what is said in this part of Lenin's article, in reply to Comrade Pyatakov, is Part 10 of the article "Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up," which follows. As has been stated in note to page 267,* this article as a whole develops the main ideas contained in Lenin's theses, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination."

PAGE 290.** The sentence quoted by Lenin is taken from Engels' *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, Part I, chapter 4, "World Schematism," p. 52.

PAGE 295.* Employing this proverb of the ancient Romans, Comrade Pyatakov wrote: "We do not postpone the solution of this problem *ad calendas græcas* [to the Greek Kalends], we do not pigeon-hole it, but introduce it into the general system of the revolutionary actions of the proletariat against imperialism. . . . We see that the problem of the relations between nations has come up against the wall of imperialism; that is why we come to the conclusion that the question here is—imperialism or socialism." By this he expressed the absolutely incorrect idea that the national problem, as such,

requires no solution, and is simply eliminated by the struggle between imperialism and socialism: under imperialism its solution is impossible; under socialism the problem will not exist. In referring in this connection to Engels' letter to Kautsky, Lenin has in mind a passage in Engels' letter, dated September 12, 1892, which reads as follows:

"In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population, Canada, the Cape, Australia, will all become independent; on the other hand the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated, India, Algiers, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions, must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. How this process will develop is difficult to say. India will perhaps, indeed very probably, produce a revolution, and as the proletariat emancipating itself cannot conduct any colonial wars, it would have to be allowed to run its course; it would not pass off without all sorts of destruction, of course, but that sort of thing is inseparable from all revolutions." (*The Correspondence of Marx and Engels*, Engels' Letter to Kautsky, September 12, 1892, No. 177.)

PAGE 296.* Comrade Pyatakov's article contains the following passage: "We firmly bear in mind that 'the means for removing the incongruities that have been revealed are not invented in one's head but must be discovered with the help of one's head in the existing material conditions of production.' (Engels.)" The words put in quotation marks by Comrade Pyatakov are a rather free translation of a passage in Engels' *Socialism Utopian and Scientific* which reads as follows: ". . . the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principles, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of production." (*Socialism Utopian and Scientific*, p. 66.)

PAGE 298.* The "International" group, which is also known as the Spartacus League, began to be formed immediately after the outbreak of the war, around the persons of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring, who later became its leaders. But it did not assume definite organisational shape until the beginning of 1916 when Karl Liebknecht and his adherents were expelled from the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

It was then that the group assumed the name of "International" from the title of a magazine published by Franz Mehring in 1915. In the beginning of 1916 the group adopted as its platform the theses drawn up by Rosa Luxemburg, which contained all the errors that were peculiar to the German Lefts. (See notes to pages 167 * and 267 * in the present volume. For the complete platform of this group see Appendix to Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX.) In the autumn of 1917 the group began to publish an illegal magazine called *Spartacus*, from which the group later assumed the title of Spartacus

League. In appraising the war as a predatory imperialist war, in rejecting the policy of "civil peace," in its estimation of the policy of the parties of the Second International and the collapse of the latter, in recognising that it was necessary to fight for the establishment of a Third International and to fight against not only the pronounced social-chauvinists, but also the tacit social-chauvinists, viz., the centrists, the International group adopted an internationalist, but an inconsistent and half-hearted position. It lacked Bolshevik and Leninist consistency in presenting and solving problems. For example, the platform referred to above, written by Rosa Luxemburg, instead of the slogan, "transform the imperialist war into civil war," talks about "the political activity of the international proletariat, the fight for peace and bringing pressure to bear on one's own government." The International group sharply differed with Lenin and the Bolsheviks on the national and colonial question and adhered to the point of view of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek with which Comrades Bukharin and Pyatakov were associated. (See note to page 267.*) Notwithstanding their sharp attacks on pronounced social-chauvinism and centrism, the group did not separate itself from them organisationally, but issued the slogan "we must win back the Party." In March 1917, the group discussed the question of affiliating to the Social-Democratic Labour Group formed by Kautsky, Haase and Ledebour, and decided to affiliate as an independent organisation. Later, it decided to retain its affiliation when the Social-Democratic Labour Group was transformed into the Independent Social-Democratic Party. (See note to page 250.*) It was only towards the end of 1918 that the group became convinced that this was no place for it. While participating in the Zimmerwald Conference, it did not join the Zimmerwald Left led by Lenin. It was only at the end of 1918, after having broken with the "Independents," that the group took an active part in organising the Inaugural Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, which met in December 1918. After this congress the Spartacus League became the principal part of the new party.

PAGE 301.* In this article, which was published in No. 1 of *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* in October 1916, Lenin sums up the discussion on the national question that had been going on in the Zimmerwald Left in 1915-16. In this article Lenin completely adheres to the position he adopted in his theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." The reason we give Part 10 of this long article is explained in note to page 290.* The article is given in full in Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX. The role and significance of the national liberation movements in dependent and colonial countries for the world socialist revolution, which Lenin explains in this article, are connected with the revolutionary upsurge that was observed in these countries as a result of the imperialist war. In spite of the meagreness of the news from these countries that managed to pass the censorship, to which Lenin refers at the beginning of this chapter, he was able on the basis of the informa-

tion in the press to judge the extent to which the war, in addition to rousing the revolutionary movement in the belligerent countries (particularly in Russia—see note to page 149 *), was rousing the oppressed nations. During the war a number of insurrections broke out in India, Armenia, Persia, the Islands of Formosa and Madagascar, in Singapore and in Morocco. In Russia, in addition to the revival of the labour movement in 1916, there was a revolt of the Kirghiz in Turkestan, in connection with the attempt of the tsarist government to mobilise them for work in labour battalions at the front. Thus, the Irish Rebellion of 1916, which Lenin discusses, was not an isolated case of insurrection of an oppressed nation. The Irish Rebellion itself, in addition to being the result of the intensification of national antagonisms and of national oppression during the war, was the continuation of the age-long struggle of the Irish people against subjection by England. The rebellion broke out in Dublin on April 24, and was crushed in a sanguinary manner in May. From 700 to 1,200 persons are estimated to have been killed in Dublin.

The rebellion was led by the democratic organisation known as Sinn Fein (meaning "ourselves alone") whose principal demand was the establishment of an independent Irish republic. A leading part in the rebellion was played by the Irish Socialist, James Connolly, who most clearly of all saw the connection between Ireland's fight for freedom and the international working class movement. Although the rebellion did not spread to the whole country it enjoyed universal sympathy, and there were many chances of its developing into a struggle of the broad masses of the peasantry against British rule in general, and against the British absentee landlords in particular.

PAGE 302.* In his article Karl Radek wrote: "This Sinn Fein movement was a purely urban petty-bourgeois movement which, notwithstanding the sensation it caused, had not much social backing. When, in the hope of receiving German support, they decided to rise in rebellion, they only managed to get a *putsch*, which the British government very easily crushed." (Author's italics.)

The article by the Cadet Kulisher concluded with the following words: "Evidently it was the general lack of attention to Sinn Fein that enabled the latter with the help of German friends and German money to organise the present Dublin '*putsch*,' which in all probability will not be the last of its kind. One thing can be said for certain, and that is that this attempt on Germany's part to strike a blow at England will also be thwarted by the same insurmountable obstacles: the British navy and British liberty." (*Rech*, No. 102, 1916.)

PAGE 303.* The item in *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, to which Lenin refers, was a report of a congress of Irish Americans which took place in New York on March 4-5, 1916. At

the opening of the congress 2,000 persons were present, and at its close 3,000 were present. The congress passed a resolution calling for the independence of Ireland, and founded an organisation which adopted the name "Friends of Free Ireland."

PAGE 305.* *Free Belgium*, the title of a newspaper published between February 1915 and November 1918 in the part of Belgium occupied by the Germans. Owing to the lack of precise news in Switzerland during the war, Lenin mistakenly refers to this paper as an "organ of revolutionary protest." Although published illegally, it was not a revolutionary but a patriotic paper, edited by a nationalist lawyer, Van der Kerckhove, and was subsidised by the Belgian government.

PAGE 307.* This speech by Lenin at the All-Russian Conference of the Party in May (April) 1917 was the speech he delivered on the report of Comrade Stalin and the co-report of Comrade Pyatakov on the national question. In his report, Comrade Stalin adhered to the Leninist line of solving the national problem. Summing up his report he said: "Thus, our point of view on the national question can be summed up in the following propositions: a) the recognition of the right of nations to secede; b) for the nations remaining within the limits of the given state—regional autonomy; c) for national minorities—special laws guaranteeing their free development; d) for the proletarians of all nationalities of the given state—a single, indivisible proletarian collective, a single party." Explaining how the "recognition of the right of nations to secede" (in other words, the right of nations to self-determination including their right to set up a separate state) should be interpreted, Comrade Stalin said: "The question of the *right* of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the question of the *obligation* of a nation to secede at any given moment. This latter question must be settled by the party of the proletariat in each particular case independently, according to circumstances. When we recognise the right of oppressed peoples to secede, the right to determine their political destiny, we do not thereby settle the question of whether particular nations *should* secede from the Russian state at any given moment. I may recognise the right of a nation to secede, but that does not mean that I compel it to secede. A people has a right to secede, but it may or may not exercise that right, according to circumstances. Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession, according to the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution."

These fundamental propositions were formulated in the draft resolution on this question that was submitted to the conference. In the section, which the conference set up for the preliminary discussion of the national question, this draft resolution obtained only two votes against *seven*. The majority of the members of the section supported the resolution proposed by Comrade Pyatakov, who acted as co-reporter at the conference in the name of the section in opposition to Comrade Stalin's report. In his co-

report Comrade Pyatakov declared that the section took up the position "which is occupied by the revolutionary section of German Social-Democracy, by Polish Social-Democracy, etc." By that he meant the position adopted by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek who, on the national question, united the Polish Social-Democrats, the German International group and the Bukharin and Pyatakov group. (See note to page 267.*) Lenin, who long before 1917 had fought against this anti-Marxian point of view, strongly opposed it in this speech. He based his arguments on the principles he had previously developed, as well as on the conditions prevailing in Russia in 1917, when the abandonment of the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination meant, in fact, nothing more nor less than joining the chauvinist imperialist position of the bourgeois Provisional Government. The latter continued the policy of the tsarist government in relation to the oppressed nations in Russia, and strove at all costs to keep them under the power of the Russian bourgeoisie.

The conference rejected the resolution proposed by Comrade Pyatakov in the name of the majority of the section and, by 56 votes against 16, 18 abstaining, adopted the resolution proposed by Comrade Stalin. (This resolution is given in full in the Appendix to Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.)

PAGE 309.* Lenin here refers to a report in Nos. 41 and 42 of the Menshevik *Rabochaya Gazeta*, 1917, under the heading "Finnish Social-Democratic Delegates Visit O.C." (O.C. stands for the Menshevik Organisation Committee.) This report stated that the Finnish Social-Democrats had come to consult the O.C. on the national policy of the Provisional Government. According to the report, the Finnish delegates stated that after the overthrow of the tsarist government the Finns "believed that the Finnish people would obtain complete liberty and the right of internal self-determination." "But now," continued the delegation, "after some time has passed, it seems that the Finns were too optimistic after all. A conflict has arisen between Finland and the Provisional Government, which, apparently, is assuming a menacing character and has even given rise to a striving for complete independence." The conflict here mentioned arose from the fact that the Provisional Government refused to ratify a Bill providing for an insignificant extension of the powers of the Finnish Sejm, or parliament. Replying to the Finnish delegation, the Menshevik O.C. stated that although "in principle the Party adopts the point of view of the self-determination of nations," the O.C., nevertheless, "assumes that the question of the mutual relations between Finland and the Russian state can and must be settled only by agreement between the Finnish Sejm and the constituent assembly." In a situation in which the bourgeois Provisional Government was continually referring to the forthcoming constituent assembly as a pretext for postponing the settlement of all questions, such a reply only served the interests of the bourgeoisie.

PAGE 309.** In 1915-16 Lenin wrote two articles on imperialist economism in opposition to the Bukharin-Pyatakov group. One was entitled "A Caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism,'" part of which is published in this volume (published in full in Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX). The other was entitled "The Nascent Trend of 'Imperialist Economism.'" Neither of these articles were published at the time they were written. In both articles Lenin puts the views of Comrades Bukharin and Pyatakov on a par with Economism, i.e., the opportunist trend in Russian Social-Democracy in the latter half of the 'nineties and the beginning of the present century. (See *Selected Works*, Vol. II.)

PAGE 311.* By this resolution the conference rejected the invitation of the Danish Social-Democrat, Borgbjerg, to take part in an international "congress of Socialists for the purpose of supporting peace," which the German social-chauvinists, acting on the instructions of the German bourgeoisie and of the German government, proposed to call "on the condition that Germany abandon most of her annexations." The French and English social-chauvinists refused to take part in this congress, they in their turn also acting on the instructions of their respective bourgeoisie and governments. The Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries accepted Borgbjerg's invitation. The resolution adopted at the Bolshevik Conference on this question was proposed by Lenin, who in his speech said: "... back of this whole comedy of an alleged Socialist congress there is a very real political manoeuvre of German imperialism. The German capitalists use the German social-chauvinists for the purpose of inviting the social-chauvinists of all countries to the conference. That is why it is necessary to launch a great campaign.

"Why do they do it through the Socialists? Because they want to fool the working masses. Messieurs the diplomats are subtle; to say so openly would not do, they think it more effective to utilise a Danish Pickhanov. . . .

"... the situation in Germany is most desperate; to carry on the war now is a hopeless task, the country is on the brink of ruin. This is the reason why they say that they are ready to give up almost all the booty, for by saying this they are still striving to retain at least something."

The French and English Socialists, he said further, refused to go to the conference proposed by the Germans only because they are bourgeois agents and are helping to prolong the imperialist war in the interests of their bourgeoisie. "There is no doubt," Lenin continued, "that when the English and the French social-chauvinists declined to attend the conference, they were familiar with all the facts. They must have gone to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs where they were told: Such and such are the underlying facts, we do not want you to go there. This is exactly what happened. . . . The purpose of the allies is to completely crush and rob Germany." And he went on to say that the task must be to "expose this whole comedy of a Socialist congress,

expose all these congresses as comedies intended to cover up the deals made by the diplomats behind the backs of the masses. . . . We must tell the truth in such a way that it may be heard by the soldiers at the front and the workers of all countries." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XX.)

Lenin's resolution on the question of Borghjerg's invitation was couched in the same terms, exposing the aims of the imperialist belligerent countries and exposing the social-chauvinists as their agents. (*Ibid.*)

